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ABSTRACT 
 
Wael Hamdi AlDAYA 
Index revisions, market quality and the cost of equity 
capital 
 
Keywords: Index revisions, stock liquidity, cost of capital, market quality, 
price efficiency. 
This thesis examines the impact of FTSE 100 index revisions on the various 
aspects of stock market quality and the cost of equity capital. Our study spans over 
the period 1986–2009. Our analyses indicate that the index membership enhances all 
aspects of liquidity, including trading continuity, trading cost and price impact. We 
also show that the liquidity premium and the cost of equity capital decrease 
significantly after additions, but do not exhibit any significant change following 
deletions. The finding that investment opportunities increases after additions, but do 
not decline following deletions suggests that the benefits of joining an index are 
likely to be permanent. This evidence is consistent with the investor awareness 
hypothesis view of Chen et al. (2004, 2006), which suggests that investors’ 
awareness improve when a stock becomes a member of an index, but do not diminish 
after it is removal from the index. Finally, we report significant changes in the 
comovement of stock returns with the FTSE 100 index around the revision events. 
These changes are driven mainly by noise-related factors and partly by fundamental-
related factors.  
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Glossary 
Adj.CEC Adj.CEC is the adjusted cost of equity capital calculated as the cost 
of equity capital of the event stock minus the cost of equity capital of 
their benchmark firms. 
Amihud Amihud is the liquidity measure of Amihud (2002) which is defined 
as the ratio of the daily absolute return to daily dollar trading volume. 
Ask-Bid Ask-bid prices is the difference between ask and bid prices. 
BFTSE100 BFTSE100 is the loading factor of the value-weighted of the FTSE100 
index. 
BN-FTSE100 BN-FTSE100 is the loading factor of the value-weighted of the FTSE250 
index. 
B* B* is the adjusted beta by using the procedures of Dimson (1979) 
and Fowler and Rorke (1983). 
BTMV BTMV is the firm’s book to market value. 
CAPM CAPM is the Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
CE CE is the firm’s capital expenditure. 
CEC CEC  is  the firm’s cost of equity capital. 
DFR DFR is Dimson (1979) and Fowler and Rorke (1983) unbiased beta. 
FLF FLF  is the fundamental loading factors 
g g is the speed of price adjustment estimated from the model of 
Amihud and Mendelson (1987). 
HML HML is the monthly difference between the value-weighted average 
of the return on the two high-book-to-market portfolios (S/H, and 
BH) and the value-weighted average of the returns on the two book-
to-market portfolios (S/L and B/L). 
LAPT LAPT is a multivariate asset pricing model approach to account for 
the market return, mimicking liquidity factor, firm size, book to 
market value, and momentum risk factor. 
LCAPM LCAPM is the two-factor liquidity-augmented CAPM of Liu (2006). 
 
xii 
 
 Glossary (continued) 
Lexis/Nexis Lexis/Nexis is the media coverage and is extracted through 
systematic manual searches in LexisNexis database. 
LM12 LM12 is the proportional number of days with zero daily return over 
12 months which captures the trading speed, trading quantity and 
trading continuity. 
MOM MOM is the momentum factor of Carhart (1997) which is long prior-
month winners and short prior-month losers. 
MV MV is the firm’s market size measured by market capitalisation 
NT NT is the firm’s number of trades. 
PI PI is the price inefficiency estimated from Amihud and Mendelson 
(1987) 
RFTSE100 RFTSE100  is the value-weighted return of the FTSE100 index which 
includes the first 100 companies in the LSE based on the market 
capitalisation. 
R N-FTSE100 R N-FTSE100 is the value-weighted return of the FTSE250 index which 
is consisting of the 101
st
 to the 350
th
 largest companies based on 
market capitalisation- on the LSE. 
Rf Rf is the risk free rate estimated as the one month return on the UK 
T-Bills from the DataStream. 
Rm Rm is the market return of the FTSE ALL SHARES ordinary 
common stocks. 
SLF SLF  is the sentiment loading factors 
SMB SMB is the monthly difference between the value-weighted average 
of the return on the three small-stock portfolios (S/L, S/M and SH) 
and the value-weighted average of the returns on the three big-stock 
portfolios (B/L, B/M, and B/H). 
UFTSE100 UFTSE100 is the residual values of value-weighted return of the 
FTSE100 index estimated from Amihud and Mendelson (1987) 
model. 
UN-FTSE100 UN-FTSE100 is the residual values of value-weighted return of the 
FTSE250 index estimated from Amihud and Mendelson (1987) 
model. 
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 Glossary (continued) 
VFTSE100 VFTSE100 is the fundamental values of value-weighted return of the 
FTSE100 index estimated from Amihud and Mendelson (1987) 
model. 
VN-FTSE100 The fundamental values of value-weighted return of the FTSE250 
index estimated from Amihud and Mendelson (1987) model. 
VAR VAR is the idiosyncratic risk of a stock i which is estimated as the 
variance of the residuals resulting from regressing stock returns on 
the returns of the market portfolios. 
VO VO is the firm’s trading volume by value. 
Zeros Zeros is the proportional number of days with zero daily return. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
1.1. Rationale of thesis 
This thesis examines the impact of the FTSE 100 index revisions on various 
aspects of stock market liquidity and the cost of equity capital. Stock market liquidity 
occupies a fundamental place in many areas of financial literature. Several studies 
investigate the importance of liquidity to various financial market players, including 
stock market regulators, investors, and listed firms. Regulators in a stock market 
consider aspects of liquidity as the main determinants of the financial market 
stability. Liquidity is also of crucial importance to both investors and firms, since it 
determines their cost of buying and selling, the ease, and speed of trading a security 
without significant price fluctuations. 
The importance of liquidity to academics has led to the development of a 
considerable number of hypotheses on the matter, as a result of diverse empirical 
studies undertaken to examine the effects of index revisions on aspects of liquidity. 
The great attention is due to the general conviction that index revision effects provide 
an important insight into the functioning of stock market liquidity, asset pricing, 
market efficiency and the behaviour of market participants.   
Previous studies propose different explanations to the potential effect of 
index revisions on stock market liquidity. These explanations include the information 
signalling hypothesis, the non-information-related liquidity hypothesis, the investor 
awareness hypothesis, the imperfect substitute’s hypothesis and the price pressure 
hypothesis. The main concerns of these hypotheses is whether the stock price or 
liquidity change is short lived or long lived after the event, whether this change is 
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attributed to the fundamental changes or to trading effects, and what kind of 
information is revealed with an addition or deletion. 
The information signalling hypothesis of Horne (1970) suggests that a stock 
may become the subject of scrutiny by analysts and attract greater interest by 
institutions when it joins an index. Such scrutiny leads to new information that is 
more fundamental and less risk associated with the accuracy of that information 
(Bechmann, 2004). Hence, one would expect greater demand and a willingness to 
pay a higher price due to a lowering of the perceived risk. This hypothesis also 
claims that the changes in price reaction and liquidity are permanent since adding or 
deleting a stock from the index is not an information-free event.  
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) propose a non-information-related liquidity 
hypothesis, which predicts that if liquidity is priced, an increase in liquidity will 
result in lower expected returns, lower transaction costs and hence a positive 
permanent price reaction. Following the index addition, a decrease in the bid-ask 
spread is accompanied by a reduction in the investor's required rate of return and 
permanent increase in share price. 
Merton (1987) assumes that the fundamental news which attracts investors’ 
attention can result in a permanent increase in the value of a company due to the 
enlargement of its potential investor base. This investor awareness hypothesis
1
 
predicts that investors know of only subsets of all stocks, hold only stocks that they 
are aware of and demand a premium for the non-systematic risk that they bear. Chen 
et al. (2004, 2006) argue that a stock’s inclusion in the index alerts investors to its 
existence, and since this stock becomes part of their portfolios, the required rate of 
                                                          
1
 Investor awareness hypothesis is also known as Market Segmentation Hypothesis (see Kappou et 
al, 2008) 
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return should fall due to a reduction in non-systematic risk. They also argue that once 
a stock joins an index, investors remain aware of it after its deletion. 
The imperfect substitute’s hypothesis2 assumes that securities are not close 
substitutes for each other. Thus, the long-term demand is less than perfectly elastic 
(Harris and Gurel, 1986). A permanent stock price effect is expected as long as a 
stock remains in the index (Shleifer, 1986; Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997).  
Harris and Gurel (1986) propose a price pressure hypothesis, which posits a 
downward sloping demand curve but only in the short term. Long-term demand is 
fully elastic and price pressure falls once the momentary demand is satisfied. This 
hypothesis also assumes that the changes in the composition of an index do not 
convey any fundamental information about the events stock. Thus, the price 
increases of the newly added stock is temporary, but in the opposite direction for 
those who leave the index. Harris and Gurel (1986) assert that the prices increase 
before the change date by the excess demand of fund managers or index arbitrageurs, 
and then reverse after the change date. 
The above summarised hypotheses show that the index revision effect is 
mixed. On one hand, several studies report permanent and substantial changes in 
firm’s fundamental characteristics following index revisions. Studies  (Jain (1987); 
Dhillon and Johnson (1991); Denis et al. (2003)) show that the increased attention 
from analysts, investors, and index tracker funds for the newly included stock 
conveys a higher level of information about the fundamentals of that particular stock 
relative to others. This attention is increased for two reasons. First, when a firm is 
added to the index, the inclusions certifies it as a leading firm. Second, the index 
revision’s committee may select firms that it believes will be able to meet the index 
                                                          
2
 The imperfect substitute’s hypothesis also known as the distribution effect hypothesis or 
Downward-sloping Demand Curve. 
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criteria for longer periods. Thus, this group of literature supports the idea that the 
index revision is not information-free event.    
On the other hand, studies (e.g. Harris and Gurel (1986); Pruitt and Wei 
(1989); Wilkens and Wimschulte (2005)) show that the index revision is an 
information-free event any improvement in liquidity is expected to be short lived, as 
index reviews are based on publicly available information. The additions can be 
viewed as carrying no information about the firms’ future fundamentals. Deininger et 
al. (2000) and Elliott et al. (2006) provide at least three reasons for observing 
temporary price effects following index revisions. First, it is assumed that there is a 
price pressure effect due to large volume effects in the short run. This effect might be 
caused by institutional investors trying to minimise the tracking error of their 
managed portfolios. In the long run this effect is supposed to disappear. Second, the 
market maker may incur a search cost to find the other side of the transaction for a 
large order. Third, the market maker may bear an inventory cost that causes his or 
her inventory to deviate away from an optimum level. The market maker will attempt 
to get back this cost by balancing the bid-ask spread.  
The liquidity effects due to the addition (deletion) of a stock to (from) a 
major stock market index remain an open empirical research question. This thesis 
contributes to the existing literature by examining the impact of index revisions on 
the cost of equity capital, the stock return comovement and the price efficiency. 
1.2. Contributions and findings 
This thesis makes several contributions to the literature of the index revisions. 
The contributions and the findings of each empirical chapter can be summarised as 
follows:  
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1.2.1. Index revision, stock liquidity and the cost of equity capital  
In the first empirical chapter, Chapter 4 of the thesis, we investigate the 
relationship between index revisions, liquidity premium and the cost of equity 
capital. Many early studies, including Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Chalmers and 
Kadlec (1998), report a positive association between individual stock liquidity and 
stock returns. Recently, however, Chordia et al. (2000) shift the focus of the liquidity 
literature by introducing the concept of systematic liquidity risk. They argue that 
liquidity risk represents a source of non-diversifiable risk that needs to be reflected in 
expected asset returns. Subsequent studies, including Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), 
Amihud (2002) and Liu (2006), provide evidence that systematic liquidity risk is 
priced in the stock market.  
Motivated by the recent development in the liquidity literature, we use the 
liquidity-augmented asset pricing model, suggested by Liu (2006), to examine the 
impact of index revision on liquidity premium in equity returns. This approach 
allows us to make at least three important contributions to the literature.   
First, previous studies, including Blease and Paul (2006), and Gregoriou and 
Nguyen (2010), focus typically on the impact of index revisions on a single 
dimension of individual stock liquidity (i.e. Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio). Liu 
(2006) argues that since liquidity is multidimensional, existing measures do not fully 
capture liquidity risk dimension. In addition to other liquidity measures, such as 
trading volume, bid-ask spread and illiquidity ratio, this study uses the proportional 
number of days with zero return to estimate the two-factor liquidity-augmented 
CAPM (LCAPM) of Liu (2006). This measure captures simultaneously 
multidimensional features of liquidity such as the trading speed, trading cost, and 
trading activity as it includes not only the transaction costs, but also the expected 
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price impact costs and opportunity costs. The proportional number of days with zero 
return outperforms some measures such as quoted bid-ask spread and effective 
spread (Lesmond et al., 1999a). This measure is also distinct from the liquidity 
measures in Amihud (2002) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), since these latter 
measures are constructed by partially excluding the effect of the absence of trading 
on liquidity. In addition, Lesmond et al. (2005) show that zero return is the best 
measure to address both the cross-sectional and time series liquidity effects among 
the other measures. More recently, Goyenko et al. (2006) ran monthly and annual 
comparisons between 12 liquidity measures. They find that zero return, Holden, and 
Effective Tick are the best overall. Finally, this measure requires only the time-series 
of daily security returns, making it relatively easy and inexpensive to obtain 
estimates of transaction costs for all firms and time periods for which daily security 
returns are available (Lesmond et al., 1999a). 
 Second, since a single liquidity measure cannot fully capture liquidity, we 
argue that Gregoriou and Nguyen’s (2010) findings that index deletions increases 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure without affecting corporate investment 
opportunities does not necessarily imply that index revisions do not affect the 
liquidity premium or the cost of equity capital. We argue that  conclusions of Becker-
Blease and Paul (2006) and Gregoriou and Nguyen’s (2010) may be misleading, as 
the changes in investment opportunities may not be solely driven by the cost of 
equity capital. Milton and Raviv (1991) suggest that the rate of investment 
opportunities depends on many factors including the relationship between managers 
and stakeholders as suggested by agency cost theory, the accessibility to both debt 
and equity markets, the financial constrains such as adverse selection problems, the 
feasibility of investment projects, and the default probability. Stenbacka and Tombak 
7 
 
(2002) summarise that decisions on investment considers the levels of retained 
earnings, debt and equity, the nature of capital market,  the availability of the internal 
funds and the characteristics of the investment opportunities available to the firm. 
Thus, the capital expenditure may also not be a good proxy for the cost of equity 
capital. Thus, by incorporating a liquidity risk factor into an asset pricing model, this 
study captures, with greater precision, the impact of index revisions on both liquidity 
premium and the cost of equity capital.  
Finally, we use a control sample methodology to account for the liquidity risk 
changes that may be caused by factors other than index revisions. We assume that in 
the pre-index revisions period, the main and control sample have some similar 
fundamental characteristics. Potentially, following the additions (deletions) the 
principal empirical implication is that additions (deletions) with relatively higher 
(lower) liquidity will have lower (higher) expected rate of returns than the control 
securities.  
 We find that the liquidity premium and the cost of equity capital decrease 
significantly after additions, but do not exhibit any significant change following 
deletions. Similar results are reported when Fama and French’ (1996) factors and 
Carhat’s (1997) momentum factor are applied as additional explanatory variables in 
the LCAPM. Our results are robust to various liquidity measures and estimation 
methods. The control sample analysis indicates that observed decline in liquidity 
premium, and the cost of equity capital are significant even after accounting for 
factors other than index additions. Overall, this chapter shows that liquidity premium 
and the cost of equity capital drop significantly following additions, but do not 
change after deletions. 
8 
 
Our robustness checks show a statistical association between stock liquidity 
and investment opportunities in the post-additions. Our results imply a positive 
(negative) association between firm size (stock illiquidity) and investment 
opportunities. We also show that deletions do not have a negative impact on 
investment opportunities. These finding are consistent with the predictions of the 
investors’ awareness hypothesis of Chen et al. (2004, 2006), which suggests that 
investors’ awareness increases after additions, but does not decreases after deletions. 
1.2.2. Index revision and stock return comovement 
Several studies suggest that since index rebalancing is based on publicly 
available information and carries no news about the firms’ future fundamentals, any 
observed changes in the correlation of a newly added (deleted) stock’s return with 
the index constituents is likely to be caused by the contemporaneous changes in the 
uninformed demand shocks (e.g. Harris and Gurel (1986); Shleifer (1986); Barberies 
et al. (2005)). Vijh (1994) argues that Standard & Poor’s decision does not signal an 
opinion about fundamentals and the decision to revise the S&P 500 index reflects 
purely the desire to make the index as representative as possible to the overall U.S. 
economy. Similarly, the FTSE Steering Committee revises the FTSE 100 index 
merely on basis of market capitalization.  
Barberis et al. (2005) examine the comovement around the S&P 500 index 
revisions and report a significant increase (decrease) in the daily S&P beta after 
addition to (deletion from) the S&P 500 index. They argue that since changes in 
stock index composition are information-free events, the comovement changes 
cannot be explained by the classical finance theory, and are therefore consistent with 
friction- or sentiment-based view. Similar results are reported by Coakley and 
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Kougoulis (2005), Greenwood (2007) and Coakley et al. (2008) around the FTSE 
100, Nikkei and MNCI-Canada index revisions, respectively. 
In the second empirical chapter, Chapter 5 of the thesis, we argue that 
changes in stock return comovement around index revision may not necessarily 
reflect investor sentiment for at least four reasons. First, several studies show that 
changes in the constituents of indices, such as the S&P 500, may not be totally 
information-free event. Denis et al. (2003) show that analysts revise their 
expectations about future earnings when stocks join the S&P 500 index. Brooks et al. 
(2004) show that S&P 500 index membership has very long term effects and index 
revisions are not information-free events. Similarly, Cai (2007) claims that S&P 500 
index membership certifies the stock as leading firm. He also argues that due to the 
high turnover associated with fund managers rebalancing their portfolios, certain 
Index Membership Committees may select firms that are likely to meet the index 
criteria for longer periods of time.  
Second, even when constituency changes are assumed to be information-free 
events, the fundamental characteristics of the event stocks may change systematically 
across pre- and post-revision periods. Daya et al. (2012) show that stocks exhibit 
significant changes in market capitalization and book-to-market value after joining or 
leaving the FTSE 100 index. Since both size and book-to-market ratio are known to 
affect stock returns (Fama, 1992), comovement changes around index revisions may 
be due to changes in the underlying fundamentals rather than investor sentiment.  
Third, many studies (Sofianos) 1993(; Hedge and Dermott )2003(; Mazouz 
and Saadouni )2007() show that index membership improves stock liquidity. Since 
liquidity risk may be priced (Pastor and Stambaugh )2003(; Liu  )2006)(, the increase 
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comovement of the included stock may reflect the contemporaneous changes 
liquidity risk rather than the correlated uninformed demand shocks.  
Finally, and perhaps more importantly, many studies  suggest that the stock 
return comovement is a function of fundamentals and non-fundamental factors (e.g. 
King (1966); Roll (1988); Piotroski and Roulstone (2004); Durnev et al. (2004); 
Kumar and Lee (2006); Evans (2009)). The presence of informed traders 
(uninformed) makes the stocks move less (more) with the market. In other words, the 
comovement in stock return would be higher (lower) on the absence of arbitragers or 
insiders (portfolio managers or outsiders). Durnev et al. (2004) and  Bissessur and 
Hodgson (2012) argue that the comovement in stock return is the combination of 
fundamental return and noise return but the role of noise return is greater. 
The above arguments imply that the conclusions of the existing comovement 
studies, which state that the shift in the correlation structure of stock returns 
following index revisions contradicts the fundamentals view, may be misleading. 
Our study proposes a new approach to investigate the determinants of comovement 
changes without assuming that index revisions are information-free events. We begin 
our analysis by decomposing security prices into intrinsic values and noise, using 
Amihud and Mendelson’s (1987) model. We then estimate the univariate and 
bivariate models of Barberis et al. (2005) using intrinsic values and noise separately. 
This approach quantifies with greater precision the impact of firm fundamentals and 
investor sentiments on the observed comovement changes around the FTSE 100 
index revisions.   
In short, this chapter makes two contributions to the comovement literature. 
First, we concentrate on the dynamic changes in the comovement resulted from the 
non-fundamental and fundamental factors in contrast with prior studies  (Barberis et 
11 
 
al. (2005); Mase (2007); Coakley et al. (2008)) which concentrate only on non-
fundamental factors. We use Amihud and Mendelson’s (1987) model with Kalman 
Filter to decompose daily returns into intrinsic values and noise. Then, we estimate 
and compare the fundamental- and sentiment-based comovement across both pre- 
and post-index revision periods. 
Second, our study extends the work of Coakley and Kougoulis (2005) and 
Mase (2008) by including the fundamental factors in the analysis. Coakley and 
Kougoulis (2005) apply similar studies of Barberis et al (2005). They find that the 
shift in the stock return comovement following the changes in the FTSE100 index 
list is attributed to the behavioural financial view of comovement. Mase (2008) 
extends the analysis of Coakley and Kougoulis (2005). He argues - without going 
into detail - that the findings from the FTSE 100 index suggest that other factors 
apart from the behavioural finance may provide additional explanation. In this 
respect our study extends the work of Mase (2008) including the fundamental-based 
analysis as an alternative explanation of the behavioural finance. We also extend this 
analysis using a longer time period (i.e. from 1985 to 2009) relative to the work of 
Coakley and Kougoulis  (2005) and Mase (2008)
3
.   
We find that the loading factors of fundamental experience a weak (no) 
significant change following the index revisions in the post-addition (deletion) 
periods. The loading factors of sentiment (non-fundamental) experience a 
statistically significant shift following the index revisions in both the additions and 
deletions. The finding that the shifts in the comovement of residuals are greater than 
                                                          
3  Our sample includes 182 additions and 172 deletions which are significantly greater than other 
comovement studies on the FTSE 100 index. The study of Coakley and Kougoulis focuses on the 
period between 1992 and 2002 producing only 58 additions and 61 deletions for daily and weekly 
data. Mase (2008) limits his analysis on examining the difference in comovement between additions 
that are new firms and additions that have previously been constituents. The sample of Mase covers 
the period between 1990 and 2005 generating 125 additions and 142 deletions. 
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those of fundamentals lends more support to the sentiment- or friction-based views. 
Moreover, we observe that the sentiment-based betas are increased (decreased) after 
the additions (deletions). However, the fundamental-based betas exhibit weak shifts 
in the opposite direction to the total stock return comovement. This evidence 
suggests that the fundamental factors are partly pushing the comovement in the 
opposite direction to the total comovement.  Overall, our findings are largely in 
agreement with the conclusions of Barberis et al. (2005), Mase (2007) and Coakley 
et al. (2008) that the non-fundamental-based comovement lead the total 
comovements in the stock return. Our findings are partly in agreement with  
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), Durnev et al. (2004), Kumar and Lee (2006), and 
Evans (2009) that the fundamental factors commove less with the total comovement. 
Our findings are consistent with the argument of Kyle (1985) that the adjustments of 
prices reflect the contribution of each, noisy trading and fundamental information.   
 Our results from the robustness checks show that the calendar-time portfolio 
approach produces similar results to the event time approach. The control sample 
methodology shows that our results are unlikely to be driven by the size effect. The 
procedures suggested by Vijh (1994) to control for non-trading effects shows that our 
results are partially driven by non-trading effects. The results on the adjusted Dimson 
beta, suggest that the information diffusion account for 17.34% and 10% of the beta 
shifts in the univariate and bivariate regressions, respectively. The results from the 
Dimson (1979) technique also confirm that the FTSE 100 index revision is 
influenced by the information diffusion.  
1.2.3. Index revision and stock market quality  
The third empirical chapter, Chapter 6 of the thesis, examines the impact of 
the FTSE100 index revisions on the market quality of the underlying stocks. Its 
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contribution to the literature is threefold. First, while previous literature consistently 
finds that there are price gains, increases in investor awareness and long-term 
improvements in stock liquidity following additions, this study introduces a noble 
approach to investigate in detail the impact of index membership on the market 
quality of the underlying stocks. Second, while most literature finds that, when a firm 
is removed from a major stock index, it experiences both stock price and liquidity 
falls, other studies report that the advantages of gaining membership remain even 
after removal from the index. We extend this debate by examining whether the 
informational efficiency of a stock is reduced after removal from the index. Finally, 
we are able to explain the key determinants of informational efficiency changes 
around the time of joining and leaving the membership of the index. 
We base our analysis on partial adjustment model with noise of Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987). We use a Kalman filter technique to estimate two important 
market quality measures, namely the speed at which information is incorporated into 
the stock price and the degree to which stock prices deviate from their intrinsic 
values. To test whether the FTSE100 index revisions affect the market quality of 
stocks, we compare measures of market quality before and after the events. We use a 
control sample to ensure that our results are not driven by factors other than the index 
revisions. We also conduct cross-sectional analysis to identify the main determinants 
of the market quality changes. 
The key findings can be briefly summarised. First, the study confirms that the 
market quality of a stock added to (deleted from) the FTSE 100 index is improved 
(not affected). Specifically, we show that the speed of price adjustment parameter 
moves closer to unity and the transaction prices move closer to their intrinsic values 
following additions. However, deletions do not exhibit any significant changes in the 
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speed of price adjustment or the pricing inefficiency. We attribute this asymmetric 
response of market quality to certain aspects of liquidity and other fundamental 
characteristics, which improve in the post-additions, but do not necessarily diminish 
in the post-deletions. Our findings are in agreement with the study of Chen et al. 
(2004) in which they find that investors awareness increases when a stock join the 
S&P 500, but does not decrease following its removal from the index. Second, our 
cross-sectional result indicates that a stock with low pre-addition market quality 
benefits more from being members of the index. This evidence confirms Roll et al.’s 
(2009) findings that information availability following option listing is larger in 
stocks where information asymmetries are greater and where investment analysis 
produces comparatively less public information. Finally, our cross-sectional results 
imply that changes in market quality are related to changes in information 
environment, liquidity, idiosyncratic risk and book-to-market value. 
1.3. Structures of the thesis 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 explains the 
price formation process, liquidity and asset pricing which includes the inventory-
based models and information-based models. In this chapter we present different 
measures of liquidity and models examine the relationship between liquidity and 
asset pricing.  Chapter 3 presents the literature of index revisions. It discusses the 
various hypotheses and summarises empirical evidence on the stock price and 
liquidity behavior around index revisions. Chapter 4, the first empirical chapter, 
examines the impact of the FTSE100 index revisions on stock market liquidity and 
the cost of equity capital. Chapter 5, the second empirical chapter, investigates the 
impact of the FTSE100 index revisions on the stock returns comovement. Chapter 6, 
the final empirical chapter, examines the impact of the FTSE100 index revisions on 
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the informational efficiency of the underlying stock prices. Chapter 7 summarises 
and concludes the thesis. 
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Chapter 2: Price formation and aspects of liquidity  
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a useful background on the price formation process. 
The extent literature relates the price formation process to the stock market liquidity, 
market quality and asset pricing, which we believe to be important in understanding 
the various potential benefits of index membership. The price formation process 
explains how prices come to impound information and liquidity over time. It 
involves the incorporation of private and as well as public information into asset 
prices and requires consideration of the behaviour of informed and uninformed 
investors. In discovering the price formation, there are two main models, the 
inventory-based models and the information-based models. The inventory-based 
models focus on the impact of the stochastic arrivals of order flows on the maker 
maker’s inventory level and, hence, the transaction costs. The Information-based 
models concentrate on the contribution of private and public information on asset 
pricing. In general, the type of information and the level of liquidity, which a market 
maker, informed traders and liquidity traders contribute to the price formation 
process, are expected to be a function in asset pricing. Amihud et al. (2005) argue 
that other factors, including  index revisions, financial market crashes and exchange 
listings, are also important in price formation process. In particular, it has been 
documented that stocks that join the index enjoy a price increase whereas those that 
are deleted suffer a price decline. Mazouz and Saadouni (2007a) attribute the 
changes in the price following index revisions to changes in both trading activity and 
the fundamental characteristics of the underlying stocks. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 introduces 
the price formation models. Section 2.3 defines the concept and the dimensions of 
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liquidity. Section 2.4 discusses the concept and measures of stock market quality. 
Section 2.5 explains the liquidity risk in the context of asset pricing. Section 2.6 
summarises and concludes.  
2.2. Price formation models  
Two main models have dominated the literature of price formation: 
inventory-based models and information-based models. 
2.2.1. The inventory-based models  
The inventory-based models predict that the uncertain arrivals of orders keep 
a market maker’s inventory level away from the desired level. Demsetz (1968) 
applies the concept of scale economies to formalise the relationship between 
transaction cost and trading activity. He argues that the transaction cost is a 
decreasing function of trading activity
4
. As the rate of transactions increase, the 
specialists reduce their economies of scales. Demsetz assumes that the flow of 
transaction rates is affected by many parameters, some of which are short-lived and 
others are long-lived. The short-lived parameters include: short-lived rumour, an 
accidental convergence of trading in the stock and the market for all stocks is 
temporarily active or inactive. The long-lived parameter concentrates on the number 
of market participants. Demsetz argues that an increase in the number of market 
participants may approximately increases the transaction rate. In turn, this will 
reduce the cost of waiting thus reduce the transaction cost. The cost of waiting for 
more liquid (active) stocks is less than that for illiquid (inactive) stocks. Accordingly, 
market makers who trade with liquid stocks have less inventory risk than those for 
illiquid stocks.   
                                                          
4
 The transaction cost is measured by the difference between the buying price and the selling price 
which is the bid and ask spread. The trading activity is measured by the flow of the transactions. 
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Smidt (1971) argues that market makers are not simply passive providers of 
immediacy as suggested by Demsetz (1968). On contrary, Smidt (1971) claims that 
specialists to avoid their ultimate bankruptcy in providing immediacy, they are 
actively balancing bid-ask spreads based on the fluctuation of their inventory levels. 
Garman (1976) models the relationship between dealer quotes and inventory levels 
based on Smidt’s (1971) assumptions. His model demonstrates how market makers 
address certain bankruptcy results from temporary fluctuations in order arrivals. 
Failure arises whenever the dealer runs out of either inventory or cash. The market 
maker balances bid-ask spread to protect their position from ultimate bankruptcy. 
Garman recommends that market makers should not depend upon re-balancing bid-
ask as a strategic policy. They should use leverage capital to fund minimum liquidity 
requirements so they cannot go bankrupt.  
Stoll (1978) assumes that market makers provide immediacy services to 
maximise the expected utility. He decomposes the cost of immediacy into holding 
costs, order processing costs and adverse selection costs. He assumes that the cost of 
immediacy is an amount which dealers maintain their expected utility of terminal 
wealth in response to unexpected transactions submitted by the public. These 
stochastic transactions tend to keep market makers’ position away from a desired 
inventory level.  
Amihud and Mendelson’s (1980) extend Garman’s (1976) model by relaxing 
the assumption of a dynamic price inventory adjustment process, which removes the 
possibility that dealers may fail when they run out of inventory. The dynamic process 
results from the arrival of a market buying and selling orders whose rates are 
controlled by the pricing decisions of the market-maker. When the arrival rate is low 
on either side of the market, the rate at which the dealer earns the bid-ask spread is 
19 
 
also low and vice versa. Accordingly, Amihud and Mendelson (1980) assume that 
the optimal bid-ask spreads are monotone decreasing functions of the dealers’ 
inventory position. As the inventory level increases, both bid and ask prices will be 
decreased. Inversely, market makers raise both bid and ask prices as inventory drops. 
Hence, the main objective of this process is to bring the market maker’s inventory 
back to the desired position. 
Ho and Stoll (1981) develop the work of Garman (1976) and Amihud and 
Mendelson (1980). They assume that the dealer’s objective is not only to maximise 
the expected profit but also to continue providing immediacy under uncertainty of 
incoming orders. They also assume that dealers cannot bankrupt over the period of 
time as they have control over the arrival of order flows. The dealer’s pricing 
problem, therefore, is to choose the balanced bid and ask spread to maximise the 
expected utility of terminal wealth. Ho and Stoll demonstrate that the dealer’s 
optimal behaviour depends on several parameters including their time horizon, the 
fixed transaction cost, and the magnitude of controlling incoming order arrivals. Ho 
and Stoll’s (1981) model shows that bid-ask spreads is expected to be higher in a 
market with a single specialist than in a market with many dealers because a market 
with many dealers stands ready to trade more securities at quote prices. 
O'Hara and Oldfield (1986) design a model in which a risk-averse and a risk-
neutral market maker behave differently with the existence of the uncertainty of 
transactions and inventory price. They assume that these uncertainties influence on 
market prices and they decompose bid-ask price into three parts: a portion for known 
limit orders, a risk-neutral adjustment for the expected market orders and a risk 
adjustment for market order inventory value uncertainty. In short, the central idea of 
inventory-based models is that market makers or specialists are trading with 
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uncertain arrivals of orders. This uncertainty put the market maker’s inventory 
position at risk. The market maker maintains the preferred inventory level by 
balancing bid-ask spread. Therefore, when the inventory level is below the preferred 
level, the market makers raise the bid-ask spread and vice versa. The process of 
balancing bid-ask spreads depends on many criteria, including the attitude of market 
makers regarding risk, the financial position of market makers, and the stock market 
criteria. What follows is the discussion of information-based models. 
2.2.2. Information-based models  
The literature on inventory based-models concludes that the changes in 
transaction costs may be attributed to the fluctuation in market maker’s inventory. 
The stochastic arrival of transactions do not only influence market maker’s inventory 
cost but they also affect the adverse information costs.  
Bagehot (1971) suggests that the bid-ask spread tracks the arrivals of the 
informed traders. Copeland and Galai (1983) formally analyse the impact of 
informed traders arrivals on stock market price behaviour. In particular, they look 
into the impact of the stochastic arrival of informed traders on several aspects of 
liquidity including bid-ask spread, trading volume and trading volatility. Dealers 
establish their profit by maximising spread and balancing the expected total revenues 
from liquidity traders against the expected total losses from informed trading. 
Dealers revise their prices immediately after every trade. Thus, the private 
information becomes public soon after every trade.  
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) investigate the impact of traders with superior 
information on the size of bid-ask spread assuming no inventory costs. They suggest 
that the bid-ask spread implies a divergence between observed return and realizable 
returns. Observed returns are approximately realizable returns plus what uninformed 
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traders anticipate losing to informed traders. In contrast to Copeland and Galai 
(1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) claim that private information is revealed 
gradually after each trade. In the same vein, as transaction prices are informative, the 
bid-ask spreads tend to decline through time resulting in the excess return declining, 
and the volatility of the stock price being decreased. In that way, informed traders 
make profit from their information but if the trade continues, the profits of late 
arriving informed traders tend to disappear. Hence, the observed return gradually 
tracks the realizable return.  
Easly and O’Hara (1987) develop the work of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
by incorporating the market markers’ learning process concept in their investigation 
of the impact of large trading volumes (block trades) on transaction costs. This 
process explains that trading volume matters, because it signals private information 
to market makers, who then update their price expectations. In particular, this 
learning process arises because informed traders prefer to trade in larger amounts at 
any given price. Easly and O’Hara show that block trades do not only influence bid-
ask spreads but also the speed in which prices adjust private information. They 
confirm that the speed at which prices adjust for larger amount is slowed down. In 
the samle line, Easley and O'Hara (1992a) develop a model to capture volume effects 
as well as trading patterns induced by repeated informed trading. They assume that 
market makers learn from the number and nature of trades and hence they adjust bid-
ask spread. The speed with which the market maker adjusts prices depends on a 
variety of market parameters, including trading volume and stochastic flow of orders.  
Easley and O'Hara (1992b) add a new parameter to the model of Easley and 
O'Hara (1992a) by examining the time impact on transaction costs. The model 
predicts that if time can be correlated with any factor related to the value of the asset, 
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then the presence or absence of trade may provide information to market participants. 
The model explains that the traders learn from the absence and the presence of 
trades, because each may be correlated with different aspects of information. For 
example, while timing the trade signals of the direction of any new information, the 
absence of trade provides a signal of the existence of any new information.  
Kyle (1985) is the first to consider the strategic interaction between informed 
traders, noise traders and market makers. The model of Kyle (1985) investigates the 
impact of private information on market liquidity dimensions
5
, tightness, depth, and 
resiliency. Kyle (1985) assumes that informed and noise trader each submit a market 
order for an asset, and the market maker sets the price depending on the aggregate 
order flow. Market makers take the informed traders actions into account in updating 
their beliefs on the future value of the asset. Hence, the market maker’s price is a 
function of order flow and trading volume. Order flow per se is the central idea of 
Kyle’s (1985) model. The informed trader’s optimal profit and quantity depend on 
both the signal and the arrival of the uninformed trader’s order flow. The larger the 
uninformed variance, the better the informed traders are able to hide their trades and, 
hence, the larger their profit. In addition, the signal variance arises because of the 
strategic links between the order size and price adjustment. The adjustments of prices 
reflect the contribution of each, noisy trading and private information. Accordingly, 
the adjustment of prices depends on the ratio of the amount of noise trading to the 
amount of informed traders with private information. As trade continues, informed 
traders are no longer benefiting from their private information. In that the learning 
problem that the market makers face leads to the equilibrium solution.  
                                                          
5 Kyle (1985) argues that liquidity characteristics include tightness which refers to the cost of turning 
over a position in a short period of time; depth which refers to the ability of the market to absorb 
quantities without having a large effect on price; and resiliency which refers to the speed with which 
prices tend to converge towards the underlying liquidation value of the commodity. 
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Barry and Brown (1985) argue that potentially, the principal empirical 
implication of assets with relatively higher information have lower expected returns 
than otherwise identical securities. Barry and Brown (1985) develop a model of 
differential information in which the amount of information available differs across 
assets. The effect of the differential information is to produce differences in the 
degree to which there is estimation risk across assets. They show that estimation risk 
and divergence of analyst opinion are associated. This result is obtained because the 
more information available on a security the lower estimation risk and convergent 
expectations on the part of all observers. Securities with relatively little available 
information are shown to have relatively higher systematic risk. 
The model of Barry and Brown (1985) is in line with the studies of Arbel and 
Strebel (1982) and Barry and Brown (1984) in which they show that the 
improvement in information environment reduce the adverse information cost. In 
particular, inactively traded stocks are suffering from shortage information and this 
increase the level of uncertainty of prospect return distributions. They also document 
that inactive firms tend to be more neglected by security analysts and investors than 
actively traded firms. Thereby, Arbel and Strebel (1982) argue that investors demand 
a positive premium for the greater risk resulted from lack of information.  
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan (1990) suggest 
models in which the equilibrium price is not only determined by informed traders or 
market makers, as in Kyle (1985, 1984), but also by liquidity traders, who can 
explicitly time their trading. They concur that the main objective of liquidity traders 
is to avoid the transaction cost as much as possible. In the model of Foster and 
Viswanathan (1990), the informed trader receives information each day, but this 
information becomes less valuable through time because there is a public 
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announcement of some portion of the private information each day. Hence, 
uninformed traders have opportunity to postpone their transactions when they believe 
that the informed trader is particularly well informed. Informed traders trade when 
order arrivals are less sensitive to the amount of information released by them. 
Otherwise, market makers increase transaction costs to offset the impact of informed 
traders.  
Back (1992) suggests continuous time model in which informed traders can 
infer the presence of noise trades simply by monitoring prices continuously (i.e. 
without directly observing them). The contribution of Back (1992) allows the 
equilibrium to be investigated under different liquidity trader’s behaviour. As a 
result, the optimal strategy for informed traders is maintained contemporaneously 
with the behaviour of uninformed traders.   
Kyle (1985) leaves unanswered question on how quickly prices adjust for the 
arrival of news in the presence of multiple informed traders. Holden and 
Subrahmanyam (1992) design a model in which the informed trader’s common 
private information is incorporated into prices immediately not gradually as Kyle 
(1985) suggested. Spiegel and Subrahmanyam (1992) examine an adverse selection 
model of trading in which both informed and uninformed traders are rational. They 
affirm that increasing the number of uninformed traders decreases the profits of the 
informed traders. In addition, the welfare per uninformed trader monotonically 
decreases in the number of informed traders. 
Li (2006) extends Kyle’s (1985) work and developed a model in which a 
single strategic trader is potentially better informed than the public. In this model, 
market makers do not have perfect information about whether the strategic trader is 
informed. The strategic trader trades between private and public information. 
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Accordingly, the market makers should assess the probability that the strategic trader 
is informed. This model shows that stocks with high trading volume seem to have a 
lower probability of information-based trades. 
O'Hara (2003) and Easley and O'Hara (2004) develop models in which the 
cost of equity capital is explained by the information asymmetry. When information 
is asymmetric, uninformed traders demand compensation for portfolio-induced risks 
which they cannot diversify. Thus, the asset associated with private information 
commands a higher rate of return than the asset with only public information. This 
return implies that trading with private information increases the risk of uninformed 
traders. This premium explains that informed traders are better able to shift their 
portfolio weights to incorporate new information.  
 In the same line, Easley et al.’s (2008) model allows the arrival rates of 
informed and uninformed trades to be time-varying and predictable. They assume 
that the market parameters such as volume, volatility, market depth and liquidity, 
govern the dynamic processes of the arrival rates. Their model affirms that both 
informed and uninformed order flows are highly persistent. 
2.2.3 Empirical evidence  
Empirical studies on the price formation components show two groups of 
results. The first group suggests that price formation component is dominated by 
adverse selection costs. In particular, Glosten and Harris (1988) and Hasbrouck 
(1988) report a permanent adverse information cost in NYSE stocks. Stoll (1989) 
finds that the adverse information component represents (43%), order processing 
costs 47%, and inventory holding cost is 10%. Kim and Ogden (1996) find that, on 
average, the adverse selection costs account for approximately 50% of the bid-ask 
spread in the NYSE and AMEX. Lin et al. (1995) find evidence from NYSE that the 
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adverse information component of the spread increases significantly and 
monotonously as trade size increases. de Jong et al. (1996) show that in CAC 40 
Paris Bourse, adverse selection costs accounts for 30% to 45% of the bid-ask spread 
and order processing cost accounts for the remainder. In London Stock Exchange 
(LSE hereafter), Hansch et al. (1998) and Menyah and Paudyal (2000) provide 
significant evidence of the presence of adverse selection cost. Their result reveals 
that on average 47% of the spread is the adverse selection cost, 30% of the spread is 
the order processing cost, and 23% is inventory cost. Chan (2000) investigates the 
price formation process on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and he finds that the 
adverse selection cost is more important than the inventory cost. More recently, 
Angelidis and Benos (2009) examine the components of the bid-ask spread in the 
Athens Stock Exchange and conclude that the adverse selection cost explains a 
significant part of the spread and is increasing with the trading volume. 
However, the second group of empirical studies shows that order processing 
costs dominate adverse selection and inventory holding cost. Huang and Stoll (1997) 
examine the bid-ask spread components in 20 major stock markets. They find that 
the adverse selection cost is 9.59% of the bid-ask spread, the inventory holding cost 
is 28.65%, and the order processing cost is 61.76%.  In LSE, Snell and Tonks (1998, 
1995) find that there is very weak evidence of the impact of adverse selection cost on 
the quote bid-ask spread. Declerck (2000) find that in CAC 40 adverse selection cost 
is equal to 10% for small-size transactions and 8.86% for medium-size transactions. 
In the Nikkei 225, Kim et al. (2002) show that the inventory holding cost is about 
(63%), the adverse selection cost is relatively small (4%) and the remaining (32%) is 
the order processing cost.  
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2.3 Liquidity definitions and dimensions 
This section provides some background on stock price liquidity, market 
quality and asset pricing, which we believe to be important in understanding the 
various potential benefits of index membership. Despite the elusive concept of 
market liquidity, most of liquidity literature defines liquidity through its dimensions. 
The extent literature proposes a large number of liquidity measures, which focus 
mainly on liquidity dimensions such as tightness, breadth, depth and resiliency. 
Some studies focus on a single dimension, while others view liquidity as multi-
dimensional phenomenon. Generally, one-dimensional liquidity measures include 
transaction costs, trading activity and trading volatility, while multi-dimensional 
measures focus more on price impact and price efficiency. Both one- and multi-
dimensional measures are extensively applied to gauge the impact of liquidity and 
liquidity risk on asset pricing.  
In the liquidity literature, there is a lack of agreement on a common definition 
of liquidity. Therefore, most of studies define liquidity based on its dimensions or 
characteristics. Black (1971) projects that a market is liquid if the following criteria 
hold: (i) there are always bid and asked prices for the investor who wants to trade 
small amounts of asset immediately; (ii) the variance between the bid and ask price is 
considerably small; (iii) an investor with a large amount of stock, in the absence of 
private information, can trade over a long period of time at a price not far away from 
the current market price; and (iv) a market demands a premium or discount from 
investor who trade with large block of stock and this premium depends on the size of 
the block. Kyle (1985) assumes that market liquidity is a slippery and elusive 
concept and liquidity encompasses a number of dimensions including tightness (or 
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width), depth, and resiliency
6
. Harris (1990) argues that a market is liquid if traders 
can buy or sell large numbers of stocks immediately and at low transaction costs. Lee 
et al. (1991) conclude that liquidity has two dimensions, with the spread being the  
price dimension and the depth being the quantity dimension.  
Sarr et al. (2002) summarise liquidity through its dimensions: (i) tightness 
refers to small bid-ask spread resulting in low transaction costs; (ii) immediacy is the 
speed with which orders can be exercised; (iii) depth is defined as the presence of 
large orders below and above the price; (iv) breadth arises when orders are frequent 
and large in volume with slight impact on price; and (v) resiliency, as defined by 
Garbade (2001), is a market with which new order arrivals flow quickly to adjust 
order imbalances and move prices away from their true values. Kyle (1985) defines 
resiliency as the speed with which pricing errors caused by noisy traders are 
corrected in the market. Likewise, Harris (2003) considers that resiliency measures 
how fast prices revert to its original levels in response to trading in a large block.   
 We summarise that liquidity can be defined according to its dimensions. 
Depth is a proxy of quantity dimension, spread and tightness are proxies of the price 
dimension and resiliency is a proxy of time dimension. Whatever liquidity is, it 
featured by multi-dimensionality. Studies of the dimensional nature of liquidity 
provide a variety of proxies as no single measure can capture all dimensions of 
liquidity. Aitken and Winn (1997) show that the studies on stock market liquidity 
apply approximately 68 proxies. They find a little agreement on the best proxy to 
use. Sarr et al. (2002) classify liquidity proxies into four groups: (i) transaction cost 
proxies to capture stock tightness; (ii) volume-based proxies to address depth and 
                                                          
6
 Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) suggest the same dimensions. 
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breadth; (iii) equilibrium price-based proxy to capture resiliency; and (iv) market-
impact proxy to address resiliency and speed of price adjustment.  
Considering the multi-facet nature of liquidity, we categorise liquidity 
measures into one-dimension and multi-dimensions
7
. One-dimensional liquidity 
measures take only one variable into account, whereas the multi-dimensional 
liquidity measures encapsulate many variables within one measure. These measures 
are classified into three groups8, volume-related liquidity measures; time-related 
liquidity measures; and bid-ask spread-related liquidity measures. Aitken and 
Comerton-Forde (2003) categorise liquidity proxies into trade-based measures and 
order-based measures. Trade-based measures generally capture the depth dimension. 
These measures include trading volume, trading frequency and the value of stocks 
traded. On the one hand, trade-based measures are attractive, as they are simple to 
calculate using readily available data and are widely accepted. On the other hand, 
these measures fail to predict the future impact of liquidity as it depends on historical 
data. Order-based measures are heavily dependent on bid-ask spread measures. They 
also use depth proxy to address the price impact and opportunity costs of trading. 
Aitken and Comerton-Forde (2003) show that order-based measures outperform 
trade-based measures. 
The following section presents the widely used liquidity proxies by taking 
into account the more common classifications. 
                                                          
7 Amihud et al. (2005) categorise liquidity measures into high-frequency and low-frequency 
measures. High-frequency measures are those relying on long term data such as annual return and 
annual trading volume data. In contrast, low-frequency data applies short term data such as intra-
daily return and daily trading return volume data 
8 Volume-related liquidity measures include trading volume; turnover, and depth measures. Time 
related measures include number of transaction per time unit. Bid-ask spread measures include 
dollar or quoted spread; relative spread; and amortized spread.  
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2.3.1 One-dimensional liquidity measures  
One-dimensional liquidity measures can be classified either into three groups: 
transaction cost measures (capture the tightness of stock liquidity); trading activity 
measures (measure depth and breadth); and volatility, or price-based, measures 
(proxies for resiliency and immediacy).  
2.3.1.1 Transaction cost measures 
Transaction cost proxies capture the cost of trading in a market with friction. 
These costs can be decomposed into inventory, adverse selection and order 
processing costs. Transaction cost is a decreasing function of market liquidity. For 
instance, high transaction costs may reduce the number of market participants and, 
hence, reduce stock market liquidity. Transaction costs can be measured by many 
versions of bid-ask spread which are widely used in market liquidity literature. The 
main measures of bid-ask spread are the current (or quote) bid-ask spread, effective 
bid-ask spread, realized bid-ask spreads, amortized bid-ask spread and relative bid-
ask spread. Bid-ask spread measures can be measured either as a dollar bid-ask or a 
percentage bid-ask spread. This section discusses the more commonly used bid-ask 
spread measures, which include the current bid-ask spread, relative bid-ask spread, 
effective bid-ask spread and Roll’s (1984) measure. 
Current bid-ask spread which is defined as the quoted spread in effect when a 
trade is executed and it can be calculated as 
           
    
  
(2.1)  
where   
  is to best ask price at time t and   
   is the best bid price at time t. The 
higher the        , the higher the transaction cost, and the lower the stock market 
liquidity. This measure is intensively used by liquidity literature.  
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        Relative bid-ask spread is the dealer’s bid-ask spread divided by the average of 
the bid-price and the ask-price and it can be calculated as 
                   
  
    
 
  
   
   (  
    
 )
  
     
  , (2.2)  
where   
  denotes the mid price, which is calculated as   
  
    
 
 
. This measure is 
easily to calculate and sometimes called inside spread. This measure can also be 
calculated with last trade (or closing price)    instead of   
 .  
The effective spread is defined as two times the absolute difference between 
the traded price and the midpoint of the best bid and ask price, divided by the 
midpoint. Effective spread can be calculated as 
                   
|      
 |
  
  
(2.3)  
The effective spread for each trade captures the difference between an estimate of the 
true value of the security (the quote midpoint) and the actual transaction price. If the 
effective spread is smaller than half the absolute spread, this reflects trading within 
the quotes. This measure can also be calculated with last trade    instead of    
 .  
Roll (1984) proposes a widely used method to measure transaction cost by 
inferring bid-ask spreads from the time series of daily price changes. The implicit 
percentage bid-ask spread is given by 
        √    
 
 , (2.4)  
Cov denotes the first-order serial covariance of price changes. Positive spreads 
induce negative serial auto-covariance in transaction price changes. The magnitude 
of the auto- covariance  √    
 
  depends on both the size of the spread and the 
probability that investors trade with the specialist at the bid or ask quotes. 
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Accordingly, the effective bid-ask spread of Roll (1984) reflects the compensation 
cost to liquidity providers for their immediacy. 
2.3.1.2 Trading activity measures 
Trading activity measures reflect the depth and breadth of stock market 
liquidity. The trading activity is an increasing function of market liquidity. For 
instance, high trading volumes or high trading turnover rate implies high market 
liquidity. Activity measures either classify into volume-based and time-based 
measures. Volume-based measures include trading volume, turnover rate ratio and 
depth measures. Trading volume is defined as the number or the dollar value of 
traded shares which is given by 
    ∑        
  
   
 
(2.5)  
where     is the dollar trading volume for time t-1 until time t,    denotes the number 
of trades between t-1 and t,    and    are prices and quantities of i trade between t-1 
and t. A higher trading volume    implies higher stock market liquidity. Trading 
volume is traditionally applied to measure the presence of numerous market 
participants (Sarr and Lybek, 2002). 
Turnover rate ratio is the number of stocks traded divided by the number of 
issued shares and can be calculated as 
          ∑
  
      
  
   
 
(2.6)  
Like the trading volume,    denotes the current price of trade i,    is the number of 
trades between t-1 until time t and     is the number of issued shares. A higher 
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         implies higher stock market liquidity. This measure may not be helpful 
when turnover is highly volatile.  
Depth captures the volume of orders available at each bid-ask spread which 
can be calculated as 
      
    
 , (2.7)  
where    the market depth in time t,   
    
  refers to the best bid and the best ask 
volume    in the order book. Higher quantity depth indicates higher market liquidity. 
The time-based measures break up into two measures: number of transactions 
per time unit, and number of orders per time unit. Number of transactions per time 
unit can be calculated as 
      
 
   
  ∑    
 
           , (2.8)  
where      is the waiting time between two trades     and      , where     denotes 
the time of the trade and       the time of the previous trade. Higher number of trades 
may imply lower waiting time between two trades     and       and, hence, higher 
liquidity.  
Number of orders per time unit     can be defined as the orders introduced 
into the limit order book within the time interval from t-1 until t. A high number of 
orders at time t indicate high market liquidity. 
2.3.1.3 Volatility or price-based measures 
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) and Huberman and Halka (2001), among others 
report that liquidity levels fluctuate over time. Amihud et al. (2005) suggest that 
volatility-based measures may capture the variation of stock market liquidity over 
time. For instance, high stock price or return volatility implies high risk. Black 
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(1986) and French and Roll (1986) argue that volatility can result either from the 
arrival of new information or from the trading process. Madhavan (1996) shows that 
the order imbalances and the changes in market mechanisms result in short term 
volatility, whereas Bennett and Wei  (2006) show that the long term price movement 
result from the flow of fundamental information. Stock market volatility can be 
calculated by using many proxies including the variance ratio or random walk 
(Barnea, 1974), the market efficiency coefficients (MEC) (Hasbrouck and Schwartz, 
1988), intraday and shorter term volatility (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991a)), 
standard deviation daily return and price volatility (Madhavan, 1995), transient 
volatility9 (Madhavan, 1996) and the price high–low range (Bennett and Wei (2006). 
In section 2.4.1 we discuss the most important measures of volatility within the 
quality measures literature.  
2.3.2 Multi-dimensional liquidity measures 
The proxies discussed so far are based on one-dimensional or single face 
measures. In what follows, we focus on the widely used measures that capture the 
multi-dimensionality of market liquidity. Most of these measures concentrate on the 
price impact, which includes both permanent and temporary components. The 
permanent price impact results from the effects of information asymmetry, while the 
temporary impact results from the effects of trading mechanisms and the cost of 
immediacy. 
Amihud et al. (1997) design a liquidity proxy, which combines two common 
measures of liquidity: the stock's trading volume and the stock's liquidity ratio known 
as Amivest (or LR). Trading volume or trading frequency of a given security is an 
                                                          
9
 Transient volatility is the variance of transaction prices around the asset’s fundamental value  
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increasing function of its liquidity. Amivest, which measures the trading volume 
associated with a unit change in the stock price, is given as  
                
∑     
∑ |   | 
 , 
(2.9)  
where     and     are the volume and return on stock j on day t, respectively. The 
higher the volume  ∑     ) the more price movement can be absorbed. High liquidity 
ratios       imply high liquidity and the larger the     the lower price impact. 
Lesmond et al. (1999) introduce an indirect liquidity measure based on the 
occurrence of zero returns. This measure is a time series-based with low-frequency 
data and is rooted from the adverse selection framework of Glosten and Milgrom 
(1985) and Kyle (1985). In this measure the marginal informed investor trades on 
new information not reflected in the price of a security only if the net trade profit 
exceeds the net of transaction costs. The cost of transacting constitutes a threshold 
that must be exceeded before a security's return will reflect new information. A 
security with high transaction costs has infrequent price movements and more zero 
returns than a security with low transaction costs. Two key arguments support this 
measure: (i) stocks with lower liquidity are more likely to have zero-volume days 
and thus are more likely to have zero-return days; (ii) stocks with high transaction 
costs has infrequent price movements and more zero returns than stocks with low 
transaction costs. If the value of the information signal is insufficient to exceed the 
costs of trading, then the marginal investor will either reduce trading or not trade, 
causing a zero return. In particular, zero returns result from the effects of transaction 
costs on the marginal investors, who may be uninformed or informed. For 
uninformed traders, if the need of liquidity is sufficiently low and the transaction 
costs sufficiently high, they may not trade and a zero return will be expected. 
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However, some uninformed traders may trade regardless of transaction costs and the 
consequent returns may be non-zero. For informed traders, if the values of the public 
and private information are insufficient to exceed the costs of trading, then those 
traders may either reduce their desire to trade or not trade at all and, hence, there may 
be no price movement from the previous day. Lesmond et al. (1999) assume that the 
value of their trades is idiosyncratic and over time the average return resulting from 
their trades will be zero.  
       
                                    
 
 (2.10)  
where Zeros is the number of days with zero returns divided by T, where T is the 
number of trading days in a month. High transaction costs imply more Zeros and, 
therefore, low liquidity. Lesmond et al. (1999a) develop Lesmond, Ogden, and 
Trzcinka (LOT) on the assumption of the role of informed trading on non-zero-return 
days and the absence of informed trading on zero-return days. This measure assumes 
that the unobserved ‘‘true return’’      of a stock j on day t is given by  
   
              (2.11)  
where    is the sensitivity of stock   to the market returns     on day  ,     is a public 
information shock on day  . Lesmond et al. (1999a) assume that     is normally 
distributed with mean zero and   
 . Then       is the per cent transaction cost of 
selling stock   and       is the per cent transaction cost of buying stock  . Then the 
observed price     on a stock   is given by 
       
              
          (2.12)  
       
              
          (2.13)  
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 . 
(2.14)  
Then LOT measures the difference between the percentage buying cost     and the 
percentage selling cost     
              (2.15)  
The magnitude of zeros depends on the number of informed traders with private 
information in Zero returns day. As the number of informed traders increase, Zeros 
decrease and hence liquidity increase. The advantages of this measure include: (i) 
this measure requires only the time-series of daily stock returns, it is easy and cheap 
to obtain estimates of transaction costs for all companies and time periods for which 
daily stock returns are available; (ii) investors can apply this measure to judge the 
competitiveness of their realized trading costs and expected return; (iii) this measure 
captures multidimensional features of liquidity as it includes not only transaction 
costs, but also the expected price impact costs and opportunity costs; (iv) the number 
of zero returns outperforms some measures such as quoted bid-ask spread and 
effective spread. Lesmond et al. (1999a) find evidence that the frequency of zero 
returns is inversely related to firm size, and directly related to both the quoted bid-
ask spread and Roll's measure of the effective spread. Grossman and Miller (1988) 
argue that the quoted spread cannot be used as an effective measure of the cost of 
supplying immediacy for trading orders. They cite other problems with the spread 
such as the failure to capture the time dimension of trades and the probability that a 
buyer and seller will trade in the same time and at the same price. Lee and Ready 
(1991) and Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) provide evidence that many trades are 
executed inside the quoted bid-ask spread. Lesmond et al. (1999a) run annual 
comparison between three liquidity measures and show that Zeros dominates Roll’s 
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(1984) measure. In the same vein, Lesmond et al. (2005) match between five 
liquidity measures for 23 emerging countries. These measures are Roll, Amivest, 
Amihud (or ILLIQ), turnover, and Zeros. The results indicate that each measure has 
strengths and weaknesses when used to assess cross-country liquidity. Cross-country 
differences in liquidity are best reported using the price impact-based models, such 
as Zeros and Roll. Lesmond et al. (2005) Zeros measure is highly correlated with the 
proxies of liquidity such as the bid-ask spread plus commission. Amihud’s (2002), 
Roll (1984) and Lesmond et al. (2005) also show that Zeros is the best measure to 
capture both the cross-sectional and time series liquidity effects among the other 
measures. More recently, Goyenko et al. (2006) run monthly and annual comparison 
between 12 liquidity measures. In the monthly effective spread comparison, they find 
that Holden, Effective Tick, and Zeros are the best overall.  
The proportional number of zeros is different from the liquidity measures in 
Amihud (2002) and Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), since these latter measures are 
constructed by partially excluding the effect of the absence of trading on liquidity. In 
particular, the liquidity measure of Amihud (2002) is defined as the ratio of the daily 
absolute return to daily dollar trading volume averaged over one year. Clearly, if a 
stock’s trading volume is zero on a particular trading day, then its return-to-volume 
ratio cannot be calculated. The liquidity measure of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) is 
estimated by using an ordinary least squares (OLS) coefficient on trading volume, 
where the estimate is based on daily data over a one-month interval with a minimum 
of 16 observations. If a stock does not trade or the number of days on which trading 
takes place is less than 16 during an entire month, its liquidity measure cannot be 
calculated. 
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However, Zeros experience some limitations. Bekaert et al. (2007) report 
three possible limitations associated with this measure: First, information-less trades 
(such as a trade by an index fund) should not give rise to price changes in liquid 
markets. Qin (2007) recommends using zero volume days instead of the proportional 
zero return days to overcome this limitation. In the FTSE 100 stocks we may not 
experience this problem as 97% of the FTSE ALL SHARE experience no zero 
volume days. Liu (2006) recommends using the proportion of zero return in markets 
which volume data are unavailable. Second, there is a zero return (no trading) 
because of a lack of news. Many empirical studies apply the number of zero return 
including Bekaert et al. (2003, 2006), Chen et al. (2006), and Chang et al. (2010)
10
.  
Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) suggest a liquidity proxy for  aggregate liquidity 
permanent price impacts. The permanent price impact proxy is measured by quote 
slope k and log quote slope k. 
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(2.20)  
Traders can estimate their trading costs on the basis of the current and sizes of the 
quotes. Where    and    denote the per share bid and ask for quote record k,   
 ,   
  
denote the respective number of shares acquired at these quote. Quote slope 
                                                          
10
 Chang et al. (2010) find from Japanese stock exchange that Liu  (2006) measure is highly 
correlated in particular with Zeros suggested by Lesmond et al. 
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measured by the spread       divided by log depth         
      (  
 ). A high 
quote slope denotes low liquidity. Log quote slope k uses the logarithmized relative 
spread in the numerator. As the ask price is always higher than the bid price, the 
quote slope and the log quote slope are always positive. The closer    and    are to 
each other, the flatter is the slope of the quote and the market becomes more liquid. 
Similarly, the larger   
  and   
  are the smaller is the slope of the quote and the more 
liquid is market. 
Amihud (2002) develops a temporary price impact measure called Amihud 
based on Kyle’s (1985) model to capture the daily price response associated with one 
dollar of trading volume. Amihud’s (or illiquidity) measure is order-based with low 
frequency and cross-sectional data. Illiquidity measure is defined as the absolute 
daily return divided by daily trading volume 
                                    (
|  |
       
), (2.21)  
where,    is the stock return on day t,         is the dollar volume on day t. The 
average is calculated overall positive-volume days, since the ratio is undefined for 
zero-volume days. Illiquidity ratio is an increasing function of daily rate of return |  | 
and decreasing function of trading volume at t time         . Higher illiquidity ratio 
results in higher rate of return.  
Chordia et al. (2001) provide liquidity proxy in which they combine depth 
and transaction cost dimensions in a single measure called composite liquidity 
(Composite Liq) as follows 
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(2.22)  
Composite liquidity is calculated by using the relative spread bid-ask spread 
  
      
  
  
   in the numerator divided by the dollar depth 
  
     
      
     
   
 
. A low relative 
bid-ask spread 
  
      
  
  
              $depth 
  
     
      
    
   
 
  implies low composite 
liquidity.  
In the spirit of Amihud et al. (1997), Ranaldo (2001) develops two market 
liquidity proxies, which are flow ratio and order ratio. These two proxies capture the 
resiliency and depth market liquidity dimensions, respectively. Flow ratio, the market 
resilience liquidity proxy, is based on the flow of volume traded each second. This 
proxy combines the quantity    and the time dimensions     of market liquidity.  
             
  
   
 (2.23)  
Since liquidity rises with the number of trades and the turnover   , a high             
implies high liquidity. Order ratio estimates the market depth as the proportion 
between order volume imbalances |  
     
 | and executed order size    over a given 
trading time t. 
               
|  
     
 |
  
  
|  
     
 |
        
  (2.24)  
If the turnover in a certain time interval is equal to zero, the order ratio is set to zero. 
A high order ratio at time t denotes low liquidity. A small order ratio at time t 
denotes high liquidity.  
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Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) design a proxy called Gamma to capture the 
temporary component of price impact induced by order flow. The larger the absolute 
value of Gamma, the larger the implied price impact. The liquidity measure of 
Gamma is characterised by significant commonality across stocks, supporting the 
notion of aggregate liquidity as a priced state variable. The basic idea of Gamma is 
that order flow should be accompanied by a return. If the stock is not perfectly liquid, 
the stock return is expected to be partially reversed in the future. Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) assume that the greater the expected reversal for a given dollar 
volume, the lower the stock’s liquidity. Specifically, the liquidity measure for stock   
in month   is the ordinary least squares estimate of       in the regression 
       
  
                           (     
 )  (          )            ,       
=1, …, D, 
(2.25)  
 
where quantities are defined as follows: where        
  the stock’s excess return above 
the CRSP
11
 value which is weighted market returns on day t;       is the return on 
stock   on   day in month  ; and            is the dollar volume on day t. The 
larger the absolute value of Gamma  , the larger the implied price impact and the 
lower market liquidity. Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) show that inactively traded 
stocks are less liquid, and the smallest stocks have high sensitivity to aggregate 
liquidity.  
                                                          
11
 All the individual-stock return and volume data used in this study are obtained from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) at the University of Chicago. 
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Liu  (2006) defines liquidity as the ability to trade large quantities quickly at 
low cost with less price impact. Based on this definition, he introduces a new 
liquidity proxy called Lmx, which is specified as follows  
     [                                              
 
                    
        
]   
   
    
 
(2.26)  
where Lmx is the degree of illiquidity for month x; the number of zero daily trading 
volumes over the prior x months to capture the intuition that the absence of trading in 
a security indicates its degree of illiquidity Lmx; NoTD is the total number of trading 
days in the market over the prior x months. This proxy captures multiple dimensions 
of liquidity such as trading speed, trading quantity, and transaction cost, with 
particular emphasis on trading speed. The number of zero daily trading volumes over 
the prior x months captures the continuity of trading and the potential delay or 
difficulty in executing an order. The turnover adjustment enables the new liquidity 
measure to capture the dimension of trading quantity. The link between zero returns 
and no trades also can capture the transaction cost dimension of liquidity.  
Holden (2006) proposes another proxy for liquidity, which is the effective 
bid-ask spread from observable price clustering
12
. The main function of price 
clustering is to simplify and reduce both the negotiation cost between potential 
traders and bid-ask spread. The Holden model combines observable price and 
midpoint clusters and the serial correlation of price changes to infer the effective 
                                                          
12
 Price clustering is defined as when there is a higher frequency of trade prices on rounder 
increments. On a fractional price grid, whole dollars are rounder (or more common) than half dollars, 
which are rounder than quarter dollars, which are rounder that eighths of a dollar. On a decimal 
price grid, whole dollars are rounder than quarters, which are rounder than dimes, which are 
rounder than nickels, which are rounder than pennies. Harris (1991) documents connection between 
price clustering and bid-ask spread. 
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spread. Holden or Effective Tick, can be measured by a probability-weighted average 
of each effective spread size divided by  ̅, the average price in time interval i  
                            (
∑  ̂ 
 
   
   
 ̅ 
)  , (2.27)  
where  ̅  is the average trade price over the time period of aggregation and the 
estimated spread probabilities must sum to one ∑  ̂      = 1,    is the realization of the 
effective spread at the closing trade of day,  ̂ is the constrained probability of the     
spread (         . The realization of the spread on the closing trade of day is 
randomly drawn from a set of possible spreads   . A high effective tick implies low 
stock market liquidity. 
Goyenko et al.(2009) provide five liquidity proxies calculated from high-
frequency Trade and Quote (TAQ)13 and Rule 60514 database. These proxies develop 
some versions for bid-ask spread and price impact. The versions of bid-ask spread 
are effective spread (TAQ)i , realized spread (TAQ)K, and $Effective Spread (605)i. 
The versions of price impact are Price Impact (605)i, and 5-Minute Price Impact 
(TAQ)k. Effective spread (TAQ)i, the first proxy is calculated from the TAQ 
database as the dollar-volume-weighted average of  Effective Spread (TAQ)k 
computed over all trades in time interval i. For a given stock, the (TAQ)i effective 
spread on the k
th
 trade is calculated as 
                           |               |, (2.28)  
                                                          
13
  The Trade and Quote (TAQ) database is a collection of intraday trades and quotes for all securities 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, Nasdaq National Market System 
and SmallCap issues http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/rc/taq.htm. 
14
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Rule 605 on November 15, 2000. The Rule 
requires market centers to make monthly public disclosure of execution quality. The Rule is intended 
to achieve a more competitive and efficient national market system by increasing the visibility of 
execution quality. 
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where    is the price of the  
   and    the midpoint of the consolidated the best bid 
offers (BBO
15
)
 
prevailing at the time of the     trade. The second liquidity proxy is 
the realized spread (TAQ)K as suggested by Huang and Stoll (1996), which is the 
temporary component of the effective spread. The third liquidity proxy is the 
$Effective Spread (605)i as aggregated from the Rule 605 database. $Effective 
Spread (605)i is the share-volume-weighted average of $Effective Spread (605)k 
calculated overall market centres in month i divided by the average price in the same 
month. The fourth liquidity proxy is the Static Price Impact (605)i which is the slope 
of the price function at a moment in time. This proxy is the cost of demanding 
additional immediate liquidity and is the first derivative of the effective spread with 
respect to order size. Static Price Impact            is calculated as 
        
 
(                                   ̅ ⁄ )  (                                     ̅ ⁄ )
(                                   )                                         
 
(2.29)  
 
where Big orders i is the set of all orders in the range of 2000–9999 shares that 
execute in time interval i and                is the set of all orders in the range of 
100–499 shares that execute in time interval i. A high          implies high 
transaction cost for additional liquidity. The last liquidity proxy is the 5-Minute Price 
Impact (TAQ)k.  This measure is the dollar-volume-weighted average of 5-Minute 
Price Impact (TAQ)k computed overall trades in time interval i.   
                                                          
15 BBO means the best bid and offer. It is the highest bid price and lowest ask available for a given 
stock at a moment in time. 
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2.3.3 Comparisons studies 
Many empirical papers compare the relative performance of the more 
commonly used liquidity measures. These studies show mixed and paradoxical 
results. Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) match between posted bid-ask spread and 
effective bid-ask spread. They document a significant difference between the posted 
spread and the effective spread paid by investors. For most orders, the effective 
spread averages half the posted spread. In addition, the effective spread is 
significantly smaller than posted spread. The simple correlation between the posted 
spread and the effective spread is less than 0.1. Petersen and Fialkowski (1994) 
explain that the low correlation suggests that the empirical results16 based on the 
posted spread are misleading. Accordingly, the posted spread is a poor measure of 
the costs of liquidity. 
Lesmond et al. (1999a) run annual comparisons between three liquidity 
measures. They find that Zeros dominates Roll (1984) measures. Similarly, Lesmond 
et al. (2005) match between five liquidity measures for 23 emerging countries and 
show that cross-country differences in liquidity are best explained by the price 
impact-based models, such as Zeros and Roll. They also find that Zeros measure is 
over 80% correlated with the underlying cross country bid–ask spread, while Roll 
measure is over 49% correlated with the underlying cross-country bid–ask spread.  
Goyenko et al. (2006) run monthly and annual comparisons between 12 
liquidity measures. In the monthly effective spread comparisons, they find that 
Holden, Effective Tick, and Zeros are the best overall. In the 5-minute price impact 
horserace, Holden is the best overall. For the realized spread comparisons, Amihud is 
the best overall. For the permanent price impact comparisons, there are mixed 
                                                          
16 Past empirical tests used the posted spread as a proxy for the spread paid by investors [see 
Demsetz (1968), Branch and Freed (1977) and Benston and Hagerman (1974). 
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results. Hasbrouck (2005, 2009) runs an annual comparisons between four 
measures17. He compares each measure to effective spread and price impact as 
computed from TAQ data from 1993 – 2003. The findings show that Gibbs 
dominates as a proxy for annual effective spread and Amihud dominates as a proxy 
for annual price impact.  
More recently, Goyenko et al. (2009) match between all of the widely used 
proxies, which include 12 bid-ask spread proxies and 12 price impact proxies. They 
find a close association between many of these measures. The results show that 
Gamma by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) is clearly dominated by other measures 
while the widely used Amihud is a good proxy for price impact. Goyenko et al. 
(2009) also conclude that liquidity measures based on daily data provide good 
measures of high-frequency transaction cost benchmarks. In the monthly and annual 
effective and realized spread comparisons, they find that Holden, Effective Tick, and 
Zeros are the best overall.  
2.4 Stock market quality 
The previous section discusses the various liquidity proxies, including 
transaction costs, trading activity, volatility and price efficiency. The concept of 
market quality has become increasing important in the liquidity literature. In 
particular, market liquidity proxies are considered as foundations to market quality 
measures. A considerable amount of market quality literature has applied the same 
proxies of market liquidity. Madhavan (2002) for instance consider spreads, trading 
activity, and volatility as metrics of market quality which are the same metrics of 
market liquidity. Furthermore, and despite the elusive concept of market quality, 
most studies agree on the notion that market quality has the same dimensions of 
                                                          
17
 These four measures are TAQ from TAQ database; ILLIQ in Amihud (2002), Gibbs in Hasbrouk 
(2004), and Zeros or LOT in Lesmond et al. (1999) 
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market liquidity18
.
 For instance, some studies assume that improvements in market 
quality would include declining transaction costs, increase in trading activity, and 
reduced trading volatility (e.g. Grossman and Miller (1988), Bacidore (1997) and 
Domwitz and Stell (1999)). Others, argue that market quality can be improved by 
reducing pricing errors, speeding up the process in which prices impound private and 
public information, reducing price asymmetry, and stock market prices follow a 
random walk (e.g. Cohen et al. (1983a, 1983b), Amihud and Mendelson (1987), 
Hasbrouck (1993), Kumar et al. (1998), Domwitz and Stell (1999), and Chelley-
Steeley (2008, 2009)). This section presents the widely used stock market quality 
measures.   
2.4.1 Market quality measures 
Stock market quality can be measured using many proxies such as price 
efficiency, transaction costs, trading activity and volatility. As the previous section 
has discussed some of these measures, this section looks exclusively into price 
efficiency measures. In that, these measures are widely applied in stock market 
quality literature.  
2.4.1.1 Price adjustment delays  
Cohen et al. (1983a, 1983b) suggest a model in which market frictions keep 
the true price
19
 away from the intrinsic price. The trading process can delay the price 
adjustment process and thus reduce market efficiency. The friction per se in the 
trading process induces variance between observed and true returns. This friction 
also causes observed returns to be generated asynchronously for a set of 
                                                          
18
 See Harris (1994), Madhavan (2000), Amihud et al (1997), and Battalioet al (1997) among others. 
19 The true returns are generated by a frictionless market and this is a hypothetical issue. Empirical 
estimates of beta are affected by friction in the trading process which delays the adjustment of a 
security's price to informational change and hence leads to an "intervalling-effect" bias. 
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interdependent securities. The difference between observed returns and true returns 
can be calculated as 
    
   ∑               
 
    , (2.30)  
where     
  denotes the difference between observed returns         and true returns 
       of stock   generated at    ; the true returns      for each stock can be 
generated by 
                       , (2.31)  
where        is the beta from the market model for stock   calculated for period k; it 
is assumed that      and      are independent for all    , and  ;      and      are 
independent for all     and all   and   and  (    )    for all   and   ; the 
estimated coefficient  ̂       can be used as a quantitative proxy variable to measure 
the frictions effect on a stock's beta. Furthermore, the larger the absolute value of the 
estimated coefficient  ̂       for any given stock the stronger is the intervalling-effect 
(frictions) on that security's beta coefficient. Cohen et al. (1983a, 1983b) assume that 
frictions may lengthen the price adjustment delays. This delay results in part from the 
structural design of the trading mechanisms and in part from the presence of 
specialists and individual traders. In particular, specialists or dealers impeding 
quotation price adjustments in the act of satisfying exchange stabilization obligations 
or maintaining inventory imbalances. Individual traders are looking for trading only 
periodically due to transaction costs, availability of information, and decision. In 
addition, these price-adjustment delays in turn imply non-synchronous trading and 
thus introduce serial cross-correlation into stock returns and serial correlation into 
index returns. The empirical results of Cohen et al. (1983a, 1983b) suggest that 
across all issues there is a strong, monotonic relationship between the bias and a 
50 
 
security's market value. They show that one-day beta estimates tend to be biased 
upward for the actively traded stocks and downward for the thinly traded stocks. 
Hence, stocks will generally lead other stocks in adjusting to new information. The 
model of the intervalling-effect bias in beta estimates show that the bias declines 
asymptotically to zero as the differencing interval increases and that the sign of the 
bias depends on a stock's relative value of shares outstanding. They also anticipate 
that betas are most biased in short-term returns and that the bias is negative for 
securities with relatively long-term price adjustment delays and positive for 
securities with relatively short price adjustment delays. 
2.4.1.2 Partial adjustment and pricing error  
In the spirit of Cohen et al. (1983a, 1983b), Amihud and Mendelson (1987) 
develop a model based on price behaviour. This model distinguishes between the 
intrinsic value of a security and its observed price. Amihud and Mendelson (1987) 
assume that the difference between the intrinsic value and observed price is due to 
the noise, as suggested by Black (1986). According to Amihud and Mendelson 
(1987), these two effects can be captured by a partial-adjustment model with noise, 
which is specified as follows  
            [       ]      , (2.32)  
where     is the logarithm of observed prices,    is the logarithm of intrinsic value 
and    is the white noise sequence of pricing errors that reflect the influence of noise. 
This noise    temporarily pushes the observed prices away from intrinsic prices. In 
addition, this noise comes from two main sources. First, it is the result of noise 
trading induced by transitory liquidity needs of traders and investors and by errors in 
the analysis and interpretation of information. Second, it reflects the impact of the 
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trading mechanism by which prices are set in the market
20
. The coefficient   reflects 
the adjustment of transaction prices towards the security's value. In particular,     
represents the extreme case of no price reaction to changes in value, and        
represents partial price adjustment. A unit adjustment coefficient     represents 
full price adjustment. The magnitude of partial price adjustment depends on the 
amount and quality of information and the extent to which there are inefficiencies in 
the market. When     then the observed price from the           will be 
            (2.33)  
By taking the absolute value of the pricing error    (or price inefficiency (PI) as 
Chelley-Steeley (2009) suggested) 
    |      | (2.34)  
where    is the pricing error between the observed price     and the intrinsic price    
and hence    captures the extent to which observed prices diverge from their intrinsic 
values. By using data         , the mean pricing error    will be 
 
    ∑
|      |
 
 
   
 
(2.35)  
In term of market quality, the improvement of market quality will decrease the 
difference between            , hence the pricing error    will fall.  
2.4.1.3 MEC  
Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) develop a model known as market efficiency 
coefficient (MEC) to measure the average transaction costs for all trades of a certain 
                                                          
20
 Amihud and Mendelson (1986) the trading mechanisms effects result from the random arrival of 
buy and sell orders to the market as in Mendelson (1982, 1985, 1986, 1987a), the transitory state of 
dealers' inventory positions as in Amihud and Mendelson (1980, the discreteness of stock prices as 
suggested by Gottlieb and Kalay (1985), delayed price discovery Cohen et al. Maier, Schwartz and 
Whitcomb (1983 a,b)),  and price fluctuations between the bid and the ask. 
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stock, in a particular market, over a certain period of time. This measure relies on the 
idea that transaction costs increase the volatility of short-term price movements 
relative to the volatility of long-term price movements 
     
       
           
 , (2.36)  
where         denotes the variance of the logarithm of long-period return,         
the variance of the logarithm of short-period return,   number of short periods in 
each long period. The variance ratio matches the return variance of a long period 
        to the return variance of a short period        . If the return series follows 
a random walk, the variance ratio equals one. The market quality improves when 
MEC declines below one. The magnitude of MEC is attributable to the transaction 
costs and adverse selection costs. If     , the changes in      is attributed to 
the information asymmetry. In contrast, if     , the changes in     is attributed 
to the immediacy costs, changes in market mechanisms, and large block trades. 
3.3.1.4 Pricing errors and random walk  
Hasbrouck (1993) develops a market quality measure based on 
decomposition of a non-stationary time series into a random- walk component and a 
residual stationary component. The random-walk component is defined as the 
efficient price with the stationary component. The stationary component measures 
the difference between the efficient price and the actual transaction price 
          , (2.37)  
the first component    is the efficient price which is similar to the intrinsic price    
in Amihud and Mendelson (1987) model;    is a reflection of all public and private 
information at time t which can be inferred from the flow of transactions;    is the 
deviation between the efficient price and the observed transaction thus    is the 
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pricing error which is similar to    in Amihud and Mendelson (1987). The magnitude 
of pricing error depends on diverse microstructure effects such as discreteness, 
inventory cost, the non-information-based component of the bid-ask spread and the 
transient component of the price response to a block trade. Accordingly, the 
difference between efficient price and observed price    is equal the transaction costs. 
The efficient price is assumed to follow a random walk  
            , (2.38)  
where    is uncorrelated increments,           
     
   and               . 
The diffusion of the pricing error measures how closely actual transaction prices 
follow a random walk and thus constitutes an appropriate measure for transaction 
costs. A measure of market quality is then defined as the variance of the pricing 
error    
  . Hasbrouck (1993) suggests the standard deviation of the pricing error as a 
unique measure of market quality that measures how closely the transaction price 
tracks the efficient price. The magnitude of standard deviation as a proxy for market 
quality depends on the assumption that as transaction costs and other trading barriers 
are reduced, actual transaction prices should track the efficient prices more closely. 
Hasbrouk’s (1993) market quality measure implies that lower variance indicates a 
market with higher quality. In addition, a decrease in the variance of the pricing error 
would be evidence of greater pricing efficiency. 
3.3.1.5 Relative Return Dispersion (RRD)  
Amihud et al. (1997) introduce a market quality proxy called the Relative 
Return Dispersion (RRD). They assume that the pricing errors can be measured by 
the RRD which is based on the variance of returns across securities as suggested by 
Amihud and Mendelson  (1989, 1991b) 
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   (2.39)  
where       is the average relative return dispersion coefficient on day t obtained 
using all i stocks in the sample;     
  are the squared market model residuals of 
security i on day t. Then the RRD measures, for each event-day s, the dispersion of 
the returns on the individual stocks around the market. Since the dispersion of values 
due to firm-fundamental information should be independent of the trading 
mechanism, systematic differences in RRD between pre- and post-periods indicate 
differences in price efficiency. A lower RRD indicates lower pricing errors hence 
higher market quality. 
3.3.1.6 The market quality index (MQUAL)  
Nimalendran and Petrella (2003) suggest a market quality index to examine 
the impact of a hybrid system on very-thinly-traded stocks in Italian Stock Exchange 
(ISE) 
         
        
         
 , (2.40)  
where          denotes the market quality index;          the depth variable is 
stated in terms of the average monetary value of the shares offered at the ask-bid 
prices;           is the difference between the ask and the bid. This index quantifies 
the trade-off between bid-ask spreads and depths. A market characterised by high 
depth and low spread induces a higher market quality index. An increase in the 
market quality index suggests that the increasing in depth is more than spread.  
3.3.1.7 Full information transaction cost (FITC)  
Similar to the standard deviation measure of Hasbrouck (1993), Bandi and 
Russell (2006) design a market quality measure known as full information 
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transaction price (FITC). This measure can be defined as the conditional expectation 
of future discounted cash flows given all private and public information. Given the 
positive difference between the observed transaction price of an asset and the 
corresponding unobserved full-information price, FITC can be calculated by 
 ̅           , (2.41)  
where  ̅    ̅   ̅    is the observed continuously-compounded return over the 
transaction interval           ;                is the corresponding full-information 
or unobserved price which reflects private and public information of the security, and 
           denotes market effects in the observed return process. Bandi and 
Russell (2006) undertake that the market effects            are mean zero and 
covariance stationary with standard deviation   . In addition, their covariance 
structure of order smaller than k can be different from zero while the covariance of 
order higher than k is equal to zero. Under these assumptions             will be 
written 
   √      (2.42)  
The magnitude of the standard deviation of market effects    depends upon the 
speed on which prices adjust to new information and the transaction costs, 
particularly, inventory and adverse selection costs. In the context of this measure, a 
market with high quality is expected to have an efficient price closer to the 
unobserved full-information price and transaction prices. This market is also 
characterised by faster price adjustment.  
2.4.2 Empirical studies on market quality  
Several empirical studies focus on the characteristics of the actively traded 
(liquid) versus inactively traded stocks (illiquid). Grossman and Miller (1988) argue 
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that the efficiency of stock markets result from the effectiveness costs of supplying 
immediacy. These costs depend on the positions of liquidity suppliers and 
demanders. The market makers as liquidity suppliers are most likely to enhance 
liquidity when the cost of immediacy is low. Based on this view, the lower the cost 
of immediacy, the more liquid a stock is. Therefore, most of actively traded stocks 
are traded by large number of market makers. These stocks have lower volatility, and 
less adverse selection costs. In contrast, illiquid stocks are characterised by high 
transaction costs that results from high volatility, and high adverse selection cost. 
Accordingly, illiquid stocks are less preferable to the market makers as they bear 
more risk. From liquidity demanders’ perspective, the cost of immediacy can be 
effective when the difference between the true price and current price is close to 
zero. Grossman and Miller (1988) conclude that the greater the demand for 
immediacy and the lower the cost to market makers, the larger the proportion of the 
transactions and, hence, the more efficient is the market.  
Neal (1992) tests Grossman and Miller’s (1988) hypothesis by comparing the 
performance of AMEX and CBOE markets. Their results show that AMEX’s 
specialist system is considered as an example of high quality market since the 
transaction cost is low. In the same vein, Harris (1994) uses trading activity and 
transaction costs measures, namely bid-ask spread, trading volume and quoted depth, 
as proxies for market quality. He shows that a reduction in minimum price 
variation
21
 damages the market quality. Madhavan et al. (2005) examine the impact 
of transparency in Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) on some market quality measures. 
These measures include transaction cost measures, volatility, stock price and depths. 
They find that higher transparency does not improve market quality.  
                                                          
21
 The minimum price variation rules limit the minimum bid-ask spread that can be quoted. 
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Battalio et al. (1997) apply market quality measures to examine the short-run 
effects of the internalization on order flow
22
. The market quality measures include 
the time-weighted average (TWS) of the quoted bid-ask spread and the liquidity 
premium (LP). They show that the internalisation of order flow on regional 
exchanges has little short-run effect on the quality measures at the national level. 
They attribute their findings to the fact that the degree of market fragmentation is too 
small. Bacidore (1997) examines the impact of decimalisation on market quality 
across two trading systems on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE). He employs 
quoted depth, the adverse selection component, average trading volume, effective, 
and quoted bid-ask spreads as quality measures. He assumes that improvements in 
market quality would include a decline in bid-ask spreads, increased depths and 
increased trading volume. Their results suggest that decimalisation partially 
improves stock market quality. Both quoted and effective bid-ask spread are 
decreased significantly after decimalization. However, the average daily trading 
volume did not increase significantly. Ronen and Weaver (1998) use volatility as 
another proxy of  quality market. In contrasts to Bacidore (1997), Ronen and Weaver 
report a significant improvement in market quality following the reduction in tick 
size. In particular, transaction costs and volatility are reduced, while trading volume 
is increased.  
Lai (2004, 2007) examines the quality of SET system in London Stock 
Exchange by using transaction costs measures such as inside spreads, effective 
spreads, realized spreads and adverse selection costs. The result shows that the 
overall market quality of the stocks moving to the hybrid market dropped after the 
                                                          
22
 Internalization means that when a brokerage receives an order they have numerous choices as to 
how it should be filled. They can send it to an exchange, an ECN, market maker, a regional exchange 
or fill it by using the firm's own inventory of stock (www.investopedia.com).  
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transition. He also shows that the decline of market quality appears to result from the 
change in the level of information asymmetry.  
Kumar et al. (1998) study the impact of stock option listings on several 
aspects of stock market quality
23
. The results confirm the notion that reduction in 
pricing error, lower information asymmetry and lower transaction costs improve the 
market quality of underlying stocks. Muscarella and Piwowar (2001) use three 
proxies of market quality to study the impact of switching from call auction to 
continuous trading mechanisms, or vice versa, in Paris Bourse stocks. The result 
shows that actively traded stocks experience better market quality in continuous 
markets order. In contrast, inactively traded stocks in the call trading market exhibit 
price and liquidity reductions.  
Ozenbas et al. (2002) use the accentuated intraday stock price volatility as a 
quality measure over the year 2000 for five stock markets: NYSE, NASDAQ, LSE, 
Euronext Paris and Deutsche Börse. They suggest that the volatility accentuation is 
attributable to spreads, price discovery and momentum trading. Accordingly, this 
proxy measures many aspects at once. They also claim that volatility is like 
cholesterol which has a good and bad side. Good volatility characterises price 
adjustments that are attributable to news. Bad volatility characterises price changes 
that are attributable to transaction costs. Ozenbas et al. (2002, 2010) show that 
accentuated volatility at open and close for the stock market damage the quality of 
underlying stocks. This implies that news cannot be translated into new consensus 
values until all orders based on the new information have arrived. Accentuated 
volatility also reflects the difficulty of absorbing price pressures at close and open 
markets.  
                                                          
23
 These measures include: the variance of pricing error, the relative weight placed by the specialist 
on public information in revising prices for the underlying stocks and quoted bid–ask spreads and 
depths. 
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Bessembinder (2003) considers a limited set of market quality measures 
including quotation sizes, price volatility and return variance ratios. They assess the 
market quality for NYSE and NASDAQ stocks before and after the change to 
decimal pricing. The result affirms the idea that decimalization improves the market 
quality of both markets. Krishnamurti et al. (2003) apply the metric for market 
quality of Hasbrouck (1993) to compare between the National Stock Exchange 
(NSE) and Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) in India. They also apply the multivariate 
regression approach of Hasbrouck and Schwartz (1988) to identify the source of the 
observed differences in market quality between the two markets. The results show 
that NSE has a better quality market relative to BSE. 
Chelley-Steeley (2008) examines the impact of the introduction of a closing 
call auction on market quality in LSE. She uses the partial adjustment coefficient 
with pricing inefficiency introduced by Amihud and Mendelson (1987)
24 
as a proxy 
for market quality. Chelley-Steeley (2008) assumes that microstructure modifications 
that speed up adjustment process and reduce pricing inefficiency, may improve 
market quality. The empirical findings show that the introduction of the closing call 
auction in LSE leads to an increase in the speed at which prices adjust to new 
information. The findings also confirm that stocks in the closing call auction 
experience a considerable improve in pricing efficiency.  
Chelley-Steeley (2009) uses a different set of market quality proxies to 
investigate the price quality associated with the introduction of a closing call auction 
in LSE. Specifically, she applies three key metrics of market quality including Cohen 
et al. (1983a,b) model; RRD and MEC. By using Cohen et al. (1983a,b), the results 
show a substantial increase in the synchronicity of opening and closing returns 
                                                          
24
 The partial adjustment model with noise introduced by Amihud and Mendelson (1987) shows that 
observed security returns can be influenced by both noise and the failure of observed prices to 
adjust to intrinsic values immediately. 
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following the introduction of LSE call auction. The results also show a reduction in 
MEC and RRD coefficient. The results of Chelley-Steeley (2009) confirm the notion 
that the improvements in market quality are larger at the open than at the close. 
Battalio et al. (2003) argue that the quality of stock market is considered as a 
multi-dimensional phenomenon. These dimensions include the execution quality of 
the order flow which is measured by execution speed, trade price and depth 
improvement. By using these measures, Battalio et al. (2003) conclude that the 
NYSE provides investors with more accurate prices than NASDAQ. Their findings 
confirm that retail market orders obtain better trade prices on the NYSE but faster 
executions, and more depth improvement. Bennett and Wei  (2006) use both 
volatility and efficiency proxies to examine the quality of consolidated system in 
NYSE. Their volatility proxies include five-minute return standard deviation, daily 
volatility and five-minute price high–low ranges and their price efficiency proxies 
are the return autocorrelation, price efficiency based on Hasbrouck (1993) and the 
variance ratio, as modelled by Barnea (1974)25. Bennett and Wei assume that the 
price movements during short periods contain less fundamental news and are more 
reflective of transitory price changes due to market structure differences or order 
imbalances. The empirical results show that on average stocks experience 
improvement in market quality and price efficiency on the consolidated system in 
NYSE.  
Eom et al. (2007) apply six measures26 of market quality to examine the 
impact of pre-trade transparency on Korea Exchange (KRX). These measures include 
bid-ask spread and relative spread, market depth, transient volatility, market to limit 
                                                          
25
  This measure is as same as MEC measure in the previous section. 
26
These measures are (i) Bid-ask spread, (ii) Liquidity market depth; (iii) Transient volatility;(iv) 
Market-to-limit order ratio; (v) full-information transaction cost as suggested by Bandi and Rusell 
(2006); and (vi) and Implied spread and its adverse selection . 
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order ratio, price efficiency measures as suggested by Bandi and Russell (2006) and 
Hasbrouck (1993), and implied spread as modelled by Madhavan et al. (2005). By 
using these measures, Eom et al. (2007) conclude that market quality is increasing in 
pre trade transparency. In particular, market quality is an increasing concave function 
of pre-trade transparency, and the benefits of providing additional pre-trade 
disclosure are significantly diminishing above a certain point. Alexander and 
Peterson (2008) examine how the uptick rule on the NYSE influence on market 
quality as measured by market volatility, price efficiency and liquidity. More 
specifically, they look at short trading volume, number of short trades, short trade 
size, quoted and effective spreads, inside depths, price location and price impact. 
They find no evidence of a significant change in either market volatility or market 
efficiency after the suspension of uptick price on either the NYSE or NASDAQ.  
Hendershott and Moulton (2009) use transaction costs and price discovery as  
market quality proxies. They measure transaction costs from immediacy and adverse 
selection costs and price discovery from intraday volatility and price efficiency 
proxies. The measures of intraday volatility are the five-minute trading range, the 
five-minute quote return volatility and the five-minute volatility of the efficient price. 
The empirical results show that the NYSE’s hybrid market raises the cost of 
immediacy by about 10 per cent relative to its pre hybrid level. This increase is 
attributable to higher adverse selection. The increase in adverse selection is 
accompanied by more information being incorporated into prices more efficiently.  
Chung and Chuwonganant (2009) examine how transparency system in Super 
Montage  in the NASDAQ affects the transaction costs and measures of execution 
quality. They use several measures of execution quality, order execution speed for 
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shares executed at the quote, fill rate
27
 and realized spread. The empirical results 
affirm the notion that Super Montage improves market and execution quality on 
NASDAQ through greater pre-trade transparency and the integrated, more efficient 
quotation and trading system. 
2.5 Liquidity risk and asset pricing 
The literature on capital asset pricing considers that investors who trade in 
illiquid securities face higher liquidity risk. Consequently, the cost of equity capital 
increases following the demand of investors for a higher liquidity premium.   
The earlier literature on the market microstructure has focused on the capital 
asset pricing model (CAPM) which is derived by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), 
Mossin (1966) and Black et al. (1972). This model has a considerable attention on 
the literature of finance of more than forty years. The CAPM explains that market 
beta is the only risk factor to explain the cross-sectional variation of expected stock 
returns. In addition, there is a positive and linear relationship between an asset’s 
expected return, its systematic risk and the expected market premium. While the 
CAPM received early empirical support, it was subsequently challenged on the basis 
of incompleteness. A number of papers attempted to address the incompleteness 
issue, notably Barry and Brown (1985), Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Chordia et 
al. (2000), Amihud (2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen 
(2005) and Liu (2006). 
2.5.1 Liquidity and asset pricing one-dimensional-based models 
 Amihud and Mendelson (1986) conduct a pioneering study to investigate the 
role of illiquidity in asset pricing using the bid-ask spread as a proxy for illiquidity. 
They suggest a model in which rational investors evaluate securities in such way that 
                                                          
27 
fill rate measured by the ratio of the cumulative number of shares of covered orders executed at 
the receiving market centre to the cumulative number of shares of covered orders 
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the expected return is higher for stocks with larger bid-ask spreads. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) provide empirical support for their model by examining portfolios  
of  NYSE stocks during the 1961-80 period. They find a positive association between 
annual portfolio returns and bid-ask spreads hence a positive relation between 
expected return and illiquidity. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Vayanos (1998) 
explain that liquidity might affect expected returns because investors anticipate 
having to sell their shares at some point in the future, and recognize that when they 
do so, they will face transactions costs. These costs can stem either from the 
inventory considerations of risk-averse market makers or from problems of adverse 
selection. But in either case, when the transactions costs are higher, rational investors 
would apply a higher discount rate to the underlying stock.  
Eleswarapu and Reinganum (1993), empirically, extend the Amihud and 
Mendelson’s study by investigating  the  relation  between average  returns  and  bid-
ask spreads in January and in non-January months. They find that the relationship 
between bid-ask spreads and asset returns is mainly limited to the month of January. 
Fama and French (1992, 1993) develop a three-factor model that includes the 
size and book-to-market factors in addition to the CAPM’s market factor. They show 
that the model is able to capture a substantial proportion of the cross-sectional 
variations in stock returns. Fama and French (1995) subsequently document that the 
three-factor model is able to explain the size and book-to-market anomalies not 
explained by the CAPM, including the long-term return reversals.  
Brennan et al. (1996) investigate the empirical relation between monthly 
stock returns and measures of illiquidity obtained from intraday data. They account 
for firm size risk using Fama and French's (1993) three-factor model. They find a 
significant relation between required rates of return and the measures of liquidity 
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after adjusting for the Fama and French factors, and also after accounting for the 
effects of the stock price level. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996) explain that the 
process of price formation in stock markets, suggest that privately informed traders 
produce significant illiquidity costs for uninformed investors, implying that the 
required rates of return should be higher for securities that are relatively illiquid. 
Their study shows no evidence of seasonality in the premiums associated with the 
transactions costs.  
Rubio and Tapia (1996) find a positive liquidity premium in January. 
Brennan et al. (1998) examine the relation between stock returns, measures of risk 
and several non-risk security characteristics, including the book-to-market ratio, firm 
size, the stock price, the dividend yield and lagged returns. They use two different 
versions of the factor model that is used to adjust for risk, which are the principal 
components approach of Connor and Korajczyk (1988) and the characteristic-factor 
based approach of Fama and French (1993). They find a strong negative relation 
between average returns and trading volume for both NYSE and NASDAQ stocks. 
They also show that the firm size and book-to-market ratio effects are strong in the 
Connor and Korajczyk (1988) method of risk-adjustment. Finally, their results 
suggest that Nasdaq stocks have much lower returns than the other stocks in the 
sample after adjusting for the effects of the firm characteristics and the factor 
loadings. 
2.5.2 Liquidity and asset pricing multi-dimensional- based models 
Chordia et al. (2000, 2001), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Huberman and 
Halka (2001) suggest a new area in examining the relationship between liquidity and 
market return. They examine the presence of commonality in individual stock 
liquidity measures. Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001) investigate common factors in 
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prices, order flows, and liquidity for 30 constituent stocks from the Dow Jones 
Industrial Index (DJIA). They find that both returns and order flows are associated 
with common factors. The common factors in the order flows explain approximately 
two-thirds of the commonality in returns. However, their results are less supportive 
to the presence of significant commonality in liquidity. 
However, Chordia et al. (2000) reach a diverse conclusion when examining 
the sources of commonality in the changes of several daily liquidity measures for 
1169 US stocks during the year 1992. Using a market model for liquidity, they find 
that common market and industry influence on individual stock’s liquidity measures. 
They assume that individual stock liquidity measured by quoted spreads, quoted 
depth, and effective spreads commove with market-wide liquidity.  In particular, they 
find that a stock’s bid-ask spread is negatively related to the aggregate level of 
market liquidity. They interpret this result as being consistent with a decrease in 
inventory risk resulting from greater market trading. This reduction is most likely 
driven by uninformed traders. The existence of commonality is also due to the 
impact of asymmetric information which is driven by informed traders attempting to 
hide their activities by breaking block trades into small number of transactions. They 
also suggest that the market-wide trading activity induces more influence on 
inventory risk whereas individual trading activity is possibly associated with 
asymmetric information. 
Huberman and Halka (1999) examine the commonality in liquidity, using the 
depth as well as the bid–ask spread as proxies for the liquidity of about 240 US-
traded stocks. They show similar results to Chordia et al. (2000), and they attribute 
commonality in stock’s liquidity to the presence of noise traders. The studies of 
Hasbrouck and Seppi (1999), Chordia et al. (2000), Huberman and Halka (1999) left 
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an open question as to whether illiquidity is a systematic risk factor, in which case 
stocks that are more sensitive to unexpected market illiquidity shocks, should offer 
higher expected returns. 
The study of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) answer the left question by the 
previous studies. They are the first to investigate whether liquidity is a source of 
priced systematic risk in stock returns. They construct a measure of market liquidity 
in a given month as the equally weighted average of the liquidity measures of 
individual stocks on the NYSE and AMEX, using daily data within the month. In 
particular, they focus on systematic liquidity risk in returns and find that stocks 
whose returns are more exposed to market wide liquidity fluctuations require higher 
expected returns. They claim that many traders may require higher expected returns 
on assets whose returns have higher sensitivities to aggregate liquidity. When market 
liquidity declines, many investors sell stocks and buy bonds and those investors 
might prefer to sell liquid stocks in order to save on transaction costs. As a result, the 
price reaction to aggregate liquidity changes could be stronger for stocks that are 
more active. In addition, prices of actively traded stocks may have greater sensitivity 
to aggregate liquidity shocks if such stocks are held in larger proportion by the more 
liquidity conscious investors. Their empirical result shows that a stock’s liquidity 
risk measured by beta (i.e. the return sensitivity to innovations in aggregate liquidity) 
plays a significant role in asset pricing. Specifically, stocks with higher liquidity 
betas are shown to exhibit higher expected returns. They also show that the 
correlation between aggregate liquidity and stock market returns is larger than those 
between aggregate liquidity and other factors included in empirical asset pricing 
literatures. The correlation between the liquidity risk and the market return is -0.52, 
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while the correlations with SMB and HML are 0.23 and -0.12, respectively. The 
correlation between liquidity risk and the momentum factor is only 0.01.   
Along the same lines, the study by Amihud (2002) shows that the expected 
stock returns are an increasing function of expected illiquidity. Across NYSE stocks 
during 1964–1997, illiquidity has a positive and strong significant effect on expected 
rate of return. The effects over time of illiquidity on stock excess return vary across 
stocks by either their liquidity or size. The effects of both expected and unexpected 
illiquidity are stronger on the returns of inactive stock portfolios. This suggests that 
the variations over time in the ‘‘inactive firm effect’’, which is explained as the 
excess return on inactive firms’ stock, is partly due to changes in market illiquidity. 
This because in times of ‘‘dreadful liquidity’’, there is a ‘‘flight to liquidity’’ that 
makes large firms relatively more attractive. The greater sensitivity of small stocks to 
illiquidity means that these stocks are subject to greater illiquidity risk which, if 
priced, should result in higher illiquidity risk premium. The results suggest that the 
stock excess return, usually referred to as ‘‘risk premium’’, is in part a premium for 
stock illiquidity which means that stock excess returns reflect not only the higher risk 
but also the lower liquidity of stock compared to high secured treasury bills. Schwert 
and National Bureau of Economic (2002) also show similar conclusions as they find 
that an increase in the liquidity of a firm’s stock would reduce required returns and 
increase the stock price if the cost of trading is low. 
Baker and Stein (2004) attribute the relationship between liquidity and the 
stock market return to the presence of market frictions and traders behaviour. At 
some initial date, uninformed traders receive private signals about future 
fundamentals, which they overreact to, generating sentiment shocks. The short-sales 
constraint implies that uninformed traders will only be active in the market when 
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their valuations are higher than those of informed traders. When the sentiment of 
uninformed traders is negative, the short-sales constraint keeps them out of the 
market altogether. At a subsequent date, there is a round of trading by an informed 
insider. Since the uninformed traders also tend to make the market more liquid in the 
face of such informed trading, measures of liquidity provide a signal of the presence 
or absence of these traders, and hence of the level of prices relative to fundamentals. 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) present a liquidity adjusted capital asset pricing 
model that helps explain how asset prices are affected by liquidity risk and 
commonality in liquidity. The model shows that the required rate of return of a 
security i is increasing in the covariance between its illiquidity and the market 
illiquidity; decreasing in the covariance between the security’s return and the market 
illiquidity and decreasing in the covariance between its illiquidity and market returns. 
The model also shows that positive shocks to illiquidity are associated with a low 
simultaneous returns and high predicted future returns.  
Gibson and Mougeot (2004) investigate whether systematic liquidity risk is 
priced in the stocks traded in the S&P 500. They define the long term aggregate 
liquidity as the number of traded stocks per month in the S&P 500 index. Consistent 
with Chordia et al. (2000), they show that market-wide liquidity in the US market is 
priced and find that cross-sectional expected stock returns are reflected the variations 
in aggregate liquidity. Sadka (2006) estimates the variable and fixed price effects of 
firm-level liquidity using high frequency data, and examines how these components 
describe asset-pricing anomalies. He finds that the unexpected fluctuations of the 
variable liquidity component explain the momentums and post-earnings 
announcement change.  
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More recently, Liu (2006) develops a new model and shows that liquidity is 
an important source of priced risk. He proposes a two-factor (market and liquidity) 
model that explains the cross-sectional stock returns after controlling for well-
documented stock characteristics. Liu (2006) argues that a two-factor model which 
incorporating the market and liquidity outperforms Fama and French’s three-factor 
model. Liu (2006) uses liquidity measure which is considered to capture the multi-
dimensional nature of liquidity namely, the trading quantity, trading speed, trading 
cost and price impact.  
The empirical evidence from markets other than the US shows similar results. 
In addition, it is noteworthy that the studies on the liquidity risk show different 
conclusions even when similar liquidity proxies were employed in different markets. 
Martínez et al. (2005) examine the liquidity risk proxy suggested by Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2002). Their results show that systematic liquidity risk is significantly 
priced in the Spanish stock market. Marcelo and Quirós (2006) apply the measure of 
Amihud (2002) and Fama and French (1993). They conclude that systematic 
illiquidity should be a key ingredient of asset pricing. From the Australian market 
Durand et al. (2006) find that the Fama and French’s three-factor model (1993) 
captures returns of the largest stocks in Australia, but that it is unable to explain the 
returns of the inactive traded stocks. Chan and Faff (2005) and Limkriangkrai et al. 
(2008) find strong evidence with support for a liquidity-augmented Fama-French 
model and evidence that liquidity plays an important role in asset valuation. Chai et 
al. (2009) augment the Carhart four-factor model with a liquidity factor and apply 
individual and system regression tools. They find a significant illiquidity premium 
and evidence that liquidity account for a portion of the common fluctuation in stock 
returns even after controlling for firm size, book-to-market and momentum factor. In 
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contrast, and from the same market, Gharghori et al. (2007) do not find strong 
evidence that liquidity risk is priced. 
Lee (2011) tests the liquidity-adjusted capital asset pricing model of Acharya 
and Pedersen (2005). They find evidence that liquidity risks are priced independently 
of market risk in international financial markets. Chung and Wei (2005) report a 
positive relation between holding periods and bid-ask spreads in Chinese stock 
markets. Luo and Jing (2011) show that the aggregate market liquidity risk is priced 
in the Chinese stock market. Similarly, Bekaert et al. (2007) show that liquidity is 
priced in their sample of 18 emerging stock markets. Lam and Tam (2011) apply 
nine measures of liquidity to examine the return-liquidity relation in the Hong Kong 
stock market. They show that liquidity is an important factor for pricing returns in 
Hong Kong. Roll et al. (2009) find that share turnover has a positive impact on 
valuation, consistent with the presence of liquidity premium in asset prices. Li et al. 
(2011) investigate whether liquidity and liquidity risk are priced in Japan. They find 
from both cross-sectional and time series that liquidity is priced in the Japanese stock 
market during the period 1975–2006.  
The existence liquidity studies show that the implications of liquidity 
influence both the asset pricing and the coroporate financial policy. If liquidity is 
priced, actively (inactively) traded stock are expected to have (higher) lower rate of 
return and, therefore, lower (higher) cost of equity capital. Increases in stock market 
liquidity through some corporate financial decisions may increase firm’s value and 
lower the cost of equity capital. Consequently, the multi-dimentional nature of 
liquidity has several implications on coroprate finacial policies. The influential work 
of Myers and Majluf (1984) suggest the presence of price adjustment costs may have 
several implications on the  capital structures decisions and corporate financial 
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policy.Stoll and Whaley (1983) was the first to note that stock transaction costs need 
to be taken into account when valuing equity investments and argue that this may 
explain the higher required rate of return on small stocks, which are relatively 
illiquid. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) suggest that firms have an incentive to 
choose corporate policy that makes their securities more liquid because liquidity 
increases firm value. Amihud and Mendelson (1989) further note that managers who 
are concerned about increasing the liquidity of their firm’s financial claims can do so 
through corporate policies such as going public, voluntary disclosure, and 
distributing ownership among a wider base of shareholders.  
Increases in liquidity through either the mechanisms of financial market or 
corporate decisions may increase firm’s value and lower the cost of equity capital. 
Welch (2004) find that the stock return accounts for approximately 40% of the 
capital structure dynamics. Hovakimian et al. (2001) and Leary and Roberts (2005) 
examine the impact of stock resiliency as time dimension of market liquidity on the 
desired capital structure. They find that the speed of price adjustment partly explain 
the decisions related to the desired capital structure thus the presence of adjustment 
costs has significant consequences in corporate financial decisions.  
 Butler et al. (2005) find that investment banking fees are lower for more 
liquid firms. The difference in the investment banking fee for firms in the most liquid 
vs. the least liquid quintile is about 101 basis points which is about 21% of the 
average investment banking fee. They also show that stock market liquidity is an 
important determinant of the cost of raising external capital. Therefore, Butler et al. 
(2005) suggest that firms can reduce the cost of raising capital by improving the 
market liquidity of their stock. Lipson and Mortal  (2009) claim that equity investors 
need to be compensated not only for the risks they bear but for the transaction costs 
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they incur when buying and selling their shares. For example, issuing firms view the 
issuance costs as a component of the cost of equity financing and recent evidence 
suggests that illiquid stocks have higher issuance costs, ceteris paribus. Lipson and 
Mortal  (2009) also show that actively traded stocks are more likely to choose equity 
over debt when raising their capital. Particularly, a decrease in effective spreads is a 
companied with the probability that firms prefer to raise capital by equity and this 
indicates a significant relation between changes in transaction costs and the cost of 
equity capital. More recently, Bharath et al. (2009) show that the market liquidity in 
general and adverse information costs in particular are an important determinant of 
capital structure decisions since the insiders are seeking to reduce the cost of capital. 
2.6 Summary and Conclusion 
The price formation process explains how prices come to impound 
information and liquidity over time. It involves the incorporation of private and 
public information into asset prices and requires consideration of the role of market 
participants. In discovering the price formation, there are two main models, the 
inventory-based models and the information-based models. The inventory-based 
models focus on the impact of the stochastic arrivals of order flows on the cost of 
providing immediacy. The information-based models concentrate on the contribution 
of private and public information on the adverse selection costs. In general, the type 
of information and the level of liquidity that a market maker, informed traders and 
liquidity traders contribute to the price formation process are expected to be a 
function in the asset value and pricing efficiency. 
Despite the elusive concept of liquidity, it can be defined by its dimensions 
which are depth, tightness or width, immediacy, breadth and resiliency. Tightness 
refers to small bid-ask spread resulting in low transaction costs. Immediacy is the 
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speed with which orders can be exercised. Depth is defined as the presence of large 
orders below and above the price. Breadth arises when orders are frequent and large 
in volume with slight impact on price. Resiliency defines as a market with which 
new order arrivals flow quickly to adjust order imbalances, which tend to move 
prices away from its true value. 
The literature of stock market liquidity has applied a considerable number of 
measures. These measures can be classified into either one-dimensional and multi-
dimensional or trade-based and ordered-based. The comparison studies affirm that 
there is a close association between many of these measures. In addition, the 
empirical results indicate that each measure has strengths and weaknesses points 
when applied to assess market liquidity.  
The concept of market quality has become increasing important in the 
liquidity literature. In particular, the proxies of market liquidity are considered as the 
foundation of market quality proxies. A considerable amount of market quality 
literature has applied the same proxies of market liquidity. The improvements in 
market quality would induce a decline in transaction costs, increase in trading 
activity, increase in market resiliency, increase in the price adjustment and reduce in 
trading volatility (e.g. Grossman and Miller (1988), Bacidore (1997) and Domwitz 
and Stell (1999)). 
The improvement of stock market liquidity and market quality has several 
implications on asset pricing and corporate financial policies. Given that if liquidity 
is priced, actively (inactively) traded stocks are expected to have lower (higher) rate 
of returns and, therefore lower (higher) cost of equity capital. The literature on 
market liquidity also shows that the inhanced liquidity influence on the corporate 
financial policies.  
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Chapter 3: The index revision literature 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter discusses how aspects of stock market liquidity 
determine the stock market quality and the cost of equity capital. Amihud et al. 
(2005) argue that in addition to liquidity, other factors, including index revisions and 
exchange listings, are also important in price formation process. In particular, it has 
been documented that stocks enjoy permanent liquidity improvements when they 
join an index and suffer permanent liquidity deterioration when they leave an index. 
The literature of index revision proposes several explanations for the impact of such 
decisions on stock market liquidity. 
Mazouz and Saadouni (2007a, 2007b) attribute the price effect of index 
revision decisions either to fundamental changes or trading effects. Theories on the 
impact of the index revisions on the price formation suggest conflicting explanations. 
Some hypotheses, namely signalling and information-related liquidity, predict that 
index revisions are not completely information-free events and additions (deletions) 
should result in a permanent improvement (deterioration) in the firm’s fundamentals. 
In contrasts, other hypotheses, such as price pressure, state that the events are 
information-free and changes in the firm’s fundamentals following the inclusions and 
exclusions can be short lived. In short, existing studies propose the following 
hypotheses to explain the potential index revision effects: the information-signalling 
hypothesis, non-information-related liquidity hypothesis, investor awareness 
hypothesis, imperfect substitute’s hypothesis and price pressure hypothesis. 
The literature also documents when a stock joins (leaves) a major index its 
commovement with the rest of index stocks increases. Existing studies propose two 
alternative explanations to the change in stock return comovement following the 
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revision events. On the one hand, traditional financial theories imply that firm’s 
fundamentals drive the asset prices. Thus, the change in the stock return comovement 
around index revision events is attributed to the changes in firm’s fundamentals. The 
price of an asset closely reflects the present value of its future cash flows and the 
correlations between the returns of two assets is attributed to their fundamental 
values. On the other hand, the behavioural theories attribute the changes in stock 
return comovement to the changes in investor sentiment. The behaviourists argue 
that asset prices are established by the dynamic interplay between noise traders and 
rational arbitrageurs in the real market with frictions (e.g. Shiller et al., (1984) 
Shleifer and Summers, (1990)). According to this view, factors such as the noise 
traders’ decisions, which are affected by investor sentiment, may induce 
comovement and arbitrage forces may not fully absorb these correlated demand 
shocks (Changsheng and Yongfeng, 2012). Thus, according to the behavioural theory 
the change in stock return comovement is more likely to be caused by the non-
fundamental factors. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the 
various index revision hypotheses, namely the information signalling hypothesis, the 
non-information-related liquidity hypothesis, the information-related liquidity 
hypothesis, the imperfect substitute’s hypothesis, and the price pressure hypothesis. 
Section 3.3 explains the comovement theories. Section 3.4 presents existing 
empirical evidence. Section 3.5 summarises the chapter. 
3.2 Index revisions hypotheses  
This section provides a brief review of the index revision literature. It 
discusses the major index revisions hypotheses and the extent to which these 
hypotheses are supported empirically.  
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3.2.1 The information signalling hypothesis  
 Horne (1970) argues that stocks benefit from the prestige accompanied with 
being listed in the major stock index as well as from the free publicity. Based on this 
view, inclusion signals "good news" about firm’s future prospects. The information 
signalling hypothesis posits that index membership increases the information that is 
available on the underlying stock. Following the inclusion of a stock, it may become 
the subject of closer investigations and scrutiny by analysts and the subject of greater 
interest by market participants. A closer scrutiny leads to more information and less 
risk associated with the accuracy of firm’s information (Bechmann, 2004). Hence, 
investors expect greater demand and a willingness to pay a higher price due to a 
lowering of the realised risk. This hypothesis also implies that the price and volume 
reaction to the revision events is likely to be permanent, since adding or deleting the 
stock from the index conveys private information to the market. In that investors may 
think that the stock exchange officials may use private information in selecting 
stocks for addition to the index. Jain (1987) and Dhillon and Johnson (1991) find 
evidence that additions or deletions can relay new fundamental information to the 
market. 
3.2.2 Non-information-related liquidity hypothesis  
Non-information-related liquidity hypothesis suggested by Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986) argue that if liquidity is priced, an increase in liquidity will result 
in lower expected returns, lower transaction costs and hence a positive permanent 
price reaction following announcement of an addition to the index. According to this 
hypothesis, a stock that joins the index enjoys a permanent increase in the stock’s 
market liquidity. Several studies (e.g. Mazouz and Saadouni (2007a); Hedge and 
McDermott (2003); and Becker-Blease and Paul (2006)) show that index additions 
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improve stock liquidity in number of ways, including a reduction in information 
searching costs and decline in both bid-ask spread and information asymmetry. 
Deininger et al. (2000) maintain that index inclusion can be associated with a 
liquidity effect due to a persistent increase in transaction volume per period. This 
could reduce the volatility of a stock and its bid-ask spread. Chen et al. (2006b) argue 
that an increase of trading volumes of the added stocks will lower the inventory costs 
and hence improve stock market liquidity. Studies of Hedge and McDermott (2003) 
and Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) find significant increase in trading volume 
following the additions. Conversely, liquidity measured by transaction costs rise after 
deletion
28
. 
3.2.3 Information-related liquidity hypothesis29 
Information-related liquidity hypothesis, developed by Merton (1987), 
suggests investors are aware of only a subset of all stocks, hold only stocks that they 
are aware of and ask a premium for the non-systematic risk that they tolerate. For 
example, if a new stock joins the S&P 500, investor awareness of that stock will 
increase and many investors will include this particular stock in their investment 
portfolios. The hypothesis also suggests that investors’ awareness does not 
diminished when stocks leave a major stock index. Dhillon and Johnson (1991) 
suggest the information-related liquidity hypothesis in which they assume that added 
stock attracts more attention from analysts and investors. This attention leads to a 
higher level of public information related to the added stocks relative to other stocks. 
Furthermore, an increase in the information available may also be accompanied with 
a potential increase in the trading volume and stock market price. Goetzmann and 
Garry (1986) and Merton (1987) show that the news which attracts investors’ 
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 A dearth of literature of non-information liquidity hypothesis focuses on deletions. 
29
 Information-related liquidity hypothesis is also known as investor awareness hypothesis. 
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attention can result in a permanent increase in the value of a company due to the 
enlargement of its potential investor base. Bildik and Gulay (2003) suggest that 
getting the attention of investors to the added stock may lower trading costs by 
reducing the time spent in searching for public information. These cost reductions 
lead to increases in the value of additions. Chen et al. (2004, 2006) assume that a 
stock’s inclusion in the index alerts investors to its existence, and since this stock 
becomes part of their portfolios, the required rate of return should fall due to a 
reduction in non-systematic risk. 
3.2.4 Imperfect substitute’s hypothesis 
The hypotheses discussed so far assume that any changes following the index 
revision is due to the changes in the fundamental aspects of the underlying stocks. 
The following discussion is related to trading effects hypotheses, which are the 
imperfect substitute’s hypothesis and the price pressure hypothesis. The imperfect 
substitute’s hypothesis30 assumes that securities are not close substitutes for each 
other. Thus, the long-term demand is less than perfectly elastic (Harris and Gurel, 
1986). This hypothesis points out that a long lived stock price effect is expected as 
long as the stock is in the index (e.g. Shleifer, 1986; Lynch and Mendenhall, 1997). 
Furthermore, buying stocks by index funds may reduce the number of stocks 
available to other market participants due to the high trading volume locked up in 
passive funds. In particular, those demand by index funds reduce the stock’s supply 
for non-indexing investors, causing the market clearing price to increase (Sui, 2003). 
Therefore, Kraus and Stoll (1972) assume that investors may demand compensation 
to adjust their portfolios because perfect substitutes for a stock are not available. 
Denis et al. (2003) also suggest that increased monitoring of management could 
                                                          
30
 The imperfect substitute’s hypothesis also known as the distribution effect hypothesis or 
Downward-sloping Demand Curve. 
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explain the positive price effects. In the same vein, a downward sloping demand 
curve experiences a symmetric response to additions and deletions (Chen et al., 
2006b). It also suggests that the price effect should be strongly correlated with the 
level of indexing. Thus, at higher levels of indexing, the excess demand should be 
higher and the price effect should be greater than at lower levels of indexing (Sui, 
2003).  
3.2.5 Price pressure hypothesis  
Stocks price pressure is the term most often used to describe the short-run 
effect of market liquidity constraints for large block trades (Elliott et al., 2006). The 
price pressure hypothesis advanced by Harris and Gurel (1986) posits a downward 
sloping demand curve but only in the short term. Long-term demand is fully elastic 
and price pressure falls once the momentary demand is satisfied. Accordingly, the 
price increase of the newly added stock is temporary, but in the opposite direction for 
those who leave the index. Furthermore, Harris and Gurel (1986) assert that the 
prices increase before the change date by the excess demand of fund managers or 
index arbitrageurs and then reverse after the change date. In the same vein, the effect 
on trading volumes should closely resemble the price effect. This hypothesis also 
assumes that changes in the composition of an index do not convey any new 
information about the added stocks (Wilkens and Wimschulte, 2005). The temporary 
price effects may result from three main sources. First, it is assumed that there is a 
price pressure effect due to large volume effects in the short run. This pressure, 
which may result from institutional investors trying to minimise the tracking error of 
their managed portfolios, is likely to be short lived (Deininger et al., 2000). Second, 
market makers may incur search costs in their effort to find the opposite sides of 
large order transactions (Elliott et al., 2006). Finally, market makers may bear 
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inventory costs, as their inventories deviate from the optimum levels, and increase 
bid-ask spread (Elliott et al., 2006). Table 3.1 summarises the main differences 
between the above discussed hypotheses.  
 
Table 3. 1 Comparisons between index revision hypotheses 
 Price and  effects   Information effect 
Hypotheses Additions Deletions Liquidity  Information 
information signalling Permanent Permanent Permanent  Not Information-free event 
Non-information- liquidity Permanent Permanent Permanent  Information-free event 
Investor awareness Permanent Temporary Permanent
31
  Not Information-free event 
The imperfect substitute Permanent Permanent Temporary  Information-free event 
The price pressure Temporary Temporary Temporary  Information-free event 
 
3.3 Comovement theories  
Classical financial theory suggests that asset prices comove only due to 
comovement in their fundamental factors such as the expected cash flows, risk-
adjusted discount rates, and firm’s specific information. However, the behavioural 
financial theory attributes comovement to factors related to noise traders’ decisions 
and investor sentiment. The following three subsections present the literature of 
fundamental-based theory, the behavioural-based theories and the combination effect 
of the fundamental- and behavioural- based theories, respectively. 
3.3.1 The fundamental-based theory  
Traditional financial theories project that firm’s fundamentals drive the asset 
prices. The price of an asset closely reflects the present value of its future cash flows, 
thus the correlations between the returns of two assets is attributed to their 
fundamental values. The prices of assets are also expected to move together due the 
correlation in the risk-adjusted factors and due to correlated shocks or other 
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 In the post-deletion, the liquidity is assumed to be temporary   
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fundamental factors such as interest rate changes. The fundamental theory suggests 
that noise traders, or irrational investors, who have erroneous beliefs can temporarily 
drive stock prices away from its true values. The arbitrageurs and rational investors 
try to prevent the price that may deviate too far from its fundamental price. Thus, any 
change in a stock value is expected to reflect its fundamental characteristics. The 
interplay relationship between informed and uninformed investors results in two 
components of an asset price formation, a permanent effect and a temporary effect. 
The permanent component is caused by fundamentals while the temporary is caused 
by investor sentiment.  
The price formation process suggests that the permanent shock is the 
innovation to the fundamental value reflecting new information and economic 
characteristics which also suggests that this innovation should be uncorrelated with 
the transitory microstructure shocks. Therefore, any changes in cash flows and/or the 
discount rate may imply permanent changes in the return comovement.  
There are three reasons for the possible comovement changes around index 
additions. First, the fundamentals-based view of comovement claims that a stock in a 
certain group has common variation because of the characteristics of its cash-flows. 
A stock that experiences improved fundamentals prior to the index revisions is 
expected to continue this trend when it is included into the index. The index effect in 
this context is considered as a continuation improvement process in fundamentals, 
which is not related to index revision event. After inclusions, one would expect 
higher growth rate of fundamentals. Chen et al. (2004) claim that financial 
institutions may be more likely to lend to the indexed firms, with higher expected 
future cash flows. The additional capital may enable index stocks to grow faster in 
the post-addition periods. Denis et al. (2003) find that additions to the S&P 500 
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experience significant increases in the expected earnings per share and considerable 
improvements in realized earnings. Kasch and Sarkar (2009) attribute the significant 
increase in the return comovement associated with the S&P 500 additions to the 
changes in the fundamental characteristics, such as size and book-to-market value, of 
the added firms. Evans (2009) and Hameed et al. (2008) argue that stocks with more 
monitoring by research analyst tend to have fundamentals that predict other firms’ 
fundamentals. Thus, the information provided by research analysts can produce 
comovement. However, Chan and Hameed (2006) find that securities which are 
covered by more analysts, incorporate greater (lesser) market-wide (firm-specific) 
information.  
Second, it is widely argued that a stock inclusion in an index is a non-
information-free event. When stocks added to the index, the inclusion certifies it as a 
leading firm. Index additions may generate positive signals about longevity and 
industry leadership of the firm (Chen et al, 2004). In addition, the index revisions 
may impart information about the quality management of the included firm since the 
index membership committee prefers stable firms for its indices. Cai (2007) argues 
that the index revision’s committee may select firms that it believes will be able to 
meet the index criteria for longer periods. For instance, S&P 500 index revision’s 
committee acknowledges that index inclusion does include the assumption that the 
company is going to remain in business. Thus, the inclusion may become the subject 
of scrutiny by analysts and the subject of greater interest by institutions leading in 
turn to an additional effort on the part of the firms’ management. A scrutiny leads 
also to new information that is more fundamental and less risk associated with the 
accuracy of that information (Bechmann, 2004). Jain (1987), Dhillon and Johnson 
(1991) and Denis et al (2003) find that S&P 500 provides strong evidence that the 
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S&P 500 index decisions have information content, including a positive revision of 
the market’s expectations about profitability of a firm and reduced riskiness. The 
changes in fundamentals are considered to be permanent, since adding a stock to or 
deleting it from an index conveys private information to the market. Thus, as long as 
investors are assumed to be rational, stock prices should reflect all the changes in 
fundamental-related information. 
Third, it has been argued that when a stock joins an index its liquidity 
improves. Previous studies attribute the improvement in liquidity to several factors, 
including increasing in the level of awareness, changes in the ownership structure 
and improvement in the trading activity. Dhillon and Johnson (1991) argue that index 
members attract more attention from analysts and investors. Thus, index revision 
may increase the information available and lower the transaction costs of the added 
stocks. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) and Easley et al. (1998) claim that when 
a stock become a member of an index, both analysts following and investors 
monitoring will increase. Bildik and Gulay (2003) suggest that the increased 
attention of investors to the added stock lowers the time spent in searching for public 
information and, therefore, reduces the trading costs. Empirically, many studies (e.g. 
Sofianos (1993); Hedge and Dermott (2003); Mazouz and Saadouni (2007)) show 
that index membership improves stock liquidity. Since liquidity risk can be priced 
(Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Liu, 2006), the increase comovement of the added 
stock may reflect the contemporaneous changes liquidity risk rather than the 
correlated uninformed demand shocks. 
3.3.2 Behavioural based-theories 
The behavioural theories argue that asset prices are established by the 
dynamic interplay among irrational investors, arbitrageurs and rational investors in 
84 
 
the real market with frictions (e.g. Shiller et al. (1984); Shleifer and Summers 
(1990)). According to this view, factors such as the irrational investor’s decisions 
affected by investor sentiment may induce stock return comovement. Then, rational 
investors and arbitrageurs may not be able to completely capture these correlated 
demand shocks (Changsheng and Yongfeng, 2012). In particular, the behavioural 
theory claims that the non-fundamental factors are the main determinants of asset 
return comovement. The return correlations between firms can be higher than their 
fundamental correlations since investors tend to focus more on market- and sector-
level information than on firm-specific fundamental information. 
Based on this theory, there are two reasons for the stock return comovement. 
First, index revisions are considered as information-free events and have little impact 
on firms’ fundamentals. The behavioural comovement theory implies that the 
revisions of the constituents list in the major stock market index are almost fully 
predictable. For example, the revisions of the constituents list in the FTSE100 index 
are primarily based on market capitalisation which is known to the public. Therefore, 
the correlation between the added stock’s return with the returns of other style stocks 
is not predicted by the changes in firms’ fundamentals. Consistent with this view, 
Harris and Gurel (1986) and Shleifer (1986) argue that the price reaction to index 
additions is not due to the release of new fundamental information but, rather, to the 
increased demand resulting from index funds and other investors who are 
rebalancing their portfolios. The role of index arbitrageurs can be short lived since 
they fail to offset the impact of index fund managers on the stock return 
comovement.  
Second, the role of switchers (index fund managers) with an investment 
interest in index stocks is assumed to create an economically meaningful effect on 
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the returns of stocks in the index category from demand shocks associated with 
fluctuations in fund flows. Fund flows into and out of well-defined index categories 
are correlated with fund returns (Abrose, 2007). Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and 
Barberis et al. (2005) argue that when investors trade on specific asset categories, 
sentiment or market frictions can arise and cause assets in the same category to 
comove more than their economic fundamentals.  
The behavioural finance theory classifies investors into ‘‘switchers’’ and 
‘‘fundamental traders’’. Switchers form their expectations of future prices based on 
historical prices, whereas fundamental traders are forward looking and form the price 
forecasts on expectations about the future cash flow. The investment policy of 
switchers is to allocate stocks into groups (styles) as an investing style rather than 
into fundamentals. Switchers believe that a certain style is often triggered by good 
fundamental news about the stocks in the style. Thus, these style investors only trade 
when a stock belongs to their targeted style, and they keep rebalancing their positions 
whenever their targeted style is restructured. The main concern of these investors is 
to take the advantages of a particular group rather than the advantages of the 
individual fundamental values of a stock belongs this group. This particular trading is 
expected to induce more comovement in return between the newly added stock into 
the group and the rest of the group members. The switchers also allocate more funds 
to styles with better than average performance and finance these additional 
investments by taking funds away from styles that are below the average 
performance (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003).  
The behavioural theory classifies switchers into index fund investors, mutual 
fund investors and other institutional investors. According to Chen et al. (2006a), the  
index fund investors expect that index fund managers to simply produce a portfolio 
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that mirrors the return and risk of the targeted index at the lowest possible price. 
Mutual fund investors are usually considered to be the least informed traders in the 
market since they delegate their investment decisions to the index fund managers. 
Therefore, indices are to be considered as the natural place for uninformed and 
irrational fund managers. Gompers and Metrick (2001) find that one of the main 
investor in indices is the institutional investors, who prefer to trade in large stocks. 
They find that after 1986 the portfolios of institutional investors target large firms 
than small. This compositional switch to larger firms increases the demand on the 
stock of large firms and decrease demand on the stock of small firms. This shift in 
the institutional investor’s behaviour is attributable to approximately half of the 
increase in the price of large firms relative to small firms.  
Gromb and Vayanos (2010) explain why index fund managers tracking a 
certain stock market index. Index revisions trigger changes in the demand by mutual 
funds. Fund managers manage their funds actively to track and mirror or benchmark 
their performance with major indices. Thus, if a stock is added to (delete from) an 
index, fund managers, who track or benchmark against an index, are ready to buy 
(sell) the newly added (deleted) stock. This behaviour will, in turn, induce more 
(less) return comovement between the added (deleted) stocks with the existing index 
members. Some empirical studies show that investor sentiment arises from the 
presence of institutional ownership (e.g. Sias (1996); Jones et al. (1999); Jackson 
(2003b); Pirinsky and Wang (2004); and Hughen et al. (2004)).  
Barberis et al. (2005) suggest three specific views on behavioural 
comovement which are category-based views, habitat-based views and information 
diffusion-based views. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) define the category-based view 
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as some investors categorise assets into different styles
32
 to simplify their investment 
decisions, and then allocate funds at the level of these categories rather than at the 
individual asset level. Assets in the same style move together too much, assets in 
different styles move together too little, and reallocating an asset into a new style 
raises its correlation with that style.  
The preferred habitat-based view, as originated by Lee et al. (1991), is based 
on the notion that investors invest only in a restricted class of assets. It is also based 
on the observation that many investors select preferred habitats for their trades. This 
could be explained by factors such as transaction costs or international trading 
restrictions (Coakley and Kougoulis, 2005).  
Vijh (1994) provides the basis of the information diffusion view in which the 
information is incorporated more quickly into the prices of some stocks than others. 
For example, some stocks may be less costly to trade, or may be held by investors 
with faster access to private news and the resources required to exploit it. In this 
view, there will be a common factor in the returns of stocks that incorporate 
information at similar rates: when good news about aggregate earnings is released, 
some stocks reflect it today and move up together immediately; the remaining stocks 
also move up together, but only after some delay. Previous studies discover return 
comovement in various types of stocks. Barberis et al. (2005) examine the 
comovement around the S&P 500 index revisions. They find a significant increase 
(decrease) in the comovement of investor’s sentiment after a stock join (leaves) the 
S&P 500 index. They argue that since changes in stock index composition are 
information-free events, the comovement changes cannot be explained by the 
classical financial theory and are therefore consistent with friction- or sentiment-
                                                          
32 Investors may group assets into categories such as large-cap stocks, oil industry stocks, junk 
bonds, or index member stocks. 
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based view. Similar findings confirmed by Mase (2008) and Coakley and Kougoulis 
(2005) from the FTSE100 index. 
3.3.3 The Combined effects  
Traditional theories suggest that comovement changes are driven by changes 
in the fundamentals however the behavioural-based theories attribute comovement 
changes to investor sentiment. However, we argue that comovement in stock return 
may not be determined by fundamentals or non-fundamental factors separately. 
Thus, the changes in the stock return comovement that been observed in the literature 
(e.g. Barberis et al. (2005); Mase (2007); and Coakley et al. (2008)) is plausibly 
driven by the aggregate contribution of both fundamental- and non-fundamental-
related factors. 
King (1966) documents that stock prices covary with both market and 
industry returns, as a result of a common set of economic fundamentals and non-
fundamentals (categories). Consistent with this result, Roll (1988) shows weak 
association between individual firms' stock returns and market and industry stock 
price movements, and suggests that this weak association (low stock return 
comovement) is the result of firm-specific information being incorporated into 
individual stock prices. Studies (e.g. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004); Durnev et al. 
(2004); Kumar and Lee (2006); and Evans (2009)) show that the dominance of 
informed traders (uninformed) makes the stocks move less (more) with the market. 
In other words, the comovement in stock return would be higher (lower) in the 
absence of arbitrageurs or insiders (portfolio managers or outsiders). Durnev et al. 
(2004) argue that the comovement in stock return is the combination of fundamental 
and noise but the role of noisy trader is greater.  
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The combination of the role of insiders and outsider ultimately will make 
share prices more reflective of fundamental value (Rachlinski and Lablanc, 2005). 
Evans (2009) claims that comovement in stock returns is driven by both the 
fundamentals and market-wide factors. He claims that noise traders indirectly 
improve the price accuracy and their presence makes it worthwhile for informed 
traders to acquire and trade on their private information. Kumar and Lee (2006), 
Hvidkjaer (2008) and Barber et al. (2006) find that buying by noise traders pushes 
prices too high (above their fundamental values). Selling by noise traders pushes 
prices too low (below their fundamental values) making a stock return comove more 
in the case of buying and comove less in the case of selling with other stocks. As the 
informed traders know the fundamental price, they intervene in the market by 
impounding more private information into the price – which results in reducing 
(increasing) the comovement.  
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and Wurgler (2000) state that stocks moving 
together is a partial reflection of the flow of firm-specific information. Therefore, 
stocks which have lower (higher) comovement, can be taken as an indication of the 
presence of private (public) information. Admati and Pfleiderer (1987) suggest that 
comovement declines when investors observe private signals and increases when 
they observe common (public) signals.  
Existing studies have identified a number of factors, including the quality of 
the information environment, the ownership structure and the presence of 
information analysts, which could influence the relationship between fundamental 
and non-fundamental effects.  
First, recent studies (Evans (2009); Alves et al. (2010); Morck et al. (2000)) 
use the degree of stock returns comovement as a measure of the quality of the 
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information environment. In a high quality information environment, arbitrageurs are 
promoted to trade on information about a firm’s fundamentals. In the presence of 
such an information environment, prices will impound more firm-specific 
information and, therefore, comove less with the market. Dasgupta et al. (2010) and 
Veldkamp (2006) explain that as valuable fundamental-information becomes 
available, market comovement will decrease because stock prices switch their 
reliance towards more specific information, and uninformed investors are able to 
better predict the firm value. In addition, the comovement effect disappears when 
more signals are observed. Bissessur and Hodgson (2012) show that higher (lower) 
comovement is related to higher (lower) uncertainty in firm specific accounting data, 
lower (higher) transparency, less (high) confidence and lower (higher) price 
efficiency.  
Second, the stock return comovement is also associated with the changes in 
the structure of ownership. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) show that greater insider 
trading activity improves the pricing efficiency and in turn reduces stock return 
comovement.  Pirinsky and Wang (2004) find that the level of price comovement is 
mainly driven by the trading of institutional investors which is delinked from firms’ 
fundamentals. However, the fundamental factors explain only part of the relation 
between institutional ownership and stock comovement measures. They show that 
the presence of low-institutional ownership with private information tend to comove 
in the opposite direction. The significant levels of institutional ownership is linked 
with greater monitoring and increased access to firm-specific information, possibly 
facilitating information transfers across similar firms in the institution's portfolio. 
 Bissessur and Hodgson (2012) find that the contribution of institutional 
trading and portfolio managers in defining comovement of stock returns is not based 
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on public information only but also on private information. They also show that 
mainly mutual funds and investment advisors are the main investors contributing in 
driving stock return comovement. However, individual investors make stock return 
to comve less with the rest of index members. Kumar (2010) demonstrate that 
comovement patterns induced by retail-trading are stronger when uncertainty is high 
and behavioural biases are improved. 
Finally, Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) show that analyst activity acts as a 
conduit through which intra-industry transfers of information occur, leading to prices 
that exhibit greater comovement. Dasgupta et al. (2010) argue that as analysts help to 
incorporate more market-wide information into the stock price, the stock return 
shows higher comovement with the market, resulting in higher beta and return 
synchronicity show that, in more transparent environments, stock prices should be 
more informative about future events. Albuquerque and Vega (2009) find that the 
announcements of foreign news about fundamentals significantly reduced the 
adverse selection costs and hence reduced the return comovement.  
3.4 Empirical evidence  
This section discusses the extent to which the different index revision 
hypotheses are supported empirically.  
3.4.1 Fundamental effects   
Horne (1970) examines the stock-price behaviour of newly listed stocks in 
the NYSE and the AMEX for the years from 1960 to1967. The result shows that the 
listing stocks are more stable relative to industry average price movements. Their 
results also show that the listed stocks are more stable when the market is up than 
they did in a down market. This finding is consistent with the notion that listing stock 
in an index may signal good news particularly in up market. Dhillon and Johnson 
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(1991) find that stocks which are listed in the S&P 500 have a permanent  price 
increase on the announcement date. Beneish and Gardner (1995) show that de-listed 
firms from DJIA experience significant negative excess returns in the three-day 
period around the date of announcement. In addition, deleted firms experience a 
significant decrease in trading activity. Beneish and Gardner (1995) argue that their 
evidence is consistent with the information cost related hypothesis. Beneish and 
Whaley (1996) support the liquidity hypothesis by carrying out the same study.  
Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2003) argue that investors in FTSE 100 hold stocks 
with more available information. Consequently, the added (deleted) stocks imply 
lower (higher) transaction costs. As a result, the added stocks record permanent price 
increase while deleted stocks report permanent price decrease. In the same vein, 
Hegde and McDermott (2003) reveal a significant and long-term improvement in 
market liquidity for S&P 500 stocks following index addition. They also find a 
significant relationship between the abnormal returns associated with the entry of a 
stock into the index and the observed decrease in effective bid-ask spread.  
Denis et al. (2003) and Sui (2003) support the predictions of the information 
hypothesis in the context of the S&P 500 revisions. Their results indicate that 
inclusion in the S&P 500 provides significantly positive information to the market. 
They also claim that joining the S&P 500 index appears increases investors’ earnings 
expectations and improves the actual earnings relative to comparable companies. In 
the same vein, Chakrabarti (2002) shows that the MSCI index membership 
broadcasts a signal of ‘quality’ to the investors. This signal results in an immediate 
and permanent price increase.  
 Bechmann (2004) also finds evidence consistent with information-related 
liquidity hypothesis from Danish blue-chip KFX index. The results show that the 
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price effect is permanent and the size of the effect has increased over time. Chen et 
al. (2004, 2006) find that investors become more aware of a stock upon its addition 
to the S&P 500 index but do not become similarly unaware of a stock following its 
deletion. Accordingly, stock added to S&P 500 index experience a permanent 
positive price while firms deleted from the index do not experience a permanent 
negative price effect. In addition, the findings show that additions to the index result 
in an increase in the number of individual shareholders of the added firm. In contrast, 
they do not find that deletions result in a reduction in the median number of 
individual shareholders.  
Cai (2007) claim that S&P 500 index membership may convey new 
information to the market for two reasons. First, when a firm is added to the index, 
S&P 500 certifies it as a leading firm, and certifies the industry of the firm as a 
leading industry. Thus, the stock price of the added firm and other firms in the same 
industry may react positively to the announcement. Second, because of the high 
turnover followed the index funds rebalancing portfolios, the S&P 500 may select 
firms that it believes will be able to meet the index criteria for longer periods of time. 
Hacibedel (2008) shows a significant increase in the analyst coverage of newly 
included stocks to MSCI. He affirms that stocks with higher increase in coverage 
experience larger and permanent price increases.  
Green and Jame (2009) argue that the observed permanent price effect 
following additions to the S&P 500 index may not be fully explained by changes in 
investor awareness. Their results suggest that improvements in fundamentals may 
drive both increases in breadth of ownership and the permanent abnormal returns 
associated with inclusion in the S&P 500. More recently, Liu (2009) finds that when 
stocks are added to (deleted from) the Nikkei 225, their return series become more 
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(less) random and, thus, less (more) predictable. Their findings also suggest that 
index membership enhances the information environment for the component stocks 
and, thus, improves their pricing efficiency.  
3.4.2 Trading effects 
Shleifer (1986) and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) argue that the observed 
price increase following additions to the S&P 500 is consistent with the predictions 
of the imperfect substitute hypothesis. Deininger et al. (2000) find that the blue-chip 
index DAX and the mid-cap index MDAX in Germany market have a permanent 
price increase (decrease) following  the day of additions (deletions). Deininger et al. 
(2000) also claim that their findings support the imperfect substitute hypothesis. 
Chakrabarti et al. (2005) find evidence from MSCI for 29 countries including UK 
consistent with the imperfect substitute hypothesis with some liquidity and price-
pressure effects. They show that UK, Japan, and emerging markets experience a 
permanent rise in stock prices, while US and other developed countries markets show 
no such increase. Furthermore, trading volumes rise on addition everywhere except 
in the US and on deletion in developed countries except the US and UK markets. 
Mazouz and Saadouni (2007a) find evidence from FTSE100 consistent with the 
imperfect substitute hypothesis with some non-information-related liquidity effect in 
the case of additions. They also report a permanent price effect associated with both 
additions and deletions and a permanent (temporary) liquidity effect in the case of 
additions (deletions).  
Harris and Gurel (1986) support the price pressure hypotheses by affirming 
that immediately after an addition is announced in the S&P 500, prices increase but 
are fully reversed after two weeks. Consistent with Harris and Gurel (1986), Pruitt 
and Wei (1989) explain that the price reversal is consistent with heavy index-fund 
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trading around the time of the change that moves stock prices temporarily away from 
their equilibrium values. Chung and Kryzanowski (1998) observe an increase 
(decrease) in stock price added to (deleted from) Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE 300) 
but the prices reverse after the change date for both additions and deletions. Elayan et 
al. (2000) show that the investors make an abnormal return in the New Zealand 
market (NZE10) and (NZSE40) by buying shares the day before they are expected to 
enter the index and selling them the following day. For those leave the index, the 
arbitrageurs could gain from the short selling positions. These findings are consistent 
with price pressure hypothesis. From Italian stock exchange index Mib30, Rigamonti 
and Barontini (2000) find that stocks included into the Mib30 experience an 
abnormal return but reverse to normal levels in the following three weeks. This 
finding confirms the existence of price pressure hypothesis. Shu et al. (2004) claim 
that the evidence from the Taiwanese market (MSCI) supports price pressure 
hypothesis. Biktimirov et al.’s (2004) results from Russell 2000 index are consistent 
with the predictions of the price pressure hypothesis. They show that institutional 
ownership and stock price increase following the additions. However, both the price 
effects and volume effects are short lived and transitory. In line with price pressure 
hypothesis, Shankar and Miller (2006) also show that additions to (deletions from) 
the S&P Small Cap 600 index are associated with positive (negative) abnormal 
returns at announcement day but these returns are subsequently reversed. 
Doeswijk (2005) shows that the impact of annual revision of the AEX index 
in the Netherlands results in temporary price pressure for added stocks. Okada et al. 
(2006) stylize the fact that revision of Nikkei 225 is consistent with price pressure 
hypothesis, where the stock prices of the added firms go up on the announcement 
date, continue to increase until the day before the effective change date, and then 
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decrease on and just after the change date. Mohanty and Mishra (2006) confirm that 
the price patterns around the CNX Nifty index revisions are consistent with the 
predictions of the price pressure hypothesis. Daniel and Gerard (2007) show a full 
price reversions  after a general price increase (decrease) on the date of additions 
(deletions) in Australian market ASX200. Vespro (2006) confirms that the 
compositional changes in both France and UK indices also support price pressure 
hypothesis. The study of Mase (2007) shows that FTSE 100 analysis indicates short 
term price pressure before the changes for both additions and deletions. Mazouz and 
Saadouni (2007b) find evidence from FTSE100 to proof the price pressure 
hypothesis, where the price increase (decrease) gradually starting before the 
announcement of an inclusion (exclusion) and reverses completely in less than two 
weeks after the index revision date. More recently, Bildik and Gülay (2008) support 
both hypotheses price pressure and imperfect substitute. They find that stocks 
included in (excluded from) ISE-30 in Turkey tend to generate positive (negative) 
abnormal returns in the event period until effective change date. In addition, price 
decreases after the change date both for included and excluded stocks. 
 
3.5 Summary and Conclusions 
In brief, the stock price behaviour around index revisions has attracted a lot 
of attention of many academics. Horne (1970) assumes that index revision may be 
considered as informational events in which added stocks signal good news and 
deleted stocks signal bad news. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) argue that if liquidity 
is priced, an increase in liquidity will result in lower expected returns, lower 
transaction costs and hence a positive permanent price reaction following 
announcement of an addition to the index. Dhillon and Johnson (1991) assume that 
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added stock attracts more attention from analysts and investors. This attention leads 
to a higher level of public information related to the added stocks compared to other 
stocks. 
 Shleifer (1986) and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) point out that a permanent 
stock price effect is expected as long as the stock is in the index. They suggest that 
buying shares by index funds would reduce the number of shares available to be 
actively traded on the market due to the volume of shares that become locked up in 
passive funds. Harris and Gurel (1986) posit a downward sloping demand curve but 
only in the short term. Long-term demand is fully elastic and price pressure fall once 
the momentary demand is satisfied. Accordingly, the price increase of the newly 
added stock is temporary, but in the opposite direction for those who leave the index.  
In the same conext, Barberis et al. (2005) shift the attention to the importance 
of behavioural finance versus classical finance. Within this literature, two different 
theories have been discussed, the traditional theory and the behavioural theories. 
Barberis et al. (2005) argue that the traditional-based theory suggests that stock 
return comovement reflects only the fundamental values of the underlying stocks. 
These fundamental values are derived from frictionless economy with rational 
investors. In this economy, asset prices are equal to their fundamental values and, 
hence, any changes in price comovement must be due to changes in the 
fundamentals. Thus, according to the traditional-based theory changes in the return 
comovement around index revisions should only be observed if the revision events 
are not information-free.  
Alternatively, the behavioural theories of comovement suggest that return 
comovement is the outcome of frictions or sentiment rather than fundamentals. 
Hence, any observed changes in the common factors following index revisions 
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should be attributed to non-fundamental variables. Based on this theory, Barberis et 
al. (2005) discuss three specific views of comovement, which are category-, habitat- 
and information diffusion-based views. The category-based view implies that 
investors classify assets into categories and, as they move assets between categories, 
comovement is generated among the underlying assets within a category. Another 
source of comovement could be induced by the habitat-based view in which traders 
limit their trades to a particular group, such as the constituents list of an index. 
Finally, the information diffusion-based view attributes return comovement to the 
speed in which information is incorporated into prices in a specific category. For 
instance, if a particular group of stocks show a lower trading costs, their prices may 
reflect aggregate information more quickly relative to other stocks.  
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Chapter 4: Index revisions and cost of equity capital 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter investigates the relationship between index revisions, liquidity 
risk and the cost of equity capital from different perspectives. Several studies (e.g. 
Shleifer, 1986; Harris and Gurel, 1986; Dhillon and Johnson, 1991) show that stocks 
experience significant liquidity increase (decrease) after joining (leaving) a major 
stock index. Many early studies, including Amihud and Mendelso (1986), Chalmers 
and Kadlec (1998), report a positive association between individual stock liquidity 
and stock market returns. Recently, Chordia et al. (2000) shift the focus of the 
liquidity literature by introducing the concept of systematic liquidity risk. They argue 
that liquidity risk represents a source of non-diversifiable risk that needs to be 
reflected in expected asset returns. Subsequent studies, including Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003), Amihud (2002) and Liu (2006), provide evidence that systematic 
liquidity risk is priced in the US market.  
Motivated by the recent development in the liquidity literature, we argue that 
since liquidity is priced, after index revesions an increase (decrease) in liquidity may 
induce lower (higher) liquidity risks which in turn lower (higher) the cost of equity 
capital. To investigate this issue, we apply the liquidity-augmented asset pricing 
model suggested by Liu (2006) to examine the impact of index revision on liquidity 
premium and cost of equity capital. This approach allows us to make at least two 
important contributions to the literature.  
First, existing studies, including Blease and Paul (2006) and Gregoriou and 
Nguyen (2010), focus typically on the impact of index revisions on a single 
dimension of individual stock liquidity (i.e. Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio). Liu 
(2006) argues that since liquidity is multidimensional, existing measures do not fully 
100 
 
capture liquidity risk. In addition to other liquidity measures, such as trading volume, 
bid-ask spread and Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio, this study uses the proportional 
number of days with zero daily return over prior 12 months (LM12 hereafter), which 
is similar to Liu (2006), to capture trading speed, trading quantity and trading cost 
simultaneously.  
Second, since a single liquidity measure cannot fully capture liquidity, we 
argue that Gregoriou and Nguyen’s (2010) findings that index deletions increases 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity measure without affecting corporate investment 
opportunities, does not necessarily imply that index revisions do not affect the 
liquidity premium or the cost of equity capital. Gregoriou and Nguyen’s (2010) and 
Blease and Paul (2006) use the capital expenditure as a proxy for cost of equity 
capital. They argue that if required equity returns rise (fall), and thus the cost of 
capital increases (decreases), one would expect, at the margin, a reduction 
(enhancement) in the investment opportunity set. We argue that investment 
opportunity may not be a good proxy for the cost of equity capital for several 
reasons. Chung et al. (1998) find that the required equity returns of a firm depends 
critically on the market's assessment of the quality of its investment opportunities. 
Therefore, it is not necessary that the investment opportunity reflect the cost of 
equity capital. Milton and Raviv (1991) suggest that the rate of investment 
opportunities depends on many factors including the relationship between managers 
and stakeholders as suggested by agency cost theory, the accessibility to both debt 
and equity markets, the financial constrains such as adverse selection problems, the 
feasibility of investment projects and the default probability. Stenbacka and Tombak 
(2002) summarise that decisions on investment considers the levels of retained 
earnings, debt and equity, the nature of capital market,  the availability of the internal 
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funds and the characteristics of the investment opportunities available to the firm. 
Thus, by incorporating a liquidity risk factor into an asset-pricing model, this study 
captures, with greater precision, the impact of index revisions on both liquidity 
premium and the cost of equity capital.  
Our empirical analysis can be stratified into three main parts. The first part 
focuses on the impact of index additions and deletions on different liquidity 
dimensions. We use bid-ask spread, trading volume, number of trades, LM12, and 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio to capture the trading costs, trading quantity, 
trading frequency, continuous trading and price impact dimensions of liquidity, 
respectively. Second, we construct a mimicking liquidity factor (LIQ hereafter) 
which is the difference in returns between portfolios of stocks with low and high 
liquidity. We use LIQ and the market return (MKT hereafter) to produce the liquidity 
risk from the two-factor liquidity augmented model (LCAPM) of Liu (2006). 
Subsequently, we use Lin et al.’s (2009) approach to estimate the cost of equity 
capital in the pre- and post-index revision periods. Finally, for robustness checks, we 
include Fama and French-three factors (1993) and momentum factor of Carhart 
(1994) in our analysis. We also adopt the procedures
33
 applied by Becker-Blease and 
Paul (2006). We use a control sample methodology to account for changes in 
liquidity risk and cost of equity capital which may be caused by factors other than 
index revisions.    
The first part of our analysis shows that index membership enhances all 
aspects of liquidity, whereas stocks who leave the index exhibit no liquidity 
significant change. In particular, the absence of any significant change in LM12 
implies that the combined effect of index deletions on the various dimensions of 
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  These procedures are detailed in section 4.5. 
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liquidity is not significant. The results of the control sample also indicate that the 
improved liquidity is caused by index additions whereas any liquidity changes that 
may be associated with deletions is likely to be caused by factors other than index 
deletions.   
The second part of the analysis examines the impact of index revisions on the 
liquidity premium and the cost of equity capital. We show that the liquidity premium 
and the cost of equity capital decrease significantly after additions, but do not exhibit 
any significant change following deletions. Similar results are reported when Fama 
and French’ (1996) factors and Carhat’s (1997) momentum factor are used as 
additional explanatory variables in the LCAPM. Our results are also robust to various 
liquidity measures and estimation methods. The control sample analysis indicate that 
observed decline in liquidity premium and the cost of equity capital are statistically 
significant even after accounting for other relevant factors.  
The final part shows that capital expenditure of both additions and deletions 
exhibit significant increase after the index revisions. This result indicates that the 
improvement in the capital expenditure in the post- additions is due to the reductions 
in the cost of equity capital. We also observe that the improvement in the capital 
expenditure is attributable to the increase in market firm size and reductions in 
illiquidity in the post- additions. However, in the case of deletions, the improvement 
in the capital expenditure is driven by factors other than index deletions.  
Overall, this study suggests that liquidity premium and the cost of equity 
capital drop significantly following additions, but do not change after deletions. 
These finding are consistent with the predictions of the investors’ awareness 
hypothesis of Chen et al. (2004, 2006), which suggests that investors’ awareness 
increase after additions, but do not diminish after deletions. Chen et al. (2004, 2006) 
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assume that a stock’s inclusion in the index alerts investors to its existence, and since 
this stock becomes part of their portfolios, the required rate of return should fall due 
to a reduction in non-systematic risk. Our result also in line with the argument of 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) which suggests that given that liquidity is priced, an 
increase in liquidity will result in lower illiquidity and, therefore, lower expected 
returns.  
 The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 provides a 
brief review of the related literature and states the hypotheses to be tested. Section 
4.3 describes the dataset. Section 4.4 presents and discusses the empirical tests. Some 
robustness checks are presented in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
    
4.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
It has been documented that added (deleted) a stock to (from) a major stock 
index tend to be more (less) liquid after the index revisions. The extent literature 
attributes the changes in stock market liquidity to either trading effects or changes in 
firm’s fundamentals. The proponents of trading effect argue that the improvement in 
liquidity is not due to the release of new information as suggested by fundamental 
views but, rather, to the increased demand by index funds mangers and risk 
arbitragers. The implications of trading effect on stock market liquidity following the 
index revision can be either long lived (permanent) or short lived (temporary). 
Nevertheless, the implication of changes in firm’s fundamentals on the stock market 
liquidity can be long lived only. Studies that support the trading effects attribute the 
permanent (temporary) liquidity changes associated with the index revision to the 
imperfect substitute (price pressure) hypothesis.  
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Previous studies have offered various explanations for the presence of 
permanent changes in stock market liquidity following the index revisions. Shleifer 
(1986); Dhillon and Johnson (1991); Beneish and Whaley (1996); Lynch and 
Mendenhall (1997), among others, show that stock market liquidity changes 
permanently following index revisions. These studies propose four possible 
explanations for such permanent change.  
First, consistent with information related liquidity hypothesis (e.g. Jain 
(1987); Dhillon and Johnson (1991); Beneish and Gardner (1995)) suggest that 
investors become more aware about the index membership stocks and therefore 
additions (deletions) could convey good (bad) news about the firms’ fundamentals. 
Dhillon and Johnson (1991) claim that added stock to the index attracts more 
attention from analysts and investors. This attention leads to a higher level of public 
and private information related to the added stocks compared to other stocks thus 
reduces the information asymmetry. Consistent with this argument, they find that 
addition to the S&P 500 index lowers the transaction costs, as measured by bid-ask 
spread, and increases trading volume. Edmister et al. (1996) find that additions to 
S&P 500 lead to increase the attention by analysts and investors. This, in turn, leads 
to greater trading volume and lower bid-ask. Beneish and Gardner (1995) find that 
the adverse selection cost component of the bid-ask spread increases for stocks that 
are less widely followed by analysts after delisting from the DJIA
34
.  Gregoriou and 
Ioannidis (2003) find that additions to (deletions from) the FTSE 100 increase 
(decrease) trading volume and the quantity of available information about the added 
(deleted) stock. Their result is attributed to the notion that investors hold (leave) a 
                                                          
34 However, additions to DJIA have little change because the editors of the Wall Street Journal make 
DJIA changes to include actively traded stocks which are associated with lower adverse selection 
costs. They also attributed their result to the absence of index funds in the DJIA market. 
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stock with more (less) available information, consequently implying lower (higher) 
trading costs. 
Second, Shleifer (1986), Harris and Gurel (1986) and Beneish (1996) 
attribute the permanent improvement in the liquidity to trading activity of index fund 
managers. Harris and Gurel (1986) find that trading volumes, adjusted for market 
volume, increase (decrease) permanently following the addition (deletions) to the 
S&P 500. Mazouz and Saadouni (2007b) carry out similar study in the FTSE 100 and 
show similar findings. They attribute their result to the presence of funds, not 
necessarily index funds, which only invest in securities on the index list. Shleifer 
(1986) suggests that following the S&P 500 addition, the bid-ask spread of added 
stock will decrease leading to a reduction in the required rate of return. Beneish and 
Whaley (1996) examine the changes in liquidity proxies following the S&P 500 
reversions by using trading volume, trade size and market bid-ask spread as measures 
of trading activity. They report that trading volume increases permanently following 
additions to the S&P 500 and the quoted bid-ask spread decreases temporarily. They 
attribute their results to role of index fund and risk arbitragers. Index fund managers 
delay rebalancing their portfolios until the effective day and this induce permanent 
increases in the trading volume. In the contrary, the improvement in the bid-ask 
spread
35
 is reversed due to the price pressure of risk arbitrageurs who buy beforehand 
of index funds aiming to sell to the index funds on the effective day.  More recently, 
Mazouz and Saadouni (2007a) find that following the additions to the FTSE100 the 
trading volume (bid ask spread) increases (decreases) permanently. However, the 
deletions experience temporary trading volume change and no changes in the case of 
                                                          
35 The temporary reduction in bid/ask spread can arise for at least two reasons. First, the specialist 
may temporarily reduce the size of bid-ask spread to increase the trading volume during this period. 
Second, the size of the spread may be reduced as a result of index funds using limit orders to acquire 
the newly added firm's shares. When index fund demand fulfils after the effective day, spreads 
return to original levels. 
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spread. They attribute their result to contemporaneous changes in the inventory cost 
rather than the information asymmetry cost.  
Third, several studies (e.g. Danathine (1978); Figlewski (1981); Grossman 
and Merton (1988)) suggest that the stock market liquidity is improved due to the 
presence of derivative contracts
36
. However other studies (e.g. Gammill and Perold 
(1989); Kumar and Seppi  (1994)) show that liquidity may suffer or not change 
following the introduction to the futures and option contracts. Studies of Danthine 
(1978) and Grossman and Merton (1988) predict that trade in derivative market may 
reveal fundamental information about the value of underlying stocks since 
arbitrageurs work as a conduit channel to transmit information for the equity market 
participants. Consequently, the information asymmetry between the market makers 
and the rest of market participant will be reduced. Holden (1995) suggests that 
trading a stock in the index shares, futures and options markets may improve 
permanently the underlying stocks liquidity by eliminating information asymmetries 
across markets, by providing buying and selling support to correct temporary order 
imbalances across markets, and by increasing the number of market participants. 
Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom (1985) suggest that when the 
transaction prices are informative and the information asymmetry is diminished, the 
bid-ask spreads tend to decline through time resulting in reductions in the excess 
return. Demsetz (1968) explains that an increase in the number of market participants 
may approximately increases the order flows and reduce the waiting and transaction 
costs. Several empirical evidence support this argument
37
 (e.g. Jennings and Starks 
(1985); Conrad (1989); Damodaran and Lim (1991); Erwin and Miller (1998)).  
                                                          
36
 Following the additions, added stock to an index is automatically becomes "cross listed" in the 
index derivative as well as in the stock index (see FTSE100 and S&P 500 regulations). 
37 Jennings and Starks (1981) find that added stocks to the option list adjust information more 
quickly than other non-optioned stocks. Conrad (1989) and Damodaran and Lim (1991) find the 
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Finally, existing studies attribute the permanent change in liquidity mainly to 
changes in the composition of the ownership structure. Hegde and McDermott 
(2003) attribute the permanent liquidity effect of index revisions to the changes in 
ownership structure, transaction cost, and trading activity. Harris and Gurel (1986) 
and Pruitt and Wei (1989) argue that the price changes around index revision can be, 
at least partly, explained by the heavy trading of index-fund managers. Pruitt and 
Wei (1989) provide evidence that institutional investors cause demand changes by 
tracking the index changes. Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) argue that index funds and 
index investors are potentially the main investors of the index stocks. These funds 
generally buy and hold shares, to construct a portfolio that mimic the return and risk 
of the stock index at the lowest possible cost. Furthermore, arbitrageurs buy when 
additions are announced with the expectation of selling them to indexers at a higher 
price on the effective date. Index revisions per se signal information that may make a 
considerable long-term shift in the composition of equity ownership to uninformed 
index traders. Moreover, additions invite more uninformed traders which may 
further, increases the awareness of a stock (Beneish and Whaley, 1996). According 
to the information based-models, the presence of informed and uninformed traders 
improves the different dimensions of stock market liquidity.  Kyle (1985) and Easley 
et al. (1998) maintain that if there is an increase in the variance and the frequency of 
uninformed liquidity traders relative to informed traders in a particular stock, the 
microstructure models imply an improvement in the dimensions of stock market 
liquidity
38
. In contrary, if the variance and the frequency of uniformed traders 
                                                                                                                                                                    
introduction of options is accompanied with a permanent decrease in the bid-ask spread. Erwin and 
Miller (1998) find that optioned stocks experience a permanent increase in trading volume, though 
stock price is reversed.  
38
 Kyle (1985) argues that liquidity dimensions include tightness which refers to the cost of turning 
over a position in a short period of time; depth which refers to the ability of the market to absorb 
108 
 
decrease, we may observe an increase in the asymmetric information component of 
the bid-ask spread. Chen et al., (2004, 2006) find that  additions to the index induce 
an increase in the number of individual shareholders and index fund traders and 
permanent increase in the trading volume of the added firms. Nevertheless, they do 
not find that deletions result in a reduction in the median number of individual 
shareholders. Rigamonti and Barontini (2000), Shu et al. (2004) and Biktimirov et al. 
(2004) show that the institutional ownership increases following the additions in 
Mib30, Taiwanese market (MSCI) and Russell 2000 index, respectively.  
The discussion above suggests that stock liquidity changes permanently 
following index revisions. The previous studies attribute these changes to a number 
of factors, including investor awareness, trading activity, the presence derivative 
contracts, and changes in the ownership structure. In the light of this discussion we 
suggest the following hypothesis: 
 
 H0a1: Additions to the FTSE 100 improves stock market liquidity. 
 
 H0a2: Deletions from the FTSE 100 harm stock market liquidity. 
 
Another strand of literature find that the effect of index revisions on the 
underlying stock liquidity can be short lived (e.g. Pruitt and Wei (1989); Beneish and 
Whaley (1996); Doeswijk (2005); Vespro (2006)). The temporary improvement in 
stock market liquid can be attributed to the impact of trading activity as suggested by 
price pressure hypothesis. On one hand, index fund managers aim to minimise their 
tracking errors by rebalance their portfolios just before the effective date of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
quantities without having a large effect on price; and resiliency which refers to the speed with which 
prices tend to converge towards the underlying liquidation value of the commodity. 
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inclusions. Once the adjustment process has ended, demand curves and prices revert 
to their original levels. On the other hand, liquidity improvement is reversed due to 
the price pressure of risk arbitrageurs who buy beforehand of index funds aiming to 
sell to the index funds on the effective day. Arbitrageurs who are trading on 
fundamental information keep the price and trading volume closer to their intrinsic 
levels. Beneish and Whaley (1996) find that additions to DJIA have little change on 
stock market liquidity because the editors of the DJIA include actively traded stocks 
which are associated with lower adverse selection costs. Vespro (2006) and 
Doeswijk (2005) find that the trading volume is completely return to its initial levels 
consistent with an index fund attempting to minimise a tracking error by trading 
before the effective index changes. Based on this argument we suggest the following 
hypothesis: 
 
 H0b1: Index addition does not affect market liquidity. 
 
H0b2: Index deletion does not affect market liquidity. 
 
It can be argued that if index revisions affect stock liquidity, it should also 
affect the liquidity risk premium and the cost of equity capital. Roll (1981), Arbel 
and Strebel (1982) and Barry and Brown (1985) argue that investors demand a 
positive premium for the greater uncertainty resulted from lack of information in 
illiquid stocks. The seminal work of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) state that 
expected returns are a decreasing function of liquidity, because investors must be 
compensated for the higher transaction costs that they bear in less liquid markets. 
Chordia et al. (2000, 2001), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Huberman and Halka 
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(2001) argue that liquidity risk represents a source of non-diversifiable risk that 
needs to be reflected in expected asset returns. Amihud  (2002) also shows that 
across stocks and over time, expected stock returns are an increasing function of 
expected illiquidity. The greater sensitivity of small stocks to illiquidity means that 
these stocks are subject to greater illiquidity risk, which, if priced, should result in 
higher illiquidity risk premium. This leading to the following testable hypotheses: 
 
 H1a: Additions to the FTSE100 index reduce the liquidity risk premium of the 
underlying stocks. 
 
H1b: Deletions from the FTSE100 index increase the liquidity risk premium of 
the underlying stocks.  
 
In this study, we also argue that index revisions may also affect the required 
rate of return on the underlying stock for at least three reasons. First, there could be 
an improvement in liquidity because of higher trading activity implying that the 
required rates of return should be higher for securities that are relatively illiquid 
(Chordia, 2001; Hegde and McDermott, 2003). Second, the greater interest in the 
FTSE100 firms relative to other firms may engender greater information production 
resulting in reduced information asymmetry and consequent improvement in 
liquidity. The stock with relatively higher information will have lower cost of equity 
return. Arbel and Strebel (1982) and Barry and Brown (1984) find that inactively 
traded firms are associated with high cost of equity capital
39
. Third, Chen et al. 
(2006b) suggest that if a stock’s addition to an index alerts more investors to its 
                                                          
39
 These studies use firm’s size, and trading frequencies as proxies for illiquidity. 
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existence, and consequently increases its breadth of ownership, the required rate of 
return on that stock should fall due to a reduction in the shadow cost. Subsequent 
studies, including Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Amihud (2002), and Liu (2006), 
provide evidence that systematic liquidity risk is a source of priced systematic risk in 
stock returns. They show that stocks’ liquidity betas, their sensitivities to innovations 
in aggregate liquidity, play a significant role in asset pricing. Stocks with higher 
liquidity betas exhibit higher cost of equity capital while stocks with lower liquidity 
betas exhibit lower cost of equity capital. This argument leads to the following 
testable hypothesis: 
 
H2a: Additions to the FTSE 100 reduce the cost of equity capital. 
 
H2b: Deletions from the FTSE 100 increase the cost of equity capital. 
 
Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) argue that if the cost of equity capital 
declines, it will expand the set of viable investment opportunities and should lead to 
increased capital expenditures. Existing literature also suggests that if required equity 
return and the cost of equity capital is lowered as a result of an increase in stock 
liquidity following the index revisions, one would expect an expansion in the 
investment opportunity. However, the reduction in liquidity does not necessarily 
decrease investment opportunity, because the benefit of index membership may not 
easily diminish following the removals. Thus, we predict the testable hypothesis: 
 
H3: Investment opportunities increase following additions but do not 
necessarily shrink after deletions. 
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4.3 Data  
Our study is based on the FTSE 100 index, which consists of 100 UK 
companies with the largest market capitalization. The FTSE Steering Committee is 
conducting a quarterly review of the FTSE 100 constituents list. Stocks listed on the 
London Stock Exchange are ranked by their market capitalization (firm size) at the 
close of business on the day before the index revisions. Any company in the FTSE 
100 list falling to 111
th
 position or below will be mechanically deleted from the 
index, while any company rising to 90
th
 position or above will be mechanically 
added to the FTSE 100 index. To ensure that the index always represents exactly 100 
members, the highest (lowest) market capitalization stocks outside (inside) the index 
are added (removed) if the number of automatic deletions exceeds (is less than) the 
number of automatic inclusions.
40
 Any constituent change is implemented on the 
third Friday of the same month, so that there are currently seven working days 
between the announcement and effective change dates. We obtain 367 FTSE 100 
index revision events from the DataStream from January 1984 to June 2009
41
. We 
drop from our sample stocks that were added (deleted) due to events such as spin 
offs, mergers and takeovers. The data related to spin offs, mergers and takeover is 
obtained from different resources, including DataStream, Ft.com, Thomson One 
Bank and the media coverage of each firm
42
. We obtain, the daily, weekly and 
monthly data from DataStream which include closing price, market capitalization, 
book-to-market value, trading volume, number of trades, bid-ask spread, the number 
                                                          
40
 A detailed description of the construction of the FTSE 100 can be found in the Ground Rules for the 
Management of the UK Series of the FTSE Actuaries Share Indices 
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/UK_Indices/Downloads/FTSE_UK_Index_Series_Index_Rules.pdf; 
accessed 20 May 2011). 
41
 Appendix A.1 reports the constituents of the FTSE 100 index from 19-Jan-1984 to 10- Jun-2009 
from the Datastream. 
42
 Appendices A.2 and A.3 include the final sample of additions and deletions, respectively. 
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of shares outstanding and UK T-bill rate. The data on the Fama and French three-
factor model (1993) and the momentum factor of Carhart (1997) is obtained from Xfi 
Centre for Finance and Investment website
43
, University of Exeter. Information on 
media coverage is extracted through systematic manual searches in LexisNexis UK. 
The final sample consists of 432 stock, 212 additions and 210 deletions, including 
both surviving and dead stocks. The same variables and data sources are used to 
construct the control sample. Table 4.1 provides the yearly distribution of additions 
and deletions across the study period. 
 
Table 4.1 The yearly distribution of the of additions and deletions events  
Year The sample of additions The sample of Deletions 
1984 4 8 
1985 9 9 
1986 13 7 
1987 5 7 
1988 8 5 
1989 8 8 
1990 3 6 
1991 7 10 
1992 15 17 
1993 9 11 
1994 3 4 
1995 11 8 
1996 5 8 
1997 7 9 
1998 7 13 
1999 8 9 
2000 17 18 
2001 12 9 
2002 12 4 
2003 5 6 
2004 7 4 
2005 6 5 
2006 7 2 
2007 9 11 
2008 12 10 
2009 3 2 
Total 212 210 
                                                          
43
 The data of Fama and French three-factor model (1993) and momentum factor of Carhart (1997) 
are obtained from http://xfi.exeter.ac.uk/researchandpublications/portfoliosandfactors/index.php. 
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4.4 Empirical analysis 
4.4.1 Changes in liquidity following the index revisions 
To examine the changes in the dimensions of stock market liquidity following 
the index revisions, we use bid-ask spread, trading volume, number of trades and 
Amihud’s (2002) illiquidity ratio to capture the trading costs, trading quantity, 
trading frequency and price impact dimensions of liquidity, respectively. We also 
construct LM12 to capture the trading speed, trading quantity and trading continuity. 
The pre- and post- revision periods are estimated from 261 to 31 days before the 
effective date and from 31 to 261 days after the effective days
44
. We do this to avoid 
the liquidity reaction induced by the trading activities of market participants, namely 
index fund managers and the index arbitrageurs. We first run a normality test for the 
main and the control sample by using Kolmogorov-Smirnov, Jarque-Bera and 
Shapiro-Wilk. These tests show that the measures of liquidity for the main and 
control sample are not normally distributed
45
.  
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics of the event stocks and their control 
pairs. Panel A presents the pre-index addition (i.e. [-261, -31]) characteristics, 
namely, trading volume (VO), number of trades (NT), bid-ask spread (Ask-Bid), 
illiquidity (Amihud) and LM12 of the added stocks and their control pairs. The paired 
t-test suggests that the pre-revision liquidity levels associated with the sample of 
additions is not statistically significant from that of the control sample. The non-
parametric Mann-Whitney test also indicates that the pre-index revision liquidity 
                                                          
44
 In unreported results, we determine which window to exclude by estimating cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CARs) over several event windows.  We find that CARs are statistically significant 
only in the windows within      days around the index revision dates.  We therefore estimate the 
liquidity measures within the windows [-261, -31] and [+31, +260]. 
45
 We run a normality test for the main and the control sample by using Jarque-Bera, Kolmogorov-
Smirnova and Shapiro-Wilk. These tests show that the measures of liquidity for both the main and 
control sample are not normally distributed (see Appendix B.1). 
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characteristics of the additions and their matched pairs belong to the same 
distribution. These results are robust to various alternative liquidity measures.    
 
Table 4. 2 Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
Panel B of Table 4.2 presents the cross-sectional descriptive statistics of 
deleted stocks and their control pairs in the pre-deletion period (i.e. [-261, -31] 
window around deletions). The results show that t-test and Mann-Whitney test 
This Table reports the means and medians of firm characteristics over the [-261, -30] window around 
index revisions. Trading volume (VO) is the turnover by volume. Number of trades (NT) is the number 
of daily transactions for a particular stock. Ask minus bid (Ask-bid) is the difference between ask and 
bid price. Amihud is the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the pound trading volume on 
that day. LM12 is the proportional number of days with zero daily return over 12 months. The 
control sample is constructed by matching each event stock with non-event stock with the closest 
pre-revision market capitalization. The paired t-test and Mann Whitney tests are then used to 
judge the statistical significance of the changes, across pre- and post- additions periods. The 
asterisks ***, **, and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: The criteria of pre-additions and control sample 
 
Additions 
 
Control 
 
 The Differences between 
Additions  and Control  
 
Mean  Median 
 
Mean  Median  
  
t-Stat 
Mann 
Whitney 
VO(10
3)
 3,691 1,888 
 
3,371 1,735 
  
-0.580 -1.271 
NT 461 135 
 
448 113 
  
-0.162 -0.329 
ASK_Bid 3.542 2.830 
 
4.060 2.960 
  
1.339 -1.120 
Amihud(10-
6)
 9.175 3.320 
 
5.736 3.270 
  
1.193* -0.322 
LM12 29 22 
 
29 23 
  
-0.032 -0.048 
Panel B: The criteria of pre-deletions and control sample 
 
Deletions 
 
Control 
 
The Differences between 
deletions  and Control   
 
Mean  Median 
 
Mean  Median  
  
t-Stat 
Mann 
Whitney 
VO(103) 4,225 2,226 
 
2,463 1,333 
  
3.496*** -4.368*** 
NT 503 121 
 
279 48 
  
3.013*** -4.507*** 
ASK_Bid 3.912 2.985 
 
3.895 3.085 
  
0.895 -0.140 
Amihud(10-6) 4.189 2.615 
 
24.2 4.760 
  
-1.671* -5.275*** 
LM12 28 22 
 
38 31 
  
-3.744*** -4.269*** 
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indicate that the mean and median values of, VO, and NT are higher for the event 
stocks than their control pair. Moreover, the deleted stock exhibit lower illiquidity 
measured of Amihud and LM12 than their control pairs.  
Table 4.3 outlines the changes, across pre- and post-index revision periods, in 
the liquidity characteristics of additions and deletions. The results indicate that the 
liquidity proxies, namely VO, NT, Ask-Bid, Amihud and LM12, are significantly 
improved following additions to the FTSE 100 index. VO and NT exhibit a 
significant increase by 236 and 201, respectively. Ask-Bid, Amihud and LM12 
decline significantly by 0.122, 1.528 and 4, respectively. The findings suggest that 
the various dimensions of liquidity including the trading costs, trading quantity, 
trading frequency, price impact dimensions of liquidity and trading continuity are 
improved following the additions. Therefore, our hypothesis H0a1, which posits that 
additions to the FTSE 100 improve stock market liquidity, is approved. 
Consequently, we reject H0b1, which posits that index addition does not affect market 
liquidity. Table 4.3 shows that apart from LM12, the rest of the liquidity variables 
remain largely unchanged after deletions. Thus, our hypothesis H0a2, which suggests 
that deletions from the FTSE 100 harm stock market liquidity, is disapproved. 
Therefore, our hypothesis H0b2, which argues that index deletion does not affect 
market liquidity, is approved. 
We argue that our results are largely consistent with the argument that 
inclusions of a stock in the index improves its liquidity (see, for example, Dhillon 
and Johnson(1991); Hegde and McDermott (2003); Chordia (2002)). Our result also 
consistent with the study of (Mazouz and Saadouni, 2007a) in which they find that 
additions to the FTSE 100 improve stock market liquidity measured by trading 
volume and bid-ask spread. However, deletions experience no liquidity change.  
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Table 4. 3 Changes in stock market liquidity 
This table presents summary statistics for the changes in the measures of stock market liquidity. Cross-
sectional means and medians of VO, NT, Ask-Bid, Amihud, and LM12 are computed over the [-261, -30] 
and [+30, +260] windows around additions. The paired t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank test are then used 
to judge the statistical significance of the changes, across pre- and post- additions periods, in the different 
liquidity proxies. The ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Change following Additions 
 
Change following Deletions 
 
Mean Median  t-test Wilcoxon 
 
Mean Median  t-test Wilcoxon 
VO (10
3
) 236 563 -1.390 -4.113***  335 179 -1.530 -1.326 
NT 201 145 --5.837*** -8.781***  -18 -4 0.592 -0.812 
Ask_Bid -0.122 0.01 0.4287 -1.803*  -0.681 -0.130 1.440 -2.259** 
Amihud(10-
6
) -1.528 -1.230 1.929** -6.574***  10.916 1.365 -1.001 -5.540*** 
LM12 -4 -5 2.616*** -6.137***  9 4 -3.785*** -3.795*** 
          
 
 
4.4.2 Liquidity risk premium  
In the previous section, we show that following index revisions, the 
dimensions of stock liquidity for additions (deletions) experience significant increase 
(decrease). This section studies the impact of changes in liquidity on the liquidity 
risk premium following the index revisions. Then, we examine whether the change in 
the liquidity risk premium explains results in the change in the cost of equity capital.  
First, for each pre- and post-event, we construct MKT and LIQ to produce the 
liquidity risk from the two-factor liquidity augmented model (LCAPM) of Liu 
(2006). MKT is excess return on the market portfolio. LIQ is the difference in returns 
between portfolios of stocks with low and high liquidity. The construction of LIQ is 
similar to the construction of SMB and HML in Fama and French (1993) and Carhart 
(1997).  
At the beginning of each month from January and July 1985 to July 2010, we 
sort all FTSE ALL SHARES ordinary common stocks in ascending order based on 
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their liquidity measures LM12
46
 producing two independent portfolios, low-liquidity 
   and high-liquidity   . The    and HL portfolios contains the 35% of the lowest-
liquidity stocks and 35% highest-liquidity in the FTSE ALL SHARES index, 
respectively. These portfolios            are held for six months after portfolio 
formation period. According to Liu (2006), the 6-month holding period is chosen 
because it gives a moderate liquidity premium compared to the 1- and 12-month 
holding period, which seems plausible for estimating the liquidity factor. We then 
construct the mimicking liquidity factor LIQ as the monthly profits from buying one 
dollar of equally weighted    and selling one dollar of equally weighted  47. 
Second, LCAPM includes the excess return on the market portfolio and a 
liquidity factor LIQ. Thus, the expected excess return of security i from the LCAPM 
is given as  
               (         )                  (4.1) 
where    is the risk-free rate at time t,       is the expected return on the market 
portfolio,        is the expected value of the mimicking liquidity factors, and      
and     are firms  ’s factor loadings for the market return and liquidity risk, 
respectively. We apply Liu’s LCAPM to measure the liquidity risk of each added 
(deleted) firm separately. Then, we examine the liquidity risk changes following each 
revision event as follows
48
: 
                                                         
                               
(4.2) 
 
                                                          
46
 We also use Amihud and the inverse of trading volume by value to construct LIQ (see Appendices 
B.3 and B.6). 
47
 Appendices B.3 and B.6 provide more details on the construction of LIQ. 
48
 Similar methodology is used by Lin et al (2009) in the context of stock split. 
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where     is the monthly return of added (deleted) firm   at time  ;     is the monthly 
risk-free rate from the UK T-bills
49
 at time t;      is the pre-addition (deletion) 
abnormal return; and      is the difference between the post-and pre-addition 
(deletion) abnormal return;    is a dummy variable with a value of one if t is in the 
post-period and zero otherwise;       and       are the pre-additions (deletions) factor 
loading on the market portfolio and the liquidity factor, respectively;       is the 
monthly return of FTSE All SHARES index;
50
        and       capture the change, 
across the post- and pre-addition (deletion) periods, in factor loading on the market 
portfolio and the liquidity factor, respectively.  
Finally, to account for the possible impact of factors other than index 
revisions on our findings, we use a control sample methodology. We construct our 
control sample by matching each event stock with a control stock (i) with the closest 
market capitalisation to the event stock at one month before revision
51
; (ii) has never 
been a member of the FTSE 100 index and (iii) has a full set of       daily price 
observations available around the event date from DataStream. We run the time-
series regression by including the benchmark-adjusted return for each addition 
(deletion) as follows: 
                                                          
                               
 
(4.3) 
where     is the monthly return of added (deleted) firm   at time  ;      is the monthly 
return of added (deleted) firm  ’s benchmark firm;      is the pre-addition (deletion) 
                                                          
49 UK T-bills is calculated monthly and obtained from the DataStream.  
50
 For the market return,      , we use the total return on the FTSE All SHARES, and for    , the risk 
free rate, we use the one month (daily) return on the UK T-Bills from the Data stream.  FT All SHARES 
is a capitalisation-weighted index, including around 1000 of more than 2,000 companies traded on 
the London Stock Exchange. 
51
 Recall that stocks are included to and excluded from the FTSE 100 index solely on the basis of their 
market capitalization. 
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excess abnormal return of the firm   over its benchmark;      is the difference 
between the post- and pre addition excess abnormal return (deletions) firm   over its 
benchmark; and        and        are  the pre-addition (deletion) excess betas on the 
market portfolio and liquidity factor for firm   over its benchmark, respectively; 
      and       are difference between the post- and pre- addition (deletion) excess 
betas on the market portfolio and liquidity factor for firm   over its benchmark, 
respectively. This benchmark-adjusted approach allows us to mitigate the effects of 
possible market wide movements in liquidity risk. We run the time series regressions 
for additions (deletions) and their benchmark.  
Table 4.4 summarises the time series estimation of the factors of LCAPM on 
the monthly basis for each addition and deletion. Panel A reports the monthly time-
series regression, which is run for each addition for t from -24 month to month -1 
prior to the effective date of the revision month and from month +1 to month +24 
after the addition. It shows that mean (median) of pre-addition market beta       is 
1.015 with t-value of 11.398 (1.044) which suggests that the average of       
associated with the sample of added stocks is significantly different from that of their 
control pairs.The finding that the mean (median) of       of -0.002 (0.025) with t-
value of -0.025 is not significantly different from zero indicates that, on average, the 
added stocks have similar liquidity betas to their control pairs in the pre-addition 
periods. Panel A also shows that the post-revision liquidity risk of added stocks is 
declined significantly by 0.462 with t-value of -2.571. We also show that 57% of 
these stocks exhibit significant drop in their liquidity risk in the post-addition 
periods, suggesting that decline is unlikely to be driven by outliers. The average 
benchmark-adjusted excess liquidity risk also exhibits a significant decrease of 0.468 
with t-value of 1.831 in the post–addition periods. We also observe a significant drop 
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in the benchmark-adjusted liquidity risk in 59% of the added stocks. These results 
indicate that the majority of additions experience greater decline in their liquidity 
betas when they join the FTSE 100 index. Thus, in the case of additions our evidence 
supports hypothesis H1a, which predicts a decline in the liquidity risk premium 
following additions to the FTSE 100. Our findings are consistent with Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Amihud (2002) and Liu (2006), 
who show that firms with higher market liquidity exhibit lower liquidity risk 
premium.   
Panel A also shows that market betas decrease significantly by 0.398 with t-
value of -2.848 when stocks join the FTSE 100 index. This decline does not seem to 
be driven by outliers as a significant decline is reported in 60% of the cases. The 
statistically significant decline in        of -0.406 with t-value of -1.672, also 
suggests that the added stocks experience greater decrease in their betas relative to 
their matched pairs. The negative sign of       is consistent with the findings of 
Coakley and Kougoulis (2005) in which they find that added stocks to the FTSE 100 
index commove by -0.872 with Non-FTEE100 stocks. We will return to this issue in 
the next chapter.  
Panel B of Table 4.4 presents the cross-sectional time series estimation of the 
factors of LCAPM on the monthly basis for deletions. The result shows that the 
average       is not significantly different from zero, indicating that deleted stocks 
have the same pre-deletion market beta as their control pairs. Similarly, the finding 
that the mean (median)       of -0.106 (0.018) with t-value -1.203 is not statistically 
significant also suggest that the deleted stocks have same level of pre-deletion 
liquidity beta as their control pairs. 
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Table 4. 4 The estimation of LCAPM 
This Table estimates the factors of LCAPM by using Firm-by-firm time series regression. We apply the 
monthly time-series regression of 24 months (260 days) around the index additions. The 24 months 
sample is run of each addition (deletion) for t from month -24 to month -1 prior to the addition 
(deletion) month and from month +1 to month +24 after the addition (deletion) month. To estimate 
the factors of Liu (2006) we follow the procedures explained by Lin et al. (2009) as in Eqs.(4.2) and 
(4.3).    and     are firms  ’s factor loadings for the FTSE ALL SHARES return and mimicking liquidity 
factors LIQ, respectively      and        are the loading factors of FTSE ALL SHARES return and 
liquidity in the pre-event, respectively.         and       are the difference in the loading factors in the 
post- relative to pre-event of FTSE ALL SHARES return and liquidity, respectively. %Ch is the 
percentage of increase in the sample that experiences an increase        and          in the post-event 
period. The t-values with autoregressive error correction standard error, assuming that the errors of 
the coefficient estimates follow AR (1) process. The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
               Monthly estimation of LCAPM  
Panel A: Additions 
 
                              
        
   Mean 1.015 -0.398 -0.002 -0.462 
Median 1.044 -0.288 0.025 -0.113 
 
(11.398**) (-2.848**) (-0.025) (-2.571***) 
%Ch  (60)  (57) 
             
Mean 0.060 -0.406 0.241 -0.468 
Median 0.056 -0.319 0.254 -.276 
 (0.495) (-1.672*) (1.15) (-1.831**) 
%Ch  (60)  (59) 
Panel B: Deletions 
                               
             
Mean 1.047 0.047 -0.106 0.022 
Median 1.007 0.131 -0.018 0.180 
t-value (2.435***) (0.42) (-1.203) (0.169) 
%Ch  54  55 
             
Mean 0.012 0.085 -0.000 0.024 
Median -0.102 0.002 0.011 0.170 
t-value (0.108) (0.534) (-0.007) (0.136) 
%Ch  50  54 
 
The mean (median) of       of 0.047 (0.131) with t-value 0.42 is also not 
significant, indicating that the deletions experience similar change of their market 
betas to their control pairs following their removal from the FTSE 100 index. The 
average        is also not statistically significant suggesting that the sample of deleted 
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stocks and the control sample experience the same change in liquidity betas 
following deletions. These results indicate that the majority of deletions experience 
no change in their liquidity beta when they leave the FTSE 100. Thus, hypothesis 
H1b, which posits that deletions from the FTSE100 index increase the liquidity risk 
premium of the underlying stocks, is disapproved. 
Viewed collectively, our results can be explained as follows: First, in the case 
of additions we observe that liquidity dimensions experience significant 
improvement thus the liquidity risk is declined. The liquidity risk reduction could be 
due to many factors including the reductions in trading discontinuity, improvement 
in information environment, and increases the activities of index fund managers. In 
particular, the reductions in LM12 following the index additions indicate that added a 
stock attracts more uninformed traders to participate in trading, market makers may 
lower their cost of immediacy as a result of reductions in their inventory cost, which 
motivates investors to increase their trade. This improvement in the liquidity 
dimensions may lead stock prices to be more efficient and less sensitive to the impact 
of market liquidity chocks. Accordingly, investors may face lower liquidity risk and 
require a lower liquidity premium, which in turn leads to a lower cost of equity 
capital which we are going to examine in the following section. Daya et al (2012) 
find that the stock market quality improvement is attributed to the changes in the 
information environment, transaction costs, and other fundamental factors such as 
book to market value. Second, in the case of deletions we observe no significant 
changes in most of liquidity dimensions and the liquidity risk. This finding is line 
with the view that the benefit of index membership is permanent and does not 
disappear even when a stock is removed from the index
52
. 
                                                          
52
 Our result is not changed by using LIQ estimated by Amihud (see Appendix B.7) 
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4.4.3 Changes in cost of equity capital 
In this section we use Lin et al. (2009) prcedures to estimate the changes in 
the cost of equity capital (CEC hereafter) caused by the shifts in the liquidity risk 
premium around index revision events. First, we begin our analysis by estimating the 
pre- and post-index revision CEC for each event using Eq.(4.1). We use the long-
term historical average of       and     as proxies for          and       , 
respectively
53
. The average monthly values of       and    , over the period from 
Jan 1987 to  Dec 2009, are        and 0.0005, respectively. Second, we calculate 
the average changes in the CEC as the difference in the average of the CEC between 
the post- and the pre-addition (deletion) periods. Finaly, to account for the possible 
impact of factors other than index revisions on CEC, we adjust our results using the 
values of benchmark firms. The benchmark -adjusted CEC (Adj.CEC hereafter) is 
the CEC of the additions (deletions) minus the CEC of the benchmark firms.  
Table 4.5 presents the changes in the CEC following index revisions. Panel A 
shows that the CEC of additions experiences a significant average (median) drop of 
0.25% (0.11%) per month which equivalent to 2.95% (1.53%) per annum. This drop 
is unlikely to be driven by outliers as 59% of individual stocks exhibit a significant 
decline in their CEC in the post-addtion periods. The Adj.CEC also exhibits a 
significant average (median) decrease of 0.259% (0.19%) per month which also 
equivalent to 3.02% (2.2%) per annum in the post-addition periods. Again this 
decrease is observed in 55.6% of the added stocks. 
Panel B of Table 4.5 suggests that the deleted stocks exhibit a mean (median) 
increase of 0.02% (0.09%) per month and equivalent to 0.38% (0.89%) per annum in 
the CEC following deletions. These figures are not significantly different from zero, 
                                                          
53
 See Appendices B.3 and B.6 for the construction of LIQ and         
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implying that deletions do not affect the cost of equity capital. Thus, our evidence 
from additions and deletions are in the line with the investor awarness hypothesis, 
which predicts that investors know of only subsets of all stocks, hold only stocks that 
they are aware of and demand a premium for the non-systematic risk that they bear. 
Following the additions a stock alerts investors to its existence, and since this stock 
becomes part of their portfolios, the required rate of return should fall due to a 
reduction in non-systematic risk. Chen et al. (2004) show that investor awareness 
increases when a stock join the index, but does not necessary decrease following its 
deletion from the index. We conclude that H2a, which states the cost of equity capital 
declines when stocks join a major index, is approved. However, H2b, which states the 
cost of equity capital increases when stocks leave a major index, is disapproved. 
4.5 Robustness Check 
For robustness purposes, we use two different methods to examine the impact 
of liquidity risk on the CEC. First, we use a multivariate asset pricing model 
approach (LAPT hereafter) to account for the market return, mimicking liquidity 
factor, firm size, book to market value, and momentum risk factor. Second, we use 
the procedure suggested by Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) to examine the impact of 
liquidity risk on the investment opportunities. 
By using LAPT we estimate the loading factors (betas) for the following 
multivariate asset-pricing model  
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Table 4. 5  Changes in CEC by using LCAPM 
Estimates the changes in CEC by using LCAPM OF Liu (2006) by using similar procedures to Lin et al. (2009) We first estimate the CEC for each event from the 
LCAPM Eq.(4.3) in the pre- and post-index revisions, seperately. By Eq.(4.3), we have               and              ,       and        are averaged 
monthly over the period from January 1987 to December 2009 (see Appendix B.6). Then, we calculate the changes in the CEC as post minus pre for each event. 
The average cross-sectional changes is the average changes of all additions (deletions), seperately. Finally, we adjusted CEC (Adj.CEC) as the cost of capital for 
the main sample minus the cost of capital for the control sample. The paired t-test, Wilcoxon Signed Rank test, and Mann Whitney (for independent 
observations) are then used to judge the statistical significance of the changes, across pre- and post- additions periods. The asterisks ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Additions   
 
                    
                                                     CEC 
 
                                             Adj.CEC 
 
Pre Post Ch %<0 t-test Wilcoxon 
 
Pre  Post Ch %<0 t-test 
Mann 
Whitney 
Mean % 0.58 0.33 -0.25*** 59.47 
-
2.857*** -2.719** 
 
0.046 -0.21 -0.259** 55.6 -1.975** -2.344** 
Median % 0.61 0.49 -0.11 
    
0.04 -0.15 -0.19 
   
              Panel B: Deletions  
 
                                                            CEC 
 
                                                  Adj. CEC 
 
Pre Post Ch %>0 t-test Wilcoxon 
 
Pre  Post Ch %>0 t-test 
Mann 
Whitney 
Mean % 0.6 0.63 0.02 54.00 -0.409 -1.205 
 
0.00 0.05 0.05 51.33 -0.512 -0.408 
Median % 0.57 0.64 0.09 
    
-0.06 0.03 0.03 
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(4.4) 
 where      ,       and       are loading factors on    ,     and    , 
respectively;      is the size risk factor in month t and is calculated as the 
difference between the returns of a portfolio of small vs. large firms;      is the 
difference in returns of a portfolio of high and low book-to-market stocks;      is 
the difference in returns between a portfolio of winner stocks with high prior returns 
and loser stocks; other parameters are previously defined in section 4.4.2 above. 
Table 4.6 presents the estimation of the loading factors of LIQ, SMB, HML, 
MOM and MKT from LAPT. Table 4.6 reports the firm by firm time-series 
regressions, which are run for each event stock over [-24 month, -1 month] and [+1 
month, +24 month] windows around index revision periods. Consistent with our 
earlier findings (see Section 4.4.2),       and       are exhibit a significant drop of 
0.450 and 0.463, respectively. This decline is unlikely to be driven by outliers as 
56% and 60% of individual stocks exhibit a significant decline in their liquidity risk 
and market beta after additions, respectively. Our results are unchanged when we 
control for other risk factor. Furthermore, the average excess        drops significantly 
by 0.465 and 53% of the additions show excess         . This result indicates that 
the liquidity risk associated with the additions experience significant reduction 
relative to their control pairs. The loading factors of        ,        and        are not 
significant from zero implying that the change in the CEC is mearly driven by 
liquidity risk and market beta in the post- additions.  
128 
 
Table 4. 6 Multivariate asset pricing model 
Estimates the LAPT which includes LCAPM and Carhart (1997) four-factor model by using Firm by firm time series regression. We estimate the LAPT in Eq.(4.4) 
    and     are firms  ’s factor loadings for the FTSE ALL SHARES return and mimicking liquidity factors, respectively;    ,    , and       are loading factors 
for the values of    ,   , and   , respectively;      is the size risk factor in month t and is calculated as the difference between the returns of a portfolio 
of small vs. large firms;      is the difference in returns of a portfolio of high and low book-to-market stocks;      is the difference in returns between a 
portfolio of winner stocks with high prior returns and loser stocks; %Ch is the percentage of increase in loading factors in the post-event period. The t-values with 
autoregressive error correction standard error, assuming that the errors of the coefficient estimates follow AR (1) process. The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively  
Panel A: Additions 
                                                                         
Mean 1.114 -0.463 0.031 -0.450 -0.007 0.073 -0.001 -0.013 -0.073 0.087 
Median 1.074 -0.206 0.142 -0.135 -0.071 0.118 0.017 -0.012 -0.070 0.020 
Ar(1) 11.335*** -3.422*** 0.317 -2.501*** -0.681 1.252 0.369 -0.656 -0.247 -0.030 
Ch%   (60)   (56)   45   51   48 
              
      Mean 0.274 -0.598 0.282 -0.465 -0.094 0.131 -0.089 -0.019 -0.020 0.164 
Median 0.208 -0.341 0.284 -0.063 -0.222 0.250 -0.120 -0.070 0.004 0.026 
Ar(1) 1.949** -3.158*** 1.713** -1.815** -1.185 0.848 -0.343 -0.467 0.411 -0.036 
Ch% <0   (59)   (53)   42   (54)   50 
Panel B: Deletions 
                                                                         
Mean 1.027 -0.065 -0.118 -0.090 -0.012 -0.021 0.092 0.154 -0.062 -0.052 
Median 1.003 0.057 0.064 -0.050 -0.023 -0.042 0.132 0.090 0.029 -0.030 
Ar(1) (12.13***) -0.529 -1.151 -0.633 -0.183 -0.233 0.963 1.143 -0.846 -0.483 
Ch%   52   49   46   52   48 
               
      Mean 0.202 -0.260 0.126 -0.282 -0.247 0.276 -0.117 0.319 -0.151 0.143 
Median 0.027 -0.171 0.094 -0.018 -0.097 0.234 -0.032 0.132 0.047 -0.093 
Ar(1) 1.601 -1.563 0.795 -1.508 -1.772* 1.897** -0.841 1.919*** -1.040 0.812 
Ch%>0   44   48   56   50   47 
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Panel B of Table 4.6 presents the result of LAPT for the deletions sample. The means 
(medians) of       and        are 1.027 (1.003) and -0.118 (0.064), respectively. These figures 
are not significantly different from zero, implying that the deleted stocks have the same pre-
deletion risk characteristics as their control pairs. The averages associated with       and        
are not significantly different from zero, suggesting that deletions do not affect the liquidity 
premium and market risk. The loading factors of      ,      , and       also do not exhibit any 
significant change following the deletions. Thus, our results suggest that liquidity premium 
experience significant drop following additions, but do not change after deletions. 
Table 4.7 reports the LAPT-based CEC estimates. Panel A shows that the CEC and 
the Adj.CEC experience stastically significant decline of 0.36% and 0.45% per month
54
  in 
the post- additions, respectively. The results in Panel B suggest that neither the CEC nor the 
Adj.CEC expericence any change in the post-deletion periods. These results, which are 
similar to those reported in Table 4.5, indicate index membership reduces the cost of capital 
permanently
55
.
                                                          
54
 This is equivalent to 7.3% and 5.2% per annum, respectively. 
55
 To decide which model is more pronounced, we compare between the LCAPM and LAPT by using R-squared, 
% of stock with non-significant alpha, and Akaike information criteria (AIC). Appendix B.8 shows that the 
LCAPM is slightly outperforms the multivariate model by using AIC while the multivariate model slightly 
outperforms LCAPM by using the Adj. R
2 
and %Non-sign α.    
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Table 4. 7 The change in the CEC by using the multivariate model 
Estimates the CEC and Adj. CEC by using LAPT as in Eq.(4.4) and SEE . We calculate the changes in the CEC as post minus pre for each event. The average cross-
sectional changes is the average changes of all additions (deletions), seperately. We adjusted CEC (Adj. CEC) as the cost of capital for the main sample minus the cost 
of capital for the control sample. The t-values with autoregressive error correction standard error, assuming that the errors of the coefficient estimates follow AR (1) 
process. Panels A and B reports the firm by firm time-series regressions, which are run for each addition and deletion separately for t from -24 month to month -1 
prior to the effective date of the revision month and from month +1 to month +24 after the addition and deletion, respectively. The paired t-test, Wilcoxon Signed 
Rank test, and Mann Whitney (for independent observations) are then used to judge the statistical significance of the changes, across pre- and post- 
additions periods, in the different liquidity proxies. The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Additions   
 
                    
                                                           CEC 
 
                                           Adj. CEC 
 
                   Pre     Post       Ch %<0 t-test Wilcoxon 
 
Pre  Post Ch %<0 t-test Mann Whitney 
Mean% 0.67 0.27 -0.36 53.5 2.443*** 1.644* 
 
0.22 -0.23 -0.45 54.1 -2.145** 1.803* 
Median% 0.53 0.15 -0.12 
    
0.20 -0.17 -0.12 
   
              
              Panel B: Deletions  
 
                                                    CEC 
 
                                             Adj. CEC 
 
Pre Post Ch %<0 t-test Wilcoxon 
 
Pre  Post Ch %<0 t-test Mann Whitney 
Mean% 0.54 0.52 -0.01 51.00 0.082 -0.124 
 
-0.01 0.09 0.09 49.66 0.489 -0.223 
Median% 0.48 0.50 0.02 
    
0.02 0.04 -0.06 
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We use the procedure suggested by Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) to 
examine the impact of liquidity risk on the investment opportunities. Becker-Blease 
and Paul (2006) claim that the cost of equity capital is one of the main determinants 
of the firm’s investment opportunity set. We test whether investment opportunities 
are increasing in stock liquidity, and thus provide a relatively indirectly implication 
of the liquidity premium. We define the measurement periods for capital 
expenditures
56
 as follows. The pre-addition (deletion) period is from the end of the 
fiscal year prior that addition (deletions). The post-additions (deletion) period is from 
the end of the fiscal year following the addition (deletion) year. 
To observe the change in the growth opportunities, we may need more than 
one year to be realized in capital expenditures, so we evaluate changes for a three-
year period surrounding index addition (deletion). The three-year change in capital 
expenditures is the average of the three fiscal years following addition (deletion) 
minus the average for the three fiscal years before addition (deletion). In the case of 
missing one year data, we estimate two-year average change in capital 
expenditures
57
. We exclude the firms with more than one year missing data. We 
apply this process for the pre- and post- addition (deletion) period. We regress the 
change in the capital expenditures (CE hereafter) on the measures of liquidity.  
Table 4.8 presents the changes in the CE associate with both additions and 
deletions. Panel A of Table 4.8 reports a significant average increase in the CE of 
0.317 in the post-addition period. It also shows that about 72% of the added stocks 
exhibit increase in their CE when they become index members. Our results are 
consistent with findings of Becker-Blease and Paul (2006), who report a significant 
increase of 6.5% in the CE following additions to the S&P500 index. Panel B of 
                                                          
56
 We use capital expenditure as a proxy for investment opportunities as suggested by Becker-Blease 
and Paul (2006). 
57
 In the case of additions (deletions) we have three (five) events with only one year missing. 
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Table 4.8 shows that the 60% of deleted stocks also exhibit significant increase by 
0.16 in their CE in the post-deletion periods.  
 
Table 4. 8 Changes in the capital expenditure 
Capital Expenditure changes for the additions and deletions sample. the changes of the mean 
(median) capital expenditure (Cap Exp.) following the index revisions ∆CE is the changes in the 
capital expenditure over the [-261, -30], [+30, +260] window around index revisions. We obtain the 
data of Capital Expenditure from the DataStream. The paired t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank test 
are then used to judge the statistical significance of the changes, across pre- and post- additions 
periods. The asterisks ***, **,* indicate significance at a 1%, 5%, 10 level respectively. 
Panel A: Additions       
                Pre-CE Post-CE   ∆CE t-test  Wilcoxon %CH 
 
 
 
    Mean             10.896 11.213 0.317 5.037*** 6.231*** 72% 
Median             11.114 11.476 0.363 
   Panel B: Deletions       
 
      Mean              11.296 11.456 0.160 3.116*** 2.633*** 60% 
Median               11.347 11.597 0.249 
                 
 
In this study, we propose twofold possible explanations to the increased CE 
in the post-index revision periods. First, we argue that the increase in the CE for both 
additions and deletions indicate that the procedure of Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) 
may not appropriately capture the impact of the changes in the CEC on the 
investment opportunities. Thus, we attribute the increase in the CE to factors other 
than index revisions. Second, the improvement in the CE of additions is greater than 
that of deletions and it is, therefore, possible to argue that the index membership 
effect on the CE continues even after removing a stock from the index. Thus, H3, 
which suggests that investment opportunities increase when a stock joins an index, 
but do necessarily shirk following its deletion, is approved. 
Table 4.9 presents the OLS regression of the CE changes on the changes in 
MV, BTMV, VO, and LM12. Our results suggest that the change in CE associated 
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with the sample of added stocks is significantly related to the changes in firm size 
and illiquidity. The coefficients of ∆MV and ∆LM12 are 0.0005 and -0.004 and 
significant at 1% level, respectively. The positive sign of ∆MV implies that the 
higher the firm size, the higher the investment opportunities. The negative sign of 
∆LM12 indicates that the lower the stock market illiquidity, the higher the 
investment opportunities. Our result is consistent with the findings of Becker-Blease 
and Paul (2006), in which they find that the changes in capital expenditures is 
increasing in trading volume and share turnover, and are decreasing in the illiquidity 
ratio. Our evidence is also consistent with the argument that corporate managers 
respond to improvements in stock market liquidity by increasing the firm’s capital 
investment.
58
  
Table 4.9 reports that the coefficient of ∆LM12 for deletions is -1.881 and 
(weakly) significant at 10% level. Our result is slightly different than the findings of 
Gregoriou and Nguyen (2010) in which they find that the coefficient of illiquidity is 
negative but not significant at conventional levels. This difference may be caused by 
the fact that our study uses a multidimensional measure of liquidity, which captures 
the trading costs, trading quantity, trading frequency and price impact dimensions of 
liquidity, while Gregoriou and Nguyen (2010) focus only on one dimensional 
measure of liquidity. The coefficient of ∆MV is 0.0001 and significant at 1% 
indicating that the higher the firm size, the higher the investment opportunities. 
Overall, our findings indicate that the enhanced liquidity reduces the cost of equity 
capital of the added stocks, whilst the decline in the liquidity does not affect the cost 
of capital of the deleted stocks.  
                                                          
58
 It is hardly to compare the ∆CE with the results of Gregoriou and Nguyen  (2010) since they do not 
report the changes in the capital expenditure following the deletions from the FTSE100. 
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Table 4. 9 The explanations of changes on CE 
This Table regress of the changes of the CE on the changes of explanatory variables. ∆ CE is the 
changes in the capital expenditure over the [-261, -30], [+30, +260] window around index revisions. 
∆MV is the changes in the firm size around the index revisions. ∆BTMV is the changes in the book- to 
market-value around the index revisions. ∆_Amihud is the changes in Amihud which the average 
ratio of the daily absolute returns to the pound trading volume on that day around the index 
revisions. ∆LM12 is the changes in the proportional number of days with zero daily return over 12 
months around the index revisions. The paired t-test is then used to judge the statistical significance 
of the changes, across pre- and post- additions periods The asterisks ***, **,* indicate significance 
at a 1%, 5%, 10 level respectively. 
Explaining the ∆CE 
    Additions   Deletions   
  
Coef. t.stat   Coef. t.stat   
Intercept 
 
-0.072 -0.841 
 
0.049 1.002 
 ∆MV 
 
0.0005 3.128*** 
 
0.0001 4.397*** 
 ∆BTMV 
 
0.294 1.639 
 
0.012 0.105 
 ∆VO 
 
-0.173 -0.636 
 
-0.251 -0.018 
 ∆Amihud 
 
-0.003 -0.430 
 
0.011 1.336 
 ∆LM12 
 
-0.004 -4.165*** 
 
-0.003 -1.881* 
 Adj R2   0.192   0.171   
f-Value   6.932   5.966   
 
 
4.6 Summary and conclusions 
In this chapter, we investigate the impact of index revision on stock liquidity, 
liquidity premium and the cost of equity capital. Our analysis yields the following 
results: 
 First, stock liquidity improves significantly following additions. However, 
the results following the exclusions show that most liquidity proxies are largely 
unchanged. These findings are in line with the investor awareness hypothesis, which 
suggests that the benefit of index membership is permanent and do not diminish 
when a stock leaves the index.   
Second, our findings from the estimation of Liu’s (2006) two-factor liquidity 
augmented model (LCAPM) document significant reductions in the risk liquidity 
premium following additions to the FTSE 100 index. The result indicates that the 
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majority of the added stocks, relative to their benchmark firms, experience reductions 
in liquidity beta. These results are consistent with the liquidity improvement 
hypothesis, which posits that inclusions improve a stock liquidity, as investors face 
lower liquidity risk. Our findings are also consistent with those of Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Amihud (2002) and Liu (2006) in 
which they assume that since liquidity is priced, actively traded stocks are 
characterised by lower risk premium and investors gain lower rate of return. 
However, our results suggest that deletions from the FTSE 100 do not affect liquidity 
risk. Similar findings are observed from the estimation of the multivariate asset 
pricing model. The asymmetric response to additions and deletions is consistent with 
the predictions of the investor awareness hypothesis, which suggests that investors 
know of only subsets of all stocks, hold only stocks that they are aware of and 
demand a premium for the non-systematic risk that they bear. 
Third, we show that stocks that entre the FTSE 100 experience a significant 
decline in their CEC.  For example, the changes in CEC estimated by LCAPM show 
a significant drop of 2.95 % per annum for approximately 59% of the inclusions. 
Furthermore, the changes in Adj.CEC, which show a similar drop of about 56% of 
the inclusions, experience significant decline of 3.02% per annum in the CEC of the 
additions relative to their counterpart. Similar results are reported when the CEC is 
estimated from LAPT. Specifically, CEC and the Adj.CEC experience stastically 
significant decline of 7.3% and 5.2% per annum in the post-additions for 
appoximately 54% of the additions, respectively. 
In the deletion cases, the estimated CEC shows no significant changes 
following the index revisions in either the LCAPM, or LAPT. Our results also show 
that the Adj.CEC is not affected by deletions. Overall, our evidence from additions 
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and deletions are in line with the investor awareness hypothesis, which suggest that 
the benefit of index membership is likely to be permanent and may not diminish 
upon deletions. However, one cannot rule out the effect of liquidity on the CEC, 
especially since we observe reductions in the cost of capital following the 
improvement in the stock market liquidity in the case of additions. 
Finally, the capital expenditure is estimated using the procedures of Becker-
Blease and Paul (2006) to investigate the changes in the investment opportunities 
following index revisions. The results show that capital expenditure experiences 
significant increases by 0.317 for 72% of the inclusions. This result supports the 
findings of Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) in which they find significant increases in 
the capital expenditure following the S&P500 index revisions. The capital 
expenditure also increases significantly by 0.16 following deletions from the 
FTSE100 index. This result may suggest that the increased investment opportunities 
associated with additions continues even after the stock is removed from the index. It 
may also suggest that investment opportunities are affected by factors other than 
index deletions. The improvement in the investment expenditure is attributed to the 
improvement in the underlying liquidity of additions stock and to the increase in their 
firm size. Since we find that additions (deletions) are (not) associated with 
improvement in liquidity which in turn reduce (no change) the liquidity risk and cost 
of equity capital, we argue that these findings are consistent with the argument of 
investment awareness hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that the asymmetric 
response of cost of equity capital to additions and deletions can, at least partly, be 
attributed to certain aspects of liquidity and other fundamental characteristics which 
improve following additions, but do not always diminish after deletions. 
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Chapter 5: Index revisions and stock return comovement 
5.1 Introduction  
Classical financial theory suggests that asset prices comove only due to 
comovement in their fundamentals – expected cash flows and risk-adjusted discount 
rates. However, the behavioural finance theory attributes comovement to factors 
related to noise traders’ decisions and investor sentiment. We test these theories in 
the context of the FTSE 100 index revisions.  
Several studies (e.g. Harris and Gurel (1986); Shleifer (1986); Barberies et al. 
(2005)) suggest that, index rebalancing is based on publically available information 
and carries no news about the firms’ future fundamentals. Thus any observed 
changes in the correlation of a newly added (deleted) stock’s return with the index 
constituents is likely to be caused by the contemporaneous changes in the uniformed 
demand shocks. Vijh (1994) argues that Standard & Poor’s decision does not signal 
an opinion about fundamentals and the decision to revise the S&P 500 index reflects 
purely the desire to make the index as representative as possible to the overall U.S. 
economy. Similarly, the FTSE Steering Committee revises the FTSE 100 index 
merely on basis of market capitalization which is already known by the public.  
Barberis et al. (2005) examine the comovement around the S&P 500 index 
revisions. They report a significant increase (decrease) in the daily S&P 500 beta 
after addition to (deletion from) the S&P 500 index. They argue that since changes in 
stock index compositions are information-free events, comovement changes cannot 
be explained by the classical financial theory and are, therefore, consistent with 
friction- or sentiment-based view. Similar results are reported by Coakley and 
Kougoulis (2005), Greenwood (2007) and Coakley et al. (2008) around the FTSE 
100, Nikkei and MNCI-Canada index revisions, respectively. 
138 
 
In this study, we argue that changes in stock return comovement around index 
revision may not necessarily reflect investor sentiment for at least four reasons. First, 
several studies show that changes in the constituents of indices, such as the S&P 500, 
may not be totally information-free event. Denis et al. (2003) show that analysts 
revise their expectations about future earnings when stocks join the S&P 500 index. 
Brooks et al. (2004) show that S&P 500 index membership has very long term 
effects and index revisions are not information-free events. Similarly, Cai (2007) 
claims that S&P 500 index membership certifies the stock as leading firm. He also 
argues that due to the high turnover associated with fund managers rebalancing their 
portfolios, certain Index Membership Committees may select firms that are likely to 
meet the index criteria for longer periods of time.  
Second, even when constituency changes are assumed to be information-free 
events, the fundamental characteristics of the event stocks may change systematically 
across pre- and post-revision periods. Daya et al. (2012) show that stocks exhibit 
significant changes in market capitalization and book-to-market value after joining or 
leaving the FTSE 100 index. Since both size and book-to-market ratio are known to 
affect stock returns as suggested by Fama and French (1992), comovement changes 
around index revisions may be due to changes in the underlying fundamentals rather 
than investor sentiment.  
Third, many studies (e.g. Sofianos (1993); Hedge and Dermott (2003); 
Mazouz and Saadouni (2007)) show that index membership improves stock liquidity. 
Since liquidity risk may be priced (Pastor and Stambaugh (2003); Liu (2006)), the 
increase comovement of the included stock may reflect the contemporaneous 
changes liquidity risk rather than the correlated informed demand shocks.  
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Finally, and more importantly, many studies (e.g. King (1966); Roll (1988); 
Piotroski and Roulstone (2004); Durnev et al. (2004); Kumar and Lee (2006); Evans 
(2009)) suggest that the stock return comovement is a function of fundamental and 
non-fundamental factors. The presence of informed traders (uninformed) makes the 
stocks move less (more) with the market. In other words, the comovement in stock 
return would be higher (lower) on the absence of arbitragers or insiders (portfolio 
managers or outsiders). Durnev et al. (2004) and  Bissessur and Hodgson (2012) 
argue that the comovement in stock return is the combination of fundamental and 
noise but the role of noise is greater. 
The above arguments imply that the conclusions of the existing comovement 
studies that the shift in the correlation structure of stock returns following index 
revisions contradicts the fundamentals view, but consistent with the friction- or 
sentiment-based views, may be misleading. Our study proposes a new approach to 
investigate the determinants of comovement changes without assuming that index 
revisions are information-free events. We begin our analysis by examining the 
predictions of friction- or sentiment-based views using the procedures suggested by 
Barberis et al. (2005). Then, we examine the predictions of fundamental-based views 
by decomposing a security price into an intrinsic value and noise, using Amihud and 
Mendelson’s (1987) model with Kalman Filter. Finally, we estimate the univariate 
and multivariate models of Barberis et al. (2005) using intrinsic values and noise 
separately. This approach quantifies with greater precision the impact of firm 
fundamentals and investor sentiments on the observed comovement changes around 
the FTSE 100 index revisions.   
This paper makes two important contributions to the comovement literature. 
First, unlike existing studies (Barberis et al. (2005); Coakley et al. (2008)), which 
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focus on the non-fundamental stock comovement, our analysis distinguish between 
the dynamic changes in both the fundamental- and sentiment-based comovement. It 
is possible to argue that the results of earlier studies may be misleading, as they 
assume that the fundamental factors are constant. It is also possible to argue that the 
changes in return comovement around index revision are driven by changes in both 
fundamental and noise. In order to examine directly whether the shifts in beta is 
driven by either or both fundamentals and noise, our analysis breaks down the daily 
returns into its true price and residuals for each addition (deletion) for the year before 
and the year after the revisions. The true price is to be considered as the fundamental 
part and the residual is the non-fundamental one. We decompose the daily returns 
using Amihud and Mendelson’s (1987) model with the Kalman filter technique. This 
process is carried out to estimate the unobserved true price from the observed price 
and decompose a contaminated price into a fundamental price and non-fundamental. 
Lyhagen (1999) shows that the Kalman filter process is much more efficient than 
other traditional techniques, such as Moving Average Convergence Divergence 
(MACD), Autoregressive Moving Average (ARMA), and a Logistic Binary 
Estimation (LOGIT). Similar evidence is reported by Brooks et al., (1998), Faff et al., 
(2000) and Dunis and Morrison (2007).  
Second, our study extends the work of Coakley and Kougoulis (2005) and 
Mase (2008) by including the fundamental factors in the analysis. Coakley and 
Kougoulis (2005) carry out similar studies of Baraberies et al (2005), and they find 
that the shift in the stock return comovement following the changes in the FTSE100 
index list is attributed to the behavioural financial view of comovement. Mase (2008) 
extends the analysis of Coakley and Kougoulis (2005). He argues - without going 
into detail - that the findings from the FTSE 100 index suggest that other factors 
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apart from the behavioural finance may provide additional explanation59. We suggest 
that the findings of Mase (2008) that the newly added stocks commove more than the 
previously added stock is due to the impact of fundamental factors. We argue that the 
previously added stocks are more subject to the impact of fundamental factors than 
the newly added stock since the index investors are already aware of the previously 
added stocks. Thus, the previously added stocks to the FTSE 100 index reflect more 
fundamental factors than behavioural factors.  Conversely, the newly added stock is 
more subject to investor sentiment, initially because it is a new entry for them, and 
may be subject to closer scrutiny and analysis. Consequently, we extend this analysis 
by investigating the impact of fundamental factors on the stock return comovement. 
We also extend this analysis using a longer time period (i.e. from 1985 to 2009) 
relative to the work of Coakley and Kougoulis  (2005) and Mase (2008)
60
.   
Our results from the procedures of Barberis et al. (2005) show that both the 
univariate and bivariate regressions support the hypothesis of the friction-based 
theory. The univariate regression indicates that about 68% of additions exhibit a 
significant increase in their comovement of the FTSE100 index. In the bivariate 
regressions, about 76% (70%) of inclusions exhibit significant increase (decrease) in 
their comovement with the FTSE100 (N-FTSE100) stocks. The results of the 
univariate regressions also indicate that about 64% of stocks exhibit lower 
comvement with the FTSE100 index in the post-deletion periods. Similarly, the 
                                                          
59
 Mase (2008) distinguishes between additions that are new firms and additions that have 
previously been constituents. Mase (2008) finds that the newly added stocks commove more with 
the index members whereas the previously added stocks comove less. He attributes this result for 
the possibility that stocks new to the FTSE 100 comove less with the index prior to their inclusion 
than stocks that are previous constituents. Consequently, there is more space for an increase in their 
comovement. 
60
 Our sample includes 182 additions and 172 deletions which are significantly greater than other 
comovement studies on the FTSE 100 index. The study of Coakley and Kougoulis focuses on the 
period between 1992 and 2002 producing only 58 additions and 61 deletions for daily and weekly 
data. Mase (2008) limits his analysis on examining the difference in comovement between additions 
that are new firms and additions that have previously been constituents. The sample of Mase covers 
the period between 1990 and 2005 generating 125 additions and 142 deletions. 
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bivariate regressions imply that 76% (73%) of stocks comove less (more) with the 
FTSE100 (N-FTSE100) in the post-deletion periods. 
The results from our decomposition of comovement into fundamental- and 
sentiment-based show that the fundamental-based loading factors (FLF hereafter) 
exhibit a weakly significant decrease (increase) after additions (deletions). In 
contrast, the sentiment-based loading factors (SLF hereafter) exhibit a strongly 
significant increase (decrease) in the post- additions (deletion). Specifically, the FLF 
experiences a weak significant average drop by 0.335 at 10% level for 54% of 
addition cases in the univariate regression. Similarly, the bivariate regressions imply 
that the FLF of FTSE100 (N-FTSE100) experiences a weak significant average drop 
(increase) of 0.609 (0.819) at 5% level for about 59% (56%) of addition cases. In the 
deletion cases we observe a weak significant increase in FLF in the univariate 
regression and no shift is recorded in the bivariate regression. 
Consistent with our findings from the procedures of Barberis et al. (2005), 
SLF exhibit a statistically significant increase (decrease) at 1% level in the post- 
additions (deletions) with the FTSE100 index. The results from the univariate 
analysis show that 58% (69%) of the added (deleted) stocks exhibit significant 
increase (decline) in their SLF around index revisions. The bivariate regressions 
yield similar results. In particular, SLF exhibits statistically significant increases 
(decreases) with FTSE100 (N-FTSE100) for about 63.12% (63.69%) of the addition 
cases. Our results also show that about 75.15% (65.60%) of SLF with FTSE100 (N-
FTSE100) are decreased (increased) after the deletions. This result also provides 
more validity for the contribution of sentiment-based comovement in the post-
deletion.  
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The finding that the FLF move in the opposite direction of the SLF is 
consistent with the view that stock return comovement is driven by the relative 
power of informed traders and noise traders in the trading arena (Bissessur and 
Hodgson (2012); Roll (1988); Piotroski and Roulstone (2004); Durnev et al. (2004); 
Kumar and Lee (2006); Evans (2009)). Specifically, the dominance of traders with 
market-wide information may cause stock return to comove more with the market 
portfolio while the dominance of traders with more firm-specific information tends to 
comove in the opposite direction.  
Overall, our results provide a strong support for the friction-based theories. 
To verify the validity of our findings further, we run a number of robustness checks. 
First, the calendar-time portfolio approach suggests that our results are not driven by 
the cross-sectional dependences that might occur in our sample. Second, the control 
sample methodology confirms that our findings are not the outcome of the size 
effect. Third, the Vijh’s (1994) approach suggests return comovement is likely to be 
driven by trading effects. Fourth, the results from Dimson–Fowler–Rorke (DFR)-
adjusted factor loadings show that the slow diffusion of information appears to 
account for about 17% of the beta shifts in the case of univariate regression and 10% 
in the case of bivariate regression. This result is relatively close to the findings of 
Coakley et al. (2005) in which they find that slow diffusion following the FTSE100 
revisions accounts for only a quarter of the overall shifts in the betas of additions. 
Barberis et al. (2005) find that the slow diffusion following the S&P 500 revisions 
accounts up to two-thirds of the beta shifts in the daily bivariate regressions. In short, 
the results of this study suggest that the shift in the return comovement around index 
revisions is driven mainly by sentiment-related factors and partly by fundamental-
related factors.  
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The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.2 presents the 
literature review and hypothesis development. Section 5.3 describes the 
methodology. Section 5.4 robustness checks. Section 5.5 concludes the paper. 
 
5.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
Many studies (e.g. Denis et al. (2003); Chen et al. (2004, 2006); Kappou et al. 
(2008)) show that the index revision is not an information-free event, while others 
(e.g. Shleifer (1986); Harris and Gurel (1986); Pruitt and Wei (1989)) show that 
index membership does not provide any new information about the future prospects 
of the newly included stock. Vijh (1994) and Barberis et al. (2005) assume that the 
stocks’ loadings on fundamental factors are unchanged around index revisions. 
Harris and Gurel (1986) find that prices increase before the change date due to the 
excess demand of fund managers or index arbitrageurs, and then reverse after the 
change date. Some studies (i.e. Pruitt and Wei (1989); Beneish and Whaley (1996); 
Doeswijk (2005); Vespro (2006)) show that the improvement in liquidity associated 
with additions is short lived. Since index reviews are based on publicly available 
information, additions can be viewed as carrying no information about the firms’ 
future fundamentals. Thus, the fundamentals-based theory does not predict any 
change in the correlation of added stock’s return with the returns of other index listed 
stocks. This leads to the null hypothesis: 
 
 H0a: The comovement in return will not change because of the index 
additions. 
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H0b: The comovement in return will not change because of the index 
deletions. 
 
The friction- or sentiment-based theories suggest that, since index 
rebalancing is based on publically available information and carries no news about 
the firms’ future fundamentals. Thus, any observed changes in the correlation of 
added (deleted) stock’s return with the index constituents is likely to be caused by 
the contemporaneous changes in the uniformed demand shocks. Vijh (1994) argues 
that Standard & Poor’s decision does not signal an opinion about fundamentals and 
the decision to revise the S&P 500 index reflects purely the desire to make the index 
as stable as possible. Similarly, the FTSE Steering Committee revises the FTSE 100 
index merely on basis of market capitalization. Barberis et al. (2005) examine the 
comovement around the S&P 500 index revisions. They find a significant increase 
(decrease) in the comovement of investor’s sentiment after a stock join (leaves) the 
S&P 500 index. They argue that since changes in stock index composition are 
information-free events, the comovement changes cannot be explained by the 
classical financial theory and are therefore consistent with friction- or sentiment-
based view. On the view of sentiment-based theories, we suggest another testable 
hypothesis: 
 
 H1a: The comovement changes following the index additions are better 
explained by friction- or sentiment-based views. 
 
 H1b: The comovement changes following the index deletions are better 
explained by friction- or sentiment-based views. 
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Another strand of studies (e.g. Dhillon and Johnson, (1991); Denis et al. 
(2003); Chen et al. (2004), Chen et al. (2006b)) show that inclusions (exclusions) 
convey fundamental information about the expected cash flow and the discounted 
rate. Investors become more aware of stocks that become index members. This 
awareness in turn reduces the transaction costs and improves the liquidity of the 
newly added stocks. Jain (1987) and Dhillon and Johnson (1991) and Denis et al. 
(2003) show that additions (deletions) signal good (bad) news about the firm’s future 
prospects. Similarly, Denker and Leavell (1993),  Bildik and Gulay (2003), Denis et 
al. (2003) and Kappou et al. (2008) find that the information effect following 
additions to the S&P 500 index is associated with higher cash flows, reduction on the 
transaction costs, significant increases in EPS forecasts, and significant 
improvements in realised earnings. Chen et al. (2004, 2006) also show that the 
required rate of return decrease due to a reduction in non-systematic risk.   
Rigamonti and Barontini (2000), Shu et al. (2004) and Biktimirov et al. 
(2004) show that additions to Mib30, Taiwanese market (MSCI) and Russell 2000 
index, respectively, improve the institutional ownership and the underlying liquidity. 
Chen et al. (2004, 2006) show that while  additions increase the number of individual 
shareholders and improves liquidity, deletions do not reduce the median number of 
individual shareholders. This leads us to the following testable hypothesis: 
 
 H2a: Comovement will change because of the changes of the fundamentals 
following the index additions. 
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H2b: Comovement will change because of the changes of the fundamentals 
following the index deletions.  
 
It has been widely argued that the comovement in stock return is related to 
both fundamental and non-fundamental factors (see Bissessur and Hodgson (2012); 
Roll (1988); Piotroski and Roulstone (2004); Durnev et al. (2004); Kumar and Lee 
(2006); Evans (2009)). Specifically, the buying (selling) pressure of noise traders 
pushes prices too high (low) making a stock return move more (less) with other 
stocks. Consequently, the informed traders as they know the fundamental price, they 
intervene in the market by impounding more (less) private information into the price 
resulting in lower (higher) comovement. Thus, our prediction is that following 
additions, the presence of uninformed investors with market-wide information causes 
stock returns to comove more with the market. In contrast, the presence of informed 
traders with more firm-specific information causes stock returns to comove less with 
the market portfolio. However, existing studies show that informed traders fail to 
offset the impact of the uninformed demand shock following the index revisions and 
the role of informed traders is short lived. This leads us to following testable 
hypothesis: 
 
 H3a: The fundamental-based (noise) return of a stock commoves less (more) 
with the members of the FTSE100 index following index additions. 
 
H3b: The fundamental-based (noise) return of a stock commoves more (less) 
with the members of the FTSE100 index following index deletions. 
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5.3 Methodology  
This section initially examines the impact of index revision on the return 
comovement using Barberis et al.’s (2005) approach. To test this, for each addition 
and deletion we run the univariate and bivariate regression. The univariate regression 
examines the presence of the three friction- or sentiment-based views which posit 
that stocks added to (deleted from) the FTSE 100 will comove more (less) with the 
rest of other index members after the additions (deletions). The bivariate regression 
is to distinguish the fundamentals-based-view from the friction- or sentiment-based 
views of comovement. This model posits that under the friction- or sentiment-based 
views, a stock that is added to (deleted from) the FTSE100 will experience a large 
increase (decrease) in its loading factor on the FTSE100 return, after controlling for 
the return of  N-FTSE100 stocks. We estimate the following univariate and bivariate 
regressions for each addition and deletion event across pre- and post-index revision 
period 
 
                             (5.1) 
                                            , (5.2) 
 where      is the return on the addition (deletion) event stock at time t-1 and t;     in 
Eq.(5.1) is the loading factor of the contemporaneous return on the FTSE100 index; 
            is the value-weighted return of the FTSE100 index which includes the 
first 100 companies in the LSE based on the market capitalisation; and     is the error 
tem. We adjust the return of the FTSE100 weighted index by excluding the event 
company to avoid spurious effects. In Eq.(5.2)    is the loading factor of the 
contemporaneous return on the FTSE250 index;               is the value-weighted 
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return of the FTSE250 index which is consisting of the 101
st
 to the 350
th
 largest 
companies based on market capitalisation- on the LSE
61
; and     is the error term. 
The FTSE250 index is an index comprising the 250 largest stocks outside the FTSE 
100.  
For each addition and deletion, we run the univariate and bivariate 
regressions seperately in the pre- and post-additions (deletions). We run univariate 
and bivariate regressions for daily frequency data. With daily, the pre-event 
regression is run over the 12-month period ending the month before the month of the 
addition announcement, while the post-event regression is run over the 12-month 
period starting the month after the month of the addition implementation. The 
regressions are estimated separately for the pre- and post-event periods using 
seemingly unrelated regression procedure (SUR) following Mase (2008) to account 
for any possible dependence across the sample as we have multiple additions and 
deletions at each quarterly review. In addition, we apply the one-sided test because 
the assumptions of the frictions-based view of comovement predict that the change in 
comovement cannot be negative (positive) for additions (deletions) events. 
Subsequently, a negative (positive) change in comovement for addition (deletion) 
events can be attributed to chance and an acceptance of the null hypothesis of no 
change in comovement. 
For the univariate regression, we record the difference between the post- and 
pre- addition (deletion) in the slope coefficient on the FTSE100,   , and the change 
in R
2,
 ΔR2. Then, we examine the mean change in slope across the event date   , and 
the mean change in    . If the prediction of Barberies et al. (2005) holds, we should 
                                                          
61
  We consider FTSE250 as the Non-FTSE100 index following Mase (2008). However, Oakly (2005) 
consider the FTSE ALL SHARES as N-FTSE100 index which is the aggregation of the FTSE100 and the 
FTSE250, and the FTSE SmallCap Index. Consequently, using the FTALL SH index as N-FTSE100 index 
may produce a superior effects. The FT-All Share Index would be predicted to be the more affected 
by non-trading due to its broader composition (see, Theopald and Price (1986)). 
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observe a positive (negative) and significant shifts in both    and     for additions 
(deletions). For the bivariate model, we repeat the same procedures in the univariate 
model and we examine the mean changes in the slopes,            and            . 
If our prediction holds we should observe a positive (negative) and significant shifts 
in           and negative (positive) shifts in             in the post- additions 
(deletions). 
Table 5.1 presents the cross-sectional descriptions of   , ΔR2,           and 
            for additions and deletions. The Table 5.1 reports the number of stocks 
in the sample (N), mean, standard deviation (StDev), minimum, first quartile (Q1), 
median, third quartile (Q3), maximum and the proportion of positive changes (% >0). 
Panel A of Table 5.1 shows that in general additions experience a strongly significant 
increase on the mean ΔB in the daily univariate regressions. In particular, the average 
   and     are significantly increased in 68.3% and 67.7% of additions, 
respectively. This output suggests that our result is not driven by outliers. The results 
in Panel A suggest that the average           (           ) increases (decreases) 
significantly in more than 76.1% (69.4%) of the addition cases.  
Panel B of Table 5.1 reports that the shifts in betas and R
2 
following 
deletions. The results suggest a significant decline in the comovement between 
deleted stocks and FTSE100 index in the post-deletion period. We report a 
significant decline in the mean   ,     and           in 64%, 67%, and 76% of 
deletion cases, respectively. Panel B also shows that             increases 
significantly in 73.1% of the deletion cases.  
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5.3.1 Univariate test 
The initial aim of the univariate regression is to examine the changes in the 
stock return comovement following index revisions. The univariate regression in 
Table 5.2 documents that additions (deletions) exhibit significant increase (decrease) 
in betas and R
2
. More precisely,    and     experience strongly significant increase 
of 0.168 with t-value of 5.638 and 0.068 with t-value 6.429 in the post- additions, 
respectively. Table 5.2 shows that after the deletions    and     exhibit strongly 
significant decrease of 0.104 with t-value of -3.184 and 0.046 with t-value of -4.979, 
respectively. The univariate regression in Table 5.2 is in line with the prediction of 
the three friction- or sentiment-based view which posits that stocks added to (deleted 
from) the FTSE100 will comove more (less) with the rest of other index stocks after 
the additions (deletions). 
Since our results document a statistically significant shift in the total 
comovement in the post addition periods, we reject the null hypotheses H0a, which 
suggests that comovement in return will not change because of the index additions. 
Similarly, H0b, which suggests that comovement in return will not change because of 
the index deletions, is disapproved. Our results are similar to those of Vijh (1994) 
and Barberis et al., (2005). In particular, Barberis et al. (2005) find the average 
increases in S&P betas of 0.151 at the daily frequencies. This figure is comparable in 
magnitude to the 0.168 in FTSE100 betas that we report for additions sample. 
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Table 5. 1 Descriptive statistics of the changes in comovement 
This Table estimates the unvariate and bivariate regression for each addition (deletion) separately for the 
pre- and post- additions (deletions) as in Eqs.(5.1) and (5.2), respectively. From the univariate regression 
we record the average changes in the post relative to the pre-event for the slope coefficient,    , and the 
change in R2, ΔR
2
. For the bivariate model, we repeat the same procedures in the univariate model and 
we examine the mean changes in the slopes,            and            . The FTSE100 index is a value-
weighted index comprising the 100 largest stocks in the LSE. The FTSE250 Index is also a value-weighted 
index consisting of the 101
st
 to the 350
th
 largest companies based on market capitalisation- on the LSE. 
The number of stocks in the sample (N), mean, standard deviation (StDev), minimum, first quartile (Q1), 
median, third quartile (Q3), maximum and the proportion of positive changes (% >0). The regressions are 
estimated separately for the pre- and post-event periods using seemingly unrelated regression procedure 
(SUR) to account for any possible dependence across the sample as we have multiple additions and 
deletions at each quarterly review. The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 Panel A: Additions 
 
N Mean StDev Min Q1 Med Q3 Max %>0 
Panel : Daily returns 
           182 0.1683 0.402 -1.030 -0.050 0.154 0.385 2.026 0.683*** 
    182 0.0689 0.144 -0.303 -0.019 0.066 0.155 0.482 0.677*** 
           182 0.3557 0.495 -1.080 0.030 0.398 0.648 1.760 0.761*** 
            182 -0.2603 0.752 -4.252 -0.641 -0.269 0.129 2.173 (0.693**) 
          Panel B: Deletions   
 
N Mean StDev Mini Q1 Med Q3 Max %<0 
Panel : Daily returns 
           162 -0.105 0.420 -2.177 -0.299 -0.116 0.116 0.896 )0.646***( 
    162 -0.0463 0.118 -0.328 -0.121 -0.050 0.017 0.38 )0.676***( 
           162 -0.386 0.509 -2.349 -0.694 -0.332 -0.051 0.529 )0.762***( 
            162 0.498 0.698 -1.168 -0.023 0.427 0.944 2.788 0.731*** 
                    
 
5.3.2 Bivariate test 
The bivariate regression is to separate the fundamentals-based-view from the 
friction- or sentiment-based views of comovement. Table 5.2 reports that the 
bivariate regression results are statistically stronger than the univariate regression 
results. The results show that the FTSE100 addition sample is associated with a 
significant increase in beta with the FTSE100 and a significant decrease in beta with 
the N-FTSE100.  
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Table 5. 2 Changes in comovement with FTSE100 and N-FTSE100 index 
This Table estimate the unvariate and bivariate regression for each addition (deletion) separately for 
the pre- and post- additions (deletions) as in Eqs.(5.1) and (5.2), respectively. From the univariate 
regression we record the average changes in the post relative to the pre-event for the slope 
coefficient,    , and the change in R2, ΔR2. For the bivariate model, we repeat the same procedures 
in the univariate model and we examine the mean changes in the slopes,            
and            . The FTSE100 index is a value-weighted index comprising the 100 largest stocks in 
the LSE. The FTSE250 Index is also a value-weighted index consisting of the 101st to the 350th largest 
companies based on market capitalisation- on the London Stock Exchange. The regressions are 
estimated separately for the pre- and post-event periods using seemingly unrelated regression 
procedure (SUR) following Mase (2008) to account for any possible dependence across the sample as 
we have multiple additions and deletions at each quarterly review. The asterisks ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
      Unvariate   Bivariate 
    N        
 
                      
Daily returns 
Additions  
1986-
2009 182 0.168*** 0.068*** 
 
0.355*** -0.260*** 
 
  
(5.638) (6.429) 
 
(9.608) (-4.347) 
Deletions 
1986-
2009 162 -0.104*** -0.046*** 
 
-0.386*** 0.498*** 
   
(-3.184) (-4.979) 
 
(-9.684) (9.108) 
                
 
In particular, the mean           (           ) is significantly increased 
(decreased) of 0.355 with t-value 9.608 (0.260 with t-value -4.347) in the post- 
additions, respectively. In the deletion sample, large and significant results also 
obtained from daily beta changes in the bivariate regressions. Specially, the average 
          (           ) exhibit a significant decrease (increase) of 0.386 with t-
value -9.684 (0.498 with t-value 9.108) following deletions. Our results show that the 
FTSE100 betas exhibit a significant increase (decrease) after addition (deletion) and 
Non-FTSE100 betas exhibit a significant decrease (increase) at conventional levels 
following additions (deletions). Thus, the hypothesis H1a, which posits that 
comovement changes following the index additions are better explained by friction- 
or sentiment-based views, is approved. Likewise, H1b, which predicts that 
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comovement changes following the index deletions are better explained by friction- 
or sentiment-based views, is approved
62
. 
 
5.3.3 Decomposing comovement into intrinsic and noise 
Amihud and Mendelson’s (1987) model decompose stock prices into intrinsic 
value and noise. This decomposition process allows us to investigate the relative 
importance of the changes in firm’s fundamentals and investor sentiment in 
determining the shifts in the return comovement around index revisions. 
Subsequently, we estimate the fundamental-based (FLF) comovement by regressing 
the intrinsic values of individual stock returns against the intrinsic values of the 
FTSE100 and N-FTSE100 index returns.  
Similarly, the sentiment-based comovement (SLF) is obtained by regressing 
the noise components of the observed stocks prices against the noise component of 
the FTSE100 and Non-FTSE100 prices.  
In order to examine directly whether the shift in betas are driven by noise or 
fundamentals or both, our analysis is carried out in four steps. First, we decompose 
the daily returns into its true price and noise for each addition (deletion) for the year 
before and the year after the revisions. We repeat this step for the value-weighted 
FTSE100 stocks return, and the value-weighted N-FTSE100 stocks return separately 
for each event. We decompose the daily returns using the model of Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987) which is specified as follows 
 
            [       ]     , 
 
                                  
   , 
(5.3) 
 
                                                          
62
 Our result is not changed in the sub-periods analysis (see Appendix B.9) 
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where     is the logarithm of the observed prices    , traders in the security market 
observe the time t price of a security at    and use this experience to infer the private 
information of informed traders in that market,    is the logarithm of the intrinsic 
value    which is assumed to be the fundamental,   is the price adjustment parameter, 
reflecting the speed at which information is incorporated into the stock price and    
is the noise term, which temporarily pushes the observed price away from their 
intrinsic prices. In particular,     represents the extreme case of no price reaction 
to changes in value,        implies partial price adjustment,      suggests full 
price adjustment,     indicates that the observed prices overreact to new 
information. The magnitude of partial price adjustment is determined by the amount 
and quality of information and the extent to which markets are efficient. Given that 
the new information improves the price efficiency which minimises the difference 
between    and      implying less adverse selection costs. If there is absence of 
private information in the market    , stock return becomes uninformative and 
there is no stock market comovement in fundamentals. In the case of public 
information, the slope of    in the price equation increases with the 
uninformativeness of public information. Amihud and Mendelson (1987) suggest 
that the convention of the logarithms of security values    follow a random walk 
process with drift 
                (5.4) 
where   is a positive drift,    is a random error, independent of    , with zero mean 
and finite variance,   
 . 
Second, we use the Kalman filter process to estimate the unobserved true 
price from the observed price and decompose it into intrinsic and noise price. This 
process includes a set of equations which allow investors to keep updating their 
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sentiments once a new observation becomes available. This process is carried out in 
two steps. The first step includes forming the optimal predictor of the next 
observation which depends on the currently available information. In the second step, 
the new observation is impounded into the estimator of the state vector using the 
updating equation (Harvey, 1991). These two steps can be specified as follows 
{
                                                                    
                                                                      
 
5
(5.5) 
 
where    is the observed variable at time t;    and    are vectors of explanatory 
variables at time t and t-1, respectively;    and      are state variable at time t and 
time t-1, respectively;    and    are stochastic drift parameters;    and    are 
uncorrelated error terms with normal distribution 
{
             
   
            
   
  
 
We use Eq.(5.5) to estimate the parameters of Amihud and Mendelson (1987) in 
Eq.(5.3) and (5.4) in state space form as follows 
 
{
 
 
                                     
               
            
    
                                                         
    
   
  
(5.6) 
 
where    is time varying unobservable state variable,    is a random distribution 
with a zero mean and a constant variance   
  . As    is a random walk with drift, the 
transition equation describes the unobservable state variable    through time t. The 
drift term   is the drift of the intrinsic value process measured by the partial 
adjustment coefficient and     . Since    is the error term in the intrinsic value 
157 
 
process measured by the partial adjustment coefficient, it also has a zero mean and a 
variance     
 . The value of       
   is unknown and must be estimated and values 
of    the logarithm of intrinsic value are obtained by dividing    by  . We use 
maximum likelihood methods with initial parameters estimates obtained from the 
first two observation in the sample to estimate the values of the variance      
 . We 
save the daily      and the daily      from this model for each addition (deletion); these 
represent the fundamentals and the residuals, respectively.  
Third, we estimate          ,             ,          , and             values of 
the value-weighted FTSE100 and the value-weighted N-FTSE100 stocks as follows 
   
                          [                     ]  
          , 
                              [                         ] 
             , 
 
 
 
(5.7) 
where           and             are the logarithm of the observed prices           and 
            , respectively;           and            are the logarithm of the intrinsic 
value          and             , respectively;           and            are noise  
associated with FTSE100 and N-FTSE100, respectively; g is the speed of price 
adjustment. 
Finally, we run the univariate and bivariate regression of the residual stock 
return      as specified in Eq.(5.8) and (5.9), respectively 
  
                              (5.8) 
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                                                                 (5.9) 
  
where      is the noise return of the event stock estimated be (Eq.(5.6));           and 
           are the loading factors of the contemporaneous noise return on the 
FTSE100 index and the N-FTSE100 index, respectively;             and ; 
                are the noise return of the FTSE100 index and N-FTSE100 index 
estimated from (E.q.(5.7)), respectively; and    , and     are error terms for univariate 
and bivariate model, respectively.  
We estimate the univariate regression (Eq.(5.8)) for each event stock in the 
pre- and post-index revision periods. We record the changes in the slope 
coefficient,               , as       , then, we average all of       , across all  
additions (deletions) to obtain    . We expect that stock return correlations 
increases        (      ) on the presence of non-fundamental information for 
additions (deletions). We also estimate a bivariate regression (Eq.(5.9)) for each 
event stock across pre- and post-index revision periods. We then report the changes 
in the slope coefficient           and                and average them across all the 
additions (deletions) to obtain            and             , respectively.  
We repeat the previous steps to estimate     ,           , and              . 
Specifically, we estimate the following regressions for each addition and deletion 
event in our sample across both pre- and post-index revision periods 
   
                             (5.10) 
 
                                                              , (5.11) 
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where      is the intrinsic return estimated by (Eq.(5.6));             and              are 
the loading factors of the contemporaneous intrinsic return on the FTSE100 and N-
FTSE100 index, respectively;             and               are the intrinsic return of the 
FTSE100 and N-FTSE100 index estimated from (E.q.(5.7));     and     are error terms. 
In the univariate regression (Eq.(5.10)), we record the changes in the slope 
coefficient,  
  
           , as       . Then, we average all of       , across all additions 
(deletions) to obtain    . Any significant shifts in fundamentals can be used as 
evidence to support the view that the return comovement is driven, at least partly, by 
firms’ fundamentals. Therefore, the fundamental-based view predicts negative 
(positive)     following additions (deletions). Similarly, in the bivariate regression 
(Eq.(5.11)), we obtain            and              across all additions (deletions). 
In bivariate regression, the fundamental-based view predicts positive 
(negative)              following additions (deletions). 
Table 5.3 presents the cross-sectional descriptions across pre- and post-index 
revision periods, in the fundamental- and sentiment-based comovement of both 
additions and deletions. Panel A shows that, in general, additions experience a 
statistically significant increase SLF in the univariate regression results. In particular, 
the mean     exhibits a significant increase of 0.152 in 57.54% of the addition 
cases. The bivariate regression documents that the average             
(              is associated with a statistically significant increases (decrease) of 
0.141 (0.135) in the post- addition periods. Panel A also shows that about 63.12% 
(63.69%) of SLF relative to the FTSE100 (N-FTSE100) stocks are increased 
(decreased) in the post- additions. This suggests that our result is not driven by 
outliers. This result also indicates that the sentiment-based comovement is playing a 
significant role in the comovemnet return which lending more support to H1a, which 
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posit that the comovement changes following the index addition are better explained 
by friction- or sentiment-based views. Furthermore, our evidence supports H1b, which 
posits that the comovement changes following the index deletions are better 
explained by friction- or sentiment-based views. 
Panel A of Table 5.3 reports FLF associated with additions. In the univariate 
regression, the average fundamental-based comovement     is negative (-0.336) and 
significant at 10% level. We also show that 54% of additions exhibit drop in FLF 
when they join the FTSE100 index. In the bivariate regression, the mean             
                is also negative (positive) and significant at the conventional 5% 
level. Approximately 59% (56%) of sample stocks experience low significant decline 
(increases) of 0.609 (0.819) in their mean                            after joining 
the FTSE 100 index. This result indicates that the fundamental return factors have a 
small consequence on the total return comovement in the post- addition periods.   
Panel B of Table 5.3 reports the SLF and FLF associated with deletions. 
Panel B shows that in general deletions experience a statistically significant 
decreases in the SLF in the post-deletion periods. In particular,     in the univariate 
regression is negative of 0.067 and significant at 1% level. These results are unlikely 
to be the outcome of outliers as 68.05% of the deletion cases exhibit significant 
decreases in   . From the bivariate regression result, we show that the 
average             (              is -0.116 (0.071). These figures are significant 
at 1% level. Panel B also shows that about 75.15% (65.60%) of SLF relative to the 
FTSE100 (N-FTSE100) stocks are decreased (increased) in the post-deletion which 
also suggests that our result is not driven by outliers. This result also provides more 
validity for the contribution of sentiment-based comovement in driving the aggregate 
comovement in the post-deletion.  
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Table 5. 3 Cross-sectional descriptions 
This Table presents the cross-sectional descriptions across pre- and post-index revision periods, in the fundamental- and sentiment-based comovement of both additions 
and deletions by using Amihud and Mendelson (1987) with Kalman Filter as explained from Eq.(5.3) to Eq.(5.11).     is the average shifts of SLF return on the FTSE100 
index in the post-event relative to the pre-event from the univariate regression.            (            ) is the average shifts SLF return on the FTSE100 (non-FTSE100) 
index in the post-event relative to the pre-event from the bivariate regression.       is the average shifts of the FLF return on the FTSE100 index in the post-event relative 
to the pre-event from the univariate regression.                           is the average shifts of FLF return on the FTSE100 (non-FTSE100) index in the post-event 
relative to the pre-event from the bivariate regression.   
Panel: A Additions Mean StDev Min Q1 Median Q3 Max %>0 
      
 
0.152*** 0.542 -1.469 -0.200 0.090 0.389 1.459 57.54*** 
            
 
0.141*** 0.506 -1.276 -0.163 0.119 0.357 2.495 63.12*** 
                  
 
-0.135*** 0.515 -1.946 -0.432 -0.085 0.128 1.442 36.31*** 
      
 
-0.336* 2.487 -10.616 -1.343 -0.125 1.008 10.375 45.81* 
            
 
-0.609** 3.926 -13.079 -2.140 -0.474 0.896 24.260 40.78** 
              
 
0.819** 4.993 -28.451 -1.398 0.286 2.429 27.323 55.86** 
Panel: B Deletions   Mean StDev Minimum Q1 Median Q3 Maxi %<0 
           
 
-0.067*** 0.155 -0.489 -0.172 -0.070 0.039 0.346 31.95*** 
            
 
-0.116*** 0.184 -0.674 -0.236 -0.110 -0.022 0.441 24.85*** 
                 
 
0.071*** 0.192 -0.665 -0.054 0.083 0.211 0.482 65.6*** 
      
 
0.321* 2.172 -8.352 -1.034 0.160 1.408 11.882 55.02* 
            
 
0.053 4.606 -15.234 -1.957 -0.450 1.363 28.279 40.23 
              
 
0.108 4.138 -26.373 -1.245 0.607 1.879 15.296 60.35 
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Panel B of Table 5.3 documents that    associated with deletions exhibit a 
weak significant increase of 0.321. However, the bivariate regression relative to 
deletions exhibits no significant changes for           and             in the post-
deletion periods. This result shows that FLF play no role in explaining the aggregate 
shifts in the stock return comovement in the post- deletions.  
We conclude that our results imply that the shift in loading factors of stock 
return comovement around index additions (deletions) is merely driven by sentiment-
based comovement and partly by the fundamental-based comovement. The shifts of 
residuals betas are more pronounced than those of fundamentals betas in either 
addition or deletion at least for two reasons: First, 58% (69%) of residual betas 
experience significant increase (decreases) following the index additions while 
approximately 54% (54%) of fundamental betas experience a weak significant 
decrease following the index additions (deletions). 
Second, all the changes in residual betas of the added stocks are significantly 
increased at 1% level, while most of the changes of fundamental betas of additions 
are significantly decreased at 5 and 10% levels. In deletions sample, only the shifts 
of residual betas exhibit significant decreases and no significant shifts is recorded in 
fundamental betas.  
Thus our hypothesis H1a, which suggests that the comovement changes 
following the index additions are better explained by friction- or sentiment-based 
views, is approved. Our hypothesis H2a, which posits that comovement will change 
because of the changes of the fundamentals following the index additions, is partly 
approved. In the case of deletions, our hypothesis H1b, which suggests that the 
comovement changes following the index deletions are better explained by friction- 
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or sentiment-based views, is approved. Our hypothesis H2b, which posits that 
comovement will change because of the changes of the fundamentals following the 
index deletions, is rejected.   
We also observe that around the index additions, the SLF is positive relative 
to the members of the FTSE 100 market in the post-addition periods. However, the 
FLF is negative relative to the members of the FTSE 100 index in post-addition 
periods. In particular, SLF exhibits an increase (decrease) with FTSE100 (N-
FTSE100), whereas FLF exhibits decrease (an increase) with FTSE100 (N-
FTSE100) around the index additions. Thus, our hypothesis H3a, which posits that 
the fundamental-based (noise) return of a stock commoves less (more) with the 
members of the FTSE100 index following index additions, is approved
63
. 
 Around the index deletion, the SLF is negative relative to the members of the 
FTSE 100 index in the post-deletion periods. However, the FLF experience no 
change relative to the members of the FTSE 100 in post-deletion periods. Thus, our 
hypothesis H3b, which posits that the fundamental-based (noise) return of a stock 
commoves more (less) with the members of the FTSE100 index following index 
deletions, is rejected. 
Overall, our findings are largely in agreement with the conclusions of 
Barberis et al. (2005), Mase (2007) and Coakley et al. (2008) that the non-
fundamental-based comovement drive the total comovements in stock returns. Our 
findings are partly consistent with the argument (e.g. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004); 
Durnev et al. (2004); Kumar and Lee (2006);and Evans (2009)) that a stock 
associated with non-fundamentals (fundamentals) commove more (less) with market. 
Dasgupta et al. (2010) and Veldkamp (2006) explain that as valuable fundamental-
                                                          
63 Our results on the sub-periods analysis show that the recent periods are more pronounced 
than the earlier periods. For example the SLF as well as FLF are greater in sample 200-2009 
than the sample 1986-1999 (see Appendix B.10). 
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information becomes available, market comovement will decrease because stock 
prices switch their reliance towards more specific information, and uninformed 
investors are able to better predict the firm value. 
 We attribute our findings to the dynamic interplay between noise traders and 
rational arbitrageurs in the real market with frictions. The noise trader’s decisions are 
affected by investment sentiment which may induce comovement and arbitrageurs 
fail to offset these correlated demand shocks (e.g. Shiller et al. (1984), Changsheng 
and Yongfeng (2012); Shleifer and Summers (1990)). The dominance of noise 
traders with market-wide information makes the role of sentiment comovement 
stronger. This evidence is in line with the prediction of Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2004) and Wurgler (2000). They argue that stocks moving together is a partial 
reflection of the flow of firm-specific information. Therefore, stocks which have 
lower (higher) comovement, can be taken as an indication of the presence of 
informed (noise) traders. 
 
5.4 Robustness checks 
We consider a calendar-time portfolio approach to deal with the cross-
sectional dependencies that might occur in our sample. The calendar time approach 
requires the construction of two portfolios: a ‘‘pre-event’’ portfolio whose return at 
time t,       , is the equal-weighted average return at time t of all stocks that will be 
added to (deleted from) the index within some window after time t; and a ‘‘post-
event’’ portfolio whose return at time t,        , is the equal-weighted average return 
at time t of all stocks that have been added to (deleted from) the index within some 
window preceding time t. For daily data, we take the window to be a 12 months. For 
each portfolio, the univariate regressions  
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                                      (5.12) 
and 
                                         , (5.13) 
where    is        of addition’s portfolio in the post- additions minus        of 
addition’s portfolio in the pre-addition for the univariate regression. If a shift in 
comovement occurs following additions, we would expect              in the case 
of univariate regressions. Similar to the event methodology, we apply the following 
two regressions to track the changes in stock comovement return in the bivariate 
regression as follows 
                                                         (5.14) 
and 
                                                            , (5.15) 
where      is the loading factor of event portfolio in the pre-addition (deletion) 
relative to the FTSE100 index; and       is the loading factor of event portfolio in 
the post-addition (deletion) relative to the FTSE100 members. 
Therefore,                      ) is the                               ) minus 
             (             ) of event’s portfolio. Similar to the event time study 
approach, for additions sample, we would expect                             and 
                            . In the deletion sample, we would expect 
                              and                              .  
Table 5.4 presents the univariate and bivariate regressions for the shifts in 
slope coefficients for additions and deletions sample. Consistent with the results in 
event study methodology sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, our results report that added 
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(deleted) a stock to (from) the FTSE100 commove more (less) with the index 
membership. Particularly, in the univariate regressions,   increases significantly by 
0.115 with t-value of 2.57 after additions. In the bivariate regressions,          
             exhibit a significant increase (decrease) of 0.215 with t-value 3.07 
(0.229 with t-value 2.65) after additions.  
Table 5.4 shows that in the univariate regressions,    declines significantly by 
0.121 with t-value of -7.2 after the deletions. In the bivariate regressions,          
             experience a significant decline (increase) of 0.418 with t-value of -
14.85 (0.425 with t-value of 12.03) after the deletions. These findings are consistent 
with our results from the event time approach. 
 
Table 5. 4 Calendar time portfolio 
In this Table we consider a calendar-time portfolio approach to deal with the cross-sectional 
dependencies that might occur in our sample. We apply Eqs.(5.12) and (5.13) to estimate the 
unvariate regression and Eqs.(5.14) and (5.15) to estimate the bivariate regression.    is         of 
addition’s portfolio in the post- additions minus        of addition’s portfolio in the pre-addition. 
                       ) is                   (                    ( of addition’s portfolio in the 
post- additions minus                 (                   ) of addition’s portfolio in the pre-
addition from the bivariate regression. 
 
    Unvariate   Bivariate 
  N                            
Additions  182 0.115*** 
 
0.215*** -0.229*** 
  
2.57 
 
3.07 -2.65 
Deletions 162 -0.121*** 
 
-0.418*** 0.425*** 
  
-7.2 
 
-14.85 12.03 
            
        
So far, both the event and calendar time methodologies show that additions 
(deletions) commove more (less) with other index members in the post-addition 
(deletion) periods. We also consider some characteristics as alternative explanations 
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for comovement that might be responsible for the shifts in the beta coefficients. The 
most obvious characteristic of the additions (deletions) is the firm size, which may be 
especially important since the selecting criteria in the FTSE100 index is based solely 
on market-capitalisation. In particular, additions to the FTSE100 index have 
considerably higher market capitalizations than stocks outside the index, and these 
additions have often been growing in size prior to inclusion. Moreover, size is known 
to be associated with a cash-flow factor: there is a common component to news about 
the earnings of large-cap stocks (Fama and French, 1995). Therefore, it is possible 
that changes in firm size can also induce changes in firm’s fundamentals. To 
investigate the impact of firm size on our results, we repeat all the analysis in 5.3.1 
and 5.3.2 sections by using a control sample methodology which is explained in 
section 4.4.2.  
If our earlier results (see Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2) are driven by changes in 
firm size, the post- additions (deletions) changes in the factor loadings across the 
sample of additions (deletions) should be no different from the corresponding 
changes in the control sample. In this case, we test whether the average change of the 
loading factors for the event stocks minus their counterparts for the control sample is 
significantly different from zero across the index revision.  
Thus, we estimate    and     from the univariate regression for each event 
stock and its control pairs. Then the excess change in the loading factor     is the 
difference between    of the additions (deletions) and     of their counterpart in the 
matched stocks. The excess change in R-squared      is the difference between 
    of the additions (deletions) and     of their counterpart in matched stocks. 
Similarly, for the bivariate regression,            is the difference between 
           of the additions (deletions) and            of their counterpart in the 
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matched stocks.              is the difference between             of the 
additions (deletions) and              of their counterpart in the matched stocks. If 
the firm size drives our result, the mean                         ) will be not 
significantly different from zero. 
Table 5.5 reports the cross-sectional average of    ,     ,            and 
             for the additions and deletions from the univariate and bivariate 
regressions. In the univariate regression, Table 5 shows    and     are significantly 
increased of 0.146 and 0.075 (decreased of 0.114 and 0.039) after the additions 
(deletions), respectively. This result suggests that the    and     of event stocks are 
significantly greater (less) than their counterpart in the control sample in the post-
addition (deletions) periods. In the bivariate regression,                           
is 0.385 with a t-value of 8.504 (- 0.353 with a t-value of 4.732) after the additions. 
These results indicate that the           (           ) is significantly greater (less) 
than their counterpart in the control sample. For the deletions, the mean            
               is -0.383 with a t-value of -8.085 (+0.466 with a t-value of 6.503). 
This result suggests that the           (           ) is significantly less (greater) 
than their counterpart in the control sample after deletions. To summarise, the control 
sample methodology shows that the post- additions (deletion) return comovement 
observed earlier in section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 is unlikely to be driven by the changes in 
the firm size of the underlying stock. 
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Table 5. 5 Firm size effects 
This table presents the excess changes in the factor loadings and the R2 of regressions of 
returns of inclusions and exclusions stocks on the FTSE100 stocks and the N-FTSE100 stocks 
relative to the corresponding changes in a sample of control firms. For the univariate 
regression, for each addition (deletion) and their matching control sample, we estimate    
and     , separately. Then the excess change in the loading factor     is the difference 
between     of the additions (deletions) and     of their counterpart matched stocks. The 
excess change in R-squared      is the difference between     of the additions 
(deletions) and     of their counterpart in matched stocks. Similarly we obtain            
and               for the bivariate analysis for additions and deletions. 
 
    Unvariate Bivariate 
  N                                    
Additions  183 0.146*** 0.075*** 0.385*** -0.353*** 
  
4.569 7.013 8.504 -4.732 
Deletions 160 -0.114*** -0.039*** -0.383*** 0.466*** 
  
-2.678 -3.617 -8.085 6.503 
            
 
Several studies (e.g. Chen et al. (2004, 2006b); Hegde and McDermott 
(2003); Chakrabarti et al. (2005)) show that index additions (deletions) improve 
(deteriorate) trading activities. A stock with larger market capitalization is 
characterized by higher trading activities. Conversely, stocks outside the index are 
usually less frequently traded than stocks already in the index. Thus, the shifts in 
stock return comovement observed in the earlier results section 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 may 
result from the fact that added stocks trade more frequently after additions64. Scholes 
and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) show that  non-synchronous trading and the 
use of high frequency (daily)
65
 data biases the estimated betas.  
                                                          
64
 However our addition sample is not suffering from lower trading after additions to the FTSE100 
index.  
65
 Lo and Craig MacKinlay (1990) report that the non-synchronicity problem results from the 
assumption that multiple time series are sampled simultaneously when in fact the sampling is non-
synchronous. Suppose that the returns to stocks x and y are temporally independent but x trades 
less frequently than y. If news affecting the aggregate stock market arrives near the close of the 
market on one day, it is more likely that y's closing price will reflect this information faster than x, 
simply because x may not trade after the news arrives. Stock x will impound this information with a 
lag induces spurious cross-autocorrelation between the closing prices of x and y. Therefore, the 
trading effects (non-trading) state that a synchronous (non-synchronous) trading bias occurs when 
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To investigate whether our results are driven by higher trading or non-trading 
effects, we follow the procedure suggested by Vijh (1994) and applied by Barberis et 
al. (2005). We split the sample of additions into two groups: those whose turnover 
decreases after addition and those whose turnover increases after addition. In 
particular, for each addition, we estimate the average monthly turnover by volume 
over the same pre- and post- additions windows. Then, we allocate the added stock to 
the first group if its post-additions average turnover is lower than its pre-addition 
average turnover and to the second group otherwise. If our result is driven by trading 
effect or non-trading effect, we should observe increase (decrease) in the post-
addition FTSE100 beta of stocks that belong to the second (first) group. However, if 
our result is driven by sentiment-based views of comovement, we should observe 
increase in the post-addition FTSE100 betas in both groups.  
Table 5.6 presents the univariate and the bivariate regression results for the 
first and the second group of stocks, respectively. Both the univariate and bivariate 
regressions show significant increase in FTSE 100 betas and R
2
. However, the results 
on the univariate as well as the bivariate regressions show some role for non-trading 
effects which is consistent with the results of Coakley and Kougoulis (2005) and 
Barberies et al (2005). In the univariate regression, our results show some role of 
trading effect since    and     in the second group Panel B are greater than their 
comparable in the first group Panel A by 9.08% and 6.26%, respectively. The 
bivariate regression results also show some role of trading effect as the ratios of the 
absolute value of           to the absolute value of             for the second 
                                                                                                                                                                    
frequently (infrequently) traded stocks appear to impound (not to impound) market information 
immediately, generating a positive correlation between security returns and (lagged) index returns, 
and an upward-biased (downward-biased) estimate of contemporaneous beta. 
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group is 0.815 times greater than it’s comparable in the first group66. After 
controlling for trading effect, our results show that the average changes in betas of 
the second group are considerably greater than those of the first group. 
Consequently, the friction- or sentiment-based comovement on FTSE100 unbiased 
betas is located somewhere between 0.1212 in Panel A and 0.212 in Panel B for the 
univariate regression. In the bivariate regression, the friction- or sentiment-based 
comovement on FTSE100 unbiased betas is located somewhere between 0.377 in 
Panel A and 0.3197 in Panel B. 
Table 5. 6 Trading effects 
This Table estimates the changes in comovement of stocks added to and deleted from the FTSE100 
index by change in trading Volume We split the sample of additions into two groups: those whose 
turnover decreases after addition as in Panel A and those whose turnover increases after addition as 
in Panel B. for each addition, we estimate the average monthly turnover by volume over the same 
pre- and post- additions windows. Then, we allocate the addition stock to the first group Panel A if 
its post- additions average turnover is lower than its pre-addition average turnover and to the 
second group Panel B otherwise. Then, from the univariate regression we record the average 
changes in the post relative to the pre-event for the slope coefficient,   , and the change in R2, ΔR2. 
For the bivariate model, we repeat the same procedures in the univariate model and we examine the 
mean changes in the slopes,            and            . 
    
  
Unvariate Bivariate 
Panel A : Turnover decrease 
  N     ΔR2 
 
                          
Additions  68 0.1212** 0.0183* 
 
0.3770*** -0.3402*** 
  
(2.092) (1.389) 
 
(6.2661) (-4.2436) 
Panel B:  Turnover increase 
     Additions  95 0.212*** 0.0809*** 0.3197*** -0.1662** 
  
5.663 5.0222 
 
6.327 -2.2689 
              
 
Despite its common use in the capital asset pricing literature, daily data may 
cause serious econometric problem. Fisher (1966) and Scholes and Williams (1977) 
were the first to recognize the potential problems caused by non-trading which, 
                                                          
66
 The ratio of the absolute value of           (3.197) to the absolute value of             (0.1662) 
of the second group is 1.9235 and for the first group is 0.3770/0.3702=1.1081. 
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subsequently, has been documented to bias beta estimates. Scholes and Williams 
(1977), Dimson (1979) and Fowler and Rorke (1983) find empirical evidence that 
betas of stocks that trade less (more) frequently than the index are downward 
(upward) biased. Cohen et al., (1980) find that the price adjustment delays is the 
main source of beta bias. The speed or the delays in the price adjustment according 
to Cohen et al. (1980) is due to the presence of  transactions costs, the adverse 
selection cost and the trading activities of market makers. The empirical results of 
Cohen et al. (1983a, 1983b) suggest that across all issues there is a strong, monotonic 
relationship between the bias and a security's market value. They show that one-day 
beta estimates tend to be biased upward for the actively traded stocks and downward 
for the thinly traded stocks. Hence, stocks will generally lead other stocks in 
adjusting to new information. Theobald and Price (1984) and McInish and Wood  
(1986) referred the price adjustment delays to the thin trading delays
67
. The speed of 
the price adjustment process is also due to the presence noise traders, the number of 
security analysts, asymmetric information, short sale constraints, information event 
as well as other types of market frictions and institutional constraints.    
The discussions above suggest that the presence of stocks in a major stock 
index such as the FTSE 100 may lead to greater visibility and faster price adjustment. 
Consequently, a stock may respond quickly to market-wide information following 
the additions, resulting in upward bias for beta. Thus, the shifts in comovement 
observed in our earlier result sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2 may be consistent with changes 
in the speed of price adjustment. Controlling for price adjustment diffusion aims 
firstly at producing unbiased beta, and secondly, to examine if the observed beta 
shifts are due to habitat and category theories of comovement- or to the slow 
                                                          
67
 McInish and Wood (1986) define the thin trading as the average time in minutes from last trade to 
market close (LTIME). LTIME is a proxy and direct measure of trading delays. 
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diffusion of information into stock prices. The reason is that the information 
diffusion view makes a prediction not shared by the category and habitat views, 
namely, if FTSE stocks incorporate information faster than N-FTSE stocks, and then 
there should be positive cross-autocorrelation between FTSE100 and N-FTSE 
returns. The intuition is that fundamental news about aggregate cash flows is 
reflected ideally immediately in FTSE prices but only at a later date in N-FTSE 
prices. Positive cross-autocorrelation might also be present if market-wide sentiment 
and cash flow news are similarly incorporated more quickly. 
 In order to determine the impact of information diffusion view, we follow 
the procedures explained by Dimson (1979) and Fowler and Rorke (1983) (DFR, 
thereafter). For each stock, we re-estimate Eqs.(5.1) and (5.2) by including five 
leading and lagging returns of the FTSE100 stocks and N-FTSE100 stocks using 
daily returns. This approach is the Dimson (1979) adjustment technique for non-
trading effects but we have also adjusted the Dimson estimates with the appropriate 
weights following Fowler and Rorke (1983). McInish and Wood (1986) examine the 
adjustment techniques proposed by Fowler and Rorke and  find that these techniques 
reduce a portion of the bias in    arising from thin trading and delays in price 
adjustment. Hartono and Surianto (2000) find evidence that the Fowler and Rorke 
method is the strongest one in reducing bias. Thus, for each event (addition or 
deletion), the univariate model is specified as  
            ∑                            
, (5.16) 
and the bivariate model   
            ∑                              ∑                                        
 (5.17) 
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Adjusted beta for pre- and post- addition (deletions) is estimated separately for each 
stock, k=5 for daily return. DFR adjusted factor loadings are calculated as   
  
   ∑       
 
    
           
   ∑                    
 
    
   
and 
            
   ∑                         
 
    
 
 
(5.18) 
 
where      ,           and             are the appropriate Fowler and Rorke 
(1983) adjustment weights which are calculated as     ∑    
 
 ∑   
 
  , the size of 
  ,   , …,    are generated from a regression equation as follows 
                                                  
                     
                                                         
                       
                                     
(5.19) 
The corrected DFR factor loadings for biases caused by speed of information 
diffusion, thus any significant changes in the post- additions (deletion) betas would 
rule out the information diffusion hypothesis as the only explanation for our earlier 
findings above. 
Table 5.7 presents the cross-sectional average change in the DFR adjusted 
slope coefficient for the univariate regression    , and the cross-sectional average of 
the change in R-squared,    . For the bivariate model, Table 5.7 reports the cross-
sectional average change in the DFR adjusted factor loadings on the FTSE100 
stocks,          
 , and the factor loading on the N-FTSE100 stocks,            
 .  
Panel A shows that both the univariate and bivariate betas shift are significant 
for both additions and deletions. The values associated with     and     are 0.139 
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(t-value is 3.863) and 0.055 (t-value is 5.054), respectively. This result suggests that 
the shifts in post- additions comovement in the univariate regressions are not driven 
by changes in the speed of information diffusion. For the bivariate regression, after 
the additions the values of          
  (           
   is 0.3197 with a t-value of 
7.464 (- 0.271with t-value of 3.882). This result provides more validity to our earlier 
findings in Table 5.2. However, by comparing the adjusted betas in Table 5.7 with 
unadjusted betas in Table 5.2, we find a presence of information diffusion. 
Particularly, after additions, we observe that     and          
  are 0.139 and 
0.3197 which are closer to zero than their counterparts in Table 5.2 as    and 
          are 0.168 and 0.355, respectively. This result indicates that the presence 
of the information diffusion accounting for 17.34% and 10% 
68
 of the beta shifts in 
the univariate and bivariate regressions, respectively. This result is consistent with 
the findings of Coakley and Kougoulis (2005) who find that  information diffusion 
accounts for about one quarter of the additions. Our result also is in line with 
Barberis et al., (2005) who find that information diffusion accounts for one third of 
the shifts in their S&P sample. 
For the deletions, the univariate regression results in Panel A of Table 5.7 
show that     and     are significantly negative of 0.111 with t-value -2.307 and 
0.046 with t-value -4.906, respectively. The value of          
  (           
  , from 
the bivariate, is -0.368 with t-value of -5.682 (+0.370 with t-value of 5.122). This 
result shows that the deletions sample experience similar shifts in betas compared 
with unadjusted betas in their counterparts in Table 5.2.   
 
                                                          
68
 17.34 and 10% are calculated as the % difference in the     from Panel A of Table 5.7 to    from 
Table 5.2 in the univariate regression and          
  from Panel A of Table 5.7 to           from 
Table 5.2 in the bivariate regression, respectively. 
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Table 5. 7 Leads and Lags  
This Table presents the changes in comovement of stocks added to and deleted from the FTSE100 
index: Information diffusion effects (five leads and lags). To determine the impact of information 
diffusion view, we follow the procedures explained by Dimson (1979) and Fowler and Rorke (1983) 
and adopted in Barberis et al., (2005),. For each stock, we re-estimate Eqs.(5.1) and (5.2) includes 
five leading and lagging returns of the FTSE100 stocks and N-FTSE100 stocks using daily returns. We 
apply Eqs. From (5.16) to (5.19) by adjusting betas for information diffusions using DFR with the 
appropriate weights. Then, the cross-sectional average change in the DFR adjusted slope coefficient 
for the univariate regression is    , and the cross-sectional average of the change in R-squared is 
   . For the bivariate model, the cross-sectional average change in the DFR adjusted factor loadings 
on the FTSE100 stocks is          
 , and the factor loading on the N-FTSE100 stocks is            
 .   
 
      Unvariate   Bivariate 
    N        .            
             
  
Panel A : Daily returns DFR Adjusted factor loadings   
Addition
s  
1986-2009 182 0.139*** 0.055*** 
 
0.3197*** -0.271*** 
   
3.863 5.045 
 
7.464 -3.882 
Deletion
s 
1986-2009 162 -0.111*** -0.046*** 
 
-0.368*** 0.370*** 
   
-2.307 -4.906 
 
-5.682 5.122 
Panel B: Components of DFR beta (5 leads and lags) 
 
ΔB                          . 
Addition
s  
1986-2009 t-5 0.0217* 
  
0.002922
96 
0.0456* 
   
1.4572 
  
0.1229 1.4989 
  
t-4 -0.0200* 
  
-0.0074 -0.0296 
   
-1.3696 
  
-0.2885 -0.8508 
  
t-3 -0.01772 
  
-0.0292 0.0105 
   
-1.16127 
  
-1.1260 0.3109 
  
t-2 0.0001 
  
-0.0293 0.0171 
   
0.0411 
  
-1.0899 0.4376 
  
t-1 0.0066 
  
0.0027 0.0088 
   
0.5117 
  
0.1057 0.2354 
  
t 0.1558*** 
  
0.3417*** -0.2367*** 
   
4.5985 
  
8.3058 -3.3032 
  
t+1 -0.0367** 
  
0.0202 -0.0511* 
   
-2.2246 
  
0.6817 -1.2938 
  
t+2 -0.0250** 
  
0.0179 -0.0445 
   
-1.7712 
  
0.6220 -1.1495 
  
t+3 -0.0360** 
  
-0.0676** 0.1059*** 
   
-2.3025 
  
-2.3407 2.7208 
  
t+4 -0.0177 
  
-0.0002 -0.0269 
   
-1.0816 
  
-0.0073 -0.7493 
  
t+5 0.0012 
  
0.0124 -0.0118 
   
0.08366 
  
0.4878 -0.3193 
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Panel B of Table 5.7 presents the components of the adjusted betas     , 
         
  and            
  for the additions in the univariate and bivariate 
regression. The results show that at t-1 the     ,             are -0.0066 and -
0.0027, respectively. This result suggests that market-wide news is reflected in the 
stock price with a one day lag before additions while news is reflected on the same 
day after additions. Overall, our findings are driven mainly by the habitat and 
category views and partly by information diffusion. Taken together, the robustness 
checks results show that after adjusting for trading, matching-firm effects, and price 
adjustment, we conclude that our findings are mainly driven by the three fiction- or 
sentiment-based views of comovement.  
 
5.5. Summary and conclusion 
The revisions in the FTSE100 index provide a rich set of events to examine 
the predictions of two broad theories of return comovement, the fundamental-and 
friction-based theories. This chapter examines the comovement shifts in the stock 
market return following the FTSE 100 index revisions. We hypothesise that the 
changes in the comovemnt is driven by both fundamental- and non-fundamental-
related factors. Our hypothesis is motivated with the argument (King (1966); Roll 
(1988); (Piotroski and Roulstone (2004); Durnev et al. (2004); Kumar and Lee 
(2006); Evans (2009)) that the stock return comovement is a function of 
fundamentals and non-fundamental factors. To examine this, we decompose the 
stock return comovement into sentiment- and fundamental-based comovement by 
using Amihud and Mendeson (1987) model with Kalman Filter. We also use similar 
procedures suggested by Barberies et al. (2005) to examine the three based-views of 
comovement which are category, habitat, and information diffusion-based views. 
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Our results are summarised as follows: First, our analysis from the univariate 
regressions document that stocks added to (deleted from) the FTSE100 comove more 
(less) with the members of the FTSE100 index. The results of the bivariate 
regressions show that stocks added (deleted from) the FTSE100 are associated with a 
substantial and significant increase (decrease) in their betas with the members of the 
FTSE100 index and a substantial and significant decrease (increase) in their beta 
with the members of the N-FTSE100 index. 
Second, our results from the decompositions of comovement into 
fundamental- and sentiment-based show that the sentiment-based betas are associated 
with a substantial and significant increase (decrease) after additions (deletions). 
However, the fundamental-based betas are associated with a weak significant 
decrease (increase) following additions (deletions).  
Third, our results imply that the shift in loading factors of stock return 
comovement after additions (deletions) is mainly driven by sentiment-based 
comovement. Our results indicate that the shifts of residuals betas are more 
pronounced than those of fundamentals betas in either addition or deletion. 
Specifically, we show that 58% (69%) of residual betas experience significant 
increase (decreases) following the index additions while approximately 54% (53%) 
of fundamental betas experience a weak significant decrease following the index 
additions (deletions). We also find that all the shifts of residual betas are significantly 
increased at 1% level while most of the shifts of fundamental betas are significantly 
decreased at 5 and 10% levels after the additions. In deletions sample only the shifts 
of residual betas are significantly decreased at conventional levels and no significant 
shifts is recorded in fundamental betas after deletions.  
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Furthermore, following the FTSE 100 index revisions, we observe that the 
total stock return comovement is increased (decreased) after the additions (deletions) 
and only the sentiment-based betas exhibit similar shifts in the same direction. 
However, the fundamental-based betas exhibit weak shifts in the opposite direction 
to the total stock return comovement. This evidence suggests that the fundamental 
factors are partly pushing the comovement in the opposite direction to the total 
comovement. The sentiment-based comovement can primarily explain the observed 
increase (decrease) in the total stock return comovement after the additions 
(deletions). We attribute this result to the impact of noise traders being stronger than 
the index arbitragers. 
Finally, in the robustness checks, we show that the calendar-time portfolio 
approach produces similar results to the event-time approach. In addition, the control 
sample methodology shows that our results are not driven by firm size. The 
procedures suggested by Vijh (1994) to control for trading and non-trading effects 
shows that our results are partially driven by non-trading effects. The results on the 
adjusted Dimson beta of the univariate and bivariate regressions suggest that the 
information diffusion account for 17.34% and 10% of the beta shifts, respectively. 
Thus, our findings are driven mainly by the habitat and category views and partly by 
information diffusion-based views 
Overall, our findings are largely in agreement with the conclusions of 
Barberis et al. (2005), Mase (2007) and Coakley et al. (2008) that the non-
fundamental-based comovement lead the total comovements in the stock return. Our 
findings are partly in agreement with  Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), Durnev et al. 
(2004), Kumar and Lee (2006), and Evans (2009) that the fundamental factors 
commove less with the total comovement.   
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Chapter 6: Index revisions and stock market quality 
 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter examines the impact of the FTSE 100 index revisions on the 
market quality of the underlying stocks. Its contribution to the literature is threefold. 
First, while previous literature consistently finds that there are price gains, increases 
in investor awareness, and long-term improvements in stock liquidity following 
additions, this study introduces a noble approach to investigate in detail the impact of 
index membership on the market quality of the underlying stocks. Second, while 
most literature finds that, when a firm is removed from a major stock index, it 
experiences both stock price and liquidity falls, a considerable studies report that the 
advantages of gaining membership remain even after removal from the index. We 
extend this debate by examining whether the informational efficiency of a stock is 
reduced after removal from the index. Finally, we are able to explain the key 
determinants of informational efficiency changes around the time of joining and 
leaving the membership of the index. 
We base our analysis on partial adjustment model with noise of Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987). We use a Kalman filter technique to estimate two important 
market quality measures, namely the speed at which information is incorporated into 
the stock price and the degree to which stock prices deviate from their intrinsic 
values
69
. To test whether the FTSE 100 index revisions affect the market quality of 
stocks, we compare measures of market quality before and after the events. We use a 
control sample to ensure that our results are not driven by factors other than the index 
                                                          
69
 This methodology is also used in the market microstructure literature (see, for example, Chelley-
Steeley, 2008 and Chelley-Steeley and Skvortsov (2010). 
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revisions. We also conduct cross-sectional analysis to identify the main determinants 
of the market quality changes. 
The key findings can be briefly summarised. First, the study confirms that the 
market quality of a stock added to (deleted from) the FTSE100 index is improved 
(not affected). Specifically, we show that the speed of price adjustment parameter (g) 
moves closer to unity and the transaction prices move closer to their intrinsic values 
following additions. However, deletions do not exhibit any significant changes in the 
speed of price adjustment or the pricing inefficiency. We attribute this asymmetric 
response of market quality to certain aspects of liquidity and other fundamental 
characteristics, which improve in the post- additions, but do not necessarily diminish 
in the post- deletions. Our findings are in agreement with the study of Chen et al. 
(2004) in which they find that investor’s awareness increases when a stock joins the 
S&P 500, but does not decrease following its removal from the index. Our cross-
sectional result indicates that a stock with low pre-addition market quality benefits 
more from being members of the index. This evidence confirms Roll et al.’s (2009) 
findings that information availability following option listing is larger in stocks 
where information asymmetries are greater and where investment analysis produces 
comparatively less public information. Our cross-sectional results also propose that a 
change in market quality is attributed to changes in information environment, 
liquidity, idiosyncratic risk, and book-to-market value. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.2 summarises 
the literature review and the hypotheses development. Section 6.3 presents the 
methodology. Section 6.4 presents and discusses the empirical findings. Section 6.5 
examines the determinants of stock market quality. Section 6.6 concludes and 
summary.    
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6.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
Previous studies show evidence that firms benefit from joining a major stock 
market index and even after leaving that index the benefit can remain unaffected. 
Dhillon and Johnson (1991) find that stocks exhibit a permanent  price increase after 
joining the S&P 500. Academic studies (i.e. Denis et al. (2003); Chen et al. (2004, 
2006); Kappou et al. (2008)) show that index membership has very long term effects, 
and index revisions are not information-free events. In this information event, 
additions report improvement in aspects of liquidity due to a greater production of 
firm-specific information, higher trading volume, lower information asymmetry and 
transaction costs. Chakrabarti (2002) and Hacibedel (2008), Gregoriou and Ioannidis 
(2003), and Bechmann (2004) find that the improvement in information flows result 
in permanent lower (higher) transaction costs in the post- additions (deletions) of the 
MSCI index, FTSE100 index, and Danish blue-chip KFX index, respectively. 
Sofianos (1993) proposes that index arbitrageurs activities enhance trading frequency 
which in turn reduce the inventory risk of the market makers and enhance liquidity in 
the post- additions. Chakrabarti et al. (2005) show in the post- additions, the trading 
volume increase in a large number of major world stock markets including the 
FTSE100 index. Similar result is obtained from the study of Mazouz and Saadouni 
(2007a) in which they attribute the long lived improvement following the FTSE100 
index additions to the non-information-related liquidity effects.This improvement 
according to Chakrabarti (2002) is due to the assumption that index convey a signal 
of quality to the investors about the underlying stocks. Chen et al. (2004, 2006b) find 
that investors become more aware of a stock upon its addition to the S&P 500 index, 
but do not become similarly unaware of a stock following its deletion. They also find 
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that the media coverage and the number of individual shareholders increase when a 
stock added to the index, but a stock that deleted from the index remains unaffected. 
Cai (2007) concludes that index inclusions may convey new information to the 
market for two reasons. First, when a firm is added to the index, the inclusions 
certifies it as a blue chip firm. Second, the index revision’s committee may select 
firms that it believes will be able to meet the index criteria for longer periods. 
The central concern of the previous studies is whether the index revisions 
effect is long lived or short lived. Shleifer (1986) and Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) 
show that the S&P 500 index records permanent price increases at the announcement 
of the inclusions. Deininger et al. (2000) find that the blue-chip index DAX and the 
mid-cap index MDAX in the German market experience permanent price increases 
(decreases) following additions (deletions). Chakrabarti et al. (2005) find evidence 
from the MSCI index for 29 countries, including the UK, consistent with the 
imperfect substitute hypothesis with some liquidity and price-pressure effects. They 
show that stocks from the UK, Japan, and other emerging markets experience 
permanent  price changes following index revisions, while the revisions of US and 
other developed markets indices does not result in such changes. They also show that 
trading volumes rise after additions in all the markets except the US and trading 
volumes drop after deletions in the developed markets except the US and the UK.  
However, Harris and Gurel (1986) show that increase in stock prices in the 
post- additions and deletions are fully reversed to their initial level prior the index 
revisions. Pruitt and Wei (1989) argue that the temporary price change following 
index revisions is consistent with heavy index-fund trading around the time of the 
change that moves stock prices temporarily away from their initial values. Chung and 
Kryzanowski (1998), Elayan et al. (2000), Rigamonti and Barontini (2000), Shankar 
184 
 
and Miller (2006), and Daniel and Gerard (2007) also observe temporary price 
increase (decrease) following additions to (deletions from) Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSE 300), the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZE10 and NZSE40), Italian Stock 
Exchange (Mib30), S&P Small-Cap 600 and  the Australian Stock Exchange 
(ASX200), respectively. 
Motivated by these evidences our testable hypotheses are formulated for 
market efficiency around the time of addition and deletion from the membership of 
the FTSE 100 index which are untested before. Thus, our first testable hypothesis 
states that: 
 
 H0a: Index additions improve the informational efficiency of the underlying 
stocks. 
H0b: Index deletions deteriorate the informational efficiency of the underlying 
stocks. 
 
 Previous evidence show that firms benefit from joining a major stock market 
index and even after leaving that index the benefit can remain unaffected. Thus, our 
second testable hypothesis states that: 
 
H1: The asymmetric response of market quality to certain aspects of liquidity 
and other fundamental characteristics induce asymmetric response in pricing 
efficiency to the addition and deletions.  
 
Previous studies (e.g. Easley and O'Hara (1987); Grossman and Miller 
(1988); Bacidore (1997); Madhavan et al. (2005); Lu and Hwang (2007)) attribute 
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market quality changes to information environment, idiosyncratic risk, liquidity and 
other fundamental characteristics of the firm.  
Existing literature proposes evidence that the level of liquidity and other 
fundamentals are functions in explaining the speed in which price adjust new 
information and the price efficiency. Harris and Raviv (1993), Shalen (1993), and 
Bessembinder et al. (1996) consider trading volume as an instrument that reveals 
both public and private information flows and with which we can explain the 
variation in opinions and beliefs. Easly and O’Hara (1987) and Brennan et al. (1993) 
show that  high trading volume (block trade) affects the speed rate of price 
adjustment. They find that the speed at which prices adjust for larger amount is not 
as fast as in the smaller amount. Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) show that trading 
volume is a significant determinant of how fast stock prices adjust to new 
information. They find that stocks with lower trading volume respond more slowly to 
market-wide information than stocks with higher trading volume. Shmuel et al. 
(2001) run a similar study by which they indicate that the increased volume and 
number of trades per session decrease the aggregate pricing error and related return 
volatility. Chiang et al., (2008) suggest that informed traders may prefer to break up 
large orders into smaller pieces to keep the prices in its initials. Mech (1993) and 
George and Hwang (2001) show that the delay in the speed adjustment process occur 
because of the high bid-ask spread. They argue that, holding other factors constant, a 
lower bid-ask spread suggests a better market quality. Ali et al. (2003) assume that 
securities with higher transaction costs are most likely to exhibit greater residual 
mispricing. Mech (1993) also attributes the speed of the price adjustment process to 
the non-trading (i.e. Zeros). Lesmond et al.(1999b) show that securities with high 
transaction costs will exhibit more frequent zero daily return than a security with low 
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transaction costs. Thus, the frequency of zero daily returns may hinder the price 
adjustment process (Ali et al., 2003).  
Fama and French (1992) consider market capitalisation and book-to-market 
value as proxies for common risk factors. Since the rebalancing decision in the 
FTSE100 index is solely based on the market value, we may attribute the 
improvement (deterioration) in the price efficiency to the changes in the market 
value in the post- additions (deletions). Damodaran (1993) finds that the a stock with 
a high market size adjusts to new released information faster than small market size 
stock. Hasbrouck (1993) finds that the pricing inefficiency is negatively related to the 
market firm size. Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), and 
Theobald and Yallup (2004) find that as small-cap stocks are more likely to be thinly 
traded than large-cap stocks, the speeds of adjustment are found to be higher for 
large-cap than for small-cap firms. Theobald and Yallup  (2004) claim that the 
information is less available for the small size companies. Mech (1993) presents 
evidence that the large firm at the NYSE portfolio reflects information without delay. 
Fama and French (1992) propose that the book-to-market value captures a 
priced element of systematic risk. Thus, stocks featuring a higher book-to-market 
value are characterized by higher risk-premium, and big stocks typically have a 
lower risk-premium than small stocks. Ali et al. (2003) find that book-to-market ratio 
is greater for stocks with higher transaction costs and stock with less ownership by 
informed investors. Agarwal and Wang (2007) find that the average annual 
transaction costs are usually higher for the highest book-to-market portfolios than for 
the lowest book-to-market portfolios. In addition, smaller firms are associated with 
high book-to-market values and are inactively traded. Several researchers, including 
Chan and Faff (2005), Chen and Zhang (1998), and Lu and Hwang (2007) document 
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that stocks with high book-to-market value, small market size, and low analyst 
coverage are likely to be mispriced by investors.   
It is widely argued in the literature that idiosyncratic risk can reflect the 
presence of firm-based information into prices. Bhagat et al. (1985) document a 
positive association between issuing cost and idiosyncratic risk, which reflect the 
asymmetric information between firm insiders and outsiders. Easley and O'Hara 
(1987), De Long et al. (1990) and Huang and Masulis (2003) show that idiosyncratic 
risk is an increasing function with the firm size trading. They claim that block trades 
experience a greater adverse selection effect, as they are executed by better-informed 
traders. Kelly (2005) shows that high idiosyncratic risk is due to poor information 
environment with higher noise trading, which causes stock prices to move away from 
their initial values. Nevertheless, Durnev et al. (2003) find that securities and 
industries associated with greater idiosyncratic volatility show greater information 
flows. They claim that higher idiosyncratic volatility convey a signal of the presence 
of active trading by informed arbitrageurs which lead stock price to be closer to its 
fundamental value.  
Shleifer (1986) suggests that the events of reclassifying the index 
membership produce more information which in turn incorporate into the price in the 
post- additions. Jennings and Starks (1985) find that stocks with better accounting 
reports are characterised by high investor perceptions and greater information flows. 
Consequently, the speed of price adjustment is faster for stocks with better 
information environment. Bhushan (1989) finds that the information environment 
measured by the number of analysts is positively associated with the speed of 
adjustment. An investor is likely to find a piece of private information about a larger 
firm more valuable than the same piece of information about a smaller firm. This is 
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because the profits that the investor can generate by trading in a larger firm on the 
basis of this information are likely to be higher than those in a smaller firm. Liu 
(2009) investigates the potential changes following the reshuffle of the Nikkei 225. 
Liu (2009) applies the change in press coverage as a proxy to the change in 
information environment. The result shows that the changes in press coverage for the 
stocks added and deleted are consistent with the notion that the Nikkei 225 
membership attracts more press coverage generating more flows of information for 
the component stocks. Motivated by this literature, we propose the following testable 
hypothesis: 
 
 H2: The improvement in the stock market quality is determined by 
improvements in liquidity, risk factors, idiosyncratic risk, and information 
environment.  
 
 
6.3 Methodology 
Amihud and Mendelson (1987) suggest a model in which the observed 
security price can be influenced by both noise and the failure of the observed prices 
to adjust immediately the fundamentals into their intrinsic values. This model breaks 
down the contaminated observed price into intrinsic value and noise. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987) assume that  the difference between the intrinsic value and the 
observed price is attributed to the noise, as suggested by Black (1986). Their model 
is explained as follows: 
            [       ]     ,                                                                                                                      (6.1) 
 
                                  
   , 
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where     is the logarithm of the observed prices    ,    is the logarithm of  the 
intrinsic value, g is the price adjustment parameter, reflecting the speed at which 
information is incorporated into the stock price, and    is the white noise, which 
temporarily pushes the observed price from their intrinsic prices. Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987) assume that the convention of the logarithms of security values    
follow a random walk process with drift 
                
(6.2) 
 
the term  is a positive drift,    is a random error, independent of   , with zero mean 
and finite variance,   
 . The coefficient g reflects the adjustment of transaction prices 
towards the security's value. In particular, g=0 represents the extreme case of no 
price reaction to changes in value,        implies partial price adjustment,     
suggests full price adjustment,     indicates that the observed prices overreact to 
new information. Examining the change in the parameter g between pre- and post- 
additions (deletion) period allows us to gauge whether the FTSE 100 index revisions 
affect the price discovery process. If the addition to (deletion from) the FTSE 100 
index improves (deteriorates) the market quality, the parameter g of the added 
(deleted) stocks should move closer (deviate further) from unity. 
The observed price from Chelley-Steeley (2009) defines pricing inefficiency 
(PIt) as the absolute value of the difference between the observed prices (pt) and their 
intrinsic values (vt), or 
     |      | 
(6.3) 
 
By using data from {1,T}, we estimate the mean pricing error      as 
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(6.4) 
 
The improvement in market quality is associated with a decline in    which is the 
difference between            . Hence, if the addition to (deletion from) the FTSE 
100 improves (harms) the market quality, one should observe a decrease (an 
increase) in PI in the post- additions (deletions). 
Lyhagen (1999) shows the price adjustment coefficient model of Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987) can be estimated using Kalman filter which is explained in section 
5.3.3. We estimate g and PI at the pre- and post-index revision periods for both event 
stocks and their control pairs. The control sample methodology
70
 is applied to 
account for the impact of factors other than index revisions on our findings.  
 
6.3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 6.1 presents the cross-sectional descriptive statistics of the additions 
and deletions stocks and their control pairs. Panels A reports the pre-index revision [-
261, -31]) characteristics, namely market capitalisation (MV), book-to-market value 
(BTMV), trading volume (VO), number of trades (NT), bid-ask spread (Ask-Bid), 
Illiquidity (Amihud), and number of days with zero return (Zeros) of the added 
stocks and their control pairs. The paired t-test and the Mann-Whitney test show that 
the in the pre-addition the added stocks and the control stocks differ significantly 
only in terms of MV, reflecting the decision of Steering Committee to add stocks 
with large market size. Our results also suggest that the pre-index addition 
characteristics of the additions and their control pairs are belong the same 
distribution.  
                                                          
70
 See section 4.4.2 for the procedure of the construction of the control sample.  
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Panel B of Table 6.1 presents the cross-sectional descriptive statistics of 
deleted stocks and their control pairs in the pre-deletion over the [-261, -31] window 
around deletions. The results show that t-test and Mann-Whitney test indicate that the 
mean and median values of MV, VO, and NT are higher for the main sample than 
their control pair. Moreover, the illiquidity measured by Amihud and Zeros are 
significantly less in the deletions than their control pairs. Though, there is no 
statistically significant difference between the deleted stocks and their control pairs 
in terms of BTMV and Ask-Bid.  
 
Table 6. 1 Descriptive statistics 
This table reports the means and medians of firm characteristics over the [-261, -30] window around index 
revisions.   Firm size (MV) is the average market capitalization (in millions of pounds).  Book to market value 
(BTMV) is ratio of book value to market value.  Trading volume (VO) is the turnover by volume. Number of 
trades (NT) is the number of daily transactions for a particular stock. Ask minus bid (Ask-bid) is the 
difference between ask and bid price.  Amihud is the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the 
pound trading volume on that day. Zeros is the number of zeros in the daily return series in the pre-index 
revision period. The control is constructed by matching each event stock with non-event stock with the 
closest pre-revision market capitalization. The asterisks 
***
, 
**
 and 
*
 indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10 % 
level, respectively.  
Panel A: The criteria of additions and control sample 
 
Additions 
 
Control 
 
The differences  
 
Mean  Median 
 
Mean  Median  
  
t-Stat Mann Whitney 
MV(103) 1,658 1,703 
 
1,952 1,663 
  
2.598*** -1.348 
BTMV 0.578 0.480 
 
0.615 0.535 
  
0.724 -0.639 
VO(10
3)
 3,691 1,888 
 
3,371 1,735 
  
-0.580 -1.271 
NT 461 135 
 
448 113 
  
-0.162 -0.329 
ASK_Bid 3.542 2.830 
 
4.060 2.960 
  
1.339 -1.120 
Amihud(10-
6)
 9.175 3.320 
 
5.736 3.270 
  
1.193* -0.322 
Zeros 29 22 
 
29 23 
  
-0.032 -0.048 
Panel B: The criteria of deletions and control sample 
 
Deletions 
 
Control 
 
The differences 
 
Mean  Median 
 
Mean  Median  
  
t-Stat Mann Whitney 
MV(10
3)
 2,070 1,934 
 
1,539 1,301 
  
3.685*** -4.570*** 
BTMV 0.544 0.485 
 
0.595 0.480 
  
-1.192 -0.541 
VO(10
3)
 4,225 2,226 
 
2,463 1,333 
  
3.496*** -4.368*** 
NT 503 121 
 
279 48 
  
3.013*** -4.507*** 
ASK_Bid 3.912 2.985 
 
3.895 3.085 
  
0.895 -0.140 
Amihud(10-
6)
 4.189 2.615 
 
24.200 4.760 
  
-1.671* -5.275*** 
Zeros 28 22 
 
38 31 
  
-3.744*** -4.269*** 
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Table 6.2 presents the shifts, across pre- and post-index revision periods, for 
the MV, BTMV, Var, VO, NT, Ask-Bid, Amihud, Zeros, and Lexis/Nexis related to 
additions and deletions separately. Table 6.2 shows that, with the exception of Var, 
all liquidity measures, common factor risks, and information environment report a 
statistically significant improvement in the post- additions to the FTSE 100 index. 
However and as we expect, the characteristics of deletions are, with exception of MV 
and Zeros, unchanged in the post- deletion period. The drop in MV is justified by the 
decision of the committee of the FTSE 100 index. 
6.4 Empirical results  
6.4.1 Market quality parameters in in the post- additions 
Table 6.3 reports the market quality parameters (g) associated with the pre- 
and post- index revision periods. Panel A of Table 6.3 reports the average g 
associated with the additions from the estimation of Amihud and Mendelson (1987) 
with Kalman Filter. Panel A documents that the mean (median) of g shows a 
statistically significant increases from 0.924 to 0.966 (0.907 to 0.959) between the 
pre- and post- additions periods, with about 63% of the stocks exhibit an increase in 
g when they move to the FTSE 100 index. That g moves closer to unity in the post- 
additions, suggests that the informational efficiency of the underlying stock is 
improved. These results are unlikely to be driven by factors other than index 
revisions, as the control pairs do not experience any significant change, across pre- 
and post- additions period, in the parameter g. 
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Table 6. 2 Explanatory variables 
Cross-sectional means and medians  of firm size (MV), book to market value (BTMV), the variance in residuals (VAR), trading volume 
(VO), number of trades (NT), Ask minus bid (Ask-Bid),  illiquidity (Amihud),  the number of zero return (Zeros), and media coverage 
(Lexis/Nexis) are computed over the [-261, -30] and [+30, +260] windows around additions. This study uses trading volume (VO), 
number of trades (NT), Ask minus bid (Ask-Bid), illiquidity (Amihud), and the (Zeros) as proxies for liquidity. VO is turnover by volume. 
NT is the number of daily transactions for a particular stock. Amihud (2002) defines illiquidity as the average ratio of the daily absolute 
return to the dollar trading volume on that day. The common factor risks and idiosyncratic risk are identified by the variance of 
residuals VAR, market capitalisation (MV) and book to market value. We define the idiosyncratic risk of a stock i, or VARi, as the 
variance of the residuals resulting from regressing stock returns on the returns of the market portfolio. The change in information 
environment is measured by Lexis/Nexis. The paired t-test and Wilcoxon Signed Rank test are then used to judge the statistical 
significance of the changes, across pre- and post- additions periods, in the different liquidity proxies. The 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
The changes of the explanatory variables following Additions (Deletions) 
 
Change following Additions 
 
Change following Deletions 
 
Mean Med  t-test Wilcox 
 
Mean Med t-test Wilcox 
MV 517 269 -8.466*** -8.339*** 
 
-458 -512 4.795*** -5.638*** 
BTMV -0.081 -0.025 4.165*** -5.988*** 
 
0.269 0.09 -1.396 -5.206*** 
VAR (x 103) -0.025 -0.088 -0.283 -1.44 
 
-2.098 -0.14 2.025** -1.416 
VO (x 103) 236 563 -1.39 -4.113*** 
 
335 179 -1.53 -1.326 
NT 201 145 --5.837*** -8.781*** 
 
-18 -4 0.592 -0.812 
Ask_Bid -0.122 0.01 0.4287 -1.803* 
 
-0.681 -0.13 1.44 -2.259** 
Amihud (x10-6) -1.528 -1.23 1.929** -6.574*** 
 
10.916 1.365 -1.001 -5.540*** 
Zeros -4 -5 2.616*** -6.137*** 
 
9 4 -3.785*** -3.795*** 
Lexis/Nexis 73 21 -5.386*** -11.832*** 
 
-9 -14 0.654 0.512 
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Panel B of Table 6.3 reports the price inefficiency (PI) associated with the 
additions from the estimation of Amihud and Mendelson (1987) with Kalman Filter. 
Panel B indicates that the mean (median) of PI drops significantly from 1.988 (1.613) 
in the pre-addition period to 1.705 (1.316) in the post- addition period, with 56 % 
event stocks exhibit a decline in PI. Again, the control sample does not exhibit any 
significant changes in the mean PI between pre- and post- additions periods. The 
finding that transaction prices move closer to their intrinsic values in the post- 
additions suggests that the market quality of the underlying stocks improve when 
they become members of the FTSE 100 index.   
 
Table 6. 3 Market quality measures following the additions 
The estimation of g and PI over pre-and post- addition periods for addition and control. In this table we 
presents market quality estimates for the pre- and post- additions period that have been obtained from 
the Kalman filter estimates of Amihud and Mendelson (1987) model in the pre- and post-index revision 
periods. g is a partial adjustment coefficient and PI is the pricing inefficiency parameter of Chelley-
Steeley (2008). The control sample is constructed by matching each event stock with a non-event stock 
with the closest market capitalization at one month prior the event date. The 
**
 and 
*
 indicate 
significance at 5% and 10% levels, respectively. % increase in adjustment reports the percentage of the 
sample that experiences a rise in the partial adjustment parameter in the post- additions period, % 
decline in inefficiency is the percentage of the sample that experiences a decline in pricing inefficiency in 
the post- additions period. The PI is multiplied by 1000 as in the Chelley-Steeley (2003). 
Panel A: The estimation of g for additions and control 
  Pre Post pre versus post 
  Mean  Median Mean  Median % g increase t-stat Wilcoxon 
Additions 0.924 0.907 0.966 0.959 63%     -4.479
***
      -4.097
***
 
Control 0.950 0.946 0.959 0.961 51% -0.890 -0.525 
Panel B:  The estimation of PI for additions and control 
  Additions             
  Pre   Post   pre versus post     
  Mean  Median Mean  Median % PI decrease t-stat Wilcoxon 
Additions 1.988 1.613 1.705 1.316 56% 1.842
*
 -1.830* 
Control 1.533 1.168 1.613 1.167 52% -0.467 -0.824 
 
Our results are consistent with other studies on the impact of index revisions 
on stock market efficiency, information production, volatility and liquidity. 
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Gregoriou and Ioannidis (2003) argue that investors in the FTSE 100 hold stocks 
with more available information. Naik et al. (1999) argue that the availability of 
information reduces adverse selection and hence lowers the transaction costs for 
uninformed traders. This reduction in adverse selection leads to better pricing. 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986) argue that since liquidity is priced, an increase in 
liquidity will result in lower expected returns, lower transaction costs and hence a 
positive permanent price reaction following announcement of an addition to the 
index. Since liquidity improvement is positively related to the efficiency gains, stock 
prices adjusted faster to market information, and the noise in stock prices declined 
(Amihud et al., 1997). Similar results are also reported by Kerry Cooper et al. (1985), 
and Kadlec and McConnell (1994). Thus our testable hypothesis H0a, which predicts 
that index additions improve the informational efficiency of the underlying stocks, is 
approved. 
 
6.4.2 Market quality parameters in in the post-deletions 
Table 6.4 reports g and PI associated with the deletions. Panel A of Table 6.4 
reports the mean (median) g for the main and control pair in the pre- and post-
deletion periods. Panel A presents that the mean (median) associated with g is 
dropped from 0.948 (0.936) to 0.939 (0.935) in the post- deletions period, with 46% 
of the deletions exhibit increase in the parameter g in the post- deletions from the 
FTSE 100. However, the parametric t-test and the non-parametric Wilcoxon Signed 
rank test suggest that the decline in g is not statistically significant. In contrast, Panel 
A reports that the mean (median) g associated with the control pair increases 
significantly from 0.918 (0.905) in the pre- deletion period to 0.936 (0.934) in post- 
deletion period. Thus our testable hypothesis H0b, which suggests that index 
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deletions deteriorate the informational efficiency of the underlying stocks, is 
rejected. 
 
Table 6. 4 Market quality measures following the deletions 
The estimation of g and PI over pre-and post- deletions periods for deletion and control. In this 
table we presents market quality estimates for the pre- and post- additions period that have been 
obtained from the Kalman filter estimates of Amihud and Mendelson (1987) model in the pre- and 
post-index revision periods. g is a partial adjustment coefficient and PI is the pricing inefficiency 
parameter of Chelley-Steeley (2008). The control sample is constructed by matching each event 
stock with a non-event stock with the closest market capitalization at one month prior the event 
date. The 
**
 and 
*
 indicate significance at 5% and 10% levels, respectively. % increase in adjustment 
reports the percentage of the sample that experiences a rise in the partial adjustment parameter in 
the post- additions period, % decline in inefficiency is the percentage of the sample that 
experiences a decline in pricing inefficiency in the post- additions period. The PI is multiplied by 
1000 as in the Chelley-Steeley (2003). 
Panel A: The estimation of g for deletions and control 
  Deletions             
                       Pre Post pre versus post 
  Mean  Median Mean  Median % g increase t-stat Wilcoxon 
Deletions 0.948 0.936 0.939 0.935 46% 1.141 -0.859 
Control 0.918 0.905 0.936 0.934 53% -1.890
*
 -1.077 
Panel B: The estimation of PI for deletions and control 
    Deletions           
                         Pre Post pre versus post 
  Mean  Median Mean  Median 
%PI 
decrease t-stat Wilcoxon 
Deletions 1.729 1.172 1.802 1.186 46% -0.457 -0.305 
Control 1.751 1.398 1.591 1.211 55% 1.072 -1.651* 
 
Panel B of Table 6.4 reports the mean (median) of PI for the main and control 
pair in the pre- and post- deletion periods. Panel B shows that the mean of PI in the 
post-deletion exhibit no significant shifts at the conventional level. Only 46% of the 
deletion exhibit decreases in the post- deletion period. Panel B also shows that the 
change in the PI associated with the control sample is not significantly different from 
zero. 
We conclude that our findings suggest that the market quality parameters 
improve in the post- additions, but do not deteriorate in the post-deletions. Thus, our 
evidence supports the testable hypothesis H1, which posits that the asymmetric 
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response of market quality to certain aspects of liquidity and other fundamental 
characteristics induce asymmetric response in pricing efficiency to the addition and 
deletions. This asymmetric response is consistent with the argument of investor 
awareness hypothesis, of Chen et al. (2006b), which suggests that investor awareness 
increase when a stock included in the index, but does not easily diminish when a 
stock removes from the index. In line with Chen et al. (2006) findings, we also show 
in Section 6.3.1 that the liquidity environment improves following additions, but 
does not change after deletions.  
 
6.5 The determinants of market quality changes 
Our previous findings in section 6.4 suggest that in the post- additions to the 
FSTE 100 index stocks exhibit significant improvement in their market quality. To 
account for the determinants of the change in the market quality after a stock joins 
the index, we regress    and     against their pre-addition values and different 
combinations of the following set of explanatory variables: change trading volume 
(   ), change in number of trades (   ), change in illiquidity (       ), change 
in bid-ask spread (        ), change in the non-trading (      ), change in 
media coverage (            )71, change in firm size (   ), and the changes in the 
residual variance of returns (    ). We include the pre-additions market quality 
                                                          
71 We use Lexis/Nexis as a proxy for information environment. Lexis/Nexis is defined as the press 
coverage of the underlying stock. We obtain data for press coverage through systematic manual 
searches in the Lexis/Nexis as suggested by Liu (2009). For each firm in each sample, we search for 
the number of “Business News” )news category( from “Business & Finance” sources )news source( in 
the search domain in the prior and posterior one-year period separately. We measure press 
coverage by the number of times that the name of a stock appears in the “Headline, Lead 
Paragraph)s(, or Terms” of news articles in a given search period. This default search domain is 
intended to ensure adequate data availability, while avoiding trivial report in passing. If the number 
of appearances for a stock exceeds 1000 in the default search domain within a search period and the 
search is interrupted by default, we then limit the scope of search for the stock to “Headline” alone 
in all search periods employed to ensure comparability. This more restrictive search domain applied 
to all stocks added to the FTSE 100 index. 
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measures in the regressions to test whether stocks with low pre-addition market 
quality benefit more from joining the index
72.
 We use ∆VO, ∆NT, ∆Amihud, and 
∆Ask-Bid, and        to capture the changes in liquidity;     and        to 
address the changes in the common risk factors; ∆VAR is to capture the changes in 
idiosyncratic risk; and ∆Lexis/Nexis is to capture the changes in information 
environment. 
Table 6.5 reports the correlations among the changes in the dependent and 
explanatory variables. The changes in both explanatory and dependent variables are 
calculated as the difference between the post- and pre- addition periods. Table 6.5 
shows that ∆g and ∆PI are strongly correlated with their pre-addition values. In 
particular, the correlation between ∆g and pre-g is about -46% and the correlation 
between ∆PI and pre-PI is approximately -69%. The negative correlations are 
consistent with the view that the greater change in market quality is associated with 
firms that have lower market quality in the prior addition period. Thus, the stocks 
with lower market quality at the pre-addition benefit more from joining the index. 
The correlation between the changes in the market quality and the changes in the 
explanatory variables varies substantially. ∆PI is significantly positively correlated 
with ∆VAR, ∆NT and ∆BTMV, suggesting that greater price inefficiency is 
associated with higher idiosyncratic risk, higher number of trades, and higher book-
to-market value. Other correlations in Table 6.5 show that the correlations among the 
explanatory variables are fairly high. In particular, the correlation between ∆MV and 
BTMV, ∆Lexis/Nexis and ∆NT are -0.32 and 0.428, respectively. To avoid multi-
collinearity problems, we run different regressions by excluding highly correlated 
variables in the same regression. 
                                                          
72
 Easely et al. (2002) and Roll et al. (2009) suggest that information production following option 
listing is larger in stock where information asymmetries are greater and where investment analysis 
produces comparatively less public information. 
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Table 6. 5 Correlations of explanatory and dependent variables 
This table reports the correlation matrix for the changes in the explanatory variables involved in the regressions of the changes in the informational efficiency. The change 
in both explanatory and dependent variables is calculated as the difference in the values of these variables between post- additions [+30, +260] and the pre- addition [-261, 
-30].  The two dependent variables are ∆g and ∆PI. The explanatory variables are the changes in market capitalisation )∆MV), the changes in book to market value (∆BTMV), 
the changes in the variance of residuals (∆VAR(, the changes in market trading volume )∆VO), the changes in number of trades )∆NT), the changes in Ask-bid spread )∆Ask-
Bid(, the changes in illiquidity )∆Amihud(, the changes in Zeros) ∆Zeros(, and the changes in media coverage )∆Lexis/Nexis). The 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate that the correlation is 
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 Pre_PI Pre_g ∆g ∆PI ∆MV ∆BTMV ∆VO ∆NT ∆Amihud ∆Ask Bid ∆Zero ∆VAR 
Pre_g -.458**                      
∆g .326** -.460**                    
∆PI -.690** .260** -.395**                  
∆MV .105 -.125 .045 -.063                
∆BTMV -.085 .048 .090 .315** -.323**              
∆VO -.015 -.105 .058 .165 -.033 .098            
∆NT -.218** .134 -.026 .265** .093 .285** .132          
∆Amihud -.071 .040 .041 .098 -.177* .218** -.042 .077        
∆Ask–Bid .105 -.334** .048 -.004 .302** -.015 -.050 -.055 .007      
∆Zero .017 .127 -.089 -.041 -.179* .126 .009 .022 .014 .134    
∆VAR .015 -.035 -.066 .211** .121 .201* .052 .310** -.032 .202* -.015  
∆Lexis/Nexis .020 .058 -.014 -.023 .053 .114 .065 .428** .065 .089 .054 .250** 
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Table 6.6 presents the cross-sectional regression results. Panel A reports the 
results from the changes in the ∆g. We include different proxies related to stocks’ 
characteristics as each alternative proxy may only capture a certain dimension of 
liquidity, information environment and risk. Panel A shows that ∆g is negatively 
related to pre-g across all models. This finding suggests that stocks with lower 
market quality in the pre- addition period benefits more from joining the index. The 
coefficient on ∆BTMV (in Model 2) is positive and significant, indicating that high 
BTMV stocks respond more aggressively to information than low BTMV stocks. 
Likewise, the significantly positive coefficient on ∆NT (in Model 1) reflects the 
positive association between the price adjustment parameter and trading frequency. 
The negative coefficient on ∆Ask-Bid (in Model 3) indicates that prices reflect 
information faster when transaction costs are low. This evidence is consistent with 
Mech (1993) who shows that the price-adjustment delays occur because of the high 
bid-ask spread. The coefficients on ∆MV, ∆VO, ∆Zeros, ∆Amihud, ∆VAR and 
∆Lexis/Nexis are not statistically significant.  
Since high price adjustment to information does not always indicate high 
market quality, we repeat our analysis using ∆PI as the dependent variable73. Then, 
the results are reported in Panel B of Table 6.6. The coefficient on pre-PI is negative 
and significant in all models, indicating that less efficiency priced stocks benefit 
more from the price noise reduction after joining the index. The coefficient on 
∆BTMV (in Model 5) is positive and significant, indicating that high BTMV are 
more likely to be inefficient. This finding is consistent with Chan and Faff (2005), 
Chen and Zhang (1998) and Lu and Hwang (2007). The coefficient on ∆VAR (in 
                                                          
73
 The increase in g indicates high market quality only if pre-g is below unity. However, a decrease of 
PI implies high market quality regardless of the value of pre-PI. 
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Model 5) is positive and significant at 1% level, implying that the price discovery 
process of stocks with idiosyncratic risk is noisier. This evidence is consistent with 
Kelly (2005) who reports a positive association between idiosyncratic risk and noise 
trading. The positive association between pricing and inefficiency and ∆BTMV does 
not contradict with our earlier finding that the speed of price adjustment increases 
with BTMV. Specifically, if the increase in BTMV causes the price adjustment 
parameter to increase above unity, stock prices are expected deviate away from their 
intrinsic value. The significantly positive coefficient ∆Ask-Bid (in Model 6) 
indicates a positive association between pricing inefficiency and transaction costs. 
Ali et al. (2003) also show positive association between transaction costs and the 
level of inefficiency. The change in the price inefficiency in the stock prices is not 
explained by the explanatory variables of ∆VO, ∆NT, ∆MV, ∆Lexis/Nexis, 
∆Amihud, and ∆Zeros. 
In short, the cross-sectional-regressions suggest that the improvement in 
market quality is explained, at least partly, by the pre-addition market quality and the 
contemporaneous changes in information environment, idiosyncratic risk, liquidity 
and book-to-market value. Thus, we find evidence support our hypothesis H2, which 
posits that the improvement in the stock market quality is determined by 
improvements in liquidity, risk factors, idiosyncratic risk, and information 
environment. 
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Table 6. 6 Regression result 
This Table explain the determinant of ∆g and ∆PI .The dependent variable in panel A is the changes in 
the speed of price adjustment (∆g) and the dependent variable in panel B is the changes in the speed 
of price inefficiency (∆PI). The change in both explanatory and dependent variables is calculated as the 
difference in the values of these variables between post- additions [+30, +260] and the pre- addition [-
261, -30]. The explanatory variables, in Panels A and B, are the changes in market capitalisation 
)∆MV), the changes in book to market value (∆BTMV), the changes in the variance of residuals (∆VAR), 
the changes in the logarithm of market trading volume )∆VO), the changes in the logarithm of number 
of trades )∆NT), the changes in Ask-bid spread )∆Ask-Bid(, the changes in illiquidity )∆Amihud), the 
changes in Zeros )∆Zeros(, and the changes in media coverage )∆Lexis/Nexis). The 
***
, 
**
, 
*
 indicate that 
the correlation is significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Panel A:  The determinants of ∆g 
Explanatory  Variables         Model 1   Model 2   Model 3 
  
Coef. t.stat   Coef. t.stat   Coef. t.stat 
Intercept 0.408 6.646
***
 
 
0.452 7.543
***
 
 
0.484 7.498
***
 
Pre_g 
 
-0.427 -6.736
***
 
 
-0.443 -6.967
***
 
 
-0.481 -7.026
***
 
∆MV 
 
-1.070 -1.007 
      BTMV 
    
0.065 1.886
*
 
   ∆VAR 
    
0.000 -1.585 
 ∆VO 
 
-0.014 -1.361 
 
  
 
-0.012 -1.122 
∆NT 
 
0.058 2.910
***
 
 
  
   ∆Ask_Bid 
    
  
 
-0.010 -1.772* 
∆Amihud 
    
3.950 0.433 
 
7.279 0.804 
∆Zeros 
 
0.000 -0.447 
 
0.000 -0.715 
 
0.000 -0.461 
∆Lexis/Nexis 
    
  
 
2.179 0.369 
Adjusted R2  0.230   0.216    0.205   
F-value   11.70     10.87     8.70   
Panel B:  The determinants of ∆PI 
 
  Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
  
Coef. t.stat   Coef. t.stat   Coef. t.stat 
Intercept 
 
0.001 5.289
***
 
 
0.001 8.783
***
 
 
0.001 7.274
***
 
Pre_PI 
 
-0.853 -12.846
***
 
 
-0.826 -13.487
***
 
 
-0.858 -12.954
***
 
∆MV 
 
-5.164 -0.354 
      BTMV 
    
0.002 4.137
***
 
   ∆VAR 
    
6.843 3.47
***
 
 ∆VO 
 
0.000 1.712* 
 
  
 
0.000 2.635
***
 
∆NT 
 
0.000 1.543 
 
  
   ∆Ask_Bid 
    
  
 
0.000 1.955
**
 
∆Amihud 
    
3.119 0.271 
 
1.265 1.036 
∆Zeros 
 
1.133 0.130 
 
-8.009 -1.038 
 
-6.434 -0.076 
∆Lexis/Nexis 
    
  
 
-3.016 -0.380 
Adjusted R2  0.483   0.559    0.487   
F-value   34.43     46.31     29.36   
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6.6 Summary and Conclusion 
The partial adjustment with noise model of Amihud and Mendelson (1987) is 
estimated by using a Kalman filter to produce estimates of the partial adjustment 
coefficient (g). The coefficient g is a market quality proxy that measures how quickly 
security prices adjust to new information. We estimate intrinsic values to generate 
the price inefficiency (PI). The partial adjustment coefficient and price inefficiency 
metrics are used to examine the impact of the addition to (deletion from) the FTSE 
100 index on stock market quality. We also use a control sample to ensure that our 
results are not driven by other market index factors.  
The key findings of this study can be summarised as follows. Our results 
show that the market quality improves after additions but does not deteriorate 
following deletions. This asymmetric effect can be attributed, at least partly, to 
liquidity proxies and other fundamental characteristics, which have improved 
following additions, but did not change after deletions. The study also shows that the 
change in market quality is attributed, at least partly, to the changes in information 
flows, idiosyncratic risk, liquidity and book to market value. The cross-sectional 
analysis also indicates that stocks with low pre-addition market quality benefit more 
from being members of the index. This evidence confirms Roll et al.’s (2009) 
findings that information production following option listing is larger in stocks where 
information asymmetries are greater and where investment analysis produces 
comparatively less public information. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and summary 
7.1 Introduction 
In the context of price formation process, this thesis examines the impact of 
the FTSE100 index revisions on liquidity and cost of equity capital, comovement in 
the stock returns and market quality of the underlying stocks. We divide this thesis 
into three empirical chapters. 
The first empirical chapter examines the impact of the FTSE100 index 
revision on stock liquidity and the cost of equity capital. We begin our analysis by 
examining the changes in the various liquidity measures following the revision 
events. Then, we apply Liu’s (2006) liquidity-augmented asset pricing model to 
investigate the impact of index revisions on the liquidity premium. For robustness, 
we include the Fama and French three-factor (1993) and the momentum factor of 
Carhart (1997) in our analysis. Subsequently, we estimate the change, across pre- and 
post-index revision periods, in the cost of equity capital. Finally, we use Becker-
Blease and Paul’s (2006) procedures to explore the changes in the investment 
opportunities following the index revisions.  
The second empirical chapter investigates the impact of the FTSE100 index 
revisions on the comovement of the underlying stocks. It applies Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987) model with the Kalman filter technique to decompose daily stock 
returns into true and residuals return. Then, we carry out Barberis et al. (2005) 
methodology to investigate the change in the return comovement around index 
revision. Finally, we account for other factors that may lead our results such as the 
trading effects and the firm size effect around the index revisions.  
The third empirical chapter examines the impact of FTSE 100 index revisions 
on the market quality of the underlying stocks. We begin our analysis by estimating 
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two measures of the market quality, which are the speed of price adjustment and 
price inefficiency from the partial adjustment with noise model of Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987) for additions and deletions separately. Then, we examine the 
changes in the market quality across pre- and post-index revision periods. Finally, we 
regress the changes in market quality measures against a number of fundamental 
characteristics, such as firm size, liquidity and media coverage.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 7.2 presents the 
findings and the contributions of the first empirical chapter, Chapter 4, which 
examined the cost of equity capital around the index revisions. Section 7.3 outlines 
the findings and the contributions of the second empirical chapter, Chapter 5, which 
investigates the stock return comovement around the index revisions. Section 7.4 
summarises the findings and the contributions of the third empirical chapter, Chapter 
6, which examines the stock market quality around the index revisions. Section 7.5 
discusses the research implications, limitations, and future research.  
 
7.2 The liquidity and the cost of equity capital  
In this chapter, we hypothesise that following index revision a higher (lower) 
liquidity induces lower (higher) liquidity premium, which, in turn, leads to lower 
(higher) cost of equity capital. On examining this hypothesis we make several 
contributions. First, a liquidity-augmented two-factor model (LCAPM) can account 
directly for the liquidity premium which other models such as the CAPM and Fama-
French three-factor fail to explain. LCAPM also explains anomalies associated with 
firm size, long-term investment and fundamental firm’s characteristics. Second, in 
estimating LCAPM, the measure of a proportional number of days with zero return is 
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applied. This measure captures simultaneously multidimensional features of liquidity 
as it includes not only the transaction costs, but also the expected price impact.  
We argue that findings of Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) and Gregoriou and 
Nguyen’s (2010) may not appropriate capture the impact of index revision on the 
cost of equity capital. This may particularly be the case, as the corporate finance 
literature suggests that the magnitude of investment opportunities is not solely 
dependent on the cost of equity capital. Milton and Raviv (1991), for example, 
suggest that the rate of investment opportunities depends on many factors, including 
the relationship between managers and stakeholders as suggested by agency cost 
theory, the accessibility to both debt and equity markets, the financial constrains such 
as adverse selection problems, the feasibility of investment projects, and the default 
probability. Similarly, Stenbacka and Tombak (2002) argue that investment decisions 
are affected by several factors, including the levels of retained earnings, debt and 
equity, the nature of capital market, and the availability of the internal funds, the 
characteristics of the investment opportunities available to the firm. Thus, the capital 
expenditure could be not a good proxy for the cost of equity capital. By incorporating 
a liquidity risk factor into an asset pricing model, this study captures, with greater 
precision, the impact of index revisions on both liquidity premium and the cost of 
equity capital. Therefore, we are the first to examine directly the impact of the index 
revisions on the cost of equity capital.  
Our findings from the investigations of the impact of the FTSE100 index 
revisions on the liquidity and the cost of equity capital for the underlying stocks are 
as follows. First, we report significant improvement in market liquidity following 
additions. Our results are robust to various liquidity measures. For example, the 
proportional number of days with zero daily return significantly decreases suggesting 
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that the trading continuity, the trading cost and the price impact are improved 
following inclusions. Our results are consistent with other liquidity proxies such as 
trading volume, number of trades, Amihud and bid-ask spread. Our results suggest 
that several liquidity aspects, including the trading costs, trading quantity, trading 
frequency, price impact and trading continuity, are improved in the post-addition 
periods. However, we show that most of these liquidity proxies remain unchanged 
after deletions.  
Second, the LCAPM results suggest significant reduction in the risk liquidity 
premium when stocks become members of the FTSE 100 index. The result also 
indicates that the majority of the added stocks experience reductions in liquidity beta, 
relative to their benchmark firms. Thus, our findings are consistent with the liquidity 
improvement hypothesis, which posits that inclusions improve stock liquidity and 
investors face lower liquidity risk. Similar findings are reported under the LAPT 
estimates of the CEC.  
Third, we report that stocks experience a significant decline in their CEC 
after joining the index. For example, the changes in the LCAPM suggest that the 
CEC of the added stock drops by a monthly average of 0.25%. We also show that 
59% of the added stocks experience a significant decline in their CEC in the post-
addition periods. Furthermore, the control sample methodlogy suggests that the 
significant reduction in the CEC of the added stocks is unlikely to be the outcome of 
factors other than index revisions. Both LCAPM and LAPT suggest that the CEC 
does not change after deletions. The result from the control sample methodlogy also 
indicates no significant difference between the deletions and their control pairs in 
terms of the change in the CEC in the post-deletions.   
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Finally, our results from the procedures of Becker-Blease and Paul (2006) 
suggest that capital expenditure experiences significant increases by 0.317 for 72% 
of the additions cases. This result supports the findings of Becker-Blease and Paul 
(2006) in which they find significant increases in the capital expenditure following 
the S&P500 index revisions. However, we also show the capital expenditure 
following the deletions significantly increases by 0.16 for approximately 60% of the 
deletions sample. This result contradicts with the findings of Becker-Blease and Paul 
(2006), who show that the capital expenditure declines significantly following 
deletions from the S&P 500. We propose two possible explanations to the observed 
improvement in capital expenditure following both additions and deletions. First, we 
argue that capital expenditure may be not a good proxy for the cost of equity capital 
since the investment decision is influenced by several other factors. Second, it 
possible that the increase in the capital expenditure following additions is permanent 
(i.e. it continues even after removal a stock from the index).    
This chapter conclude that our findings are consistent with the predictions of 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Amihud (2002) and 
Liu (2006) in which they assume that since liquidity can be priced, liquid stocks are 
associated with lower risk premium and investors gain lower rate of return. The 
asymmetric response to additions and deletions is consistent with the predictions of 
the investor awareness hypothesis, which suggests that investors know of only 
subsets of all stocks, hold only stocks that they are aware of and demand a premium 
for the non-systematic risk that they bear. Index membership alerts investors to the 
stock’s existence, and since this stock becomes part of their portfolios, their required 
rate of return should fall due to a reduction in non-systematic risk. Chen et al. (2004) 
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show that investor awareness increases when a stock join the index, but does not 
necessarily change following its deletion from the index.  
7.3 The stocks return comovement  
In this chapter, we hypothesise that the comovement in stock return is not 
only explained by the frictions or sentiment based views, but firm fudamentals may 
also play an important role. Thus, this chapter studies the changes in the stock return 
comovement following the index revisions. In doing this, we make several 
contributions: First, we directly examine comovement changes following the 
FTSE100 index revisions. We hypothesise that the changes in comovement is driven 
by fundamentals and non-fundamental factors. Our hypothesis is motivated by the 
argument of (King (1966); Roll (1988); Piotroski and Roulstone (2004); Durnev et 
al. (2004); Kumar and Lee (2006); Evans (2009)) that the stock return comovement 
is a function of fundamentals and non-fundamental factors. They argue that the 
presence of informed traders (uninformed) makes the stocks move less (more) with 
the other stocks in the market. Second, we extend the studies of Mase (2008) and 
Coakley and Kougoulis (2005) by using longer dataset in the FTSE100 index. The 
main findings in this chapter are as follows.  
The result from the procedures of  Barberis et al. (2005) show that both the 
univariate and bivariate regressions support the hypothesis of the friction-based 
theory. In particular, we show that a stock added to the FTSE100 index is generally 
associated with a significant increase in the coefficient on the FTSE100 index returns 
and a decline in the coefficient on the N-FTSE100 index returns. In particular, the 
univariate regression indicates that about 68% of additions exhibit a significant 
increase in their comovement with the FTSE100 index. In the bivariate regressions, 
about 76% (70%) of additions experience significant increase (decrease) in their 
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comovement with the FTSE100 (N-FTSE100) index. We also show that deleted 
stocks experience a significant decrease in their comovement with the FTSE100 
index and a significant increase in their comovment with the N-FTSE100 stocks. 
Specifically, the results of the univariate regressions indicate that about 64% of the 
deleted stocks exhibit decrease in comovement with the FTSE100 index in the post-
deletion periods. Similarly, the bivariate regressions imply that 76% (73%) of stocks 
comove less (more) with the FTSE100 (N-FTSE100) in the post-deletion period. 
The results from our decomposition of comovement into fundamental- and 
sentiment-based show that the FLF exhibit a weak significance decrease (increase) 
while the SLF exhibit a strongly significant increase (decrease) in the post- additions 
(deletion). In particular, the FLF experiences a low significant average drop by 0.335 
at 10% level for 54% of addition cases in the univariate regression. Similarly, the 
bivariate regressions imply that the FLF with FTSE100 (N-FTSE100) experiences a 
weak significant average drop (increase) by 0.609 (0.819) at 5% level for about 59% 
(56%) of addition cases. In the deletion cases, we observe a weak significant increase 
in FLF in the univariate regression and no shift is reported in the bivariate regression. 
In contrast and consistent with our findings from the procedures of Barberis 
et al. (2005), the SLF exhibits a statistically significant increase (decrease) in the 
post- additions (deletions). The results from the univariate analysis show that 58% 
(69%) of the added (deleted) stocks exhibit significant increase (decline) in their SLF 
around index revisions. The multivariate regressions yield similar results. In 
particular, the SLF exhibits a statistically significant increases (decreases) with 
FSTE100 (N-FTSE100) for about 63.12% (63.69%) of the addition cases.  
The finding that the FLF move in the opposite direction of the SLF is 
consistent with the view that stock return comovement is driven by the relative 
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power of informed traders and noise traders in the trading arena (Bissessur and 
Hodgson (2012); Roll (1988); Piotroski and Roulstone (2004); Durnev et al. (2004); 
Kumar and Lee (2006); Evans (2009)). Specifically, the dominance of traders with 
market-wide information may cause stock return to comove more with the market 
portfolio while the dominance of traders with more firm-specific information tends to 
comove in the opposite direction.  
Overall, our results provide a strong support for the friction-based theories. 
To insure the validity of our results, we run a number of robustness checks. First, the 
calendar-time portfolio approach suggests that our results are not driven by the cross-
sectional dependences that might occur in our sample. Second, the control sample 
methodology confirms that our findings are not the outcome of the size effect. Third, 
the Vijh’s (1994) approach suggests return comovement is partly driven by the non-
trading effects. Fourth, the results from DFR show that the slow diffusion of 
information appears to account for about 17% of the beta shifts in the case of 
univariate regression and 10% in the case of bivariate regression. This result is 
relatively close to the findings of Coakley et al., (2005) in which they find that slow 
diffusion following the FTSE100 revisions accounts for only a quarter of the overall 
shifts in the betas of additions. Barberis et al. (2005) find that the slow diffusion 
following the S&P 500 revisions accounts for up to two-thirds of the beta shifts in 
the daily bivariate regressions.  
In short, the results presented in this chapter suggest that the shift in the 
return comovement around index revisions is driven mainly by sentiment-related 
factors, and partly by fundamental-related factors.  
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7.4 The informational efficiency  
In examining the informational efficiency following the FTSE 100 index 
revisions, we hypothesise that an improvement (deterioration) in fundamentals such 
as liquidity and the environment of the information could make the price more (less) 
efficient following the inclusions (exclusions). We also suggest that changes in price 
efficiency to additions and deletions will only be symmetric if the core underlying 
variables, such as market liquidity, also change in a symmetric fashion. We assume 
that the improvement in the stock market quality is determined by improvements in 
liquidity, risk factors, idiosyncratic risk and information environment. 
The contribution of this chapter to the literature is threefold. First, while 
previous literature consistently finds that there are price gains, increases in investor 
awareness, and long-term improvements in stock liquidity following additions, this 
study introduces a noble approach to investigate in detail the impact of index 
membership on the market quality of the underlying stocks. Second, while most 
literature finds that, when a firm is removed from a major stock index, it experiences 
both stock price and liquidity falls, there are some studies reports that the advantages 
of gaining membership remain even after removal from the index. We extend this 
debate by examining whether the informational efficiency of a stock is reduced after 
removal from the index. Finally, we are able to explain the key determinants of 
informational efficiency changes around the time of joining and leaving the 
membership of the index. 
We base our analysis on partial adjustment model with noise of Amihud and 
Mendelson (1987). We use a Kalman filter technique to estimate two important 
market quality measures, namely the speed at which information is incorporated into 
the stock price and the degree to which stock prices deviate from their intrinsic 
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values. To test whether the FTSE 100 index revisions affect the market quality of 
stocks, we compare measures of market quality before and after the events. We use a 
control sample to ensure that our results are not driven by factors other than the index 
revisions. We also conduct cross-sectional analysis to identify the main determinants 
of the market quality changes. 
The key findings can be briefly summarised. First, the study confirms that the 
market quality of a stock added to (deleted from) the FTSE 100 index is improved 
(not affected). Specifically, we show that the speed of price adjustment parameter (g) 
moves closer to unity and the transaction prices move closer to their intrinsic values 
following additions. However, deletions do not exhibit any significant changes in the 
speed of price adjustment or the pricing inefficiency. We attribute this asymmetric 
response of market quality to certain aspects of liquidity and other fundamental 
characteristics, which improve in the post- additions, but do not necessarily diminish 
in the post- deletions. Our findings are in agreement with the study of Chen et al. 
(2004) in which they find that investors awareness increases when a stock join the 
S&P 500, but does not decrease following its removal from the index. Our cross-
sectional result indicates that a stock with low pre-addition market quality benefits 
more from being members of the index. This evidence confirms Roll et al.’s (2009) 
findings that information availability following option listing is larger in stocks 
where information asymmetries are greater and where investment analysis produces 
comparatively less public information. Our cross-sectional results also propose that a 
change in market quality is attributed to changes in information environment, 
liquidity, idiosyncratic risk, and book-to-market value. 
214 
 
7.5 The research implications, limitations and Future research 
The empirical findings that we have achieved are important for academics, 
investors and regulators. From the academic perspective, we examine areas which 
were previously under-researched. First, we shed some light on the importance of the 
stock market quality in explaining the price formation process. We show that both 
the speed of the price adjustment and the price inefficiencies are amongst the 
important determinant of the stock market quality. Second, the improvement in the 
stock market quality is also linked to the fundamental characteristics of the 
underlying stocks. Third, our evidence suggests that the changes in the stock return 
comovement is mainly driven by the sentiment-based factors and that the 
fundamental-based factors drive commovement in the opposite direction. Finally, we 
support the prediction of Amihud and Mendelson (1987) that the liquidity is priced.  
From the investors and regulators point of view, we confirm that uninformed and 
informed investors together contribute in the price formation process.  
On the limitations of our work, we may raise up four limitations. First, we 
face challenges in constructing the control sample as we have a limited number of 
companies which match the criteria of the event firms. However, we find that the 
criteria of the control firms are similar to those on the event firms in the pre-index 
revisions. Second, in the literature of liquidity measures there are a vast number of 
liquidity proxies. Thus, we limit our study to the more common proxies such as bid-
ask spread, trading volume, number of trades, Amihud, and the proportional number 
of days with zero return. Third, in estimating the press coverage, our data is suffering 
from the limitations of Lexis/Nexis as they limit the number of appearances for a 
stock to 1000 events. We overcome this problem by limiting the scope of search for 
the stock to “Headline’’. Finally, due to the time limitations of a PhD project, it was 
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not possible to expand our analysis to include other areas such as auditing and 
accounting, the ownership structure, and other information proxies.  
Thus, we suggest three main areas to consider in the future research. First, 
Dasgupta et al. (2010) and Chan and Hameed (2006) find that monitoring the firms 
by analysts produce more firm-specific and market-wide information. Since we find 
that the liquidity is priced, it is possible to suggest that the information is also priced. 
This may particularly be the case, since liquidity as a conduit of information. Easley 
and O'Hara (2004) and Lambert et al. (2012) find that the information is priced. They 
formulate the relationship between information quality and cost of equity capital. 
They find differences in the composition of information between public and private 
information affect the cost of equity capital, with investors demanding a higher 
return to hold stocks with greater private information. Therefore, we feel that future 
analysts could examine the impact that the information environment has on the cost 
of equity return - following the index revisions.  
Second, studies attribute the changes in the fundamentals and non-
fundamental factors to the changes in the ownership structure. It is possible to argue 
that this area is rather underdeveloped, particularly with regard to the literature 
related to the FTSE100 index. The studies of Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) and 
Pirinsky and Wang (2004) show that the price efficiency is largely driven by the 
structure of the ownership. Easley and O'Hara (2004)  find that the capital market’s 
degree of competition plays a critical role in the relationship between information 
asymmetry and the cost of equity capital. Thus, it is recommended that further 
research be undertaken to investigate the impact of changes in the structure of the 
ownership on the cost of equity capital, and the price efficiency following the index 
revisions.  
216 
 
Finally, it is also important to point out that the implications of this thesis are 
not limited to the UK market. Thus, re-examining the impact of index revisions on 
the cost of equity capital and market quality in market other than LSE may also be a 
useful area for research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
217 
 
References 
ACHARYA, V. V. & PEDERSEN, L. H. 2005. Asset pricing with liquidity risk. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 77, 375-410. 
ADMATI, A. R. & PFLEIDERER, P. 1987. Viable allocations of information in financial markets. 
Journal of Economic Theory, 43, 76-115. 
ADMATI, A. R. & PFLEIDERER, P. 1988. A Theory of Intraday Patterns: Volume and Price 
Variability. The Review of Financial Studies, 1, 3-40. 
AGARWAL, V. & WANG, L. 2007. Transaction Costs and Value Premium. Working Paper. 
Georgia State University. 
AITKEN, M. & COMERTON-FORDE, C. 2003. How should liquidity be measured? Pacific-Basin 
Finance Journal, 11, 45-59. 
AITKEN, M. & WINN, R. 1997. What is this thing called liquidity? Working Paper, Securities 
Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific. 
ALBUQUERQUE, R. & VEGA, C. 2009. Economic News and International Stock Market Co-
movement*. Review of Finance, 13, 401-465. 
ALEXANDER, G. J. & PETERSON, M. A. 2008. The effect of price tests on trader behavior and 
market quality: An analysis of Reg SHO. Journal of Financial Markets, 11, 84-111. 
ALI, A., HWANG, L.-S. & TROMBLEY, M. A. 2003. Arbitrage risk and the book-to-market 
anomaly. Journal of Financial Economics, 69, 355-373. 
ALVES, P., PEASNELL, K. & TAYLOR, P. 2010. The Use of the R2 as a Measure of Firm-
Specific Information: A Cross-Country Critique. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 37, 1-26. 
AMIHUD, Y. 2002. Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series effects. Journal 
of Financial Markets, 5, 31-56. 
AMIHUD, Y. & MENDELSON, H. 1980. Dealership market : Market-making with inventory. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 8, 31-53. 
AMIHUD, Y. & MENDELSON, H. 1986. Asset pricing and the bid-ask spread. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 1, 17  
AMIHUD, Y. & MENDELSON, H. 1987. Trading Mechanisms and Stock Returns: An Empirical 
Investigation. The Journal of Finance, 42, 533-553. 
AMIHUD, Y. & MENDELSON, H. 1989. Market microstructure and price discovery on the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange. Japan and the World Economy, 1, 341-370. 
AMIHUD, Y. & MENDELSON, H. 1991a. Trading mechanisms and value-discovery: cross-
national evidence and policy implications. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on 
Public Policy, 34 105-30 Spring 1991. 
AMIHUD, Y. & MENDELSON, H. 1991b. Volatility, Efficiency, and Trading: Evidence from the 
Japanese Stock Market. The Journal of Finance, 46, 1765-1789. 
AMIHUD, Y., MENDELSON, H. & LAUTERBACH, B. 1997. Market microstructure and 
securities values: Evidence from the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 45, 365-390. 
AMIHUD, Y., MENDELSON, H. & PEDERSEN, L. H. 2005. Liquidity and asset prices, Hanover, 
MA, Now Publishers. 
ANGELIDIS, T. & BENOS, A. 2009. The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: the Case of the 
Athens Stock Exchange. European Financial Management, 15, 112-144. 
ARBEL, A. & STREBEL, P. 1982. THE NEGLECTED AND SMALL FIRM EFFECTS. Financial 
Review, 17, 201-218. 
BACIDORE, J. M. 1997. The Impact of Decimalization on Market Quality: An Empirical 
Investigation of the Toronto Stock Exchange. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 6, 
92-120. 
BAGEHOT, W. 1971. The Only Game in Town Financial Analysts Journal, 27, 12-14+22. 
218 
 
BAKER, M. & STEIN, J. C. 2004. Market liquidity as a sentiment indicator. Journal of Financial 
Markets, 7, 271-299. 
BANDI, F. M. & RUSSELL, J. R. 2006. Full-information transaction costs. Working paper. 
Graduate School of Business: University of Chicago. 
BANZ, R. W. 1981. The relationship between return and market value of common stocks. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 9, 3-18. 
BARBER, B. M., ODEAN, T. & ZHU, N. 2006. Do Noise Traders Move Markets? EFA 2006 
Zurich Meetings Paper  
BARBERIS, N. & SHLEIFER, A. 2003. Style investing. Journal of Financial Economics, 68, 161-
199. 
BARBERIS, N., SHLEIFER, A. & WURGLER, J. 2005. Comovement. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 75, 283-317. 
BARNEA, A. 1974. Performance Evaluation of New York Stock Exchange Specialists. The 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 9, 511-535. 
BARRY, C. B. & BROWN, S. J. 1985. Differential Information and Security Market 
Equilibrium. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20, 407-422. 
BATTALIO, R., HATCH, B. & JENNINGS, R. 2003. All else equal?: a multidimensional analysis 
of retail, market order execution quality. Journal of Financial Markets, 6, 143-162. 
BECHMANN, K. L. 2004. Price and Volume Effects Associated with Changes in the Danish 
Blue-Chip Index - The KFX Index. SSRN eLibrary. 
BECKER-BLEASE, J. R. & PAUL, D. L. 2006. Stock Liquidity and Investment Opportunities: 
Evidence from Index Additions. Financial Management, 35, 35-51. 
BEKAERT, G., HARVEY, C. R. & LUNDBLAD, C. 2007. Liquidity and Expected Returns: Lessons 
from Emerging Markets. Rev. Financ. Stud., hhm030. 
BENEISH, M. D. & GARDNER, J. C. 1995. Information Costs and Liquidity Effects from 
Changes in the Dow Jones Industrial Average List. The Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 30, 135-157. 
BENEISH, M. D. & WHALEY, R. E. 1996. An Anatomy of the "S & P Game": The Effects of 
Changing the Rules. The Journal of Finance, 51, 1909-1930. 
BENNETT, P. & WEI, L. 2006. Market structure, fragmentation, and market quality. Journal 
of Financial Markets, 9, 49-78. 
BESSEMBINDER, H. 2003. Trade Execution Costs and Market Quality after Decimalization. 
The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38, 747-777. 
BESSEMBINDER, H., CHAN, K. & SEGUIN, P. J. 1996. An empirical examination of 
information, differences of opinion, and trading activity. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 40, 105-134. 
BHAGAT, S., BRICKLEY, J. A. & LEASE, R. C. 1985. Incentive effects of stock purchase plans. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 195-215. 
BHARATH, S. T., PASQUARIELLO, P. & WU, G. 2009. Does Asymmetric Information Drive 
Capital Structure Decisions? Review of Financial Studies, 22, 3211-3243. 
BHUSHAN, R. 1989. Firm characteristics and analyst following. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 11, 255-274. 
BIKTIMIROV, E. N., COWAN, A. R. & JORDAN, B. D. 2004. Do Demand Curves for Small 
Stocks Slope Down? The Journal of Financial Research, 27, 161-178. 
BILDIK, R. & GULAY, G. 2003. Effects of Changes in Index Composition on Stock Market: 
Evidence from the Istanbul Stock Exchange. working papaer. Istanbul Stock 
Exchange 2003. 
BILDIK, R. & GÜLAY, G. 2008. The effects of changes in index composition on stock prices 
and volume: Evidence from the Istanbul stock exchange. International Review of 
Financial Analysis, 17, 178-197. 
219 
 
BISSESSUR, S. & HODGSON, A. 2012. Stock market synchronicity – an alternative approach 
to assessing the information impact of Australian IFRS. Accounting & Finance, 52, 
187-212. 
BLACK, F. 1971. Toward a Fully Automated Stock Exchange Financial Analysts Journal, 27, 
24-28+86-87  
 
BLACK, F. 1986. Noise. The Journal of Finance, 41, 529-543. 
BLACK, F., JENSEN, M. C. & SCHOLES, M. S. 1972. The Capital Asset Pricing Model: Some 
Empirical Tests, Praeger Publishers Inc. 
BRENNAN, M., JEGADEESH, N. & SWAMINATHAN, B. 1993. Investment analysis and the 
adjustment of stock prices to common information. Review of Financial Studies, 6, 
799-824. 
BRENNAN, M. J., CHORDIA, T. & SUBRAHMANYAM, A. 1996. Cross-Sectional Determinants 
of Expected Returns. Working paper. UCLA. 
BRENNAN, M. J., CHORDIA, T. & SUBRAHMANYAM, A. 1998. Alternative factor 
specifications, security characteristics, and the cross-section of expected stock 
returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 49, 345-373. 
BRENNAN, M. J. & SUBRAHMANYAM, A. 1995. Investment analysis and price formation in 
securities markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 361-381. 
BRENNAN, M. J. & SUBRAHMANYAM, A. 1996. Market microstructure and asset pricing: On 
the compensation for illiquidity in stock returns. Journal of Financial Economics, 41, 
441-464. 
BROOKS, R. D., FAFF, R. W. & MCKENZIE, M. D. 1998. Time Varying Beta Risk of Australian 
Industry Portfolios: A Comparison of Modelling Techniques. Australian Journal of 
Management, 23, 1-22. 
BUTLER, A. W., GRULLON, G. & WESTON, J. P. 2005. Stock Market Liquidity and the Cost of 
Issuing Equity. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 40, 331-348. 
CAI, J. 2007. What's in the News? Information Content of S&P 500 Additions. Financial 
Management, 36, 113-124. 
CARHART, M. M. 1997. On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance. The Journal of Finance, 
52, 57-82. 
CHAI, D., FAFF, R. & GHARGHORI, P. 2009. Liquidity in asset pricing: New evidence using low 
frequency data. Working Paper. Monash University. 
CHAKRABARTI, R. 2002. Market Reaction to Addition of Indian Stocks to the MSCI Index. 
Money and Finance, 2, 23. 
CHAKRABARTI, R., HUANG, W., JAYARAMAN, N. & LEE, J. 2005. Price and volume effects of 
changes in MSCI indices - nature and causes. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29, 
1237-1264. 
CHAN, H. W. & FAFF, R. W. 2005. Asset Pricing and the Illiquidity Premium. Financial 
Review, 40, 429-458. 
CHAN, K. & HAMEED, A. 2006. Stock price synchronicity and analyst coverage in emerging 
markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 80, 115-147. 
CHAN, Y.-C. 2000. The price impact of trading on the stock exchange of Hong Kong. Journal 
of Financial Markets, 3, 1-16. 
CHANGSHENG, H. & YONGFENG, W. 2012. Investor Sentiment and Assets Valuation. 
Systems Engineering Procedia, 3, 166-171. 
CHELLEY-STEELEY, P. 2009. Price synchronicity: The closing call auction and the London 
stock market. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 
19, 777-791. 
CHELLEY-STEELEY, P. L. 2008. Market quality changes in the London Stock Market. Journal 
of Banking & Finance, 32, 2248-2253. 
220 
 
CHEN, H., NORONHA, G. & SINGAL, V. 2004. The price response to S&P 500 index additions 
and deletions: evidence of asymmetry and a new explanation. Journal of Finance, 
59, No. 4 1901-29, August 2004. 
CHEN, H., NORONHA, G. & SINGAL, V. 2006a. Index Changes and Losses to Index Fund 
Investors. Financial Analysts Journal, 62, 31-47. 
CHEN, H., NORONHA, G. & SINGAL, V. 2006b. S&P 500 index changes and investor 
awarness. Journal of investment management 4, 23-37. 
CHEN, N.-F. & ZHANG, F. 1998. Risk and Return of Value Stocks. Journal of Business, 71. 
CHIANG, T. C., NELLING, E. & TAN, L. 2008. The speed of adjustment to information: 
Evidence from the Chinese stock market. International Review of Economics & 
Finance, 17, 216-229. 
CHORDIA, T., ROLL, R. & SUBRAHMANYAM, A. 2000. Commonality in liquidity. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 56, 3-28. 
CHORDIA, T., ROLL, R. W. & SUBRAHMANYAM, A. 2001. Market Liquidity and Trading 
Activity. Journal of Finance, 56, 501-530. 
CHORDIA, T. & SWAMINATHAN, B. 2000. Trading Volume and Cross-Autocorrelations in 
Stock Returns. The Journal of Finance, 55, 913-935. 
CHUNG, K. H. & CHUWONGANANT, C. 2009. Transparency and market quality: Evidence 
from SuperMontage. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 18, 93-111. 
CHUNG, K. H., WRIGHT, P. & CHAROENWONG, C. 1998. Investment opportunities and 
market reaction to capital expenditure decisions. Journal of Banking &amp; 
Finance, 22, 41-60. 
CHUNG, R. & KRYZANOWSKI, L. 1998. Are the market effects associated with revisions to 
the TSE300 Index robust? Multinational Finance Journal, 2, 1-36. 
CHUNG, S. & WEI, P. 2005. The relationship between bid–ask spreads and holding periods: 
The case of Chinese A and B shares. Global Finance Journal, 15, 239-249. 
COAKLEY, J. & KOUGOULIS, P. 2005. Comovement and FTSE 100 Index Changes. SSRN 
eLibrary. 
COAKLEY, J., KOUGOULIS, P. & NANKERVIS, J. C. 2008. The MSCI-Canada index rebalancing 
and excess comovement. Applied Financial Economics, 18, 1277-1287. 
COHEN, K. J., HAWAWINI, G. A., MAIER, S. F., SCHWARTZ, R. A. & WHITCOMB, D. K. 1980. 
Implications of Microstructure Theory for Empirical Research on Stock Price 
Behavior. The Journal of Finance, 35, 249-257. 
COHEN, K. J., HAWAWINI, G. A., MAIER, S. F., SCHWARTZ, R. A. & WHITCOMB, D. K. 1983a. 
Estimating and Adjusting for the Intervalling-Effect Bias in Beta. Management 
Science, 29, 135-148. 
COHEN, K. J., HAWAWINI, G. A., MAIER, S. F., SCHWARTZ, R. A. & WHITCOMB, D. K. 1983b. 
Friction in the trading process and the estimation of systematic risk. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 12, 263-278. 
CONRAD, J. 1989. The Price Effect of Option Introduction. The Journal of Finance, 44, 487-
498. 
COPELAND, T. E. & GALAI, D. 1983. Information Effects on the Bid-Ask Spread. The Journal 
of Finance, 38, 1457-1469. 
DAMODARAN, A. 1993. A Simple Measure of Price Adjustment Coefficients. The Journal of 
Finance, 48, 387-400. 
DAMODARAN, A. & LIM, J. 1991. The effects of option listing on the underlying stocks' 
return processes. Journal of Banking & Finance, 15, 647-664. 
DANIEL, P. & GERARD, G. 2007. The index effect: an investigation of the price, volume and 
trading effects surrounding changes to the S&P Australian indices. Working Paper. 
Deakin University  
DANTHINE, J.-P. 1978. Information, futures prices, and stabilizing speculation. Journal of 
Economic Theory, 17, 79-98. 
221 
 
DASGUPTA, S., GAN, J. & GAO, N. 2010. Transparency, Price Informativeness, and Stock 
Return Synchronicity: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 45, 1189-1220. 
DAYA, W., MAZOUZ, K. & FREEMAN, M. 2012. Information efficiency changes following 
FTSE 100 index revisions. Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions 
and Money. 
DE JONG, F., NIJMAN, T. & RÖELL, A. 1996. Price effects of trading and components of the 
bid-ask spread on the Paris Bourse. Journal of Empirical Finance, 3, 193-213. 
DE LONG, J. B., SHLEIFER, A., SUMMERS, L. H. & WALDMANN, R. J. 1990. Noise Trader Risk 
in Financial Markets. The Journal of Political Economy, 98, 703-738. 
DECLERCK, F. 2000. Trading Costs on a Limit Order Book Market: Evidence from the Paris 
Bourse. European Financial Management Association Meetings. Athens Meetings. 
DEININGER, C. G., KASERER, C. & ROOS, S. 2000. Stock Price Effects Associated with Index 
Replacements in Germany. SSRN eLibrary. 
DEMSETZ, H. 1968. The Cost of Transacting. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 82, 33-53. 
DENIS, D. K., MCCONNELL, J. J., OVTCHINNIKOV, A. V. & YU, Y. 2003. S&P 500 index 
additions and earnings expectations. Journal of Finance, 58, 1821-40. 
DENKER, C. D. & LEAVELL, H. W. 1993. An investigation of shareholder wealth effects of 
change in S&P 500 Index. In: PAPER, W. (ed.). Center For Business and Economic 
Developmen at Sam HoustonState University, Huntsville, Texas. 
DHILLON, U. & JOHNSON, H. 1991. Changes in the Standard and Poor's 500 List. The Journal 
of Business, 64, 75-85. 
DIMSON, E. 1979. Risk measurement when shares are subject to infrequent trading. Journal 
of Financial Economics, 7, 197-226. 
DOESWIJK, R. Q. 2005. The index revision party. International Review of Financial Analysis, 
14, 93-112. 
DOMWITZ, I. & STELL, B. 1999. Automation, trading costs, and the structure of the 
trading services. Working paper. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services. 
DUNIS, C. L. & MORRISON, V. 2007. The Economic Value of Advanced Time Series Methods 
for Modelling and Trading 10-year Government Bonds. The European Journal of 
Finance, 13, 333 - 352. 
DURAND, R. B., LIMKRIANGKRAI, M. & SMITH, G. 2006. In America's thrall: the effects of the 
US market and US security characteristics on Australian stock returns. Accounting & 
Finance, 46, 577-604. 
DURNEV, A., MORCK, R. & YEUNG, B. 2004. Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting and Firm-
Specific Stock Return Variation. The Journal of Finance, 59, 65-105. 
DURNEV, A., MORCK, R., YEUNG, B. & ZAROWIN, P. 2003. Does Greater Firm-Specific Return 
Variation Mean More or Less Informed Stock Pricing? Journal of Accounting 
Research, 41, 797-836. 
EASLEY, D., ENGLE, R. F., O'HARA, M. & WU, L. 2008. Time-Varying Arrival Rates of Informed 
and Uninformed Trades. JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMETRICS, 6, 171-207. 
EASLEY, D. & O'HARA, M. 1987. Price, trade size, and information in securities markets. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 19, 69-90. 
EASLEY, D. & O'HARA, M. 1992a. Adverse Selection and Large Trade Volume: The 
Implications for Market Efficiency. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis, 27, 185-208. 
EASLEY, D. & O'HARA, M. 1992b. Time and the Process of Security Price Adjustment. The 
Journal of Finance, 47, 577-605. 
EASLEY, D. & O'HARA, M. 2004. Information and the Cost of Capital. The Journal of Finance  
59, 1553-1583. 
222 
 
EDMISTER, R., GRAHAM, A. & PIRIE, W. 1996. Trading cost expectations: Evidence from S&P 
500 index replacement stock announcements. Journal of Economics and Finance, 
20, 75-85. 
ELAYAN, F. A., LI, W. & PINFOLD, J. F. 2000. Price Effects of Changes to the Composition of 
New Zealand Share Indices. SSRN eLibrary. 
ELESWARAPU, V. R. & REINGANUM, M. R. 1993. The seasonal behavior of the liquidity 
premium in asset pricing. Journal of Financial Economics, 34, 373-386. 
ELLIOTT, W. B., NESS, B. F., WALKER, M. D. & WAN, R. S. 2006. What Drives the S&P 500 
Inclusion Effect? An Analytical Survey. Financial Management, 35, 31-48. 
EOM, K. S., OK, J. & PARK, J.-H. 2007. Pre-trade transparency and market quality. Journal of 
Financial Markets, 10, 319-341. 
ERWIN, G. R. & MILLER, J. M. 1998. The liquidity effects associated with addition of a stock 
to the S&P 500 index: evidence from bid/ask spreads. Financial Review, 33, 131-
146. 
EVANS, A. D. 2009. Do Individual Investors Affect Share Price Accuracy? Some Preliminary 
Evidence’. In), W. P. U. O. M. L. S. (ed.). 
FAFF, R. W., HILLIER, D. & HILLIER, J. 2000. Time Varying Beta Risk: An Analysis of 
Alternative Modelling Techniques. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 27, 
523-554. 
FAMA, E. F. & FRENCH, K. R. 1992. The Cross-Section of Expected Stock Returns. The Journal 
of Finance, 47, 427-465. 
FAMA, E. F. & FRENCH, K. R. 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 33, 3-56. 
FAMA, E. F. & FRENCH, K. R. 1995. Size and Book-to-Market Factors in Earnings and 
Returns. The Journal of Finance, 50, 131-155. 
FIGLEWSKI, S. 1981. Futures Trading and Volatility in the GNMA Market. The Journal of 
Finance, 36, 445-456. 
FISHER, L. 1966. Some New Stock-Market Indexes. The Journal of Business, 39, 191-225. 
FOSTER, F. D. & VISWANATHAN, S. 1990. A Theory of the Interday Variations in Volume, 
Variance, and Trading Costs in Securities Markets. The Review of Financial Studies, 
3, 593-624. 
FOWLER, D. J. & RORKE, C. H. 1983. Risk measurement when shares are subject to 
infrequent trading: Comment. Journal of Financial Economics, 12, 279-283. 
FRENCH, K. R. & ROLL, R. 1986. Stock return variances : The arrival of information and the 
reaction of traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 17, 5-26. 
GAMMILL, J. F. & PEROLD, A. F. 1989. The Changing Character of Stock-Market Liquidity. 
Journal of Portfolio Management, 15, 13-&. 
GARBADE, K. D. 2001. Pricing corporate securities as contingent claims, Cambridge, Mass., 
MIT Press. 
GARMAN, M. B. 1976. Market microstructure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 257-275. 
GEORGE, T. J. & HWANG, C.-Y. 2001. Information Flow and Pricing Errors: A Unified 
Approach to Estimation and Testing. The Review of Financial Studies, 14, 979-1020. 
GHARGHORI, P., CHAN, H. & FAFF, R. 2007. Are the Fama-French Factors Proxying Default 
Risk? Australian Journal of Management, 32, 223-249. 
GIBSON, R. & MOUGEOT, N. 2004. The pricing of systematic liquidity risk: Empirical 
evidence from the US stock market. Journal of Banking &amp; Finance, 28, 157-
178. 
GLOSTEN, L. R. & HARRIS, L. E. 1988. Estimating the components of the bid/ask spread. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 21, 123-142. 
GLOSTEN, L. R. & MILGROM, P. R. 1985. Bid, ask and transaction prices in a specialist 
market with heterogeneously informed traders. Journal of Financial Economics, 14, 
71-100. 
223 
 
GOETZMANN, W. N. & GARRY, M. 1986. Does Delisting from the S&P 500 Affect Stock 
Price? Financial Analysts Journal, 42, 64-69. 
GOMPERS, P. A. & METRICK, A. 2001. Institutional Investors and Equity Prices. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 116, No. 1, pp. 229-259, February 2001. 
GOYENKO, R., HOLDEN, C. W., LUNDBLAD, C. T. & TRZCINKA, C. 2006. Horseraces of 
Monthly and Annual Liquidity Measures. Working paper. Indiana University. 
GOYENKO, R., HOLDEN, C. W. & TRZCINKA, C. 2009. Do Measures of Liquidity Measure 
Liquidity? Journal of Financial Economics 92, 153-181. 
GREEN, T. C. & JAME, R. E. 2009. Understanding the S&P 500 Composition Effect: Evidence 
from Transaction Data. SSRN eLibrary. 
GREGORIOU, A. & IOANNIDIS, C. 2003. Liquidity effects due to information costs from 
changes in the FTSE 100 list, Brunel University. 
GREGORIOU, A. & NGUYEN, N. D. 2010. Stock liquidity and investment opportunities: New 
evidence from FTSE 100 index deletions. Journal of International Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Money, 20, 267-274. 
GROMB, D. & VAYANOS, D. 2010. Limits of Arbitrage: The State of the Theory. Annual 
Review of Financial Economics, forthcoming. 
GROSSMAN, S. J. & MERTON, H. M. 1988. Liquidity and Market Structure. The Journal of 
Finance, 43, 617-633. 
HACIBEDEL, B. 2008. Why do index changes have price effects? University of Oxford. 
HAMEED, A., MORCK, R. & YEUNG, S. 2008. Information markets, analysts, and 
comovement in stock returns. NYU Working  
HANSCH, O., NAIK, N. Y. & VISWANATHAN, S. 1998. Do Inventories Matter in Dealership 
Markets? Evidence from the London Stock Exchange. The Journal of Finance, 53, 
1623-1656. 
HARRIS, L. 1990. Statistical Properties of the Roll Serial Covariance Bid/Ask Spread 
Estimator. The Journal of Finance, 45, 579-590. 
HARRIS, L. 2003. Trading & Exchanges: Market Microstructure for Practitioner, Oxford 
University Press. 
HARRIS, L. & GUREL, E. 1986. Price and volume effects associated with changes in the S&P 
500 list: new evidence for the existence of price pressures. Journal of Finance, 41 
815-29 September 1986. 
HARRIS, L. E. 1994. Minimum Price Variations, Discrete Bid--Ask Spreads, and Quotation 
Sizes. The Review of Financial Studies, 7, 149-178. 
HARRIS, M. & RAVIV, A. 1993. Differences of Opinion Make a Horse Race. The Review of 
Financial Studies, 6, 473-506. 
HARTONO, J. & SURIANTO 2000. Bias in Beta Values and Its Correction:Empirical Evidence 
from the Jakarta Stock Exchange. Gadjah Mada International Journal of Business, 2, 
337-347. 
HARVEY, A. C. 1991. Forecasting, Structural Time Series and the Kalman Filter, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
HASBROUCK, J. 1988. Trades, quotes, inventories, and information. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 22, 229-252. 
HASBROUCK, J. 1993. Assessing the Quality of a Security Market: A New Approach to 
Transaction- Cost Measurement. The Review of Financial Studies, 6, 191-212. 
HASBROUCK, J. 2005. Trading Costs and Returns for US Equities:Estimating Effective Costs 
from Daily Data. Working paper. NYU Stern. 
HASBROUCK, J. 2009. Trading Costs and Returns for U.S. Equities: Estimating Effective Costs 
from Daily Data. The Journal of Finance, 64, 1445-1477. 
HASBROUCK, J. & SCHWARTZ, R. A. 1988. Liquidity and execution costs in equity market. 
The Journal of Portfolio Management markets 
224 
 
14, 10-16. 
HASBROUCK, J. & SEPPI, D. J. 2001. Common factors in prices, order flows, and liquidity. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 59, 383-411. 
HEGDE, S. P. & MCDERMOTT, J. B. 2003. The liquidity effects of revisions to the S&P 500 
index: an empirical analysis. Journal of Financial Markets, 6, 413-459. 
HENDERSHOTT, T. J. & MOULTON, P. C. 2009. Speed and Stock Market Quality: The NYSE's 
Hybrid. SSRN eLibrary. 
HO, T. & STOLL, H. R. 1981. Optimal dealer pricing under transactions and return 
uncertainty. Journal of Financial Economics, 9, 47-73. 
HOLDEN, C. W. 1995. Index Arbitrage as Cross-Sectional Market Making. Journal of Futures 
Markets, 15, 423-455. 
HOLDEN, C. W. 2006. New Low-Frequency Liquidity Measures. Unpublished working paper. 
Indiana University. 
HORNE, J. C. V. 1970. New Listings and Their Price Behavior. The Journal of Finance, 25, 783-
794. 
HOVAKIMIAN, A., OPLER, T. & TITMAN, S. 2001. The Debt-Equity Choice. The Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 36, 1-24. 
HUANG, R. D. & MASULIS, R. W. 2003. Trading activity and stock price volatility: evidence 
from the London Stock Exchange. Journal of Empirical Finance, 10, 249-269. 
HUANG, R. D. & STOLL, H. R. 1997. The Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: A General 
Approach. The Review of Financial Studies, 10, 995-1034. 
HUBERMAN, G. & HALKA, D. 2001. Systematic Liquidity. Journal of Financial Research 
24, 161-178. 
HVIDKJAER, S. 2008. Small Trades and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns. Review of 
Financial Studies, 21, 1123-1151. 
JAIN, P. C. 1987. The effect on stock price of inclusion in or exclusion from the S&P 500. 
Financial Analysts Journal, 58-65. 
JEGADEESH, N. & TITMAN, S. 1995. Overreaction, delayed reaction, and contrarian profits. 
Review of Financial Studies, 8, 973-993. 
JENNINGS, R. & STARKS, L. 1985. Information Content and the Speed of Stock Price 
Adjustment. Journal of Accounting Research, 23, 336-350. 
KADLEC, G. B. & MCCONNELL, J. J. 1994. The Effect of Market Segmentation and Illiquidity 
on Asset Prices: Evidence from Exchange Listings. The Journal of Finance, 49, 611-
636. 
KAPPOU, K., BROOKS, C. & WARD, C. W. R. 2008. A re-examination of the index effect: 
Gambling on additions to and deletions from the S&P 500's [`]gold seal'. Research in 
International Business and Finance, 22, 325-350. 
KELLY, P. J. 2005. Information Efficiency and Firm-Specific Return Variation. Arizona State 
University. Arizona State University: Arizona State University. 
KERRY COOPER, S., GROTH, J. C. & AVERA, W. E. 1985. Liquidity, exchange listing, and 
common stock performance. Journal of Economics and Business, 37, 19-33. 
KIM, I. J., KO, K. & NOH, S. K. 2002. Time-varying bid-ask components of Nikkei 225 index 
futures on SIMEX. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 10, 183-200. 
KIM, S.-H. & OGDEN, J. P. 1996. Determinants of the components of bid-ask spreads on 
stocks. European Financial Management, 2, 127-145. 
KING, B. F. 1966. Market and Industry Factors in Stock Price Behavior. The Journal of 
Business, 39, 139-190. 
KRAUS, A. & STOLL, H. R. 1972. Price Impacts of Block Trading on the New York Stock 
Exchange. The Journal of Finance, 27, 569-588. 
KRISHNAMURTI, C., SEQUEIRA, J. M. & FANGJIAN, F. 2003. Stock exchange governance and 
market quality. Journal of Banking & Finance, 27, 1859-1878. 
225 
 
KUMAR, A. & LEE, C. M. 2006. Retail Investor Sentiment and Return Comovements. THE 
JOURNAL OF FINANCE, LXI, 2451-2485. 
KUMAR, P. & SEPPI, D. J. 1994. Information and Index Arbitrage. Journal of Business, 67, 
481-509. 
KUMAR, R., SARIN, A. & SHASTRI, K. 1998. The Impact of Options Trading on the Market 
Quality of the Underlying Security: An Empirical Analysis. The Journal of Finance, 53, 
717-732. 
KYLE, A. S. 1985. Continuous Auctions and Insider Trading. Econometrica, 53, 1315-1335. 
LAI, H.-N. 2007. The Market Quality of Dealer versus Hybrid Markets: The Case of 
Moderately Liquid Securities. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 34, 349-
373. 
LAI, H. N. 2004. The Market Quality of Moderately Liquid Securities in a Hybrid Market: The 
Evidence. SSRN eLibrary. 
LAM, K. S. K. & TAM, L. H. K. 2011. Liquidity and asset pricing: Evidence from the Hong Kong 
stock market. Journal of Banking &amp; Finance, 35, 2217-2230. 
LAMBERT, R. A., LEUZ, C. & VERRECCHIA, R. E. 2012. Information Asymmetry, Information 
Precision, and the Cost of Capital. Review of Finance, 16, 1-29. 
LEARY, M. T. & ROBERTS, M. R. 2005. Do Firms Rebalance Their Capital Structures? The 
Journal of Finance, 60, 2575-2619. 
LEE, C. M. C. & READY, M. J. 1991. Inferring Trade Direction from Intraday Data. The Journal 
of Finance, 46, 733-746. 
LEE, C. M. C., SHLEIFER, A. & THALER, R. H. 1991. Investor Sentiment and the Closed-End 
Fund Puzzle. The Journal of Finance, 46, 75-109. 
LEE, K.-H. 2011. The World Price of Liquidity Risk. Journal of Financial Economics 99, 136-
161. 
LESMOND, D., OGDEN, J. & TRZCINKA, C. 1999a. A new estimate of transaction costs. Rev. 
Financ. Stud., 12, 1113-1141. 
LESMOND, D. A. 2005. Liquidity of emerging markets. Journal of Financial Economics, 77, 
411-452. 
LESMOND, D. A., OGDEN, J. P. & TRZCINKA, C. A. 1999b. A New Estimate of Transaction 
Costs. The Review of Financial Studies, 12, 1113-1141. 
LI, B., SUN, Q. & WANG, C. 2011. Liquidity, Liquidity Risk and Stock Returns: Evidence from 
Japan. European Financial Management, no-no. 
LI, T. 2006. Strategic Trading, Information Asymmetry, and Securities Prices. SSRN eLibrary. 
LIMKRIANGKRAI, M., DURAND, R. B. & WATSON, I. 2008. Is Liquidity the Missing Link? 
Accounting & Finance, 48, 829-845. 
LIN, J.-C., SANGER, G. C. & BOOTH, G. G. 1995. Trade Size and Components of the Bid-Ask 
Spread. The Review of Financial Studies, 8, 1153-1183. 
LIN, J.-C., SINGH, A. K. & YU, W. 2009. Stock splits, trading continuity, and the cost of equity 
capital. Journal of Financial Economics, 93, 474-489. 
LINTNER, J. 1965. The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in 
Stock Portfolios and Capital Budgets. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 47, 
13-37. 
LIPSON, M. L. & MORTAL, S. 2009. Liquidity and capital structure. Journal of Financial 
Markets, 12, 611-644. 
LIU, S. 2009. Index membership and predictability of stock returns: The case of the Nikkei 
225. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 17, 338-351. 
LIU, W. 2006. A liquidity-augmented capital asset pricing model. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 82, 631-671. 
LO, A. & MACKINLAY, A. 1990. When are contrarian profits due to stock market 
overreaction? Review of Financial Studies, 3, 175-205. 
226 
 
LU, C. & HWANG, S. 2007. Cross-Sectional Stock Returns in the UK Market: The Role of 
Liquidity Risk. FORECASTING EXPECTED RETURNS, Butterworth-Heinemann, 
Forthcoming. 
LUO, D. & JING, L. Asset pricing and systematic liquidity risk: Empirical evidence from the 
China stock market.  E -Business and E -Government (ICEE), 2011 International 
Conference on, 6-8 May 2011 2011. 1-4. 
LYHAGEN, J. 1999. Efficient estimation of price adjustment coefficients. working paper. 
Stockholm Scholl of Economic. 
LYNCH, A. W. & MENDENHALL, R. R. 1997. New evidence on stock price effects associated 
with changes in the S & P 500 index. Journal of Business, 70 351-83, July 1997. 
MADHAVAN, A. 1996. Security Prices and Market Transparency. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 5, 255-283. 
MADHAVAN, A., PORTER, D. & WEAVER, D. 2005. Should securities markets be transparent? 
Journal of Financial Markets, 8, 265-287. 
MARCELO, J. L. M. & QUIRÓS, M. D. M. M. 2006. The role of an illiquidity risk factor in asset 
pricing: Empirical evidence from the Spanish stock market. The Quarterly Review of 
Economics and Finance, 46, 254-267. 
MARTÍNEZ, M. A., NIETO, B., RUBIO, G. & TAPIA, M. 2005. Asset pricing and systematic 
liquidity risk: An empirical investigation of the Spanish stock market. International 
Review of Economics & Finance, 14, 81-103. 
MASE, B. 2007. The Impact of Changes in the FTSE 100 Index. Financial Review, 42, 461-484. 
MASE, B. 2008. Comovement in the FTSE 100 Index. Applied Financial Economics Letters, 4, 
9-12. 
MAZOUZ, K. & SAADOUNI, B. 2007a. New evidence on the price and liquidity effects of the 
FTSE 100 index revisions. International Review of Financial Analysis, 16, 223-241. 
MAZOUZ, K. & SAADOUNI, B. 2007b. The price effects of FTSE 100 index revision: what 
drives the long-term abnormal return reversal? Applied Financial Economics, 17, 
501-510. 
MCINISH, T. H. & WOOD, R. A. 1986. Adjusting for Beta Bias: An Assessment of Alternate 
Techniques: A Note. The Journal of Finance, 41, 277-286. 
MECH, T. S. 1993. Portfolio return autocorrelation. Journal of Financial Economics, 34, 307-
344. 
MENYAH, K. & PAUDYAL, K. 2000. The components of bid-ask spreads on the London Stock 
Exchange. Journal of Banking & Finance, 24, 1767-1785. 
MERTON, R. C. 1987. A Simple Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete 
Information. The Journal of Finance, 42, 483-510. 
MILTON, H. & RAVIV, A. 1991. The Theory of Capital Structure. The Journal of Finance, 46, 
297-355. 
MOHANTY, M. & MISHRA, B. 2006. Index Revision and Firm Size Effect. 9th Capital Markets 
Conference. India Indian Institute of Capital Markets. 
MORCK, R. K., YU, W. & YEUNG, B. Y. 2000. The Information Content of Stock Markets: Why 
Do Emerging Markets Have Synchronous Stock Price Movements? Journal of 
Financial Economics, 58. 
MOSSIN, J. 1966. Equilibrium in a Capital Asset Market. Econometrica, 34, 768-783. 
MUSCARELLA, C. J. & PIWOWAR, M. S. 2001. Market microstructure and securities values: : 
Evidence from the Paris Bourse. Journal of Financial Markets, 4, 209-229. 
MYERS, S. C. & MAJLUF, N. S. 1984. Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When 
Firms Have Information That Investors Do Not Have. Journal of Financial Economics, 
13, 187-221. 
NAIK, N. Y., NEUBERGER, A. & VISWANATHAN, S. 1999. Trade Disclosure Regulation in 
Markets with Negotiated Trades. The Review of Financial Studies, 12, 873-900. 
227 
 
NEAL, R. 1992. A Comparison of Transaction Costs Between Competitive Market Maker and 
Specialist Market Structures. The Journal of Business, 65, 317-334. 
NIMALENDRAN, M. & PETRELLA, G. 2003. Do thinly-traded' stocks benefit from specialist 
intervention? Journal of Banking & Finance, 27, 1823-1854. 
O'HARA, M. 2003. Presidential Address: Liquidity and Price Discovery. The Journal of 
Finance, 58, 1335-1354. 
O'HARA, M. & OLDFIELD, G. S. 1986. The Microeconomics of Market Making. The Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 21, 361-376. 
OKADA, K., ISAGAWA, N. & FUJIWARA, K. 2006. Addition to the Nikkei 225 Index and 
Japanese market response: Temporary demand effect of index arbitrageurs. Pacific-
Basin Finance Journal, 14, 395-409. 
OZENBAS, D., SCHWARTZ, R. A. & WOOD, R. A. 2002. Volatility in US and European Equity 
Markets: An Assessment of Market Quality. International Finance, 5, 437-461. 
PASTOR, L. & STAMBAUGH, R. F. 2003. Liquidity Risk and Expected Stock Returns. Journal of 
Political Economy, 111, 642-685. 
PETERSEN, M. A. & FIALKOWSKI, D. 1994. Posted versus effective spreads : Good prices or 
bad quotes? Journal of Financial Economics, 35, 269-292. 
PIOTROSKI, J. D. & ROULSTONE, B. T. 2004. The Influence of Analysts, Institutional 
Investors, and Insiders on the Incorporation of Market, Industry, and Firm-Specific 
Information into Stock Prices. The Accounting Review, 79, 1119-1151. 
PIRINSKY, C. A. & WANG, Q. 2004. Institutional Investors and the Comovement of Equity 
Prices. Working Paper, Mays Business School, Texas A&M University. 
PRUITT, S. W. & WEI, K. C. J. 1989. Institutional Ownership and Changes in the S&P 500. The 
Journal of Finance, 44, 509-513. 
RACHLINSKI, J. J. & LABLANC, G. P. 2005. In Praise of Investor Irrationality, Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press. 
RANALDO, A. 2001. Intraday Market Liquidity on the Swiss Stock Exchange. Financial 
Markets & Portfolio Management, 15. 
RIGAMONTI, S. & BARONTINI, R. 2000. Stock Index Futures and the Effect on Cash Market in 
Italy: Evidence from Changes in Indexes' Composition. SSRN eLibrary. 
ROLL, R. 1981. A Possible Explanation of the Small Firm Effect. The Journal of Finance, 36, 
879-888. 
ROLL, R. 1988. R2. The Journal of Finance, 43, 541-566. 
ROLL, R., SCHWARTZ, E. & SUBRAHMANYAM, A. 2009. Options trading activity and firm 
valuation. Journal of Financial Economics, 94, 345-360. 
RONEN, T. & WEAVER, D. G. 1998. The Effect of Tick Size on Volatility, Trader Behavior, and 
Market Quality. Working paper. School of Business-Newark: Rutgers University, 
Newark 
 
RUBIO, G. & TAPIA, M. 1996. Adverse selection, volume and transactions around dividend 
announcements in a continuous auction system. European Financial Management, 
2, 39-67. 
SADKA, R. 2006. Momentum and post-earnings-announcement drift anomalies: The role of 
liquidity risk. Journal of Financial Economics, 80, 309-349. 
SARR, A. & LYBEK, T. 2002. Measuring Liquidity in Financial Markets. Working paper. IMF. 
SARR, A., LYBEK, T. & INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND. MONETARY AND EXCHANGE 
AFFAIRS DEPT. 2002. Measuring liquidity in financial markets, [Washington, D.C.], 
International Monetary Fund, Monetary and Exchange Affairs Department. 
SCHOLES, M. & WILLIAMS, J. 1977. Estimating betas from nonsynchronous data. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 5, 309-327. 
228 
 
SCHWERT, G. W. & NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC, R. 2002. Anomalies and market 
efficiency, National Bureau of Economic Research. 
SHALEN, C. T. 1993. Volume, Volatility, and the Dispersion of Beliefs. The Review of 
Financial Studies, 6, 405-434. 
SHANKAR, S. G. & MILLER, J. M. 2006. Market Reaction to Changes in the S&P SmallCap 600 
Index. Financial Review, 41, 339-360. 
SHARPE, W. F. 1964. Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under Conditions 
of Risk. The Journal of Finance, 19, 425-442. 
SHILLER, R. J., FISCHER, S. & FRIEDMAN, B. M. 1984. Stock Prices and Social Dynamics. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1984, 457-510. 
SHLEIFER, A. 1986. Do demand curves for stocks slope down? Journal of Finance, 41 579-90 
July 1986. 
SHLEIFER, A. & SUMMERS, L. H. 1990. The Noise Trader Approach to Finance. The Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 4, 19-33. 
SHMUEL, H., AZRIEL, L. & UZI, Y. 2001. Trading frequency and the efficiency of price 
discovery in a non-dealer market. European Journal of Finance, 7, 187-197. 
SHU, P.-G., YEH, Y.-H. & HUANG, Y.-C. 2004. Stock Price and Trading Volume Effects 
Associated with Changes in the MSCI Free Indices: Evidence from Taiwanese Firms 
Added to and Deleted from the Indices  
Review of Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, 7, 471-491. 
SMIDT, S. 1971. Which road to an efficient stock market: free competition or regulated 
monopoly. Financial Analysts Journal, 27, 64-69. 
SNELL, A. & TONKS, I. 1995. Determinants of Price Quote Revisions on the London Stock 
Exchange. The Economic Journal, 105, 77-94. 
SNELL, A. & TONKS, I. 1998. Testing for asymmetric information and inventory control 
effects in market maker behaviour on the London Stock Exchange. Journal of 
Empirical Finance, 5, 1-25. 
SOFIANOS, G. 1993. Index Arbitrage Profitability. Journal of Derivatives, 1, 20. 
SPIEGEL, M. & SUBRAHMANYAM, A. 1992. Informed Speculation and Hedging in a 
Noncompetitive Securities Market. The Review of Financial Studies, 5, 307-329. 
STENBACKA, R. & TOMBAK, M. 2002. Investment, Capital Structure, and Complementarities 
between Debt and New Equity. Management Science, 48, 257-272. 
STOLL, H. R. 1989. Inferring the Components of the Bid-Ask Spread: Theory and Empirical 
Tests. The Journal of Finance, 44, 115-134. 
STOLL, H. R. & WHALEY, R. E. 1983. Transaction costs and the small firm effect. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 12, 57-79. 
SUI, L. 2003. The Addition and Deletion Effects of the Standard & Poor's 500 Index and Its 
Dynamic Evolvement from 1990 to 2002: Demand Curves, Market Efficiency, 
Information, Volume and Return. SSRN eLibrary. 
THEOBALD, M. & PRICE, V. 1984. Seasonality Estimation in Thin Markets. The Journal of 
Finance, 39, 377-392. 
THEOBALD, M. & YALLUP, P. 2004. Determining security speed of adjustment coefficients. 
Journal of Financial Markets, 7, 75-96. 
VAYANOS, D. 1998. Transaction Costs and Asset Prices: A Dynamic Equilibrium Model. The 
Review of Financial Studies, 11, 1-58. 
VELDKAMP, L. L. 2006. Information Markets and the Comovement of Asset Prices. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 73, 823-845. 
VESPRO, C. 2006. Stock Price and Volume Effects Associated with Compositional Changes in 
European Stock Indices. European Financial Management, 12, 103-127. 
VIJH, A. M. 1994. S&P 500 Trading Strategies and Stock Betas. The Review of Financial 
Studies, 7, 215-251. 
229 
 
WELCH, I. 2004. Capital Structure and Stock Returns. Journal of Political Economy, 112, 106-
132. 
WILKENS, S. & WIMSCHULTE, J. 2005. Price and Volume Effects Associated with 2003’s 
Major Reorganization of German Stock Indices. Financial Markets and Portfolio 
Management, 19, 61-98. 
WURGLER, J. 2000. Financial markets and the allocation of capital. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 58, 187-214. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
230 
 
Appendices 
231 
 
 
Appendix A
232 
 
 
Appendix A.1 
The constituents of the FTSE 100 index from 19-Jan-1984 to 10- Jun-2009 from 
the Datastream. 
Event date  Additions Deletions  
19-Jan-84 CJ Rothschild Eagle Star 
02-Apr-84 Lonrho  Magnet Sthrns. 
02-Jul-84 Reuters  Edinburgh Inv. Trust 
02-Jul-84 Woolworths  Barrat Development 
19-Jul-84 Enterprise Oil  Bowater Corporation 
01-Oct-84 Willis Faber  Wimpey (George) 
01-Oct-84 Granada    Group Scottish & Newcastle 
01-Oct-84 Dowty    Group MFI Furniture 
04-Dec-84 Brit. Telecom  Matthey Johnson 
02-Jan-85 Dee Corporation  Dowty Group 
02-Jan-85 Argyll Group  Berisford (S.& W.) 
02-Jan-85 MFI Furniture  RMC Group 
02-Jan-85 Dixons Group  Dalgety 
01-Feb-85 Jaguar  Hambro Life 
01-Apr-85 Guinness (A)  Enterprise Oil 
01-Apr-85 Smiths Inds.  House of Fraser 
01-Apr-85 Ranks Hovis McD.  MFI Furniture 
01-Jul-85 Abbey Life  Ranks Hovis McD. 
01-Jul-85 Debenhams  I.C. Gas 
06-Aug-85 Bnk. Scotland  Debenhams 
01-Oct-85  Habitat Mothercare  Lonrho 
02-Jan-86 Scottish & Newcastle  Rothschild (J) 
08-Jan-86 Storehouse  Habitat Mothercare 
08-Jan-86 Lonrho  B.H.S. 
01-Apr-86 Wellcome  EXCO International 
01-Apr-86 Coats Viyella  Sun Life Assurance 
01-Apr-86 Lucas  Harrisons & Crosfield 
01-Apr-86 Cookson Group  Ultramar 
21-Apr-86 Ranks Hovis McD.  Imperial Group 
22-Apr-86 RMC Group  Distillers 
01-Jul-86 British Printing & Comms. Corp  Abbey Life 
01-Jul-86 Burmah Oil  Bank of Scotland 
01-Jul-86 Saatchi & S.  Ferranti International 
01-Oct-86 Bunzl  Brit. & Commonwealth 
01-Oct-86 Amstrad  BICC 
01-Oct-86 Unigate  Smiths Industries 
09-Dec-86 British Gas  Northern Foods 
02-Jan-87 Hillsdown Holdings  Argyll Group 
02-Jan-87 I.C. Gas  Burmah Oil 
02-Jan-87 TSB Group L ucas Industries 
01-Apr-87 Argyll Group  Willis Faber 
01-Apr-87 Brit. & Commonwealth  Scottish & Newcastl 
01-Apr-87 British Airways  Hammerson Properties 
27-Apr-87 Next  I.C. Gas 
01-Jul-87 Rolls Royce  GKN 
01-Jul-87 Hammerson Properties  Lonrho 
01-Oct-87  BAA  Unigate 
01-Oct-87 Rothmans Intl.  RMC Group 
01-Oct-87 Blue Arrow  Saatchi & Saatchi 
04-Jan-88 Lonrho  Blue Arrow 
04-Jan-88 Scottish & Newcastle  Jaguar 
25-Feb-88 Enterprise Oil  Britoil 
05-Apr-88  Williams Holdings  Bunzl 
05-Apr-88 Burmah Oil  Dixons Group 
05-Apr-88 Blue Arrow  Sedgwick 
05-Apr-88 RMC Group  Standard & Chartered 
01-Jul-88 Lucus Industries  Globe Investment Trust 
07-Jul-88 Abbey Life  Rowntree 
03-Oct-88 LASMO  Blue Arrow 
21-Dec-88 British Steel  Abbey Life 
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Appendix A.1 (continued): 
 
The constituents of the FTSE 100 index from 19-Jan-1984 to 10- Jun-2009 from 
the Datastream. 
  
Event date  Additions Deletions  
03-Jan-89 Standard & Chartered  Next 
03-Jan-89 Ultramar  Williams Holdings 
03-Apr-89 BICC  Amstrad 
03-Apr-89 Carlton Communications  British & Commonwealth 
03-Apr-89 Harrisons & Crosfield  Coats Viyella 
03-Apr-89 Taylor Woodrow  Storehouse 
17-Jul-89 Abbey National  Gateway Corporation (Formerly Dee Corp.) 
27-Jul-89 Smithkline  Beecham Beecham Group 
08-Aug-89 GKN  Cons. Gold Fields 
11-Sep-89 Siebe  Plessey 
02-Oct-89 Polly Peck Intl.  Harrisons & Crosfield 
02-Jan-90 Globe Investment Trust  Granada Group 
02-Jan-90 Thames Water  Siebe 
02-Apr-90 North West Water  ECC Group 
02-Jul-90 Harrisons & Crosfield  Cookson Group 
13-Jul-90 Wiggins Teape Appleton  Globe Investment Trust 
01-Oct-90  Severn  Trent Burton Group 
01-Oct-90 Anglian Water  Carlton Communications 
01-Oct-90 Bank of Scotland  Taylor Woodrow 
02-Oct-90 Dalgety  Polly Peck 
02-Jan-91 Eurotunnel  BPB Industries 
02-Jan-91 Willis Corroon  Standard & Chartered 
23-Jan-91 Tate & Lyle  STC 
02-Apr-91  National Power  Dalgety 
02-Apr-91 PowerGen  GKN 
02-Apr-91 Williams Holdings  Burmah Castrol 
01-Jul-91 Scottish Power  Ranks Hovis McD. 
01-Jul-91 Inchcape  Harrisons & Crosfield 
01-Jul-91 Rentokil  Hammerson Properties 
16-Sep-91  Vodafone Group  Racal Electronics 
01-Oct-91 Northern Foods  Ultramar 
26-Nov-91 NFC  Hawker Siddeley 
04-Dec-91 Smith (W.H.)  Maxwell Communications (formerly British 
02-Jan-92 Tomkins  ASDA Group (formerly Associated Dairies 
02-Jan-92 MB-Caradon  Lucus Industries 
02-Jan-92 Laporte  BICC 
01-Apr-92 ECC Group  Lonrho 
01-Apr-92 Bowater  Royal Insurance 
01-Apr-92 Siebe  Trafalgar House 
01-Apr-92 Coats Viyella  Tarmac 
22-Jun-92 Carlton Communications  Laporte 
22-Jun-92 Royal Insurance  Eurotunnel 
22-Jun-92 Granada Group  MEPC 
13-Jul-92 HSBC Holdings  Midland Bank 
21-Sep-92  TI Group  Willis Corroon 
21-Sep-92  Scottish Hydro  Pilkington 
21-Sep-92 Southern Electric  Royal Insurance 
21-Sep-92 Burmah Castrol  Hillsdown Holdings 
21-Sep-92 De La Rue  British Aerospace 
21-Sep-92 Kwik Save Group  RMC Group 
21-Dec-92 Royal Insurance  BET 
21-Dec-92 Standard Chartered  Rolls Royce 
22-Mar-93 ASDA Group  Smith (W.H.) 
01-Jun-93 Zeneca Group  English China Clays 
21-Jun-93 British Aerospace  Fisons 
21-Jun-93 RMC Group  Kwik Save Group 
21-Jun-93 Warburg S.G.  LASMO 
21-Jun-93 Wolseley  Southern Electric 
20-Sep-93 MEPC  De La Rue 
20-Sep-93 Rolls Royce  Tate & Lyle 
20-Sep-93 Schroders  Scottish Hydro 
25-Oct-93 Southern Electric  Rothmans International 
05-Nov-93 Caradon Plc  MB-Caradon 
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Appendix A.1 (continued): 
 
The constituents of the FTSE 100 index from 19-Jan-1984 to 10- Jun-2009 from 
the Datastream. 
  
Event date  Additions Deletions  
20-Dec-93 Eastern Electricity  Northern Foods 
20-Dec-93 Scottish Hydro Electricity  NFC 
21-Mar-94 De La Rue  Schroders 
21-Mar-94 Tarmac  Scottish Hydro 
21-Mar-94 NFC  Anglian Water 
20-Jun-94 GKN  Tarmac 
19-Sep-94 Schroders  NFC 
19-Sep-94 3I Group  Coats Viyella 
17-Mar-95 Tate & Lyle  Wellcome 
26-Jul-95 Cookson Group  Warburg SG Group 
18-Sep-95  British Sky Broadcasting Group  Caradon 
18-Sep-95 Fisons  MEPC 
18-Sep-95 LASMO  United Biscuits 
19-Sep-95 Midlands Electricity  Eastern Group 
23-Oct-95 London Electricity  Fisons 
11-Dec-95 National Grid Group plc  Inchcape plc 
18-Dec-95 Pilkington plc  Arjo Wiggins Appleton plc 
18-Dec-95 Burton Group plc  London Electricity plc 
18-Dec-95 Smiths Industries plc  De La Rue plc 
18-Dec-95 Argos plc  Sears plc 
18-Dec-95 Foreign & Col Invest Trust  Midlands Electricity plc 
28-Dec-95 Dixons Group  TSB Group 
31-Jan-96 Greenalls Group plc  Forte plc 
24-Jun-96 United News & Media  Foreign & Col Inv Trust 
24-Jun-96 Orange  Greenalls Group 
24-Jun-96 Next  REXAM (formerly Bowater Group) 
18-Jul-96 Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Group plc  Sun Alliance Group plc 
18-Jul-96 Railtrack  Royal Insurance 
17-Aug-96 Thorn plc  Thorn EMI plc 
17-Aug-96 EMI Group plc  Cookson Group plc 
23-Sep-96 LucasVarity  Thorn 
30-Sep-96 Imperial Tobacco Group  Southern Electric 
23-Dec-96 Mercury Asset Management  Coutaulds 
23-Dec-96 Hays  Pilkington 
14-Feb-97 Centrica  Williams Holdings 
24-Feb-97 Energy Group  Redland 
24-Mar-97 British Land  Argos 
23-Jun-97 Halifax  Smith & Nephew 
23-Jun-97 Alliance & Leicester  Burton Group 
22-Sep-97 Norwich Union  Tate & Lyle 
22-Sep-97 Billiton  Hanson 
22-Sep-97 Woolwich Imperial  Tobacco Group 
22-Sep-97 Sun Life & Provincial Holdings  Mercury Asset Management 
22-Sep-97 Williams  Burmah Castrol 
17-Dec-97 Diageo  Guinness 
17-Dec-97 Nycomed Amersham  Grand Metropolitan 
22-Dec-97 Mercury Asset Management  RMC Group 
22-Dec-97 British Energy  Blue Circle Industries 
22-Dec-97 Amvescap  TI Group 
24-Dec-97 Blue Circle  Industries Mercury Asset Management 
23-Mar-98 Compass  Dixons 
21-May-98 Misys  The Energy Group 
02-Jun-98 RMC Group  General Accident 
22-Jun-98 Stagecoach Holdings  Wolseley 
22-Jun-98 WPP Group  Next 
08-Sep-98 Allied Zurich  LASMO 
08-Sep-98 British American Tobacco  B.A.T. Industries Plc 
21-Sep-98  Colt Telecom Group  British Steel 
21-Sep-98 Telewest Communications  Rank Group 
21-Sep-98 Sema Group  Blue Circle Industries 
21-Sep-98 Securicor  RMC Group 
21-Sep-98 Southern Electric  Enterprise Oil 
16-Dec-98 Scottish & Southern Energy  Southern Electric Plc 
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Appendix A.1 (continued): 
 
The constituents of the FTSE 100 index from 19-Jan-1984 to 10- Jun-2009 from 
the Datastream. 
  
Event date  Additions Deletions  
21-Dec-98  Imperial Tobacco Group  Misys 
21-Dec-98 Dixons Group  Nycomed Amersham 
21-Dec-98 Gallaher Group  Sema Group 
21-Dec-98 Hanson  British Land Co 
04-Feb-99 BTR Siebe  BTR 
04-Feb-99 Daily Mail & General Trust  Siebe 
22-Mar-99 Energis  Gallaher Group 
22-Mar-99 South African Breweries  Safeway 
22-Mar-99 Misys  Williams 
22-Mar-99 EMAP  Tomkins 
29-Mar-99 Sema Group Plc  LucasVarity 
06-Apr-99 AstraZeneca  Zeneca 
10-May-99  Next  Guardian Royal Exchange PLC 
21-Jun-99 Anglo American  Next 
21-Jun-99 Blue Circle Industries  Sema Group 
28-Jul-99 British Steel Plc  Asda Group Plc 
20-Sep-99  Old Mutual  Smiths Industries 
20-Sep-99 Sage Group  Stagecoach Holdings 
20-Sep-99 Sema Group  EMAP 
06-Oct-99 Corus Group B ritish Steel 
11-Nov-99 Logica Plc  Securicor Plc 
24-Nov-99 Wolseley Plc  Orange Plc 
30-Nov-99 Marconi  General Electric Company 
20-Dec-99 ARM Holdings  Severn Trent 
20-Dec-99 CMG  British Energy 
20-Mar-00 Kingston Communications  NatWest 
20-Mar-00 Cable & Wireless Communications Associated  British Foods 
20-Mar-00 Freeserve  Allied Domecq 
20-Mar-00 Thus  Hanson 
20-Mar-00 Baltimore Technologies  Whitbread 
20-Mar-00 Psion  Scottish & Newcastle 
20-Mar-00 Nycomed Amersham  PowerGen 
20-Mar-00 Celltech Group  Thames Water 
20-Mar-00 Capita Group  Imperial Tobacco Group 
20-Mar-00 EMAP  Wolseley 
12-May-00 Allied Domecq  Cable & Wireless Communications Plc 
30-May-00 Associated British Foods  Norwich Union Plc 
19-Jun-00 Bookham Technology  Kingston Communications 
19-Jun-00  Hanson  Psion 
19-Jun-00 Ocean Group (now Exel)  Thus 
19-Jun-00 Scottish & Newcastle  Baltimore Technologies 
12-Jul-00 PowerGen Plc  SLPH 
27-Jul-00 Granada Compass  Granada Group 
27-Jul-00 Imperial Tobacco  Compass Group 
18-Sep-00  Granada Media Associated  British Foods 
18-Sep-00  Dimension Data Holdings  Hanson 
18-Sep-00  Electrocomponents  Rolls Royce 
18-Sep-00  Spirent  Scottish & Newcastle 
18-Sep-00  Baltimore Technologies  Corus Group 
17-Oct-00 Canary Wharf Group  Allied Zurich 
23-Oct-00 P & O Princess Cruises PLC  P & O 
23-Oct-00 Lattice Group PLC  Freeserve 
26-Oct-00 Shire Pharmaceuticals  Woolwich 
18-Dec-00 Smiths Group  Baltimore Technologies 
18-Dec-00 Associated British Foods  EMAP 
18-Dec-00 Autonomy Corporation  Sema 
18-Dec-00 Rolls Royce P & O  Princess Cruises 
18-Dec-00 Safeway  Bookham Technology 
27-Dec-00 Hanson  Glaxo Wellcome 
27-Dec-00 GlaxoSmithKline  SmithKline Beecham 
02-Feb-01 Compass Group  Granada Compass 
02-Feb-01 Granada  Granada Media 
19-Mar-01 Sema  Exel 
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Appendix A.1 (continued): 
 
The constituents of the FTSE 100 index from 19-Jan-1984 to 10- Jun-2009 from 
the Datastream. 
  
Event date  Additions Deletions  
19-Mar-01 Scottish & Newcastle  Autonomy Corporation 
10-Apr-01 
Morrison (Wm.) 
Supermarkets 
 Sema 
18-Jun-01 Next  Railtrack Group 
12-Jul-01 Smith & Nephew PLC  Blue Circle Industries 
07-Aug-01 Brambles Industries  Dimension Data Holdings 
10-Sep-01  Gallaher Group  Bank of Scotland 
10-Sep-01 HBOS  Halifax Group 
24-Sep-01 Friends Provident  Carlton Communication 
24-Sep-01 Enterprise Oil  Misys 
24-Sep-01 Wolseley  CMG 
24-Sep-01 Severn Trent  Colt Telecom Group 
24-Sep-01 British Land Co  Telewest Communications 
24-Sep-01 Man Group  Energis 
24-Sep-01 Northern Rock  Spirent 
24-Sep-01 Innogy Holdings  Marconi 
19-Nov-01 BT Group  British Telecommunications 
19-Nov-01 mmO2  United Business Media 
24-Dec-01 P&O Princess Cruises  GKN 
18-Mar-02 Corus Group  Celltech 
10-May-02 Exel  Enterprise Oil 
29-May-02 GKN PLC  Innogy Hldgs 
24-Jun-02 Johnson Matthey  ARM Holdings 
24-Jun-02 Xstrata  Electrocomponents 
24-Jun-02 Bunzl  Logica 
02-Jul-02 Bradford & Bingley  Powergen 
23-Sep-02  Rexam  British Airways 
23-Sep-02 Tomkins  EMI Group 
23-Sep-02 Alliance Unichem  International Power 
21-Oct-02 Emap  Lattice 
23-Dec-02 Liberty International  Brambles Industries 
23-Dec-02 British Airways  Cable & Wireless 
23-Dec-02 Whitbread  Corus Group 
24-Mar-03 Kelda Group  Rolls Royce 
24-Mar-03 Foreign & Col Invest Trust  British Airways 
24-Mar-03 Provident Financial  Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Group 
24-Mar-03  Cable & Wireless  Invensys 
11-Jun-03 Rolls Royce  Capita Group 
11-Jun-03 Royal & Sun Alliance  Hays 
19-Sep-03 Yell Group  Kelda Group 
19-Dec-03 British Airways  Provident Fiancial 
19-Dec-03 Hays  Mitchells & Butlers 
08-Mar-04 Antofagasta  Safeway Corporate Action - bought by Morrisons 
19-Mar-04 Enterprise Inns  Foreign & Col Inv Trust 
08-Apr-04 William Hill  
Amersham Corporate Action - Scheme of Arrangement of Amersham PLC 
(UK) 
18-Jun-04 Capita Group  GKN 
17-Sep-04 Cairn Energy  Bradford & Bingley 
16-Nov-04 Corus Group  
Abbey National Corporate Action - bought by Banco Santander Central 
Hispano 
17-Dec-04 Tate & Lyle  Tomkins 
18-Mar-05  International Power  Cairn Energy 
17-Jun-05 BPB  Corus Group 
17-Jun-05 Hammerson  Bunzl 
15-Jul-05 Royal Dutch Shell A&B  Shell Transport & Trading Co Corporate Action 
20-Jul-05 Kelda Group  Allied Domecq Corporate Action - Allied Domecq bought by Pernod Ricard 
16-Sep-05  Partygaming  Hays 
16-Sep-05 Cairn Energy  Emap 
08-Dec-05 P&O  BPB Corporate Action - BPB bought by Saint-Gobain 
13-Dec-05 Brambles Industries  Exel Corporate Action - Exel bought by Deutsche Post 
19-Dec-05 Persimmon  Whitbread 
19-Dec-05 Kazakhmys  William Hill 
26-Jan-06 British Energy Group  O2 Corporate Action - O2 bought by Telefonica 
08-Mar-06 Corus Group  P&O Corporate Action - P&O bought by Dubai Ports 
07-Jun-06 Vedanta Resources  Daily Mail & General Trust 
07-Jun-06 Lonmin  Cable & Wireless 
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Appendix A.1 (continued): 
 
The constituents of the FTSE 100 index from 19-Jan-1984 to 10- Jun-2009 from 
the Datastream. 
  
Event date  Additions Deletions  
07-Jun-06 Drax Group  Ladbrokes 
30-Jun-06 ICAP  BAA Corporate Action - BAA bought by Airport Dev&Inv 
31-Jul-06  Slough Estates Merger  Boots/Alliance UniChem (FTSE 100 cos) 
05-Sep-06  Bradford & Bingley  BOC Corporate Action - BOC bought by Linde 
15-Sep-06 Standard Life  Rentokil 
15-Sep-06  Resolution  Schroders 
11-Oct-06 Experian Group GUS Demerger  GUS Plc 
11-Oct-06 Home Retail Group  Partygaming Demerger GUS Plc 
27-Nov-06  Cable & Wireless  Brambles Industries Unification, Brambles Ltd 
15-Dec-06 Whitbread  British Energy Group 
16-Mar-07 Daily Mail & General Trust  Cairn Energy 
30-Mar-07 Schroders  Corus Group Corporate Action - Corus bought by Tata Steel 
17-Apr-07 Punch Taverns  Gallaher Group Corporate Action - Gallaher Gp bought by Japan Tobacco 
20-Apr-07 Mitchells & Butlers  Scottish Power Corporate Action - Scottish Power bought by Iberdrola 
18-Jun-07 Barratt Developments  Bradford & Bingley 
26-Jun-07 British Energy Group  Alliance Boots Corporate Action - Acquisition of Alliance 
22-Aug-07  Rentokil Initial  
Hanson Corporate Action - Acquisition of Hanson PLC by Lehigh UK 
Limited 
24-Sep-07 Tallow Oil  Drax Group 
24-Sep-07 Taylor Wimpey  Segro 
24-Sep-07 Carphone Warehouse  Kelda Group 
04-Dec-07 London Stock Exchange  Invesco Plc Transfer if listing from LSE to NYSE (change of nationality) 
20-Dec-07 AMEC  
Imperial Chemical Industries Corporate Action - ICI bought by Akzo Noble 
NV 
24-Dec-07 Cairn Energy  Punch Taverns 
24-Dec-07 First Group  Tate & Lyle 
24-Dec-07 TUI Travel  Daily Mail & General Trust 
24-Dec-07 Kelda Group  DSG International 
24-Dec-07 Admiral Group Mitchells & Butlers 
24-Dec-07 G4S  Barratt Developments 
24-Dec-07 Thomas Cook Group  Northern Rock 
26-Mar-08 Eurasian Natural Resources Corp  Taylor Wimpey 
26-Mar-08 Tate & Lyle  Yell Group 
26-Mar-08 Cobham  Rentokil Initial 
28-Apr-08 Wood Group (John)  Scottish & Newcastle 
30-Apr-08 Bunzl  Resolution 
23-Jun-08 Invensys  Alliance & Leicester 
23-Jun-08 Ferrexpo  Persimmon 
23-Jun-08 Petrofac  Home Retail Group 
23-Jun-08 Drax Group  Tate & Lyle 
22-Sep-08 Autonomy Corporation  Carphone Warehouse Group 
22-Sep-08 Fresnillo  Enterprise Inns 
22-Sep-08 Inmarsat  Ferrexpo 
22-Sep-08 Stagecoach Group  ITV 
22-Dec-08 Amlin  Fresnillo 
22-Dec-08 Home Retail Group  Lonmin 
22-Dec-08 Randgold Resources  Petrofac 
22-Dec-08 Serco Group  Stagecoach Group 
22-Dec-08 Tate & Lyle  Wood Group (John) 
11-Mar-09 
Foreign & Colon Investment 
Trust 
 3i Group 
11-Mar-09  Fresnillo  First Group 
11-Mar-09 Intertek Group  London Stock Exchange Group 
11-Mar-09 Lonmin  Wolseley 
11-Mar-09 Petrofac  Tate & Lyle 
10-Jun-09  3I Group  Amlin 
10-Jun-09 London Stock Exchange Group  Drax Group 
10-Jun-09 Wolseley  Whitbread 
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Appendix A.2: 
 
The final sample of the Additions of the FTSE 100 index lists.  
We obtain 367 FTSE 100 index revision events from the DataStream from January 1984 to June 
2009. We drop from our sample stocks that were added (deleted) due to events such as spin 
offs, mergers and takeovers. The data related to spin offs, mergers and takeover is obtained 
from different resources, including DataStream, Ft.com, Thomson One Bank and the media 
coverage of each firm. Thus, The final sample consists of 212 additions. The effective dates for 
all quarterly changes are obtained from FTSE International Limited. 
Effective date Additions Ticker 
22/06/2009 WOLSELEY WOS 
22/06/2009 3I GROUP III 
19/01/2009 BALFOUR BEATTY BBY 
22/12/2008 AMLIN AML 
22/12/2008 HOME RETAIL GROUP HOME 
22/12/2008 RANDGOLD RESOURCES RRS 
22/12/2008 TATE & LYLE TATE 
22/09/2008 INMARSAT ISAT 
23/06/2008 DRAX GROUP DRXG 
23/06/2008 FERREXPO FXPO 
23/06/2008 INVENSYS ISYS 
23/06/2008 PETROFAC PFC 
28/04/2008 WOOD GROUP (JOHN) WG. 
26/03/2008 TATE & LYLE TATE 
07/02/2008 ALLIANCE TRUST ATST 
24/12/2007 KELDA GROUP DEAD - 12/02/08 KEL 
24/12/2007 ADMIRAL GROUP ADM 
24/12/2007 CAIRN ENERGY CNE 
24/12/2007 FIRST GROUP FGP 
20/12/2007 AMEC AMEC 
24/09/2007 CARPHONE WHSE.GP. CPW 
24/09/2007 TULLOW OIL TLW 
23/08/2007 RENTOKIL INITIAL RENT 
26/06/2007 BRITISH ENERGY GROUP DEAD - 03/02/09 BGY 
18/06/2007 BARRATT DEVELOPMENTS BDEV 
19/03/2007 DAILY MAIL 'A' DMGO 
05/09/2006 BRADFORD & BINGLEY DEAD - 30/09/08 BB. 
31/07/2006 SEGRO SGRO 
30/06/2006 ICAP IAP 
19/06/2006 LONMIN LMI 
19/06/2006 VEDANTA RESOURCES VED 
09/03/2006 CORUS GROUP DEAD - 05/04/07 CS. 
26/01/2006 BRITISH ENERGY GROUP DEAD - 03/02/09 BGY 
08/12/2005 PENINSULAR & OR.STM.NAV DEAD - 09/03/06 PO. 
19/09/2005 CAIRN ENERGY CNE 
26/07/2005 KELDA GROUP DEAD - 12/02/08 KEL 
20/06/2005 BPB DEAD - T/O BY 741689 BPB 
20/06/2005 HAMMERSON HMSNO 
21/03/2005 INTERNATIONAL POWER IPR 
20/12/2004 TATE & LYLE TATE 
16/11/2004 CORUS GROUP DEAD - 05/04/07 CS. 
20/09/2004 CAIRN ENERGY CNE 
21/06/2004 CAPITA GROUP CPI 
08/04/2004 WILLIAM HILL WMH 
22/03/2004 ENTERPRISE INNS ETI 
08/03/2004 ANTOFAGASTA ANTO 
22/12/2003 BRITISH AIRWAYS BAY 
23/06/2003 RSA INSURANCE GROUP RSA 
24/03/2003 KELDA GROUP DEAD - 12/02/08 KEL 
24/03/2003 FOREIGN & COLONIAL FRCL 
24/03/2003 PROVIDENT FINANCIAL PFG 
23/12/2002 BRITISH AIRWAYS BAY 
23/12/2002 WHITBREAD WTB 
21/10/2002 EMAP DEAD - 20/03/08 EMAPO 
23/09/2002 ALLIANCE UNICHEM DEAD - EX.INTO 901192 AUN 
23/09/2002 REXAM REX 
23/09/2002 TOMKINS TOMK 
02/07/2002 BRADFORD & BINGLEY DEAD - 30/09/08 BB. 
24/06/2002 BUNZL BNZL 
24/06/2002 JOHNSON MATTHEY JMAT 
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Appendix A.2 (continued): 
 
The final sample of the Additions of the FTSE 100 index lists. 
 
We obtain 367 FTSE 100 index revision events from the DataStream from January 1984 to June 
2009. We drop from our sample stocks that were added (deleted) due to events such as spin 
offs, mergers and takeovers. The data related to spin offs, mergers and takeover is obtained 
from different resources, including DataStream, Ft.com, Thomson One Bank and the media 
coverage of each firm. Thus, The final sample consists of 212 additions. The effective dates for 
all quarterly changes are obtained from FTSE International Limited. 
Effective date Additions Ticker 
29/05/2002 GKN GKN 
10/05/2002 EXEL DEAD - EX.INTO 280598 EXL 
18/03/2002 CORUS GROUP DEAD - 05/04/07 CS. 
12/12/2001 CARNIVAL CCL 
24/09/2001 NORTHERN ROCK DEAD - 25/02/08 NRK 
24/09/2001 ENTERPRISE OIL DEAD - DEAD 25/06/02 ENTO 
24/09/2001 BRITISH LAND BLND 
24/09/2001 SEVERN TRENT SVT 
24/09/2001 WOLSELEY WOS 
10/09/2001 GALLAHER GROUP DEAD - 18/04/07 GLH 
12/07/2001 SMITH & NEPHEW SN. 
18/06/2001 NEXT NXT 
10/04/2001 MORRISON(WM)SPMKTS. MORW 
19/03/2001 SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE DEAD - 29/04/08 SCTN 
19/03/2001 SEMA DEAD - 11/05/01 SEM 
27/12/2000 HANSON DEAD - 30/08/07 HNS 
18/12/2000 SAFEWAY (UK) DEAD - DELIST 08/03/04 SFW 
18/12/2000 ASSOCIATED BRIT.FOODS ABF 
18/12/2000 AUTONOMY CORP. AU. 
18/12/2000 ROLLS-ROYCE GROUP RR. 
26/10/2000 SHIRE SHRS 
17/10/2000 CANARY WHARF GROUP DEAD - DELIST 22/06/04 CWG 
18/09/2000 BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES DEAD - DELIST 14/02/05 137543 
12/07/2000 POWERGEN DEAD - DEAD 01/07/02 PWG 
19/06/2000 SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE DEAD - 29/04/08 SCTN 
19/06/2000 HANSON DEAD - 30/08/07 HNS 
19/06/2000 BOOKHAM TECHNOLOGY DEAD - DEAD 13/09/04 BHM 
30/05/2000 ASSOCIATED BRIT.FOODS ABF 
12/05/2000 ALLIED DOMECQ DEAD - EX.INTO 923539 ALLD 
20/03/2000 EMAP DEAD - 20/03/08 EMAPO 
20/03/2000 AMERSHAM DEAD - DELIST 08/04/04 AHM 
20/03/2000 BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES DEAD - DELIST 14/02/05 137543 
20/03/2000 FREESERVE DEAD - 14/03/01 270118 
20/03/2000 CAPITA GROUP CPI 
20/03/2000 THUS THUS 
20/12/1999 CMG DEAD - DEAD 30/12/02 870205 
11/11/1999 LOGICA LOG 
20/09/1999 SEMA DEAD - 11/05/01 SEM 
21/06/1999 BLUE CIRCLE INDS. DEAD - DEAD 12/07/01 BCI 
10/05/1999 NEXT NXT 
29/03/1999 SEMA DEAD - 11/05/01 SEM 
22/03/1999 EMAP DEAD - 20/03/08 EMAPO 
22/03/1999 ENERGIS DEAD - DEAD 16/07/02 671363 
22/03/1999 MISYS MISY 
04/02/1999 DAILY MAIL 'A' DMGO 
21/12/1998 HANSON DEAD - 30/08/07 HNS 
21/12/1998 GALLAHER GROUP DEAD - 18/04/07 GLH 
21/12/1998 DSG INTERNATIONAL DSGI 
21/09/1998 SEMA DEAD - 11/05/01 SEM 
21/09/1998 SOUTHERN ELEC. DEAD - CANCEL.30/12/98 SEL 
21/09/1998 COLT TELECOM GROUP COLT 
08/09/1998 ALLIED ZURICH DEAD - DEAD 17/10/00 ADZ 
02/06/1998 RMC GROUP DEAD - DELIST 01/03/05 RMC 
21/05/1998 MISYS MISY 
23/03/1998 COMPASS GROUP 953289 
24/12/1997 BLUE CIRCLE INDS. DEAD - DEAD 12/07/01 BCI 
22/12/1997 BRITISH ENERGY DEAD - DELIST 21/10/04 876252 
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Appendix A.2 (continued): 
 
The final sample of the Additions of the FTSE 100 index lists. 
 
We obtain 367 FTSE 100 index revision events from the DataStream from January 1984 to June 
2009. We drop from our sample stocks that were added (deleted) due to events such as spin 
offs, mergers and takeovers. The data related to spin offs, mergers and takeover is obtained 
from different resources, including DataStream, Ft.com, Thomson One Bank and the media 
coverage of each firm. Thus, The final sample consists of 212 additions. The effective dates for 
all quarterly changes are obtained from FTSE International Limited. 
Effective date Additions Ticker 
17/12/1997 AMERSHAM DEAD - DELIST 08/04/04 AHM 
22/09/1997 WOOLWICH DEAD - 26/10/00 WWH 
22/09/1997 WILLIAMS DEAD - DEAD 09/11/00 WLMS 
24/03/1997 BRITISH LAND BLND 
24/02/1997 ENERGY GROUP DEAD - T/O BY 902329 888284 
23/12/1996 MERCURY ASSET MAN. DEAD - T/O 922060 MAM 
23/12/1996 HAYS HAS 
24/06/1996 ORANGE DEAD - DEAD 10/02/00 870800 
24/06/1996 NEXT NXT 
24/06/1996 UNITED BUSINESS MEDIA UBM 
28/12/1995 DSG INTERNATIONAL DSGI 
18/12/1995 ARCADIA GROUP DEAD - DEAD 09/12/02 901195 
18/12/1995 ARGOS DEAD - T/O BY 901199 904985 
18/12/1995 PILKINGTON DEAD - 16/06/06 PILK 
18/12/1995 FOREIGN & COLONIAL FRCL 
18/12/1995 SMITHS GROUP SMIN 
19/09/1995 MIDLANDS ELTY. DEAD - TAKEOVER 928857 
18/09/1995 LASMO DEAD - T/OVER 03/04/01 LSMR 
18/09/1995 BRITISH SKY BCAST.GROUP BSY 
26/07/1995 COOKSON GROUP CKSN 
17/03/1995 TATE & LYLE TATE 
21/03/1994 LYNX GP. DEAD - 05/03/02 953595 
21/03/1994 TARMAC DEAD - DELIST.04/05/00 TARM 
21/03/1994 DE LA RUE DLAR 
05/11/1993 CARNAULDMETALBOX (LON) DEAD - T/O 912188 953835 
25/10/1993 SOUTHERN ELEC. DEAD - CANCEL.30/12/98 SEL 
20/09/1993 MEPC DEAD - 13/10/00 MEPC 
20/09/1993 ROLLS-ROYCE GROUP RR. 
20/09/1993 SCHRODERS SDRC 
21/06/1993 RMC GROUP DEAD - DELIST 01/03/05 RMC 
21/06/1993 WARBURG (SG) GP. DEAD - EXCH. 27/07/95 WARB 
21/06/1993 BAE SYSTEMS BA. 
22/03/1993 ASDA GROUP DEAD - T/O BY 916548 ASDA 
21/12/1992 ROYAL IN.HDG. DEAD - SEE 901514 ROYL 
21/12/1992 STANDARD CHARTERED STAN 
21/09/1992 SOUTHERN ELEC. DEAD - CANCEL.30/12/98 SEL 
21/09/1992 BURMAH CASTROL DEAD - 13/09/00 BMAH 
21/09/1992 KWIK SAVE GP. DEAD - MERGE 882048 KWIK 
21/09/1992 DE LA RUE DLAR 
21/09/1992 SCOT.& SOUTHERN ENERGY SSE 
22/06/1992 CARLTON COMMS. DEAD - DELIST 02/02/04 901604 
22/06/1992 ROYAL IN.HDG. DEAD - SEE 901514 ROYL 
22/06/1992 ITV ITV 
01/04/1992 COATS DEAD - 10/06/03 CO. 
01/04/1992 ENG.CHINA CLAYS DEAD - DEAD 17/06/99 ECC 
01/04/1992 INVENSYS ISYS 
01/04/1992 REXAM REX 
02/01/1992 CARNAULDMETALBOX (LON) DEAD - T/O 912188 953835 
02/01/1992 LAPORTE DEAD - DEAD 10/04/01 LPRT 
04/12/1991 WH SMITH SMWH 
26/11/1991 LYNX GP. DEAD - 05/03/02 953595 
01/07/1991 INCHCAPE INCH 
01/07/1991 RENTOKIL INITIAL RENT 
02/04/1991 WILLIAMS DEAD - DEAD 09/11/00 WLMS 
23/01/1991 TATE & LYLE TATE 
02/01/1991 WILLIS CORROON DEAD - DEAD 19/11/98 WILC 
02/11/1990 SYGEN INTERNATIONAL DEAD - T/O BY 296734 SNI 
01/10/1990 BANK OF SCOTLAND DEAD - MERGER 897376 BSCT 
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Appendix A.2 (continued): 
 
The final sample of the Additions of the FTSE 100 index lists. 
 
We obtain 367 FTSE 100 index revision events from the DataStream from January 1984 to 
June 2009. We drop from our sample stocks that were added (deleted) due to events such as 
spin offs, mergers and takeovers. The data related to spin offs, mergers and takeover is 
obtained from different resources, including DataStream, Ft.com, Thomson One Bank and 
the media coverage of each firm. Thus, The final sample consists of 212 additions. The 
effective dates for all quarterly changes are obtained from FTSE International Limited. 
Effective date Additions Ticker 
02/07/1990 ELEMENTIS ELM 
11/09/1989 INVENSYS ISYS 
08/08/1989 GKN GKN 
03/04/1989 CARLTON COMMS. DEAD - DELIST 02/02/04 901604 
03/04/1989 BALFOUR BEATTY BBY 
03/04/1989 ELEMENTIS ELM 
03/04/1989 TAYLOR WIMPEY TW. 
03/01/1989 ULTRAMAR UMAR 
03/01/1989 STANDARD CHARTERED STAN 
03/10/1988 LASMO DEAD - T/OVER 03/04/01 LSMR 
01/07/1988 LUCAS INDUSTRIES DEAD - MERGE.871622 LUCS 
05/04/1988 RMC GROUP DEAD - DELIST 01/03/05 RMC 
05/04/1988 WILLIAMS DEAD - DEAD 09/11/00 WLMS 
05/04/1988 BURMAH CASTROL DEAD - 13/09/00 BMAH 
25/02/1988 ENTERPRISE OIL DEAD - DEAD 25/06/02 ENTO 
04/01/1988 SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE DEAD - 29/04/08 SCTN 
04/01/1988 LONMIN LMI 
01/10/1987 BAA DEAD - 15/08/06 BAA 
01/07/1987 HAMMERSON HMSNO 
01/04/1987 SAFEWAY (UK) DEAD - DELIST 08/03/04 SFW 
01/04/1987 BRIT.&COMMONWLTH BCOM 
02/01/1987 HILLSDOWN HDG. DEAD - DEAD HDWN 
01/10/1986 AMSTRAD DEAD - DELISTED 901393 
01/10/1986 BUNZL BNZL 
01/07/1986 MAXWELL COMM. CANCELLED 08/06/92 MAXC 
22/04/1986 RMC GROUP DEAD - DELIST 01/03/05 RMC 
21/04/1986 RANKS HOVIS 900831 
01/04/1986 WELLCOME WLCM 
01/04/1986 COATS DEAD - 10/06/03 CO. 
01/04/1986 COOKSON GROUP CKSN 
08/01/1986 LONMIN LMI 
02/01/1986 SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE DEAD - 29/04/08 SCTN 
01/10/1986 UNIQ UNIQ 
01/07/1986 BURMAH CASTROL DEAD - 13/09/00 BMAH 
01/04/1986 LUCAS INDUSTRIES DEAD - MERGE.871622 LUCS 
01/10/1985 HABITAT MCARE. HBTT 
06/08/1985 BANK OF SCOTLAND DEAD - MERGER 897376 BSCT 
01/04/1985 RANKS HOVIS 900831 
01/04/1985 SMITHS GROUP SMIN 
01/02/1985 JAGUAR JAGR 
02/01/1985 SAFEWAY (UK) DEAD - DELIST 08/03/04 SFW 
02/01/1985 GATEWAY CORP TAKEOVER 506268 13/07/ GTWY 
02/01/1985 DSG INTERNATIONAL DSGI 
02/01/1985 GALIFORM GFRM 
01/10/1984 WILLIS CORROON DEAD - DEAD 19/11/98 WILC 
01/10/1984 ITV ITV 
01/10/1984 DOWTY GROUP DWTY 
02/04/1984 LONMIN LMI 
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Appendix A.3 : 
 
The final sample of the Deletions of the FTSE 100 index lists. 
 
We obtain 367 FTSE 100 index revision events from the DataStream from January 
1984 to June 2009. We drop from our sample stocks that were added (deleted) due 
to events such as spin offs, mergers and takeovers. The data related to spin offs, 
mergers and takeover is obtained from different resources, including DataStream, 
Ft.com, Thomson One Bank and the media coverage of each firm. Thus, The final 
sample consists of 210 deletions. The effective dates for all quarterly changes are 
obtained from FTSE International Limited. The effective dates for all quarterly 
changes are obtained from FTSE International Limited. 
Effective date Deletions Ticker 
22/06/2009 DRAX GROUP DRXG 
22/06/2009 WHITBREAD WTB 
22/12/2008 LONMIN LMI 
22/12/2008 PETROFAC PFC 
22/12/2008 WOOD GROUP (JOHN) WG. 
22/09/2008 ENTERPRISE INNS ETI 
22/09/2008 FERREXPO FXPO 
22/09/2008 ITV ITV 
23/06/2008 HOME RETAIL GROUP HOME 
23/06/2008 PERSIMMON PSN 
23/06/2008 TATE & LYLE TATE 
26/03/2008 RENTOKIL INITIAL RENT 
24/12/2007 NORTHERN ROCK DEAD - 25/02/08 NRK 
24/12/2007 DAILY MAIL 'A' DMGT 
24/12/2007 DSG INTERNATIONAL DXNS 
24/12/2007 MITCHELLS & BUTLERS MAB 
24/12/2007 PUNCHTAVERNS PUB 
24/12/2007 TATE & LYLE TATE 
24/09/2007 KELDA GROUP DEAD - 12/02/08 KEL 
24/09/2007 DRAX GROUP DRXG 
18/06/2007 BRADFORD & BINGLEY DEAD - 30/09/08 BB. 
20/04/2007 SCOTTISH POWER DEAD - EX.INTO 15299K SPW 
19/03/2007 CAIRNENERGY CNE 
18/12/2006 BRITISH ENERGY GROUP DEAD - 03/02/09 BGY 
19/06/2006 DAILY MAIL 'A' DMGT 
19/12/2005 WHITBREAD WTB 
07/07/2005 UNITED UTILITIES GROUP UU. 
20/06/2005 CORUS GROUP DEAD - 05/04/07 CS. 
20/06/2005 BUNZL BNZL 
21/03/2005 CAIRNENERGY CNE 
20/12/2004 TOMKINS TOMK 
20/09/2004 BRADFORD & BINGLEY DEAD - 30/09/08 BB. 
21/06/2004 GKN GKN 
08/03/2004 SAFEWAY (UK) DEAD - DELIST 08/03/04 SFW 
22/12/2003 PROVIDENT FINANCIAL PFG 
22/09/2003 KELDA GROUP DEAD - 12/02/08 KEL 
23/06/2003 CAPITA GROUP CPI 
15/04/2003 CANARY WHARF GROUP DEAD - DELIST 22/06/04 CWG 
24/03/2003 BRITISH AIRWAYS BAY 
24/03/2003 RSAINSURANCE GROUP RSA 
23/12/2002 CORUS GROUP DEAD - 05/04/07 CS. 
23/09/2002 EMI GROUP DEAD - 18/09/07 EMI 
23/09/2002 BRITISH AIRWAYS BAY 
24/06/2002 ELECTROCOMP. ECOM 
12/12/2001 GKN GKN 
19/11/2001 UNITED BUSINESS MEDIA UBM 
24/09/2001 ENERGIS DEAD - DEAD 16/07/02 671363 
24/09/2001 MARCONI DEAD - EXCH SEE 26958F 900498 
24/09/2001 COLT TELECOM GROUP COLT 
24/09/2001 MISYS MISY 
07/08/2001 DIMENSION DATA HDG. DDT 
10/04/2001 SEMA DEAD - 11/05/01 SEM 
19/03/2001 EXEL DEAD - EX.INTO 280598 EXL 
19/03/2001 AUTONOMY CORP. AU. 
18/12/2000 EMAP DEAD - 20/03/08 EMAPO 
18/12/2000 SEMA DEAD - 11/05/01 SEM 
18/12/2000 BOOKHAM TECHNOLOGY DEAD - DEAD 13/09/04 BHM 
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Appendix A.3 (continued): 
 
The final sample of the Deletions of the FTSE 100 index lists. 
 
We obtain 367 FTSE 100 index revision events from the DataStream from January 
1984 to June 2009. We drop from our sample stocks that were added (deleted) due 
to events such as spin offs, mergers and takeovers. The data related to spin offs, 
mergers and takeover is obtained from different resources, including DataStream, 
Ft.com, Thomson One Bank and the media coverage of each firm. Thus, The final 
sample consists of 210 deletions. The effective dates for all quarterly changes are 
obtained from FTSE International Limited. 
Effective date Deletions Ticker 
18/12/2000 BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES DEAD - DELIST 14/02/05 137543 
23/10/2000 PENINSULAR & OR.STM.NAV DEAD - 09/03/06 PO. 
18/09/2000 SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE DEAD - 29/04/08 SCTN 
18/09/2000 HANSON DEAD - 30/08/07 HNS 
18/09/2000 CORUS GROUP DEAD - 05/04/07 CS. 
18/09/2000 ASSOCIATED BRIT.FOODS ABF 
19/06/2000 BALTIMORE TECHNOLOGIES DEAD - DELIST 14/02/05 137543 
19/06/2000 THUS GROUP DEAD - 03/11/08 THUS 
20/03/2000 SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE DEAD - 29/04/08 SCTN 
20/03/2000 HANSON DEAD - 30/08/07 HNS 
20/03/2000 ALLIED DOMECQ DEAD - EX.INTO 923539 ALLD 
20/03/2000 POWERGEN DEAD - DEAD 01/07/02 PWG 
20/03/2000 THAMES WATER DEAD - T/OVER-902191 904393 
20/03/2000 ASSOCIATED BRIT.FOODS ABF 
20/03/2000 WHITBREAD WTB 
20/12/1999 SEVERN TRENT SVT 
20/09/1999 EMAP DEAD - 20/03/08 EMAPO 
20/09/1999 SMITHS GROUP SMIN 
20/09/1999 STAGECOACH GROUP SGC 
21/06/1999 SEMA DEAD - 11/05/01 SEM 
21/06/1999 NEXT NXT 
22/03/1999 GALLAHER GROUP DEAD - 18/04/07 GLH 
22/03/1999 SAFEWAY (UK) DEAD - DELIST 08/03/04 SFW 
22/03/1999 WILLIAMS DEAD - DEAD09/11/00 WLMS 
21/12/1998 AMERSHAM DEAD - DELIST 08/04/04 AHM 
21/12/1998 SEMA DEAD - 11/05/01 SEM 
21/12/1998 BRITISH LAND BLND 
21/12/1998 MISYS MISY 
21/09/1998 ENTERPRISE OIL DEAD - DEAD 25/06/02 ENTO 
21/09/1998 BLUE CIRCLE INDS. DEAD - DEAD 12/07/01 BCI 
21/09/1998 RMC GROUP DEAD - DELIST 01/03/05 RMC 
21/09/1998 RANK GROUP RNK 
08/09/1998 LASMO DEAD - T/OVER 03/04/01 LSMR 
22/06/1998 NEXT NXT 
22/06/1998 WOLSELEY WOS 
21/05/1998 ENERGY GROUP DEAD - T/O BY 902329 888284 
23/03/1998 DSG INTERNATIONAL DXNS 
22/12/1997 BLUE CIRCLE INDS. DEAD - DEAD 12/07/01 BCI 
22/12/1997 RMC GROUP DEAD - DELIST 01/03/05 RMC 
22/09/1997 HANSON DEAD - 30/08/07 HNS 
22/09/1997 BURMAH CASTROL DEAD - 13/09/00 BMAH 
22/09/1997 TATE & LYLE TATE 
23/06/1997 ARCADIA GROUP DEAD - DEAD 09/12/02 901195 
23/06/1997 SMITH & NEPHEW SN. 
24/03/1997 ARGOS DEAD - T/O BY 901199 904985 
14/02/1997 WILLIAMS DEAD - DEAD09/11/00 WLMS 
23/12/1996 COURTAULDS DEAD - DEAD 24/09/98 CTLD 
23/12/1996 PILKINGTON DEAD - 16/06/06 PILK 
30/09/1996 SOUTHERN ELEC. DEAD - CANCEL.30/12/98 SEL 
17/08/1996 COOKSON GROUP CKSN 
19/07/1996 ROYAL IN.HDG. DEAD - SEE 901514 ROYL 
24/06/1996 GREENALLS GP.'A' GREWA 
24/06/1996 FOREIGN & COLONIAL FRCL 
24/06/1996 REXAM REX 
18/12/1995 ARJO WIGGINS APL. DEAD - DEAD 24/08/00 AWA 
18/12/1995 SEARS DEAD - TAKEOVER 02/99 SEAR 
18/12/1995 MIDLANDS ELTY. DEAD - TAKEOVER 928857 
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Appendix A.3 (continued): 
 
The final sample of the Deletions of the FTSE 100 index lists. 
 
We obtain 367 FTSE 100 index revision events from the DataStream from 
January 1984 to June 2009. We drop from our sample stocks that were added 
(deleted) due to events such as spin offs, mergers and takeovers. The data 
related to spin offs, mergers and takeover is obtained from different 
resources, including DataStream, Ft.com, Thomson One Bank and the media 
coverage of each firm. Thus, The final sample consists of 210 deletions. The 
effective dates for all quarterly changes are obtained from FTSE International 
Limited. 
Effective date Deletions Ticker 
18/12/1995 DE LA RUE DLAR 
11/12/1995 INCHCAPE INCH 
18/09/1995 MEPC DEAD - 13/10/00 MEPC 
18/09/1995 CARNAULDMETALBOX (LON) DEAD - T/O 912188 953835 
18/09/1995 UNITED BISCUITS DEAD - DEAD 16/06/00 UBIS 
19/09/1994 COATS DEAD - 10/06/03 CO. 
19/09/1994 LYNX GP. DEAD - 05/03/02 953595 
20/06/1994 TARMAC DEAD - DELIST.04/05/00 TARM 
21/03/1994 SCOT.& SOUTHERN ENERGY SSE 
20/12/1993 LYNX GP. DEAD - 05/03/02 953595 
05/11/1993 CARNAULDMETALBOX (LON) DEAD - T/O 912188 953835 
25/10/1993 ROTHMANS INTL.'B' DEAD - SEE RINU RINT 
20/09/1993 DE LA RUE DLAR 
20/09/1993 SCOT.& SOUTHERN ENERGY SSE 
20/09/1993 TATE & LYLE TATE 
21/06/1993 SOUTHERN ELEC. DEAD - CANCEL.30/12/98 SEL 
21/06/1993 LASMO DEAD - T/OVER 03/04/01 LSMR 
21/06/1993 FISONS DEAD - DEAD T/O 905671 FISN 
21/06/1993 KWIK SAVE GP. DEAD - MERGE 882048 KWIK 
01/06/1993 ENG.CHINA CLAYS DEAD - DEAD 17/06/99 ECC 
21/12/1992 BET DEAD - T/O 906480 901339 
21/12/1992 ROLLS-ROYCE GROUP RR. 
21/09/1992 RMC GROUP DEAD - DELIST 01/03/05 RMC 
21/09/1992 PILKINGTON DEAD - 16/06/06 PILK 
21/09/1992 ROYAL IN.HDG. DEAD - SEE 901514 ROYL 
21/09/1992 HILLSDOWN HDG. DEAD - DEAD HDWN 
21/09/1992 WILLIS CORROON DEAD - DEAD 19/11/98 WILC 
21/09/1992 BAE SYSTEMS BA. 
22/06/1992 MEPC DEAD - 13/10/00 MEPC 
22/06/1992 LAPORTE DEAD - DEAD 10/04/01 LPRT 
01/04/1992 ROYAL IN.HDG. DEAD - SEE 901514 ROYL 
01/04/1992 TARM TARM 
01/04/1992 TRAFALGAR HSE.A TRAF  
01/04/1992 LONMIN LMI 
02/01/1992 ASDA GROUP DEAD - T/O BY 916548 ASDA 
02/01/1992 LUCAS INDUSTRIES DEAD - MERGE.871622 LUCS 
02/01/1992 BALFOUR BEATTY BBY 
01/10/1991 ULTRAMAR UMAR 
16/09/1991 RACAL ELECTRONIC DEAD - DEAD 27/07/00 RCAL 
01/07/1991 RANKS HOVIS 900831 
01/07/1991 ELEMENTIS ELM 
01/07/1991 HAMMERSON HMSNO 
02/04/1991 BURMAH CASTROL DEAD - 13/09/00 BMAH 
02/04/1991 GKN GKN 
02/04/1991 SNI SNI 
02/01/1991 BPB DEAD - T/O BY 741689 BPB 
02/01/1991 STANDARD CHARTERED STAN 
01/10/1990 CARLTON COMMS. DEAD - DELIST 02/02/04 901604 
01/10/1990 ARCADIA GROUP DEAD - DEAD 09/12/02 901195 
01/10/1990 TAYLOR WIMPEY TW. 
02/07/1990 COOKSON GROUP CKSN 
02/04/1990 ENG.CHINA CLAYS DEAD - DEAD 17/06/99 ECC 
02/01/1990 INVENSYS ISYS 
02/01/1990 ITV ITV 
02/11/1989 ELEMENTIS ELM 
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Appendix A.3 (continued): 
 
The final sample of the Deletions of the FTSE 100 index lists. 
 
We obtain 367 FTSE 100 index revision events from the DataStream from 
January 1984 to June 2009. We drop from our sample stocks that were added 
(deleted) due to events such as spin offs, mergers and takeovers. The data 
related to spin offs, mergers and takeover is obtained from different 
resources, including DataStream, Ft.com, Thomson One Bank and the media 
coverage of each firm. Thus, The final sample consists of 210 deletions. The 
effective dates for all quarterly changes are obtained from FTSE International 
Limited. 
Effective date Deletions Ticker 
17/07/1989 GATEWAY CORP TAKEOVER 506268 13/07/ GTWY 
03/04/1989 COATS DEAD - 10/06/03 CO. 
03/04/1989 AMSTRAD DEAD - DELISTED 901393 
03/04/1989 BRIT.&COMMONWLTH BCOM 
03/04/1989 MOTHERCARE MTC 
03/01/1989 WILLIAMS DEAD - DEAD09/11/00 WLMS 
03/01/1989 NEXT NXT 
05/04/1988 SEDGWICK GROUP DEAD - DEAD 08/01/99 SDWK 
05/04/1988 BUNZL BNZL 
05/04/1988 DSG INTERNATIONAL DXNS 
05/04/1988 STANDARD CHARTERED STAN 
04/01/1988 JAGUAR JAGR 
01/10/1987 RMC GROUP DEAD - DELIST 01/03/05 RMC 
01/07/1987 GKN GKN 
01/07/1987 LONMIN LMI 
01/04/1987 SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE DEAD - 29/04/08 SCTN 
01/04/1987 WILLIS CORROON DEAD - DEAD 19/11/98 WILC 
02/01/1987 SAFEWAY (UK) DEAD - DELIST 08/03/04 SFW 
01/10/1987 UNIQ UNIQ 
01/10/1986 BRIT.&COMMONWLTH BCOM 
01/10/1986 BALFOUR BEATTY BBY 
01/07/1986 BANK OF SCOTLAND DEAD - MERGER 897376 BSCT 
01/07/1986 FERRANTI INTL. DEAD - DEAD FNTI 
01/04/1986 ULTRAMAR UMAR 
01/04/1986 ELEMENTIS ELM 
01/04/1986 SUN LIFE CORP. SUN 
01/10/1985 LONMIN LMI 
01/07/1985 RANKS HOVIS 900831 
01/07/1985 IMP.CONT.GAS ICGS 
01/04/1985 ENTERPRISE OIL DEAD - DEAD 25/06/02 ENTO 
01/04/1985 HOUSE OF FRASER HFRS 
02/01/1985 RMC GROUP DEAD - DELIST 01/03/05 RMC 
02/01/1985 ENODIS DEAD - 27/10/08 ENO 
02/01/1985 DOWTY GROUP DWTY 
02/01/1985 SYGEN INTERNATIONAL DEAD - T/O BY 296734 SNI 
04/12/1984 JOHNSON MATTHEY JMAT 
01/10/1984 SCOTTISH & NEWCASTLE DEAD - 29/04/08 SCTN 
01/10/1984 WIMPEY (GEORGE) DEAD- EX.INTO 900345 WMPY 
19/07/1984 REXAM REX 
02/07/1984 BARRATT DEVELOPMENTS BDEV 
02/07/1984 EDINBURGH INV.TRUST EDIN 
02/04/1984 MAGNET MAGS 
19/01/1984 EAGLE STAR HDG. EAGL 
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Appendix B.1: 
The normality test  of the measures of liquidity for additions and their control  
This Table reports the normality test for the main and the control sample of addition as well as the deletions by using Jarque-Bera, Kolmogorov-Smirnova and Shapiro-
Wilk. These tests show that the measures of liquidity for both the main and control sample are not normally distributed. Trading volume (VO) is the turnover by 
volume. Number of trades (NT) is the number of daily transactions for a particular stock. Ask minus bid (Ask-bid) is the difference between ask and bid price. Amihud is 
the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the pound trading volume on that day. LM12 is the proportional number of days with zero daily return over 12 
months. The control sample is constructed by matching each event stock with non-event stock with the closest pre-revision market capitalization. 
Tests of Normality Additions     Control      
  
Kolmogorov-
Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk Jarque-Bera 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk Jarque-Bera 
Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig. jb Chi(2) Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig. jb Chi(2) 
VO .244 .000 .686 .000 490 .000 .268 .000 .529 .000 3932 .000 
NT .275 .000 .633 .000 947 .000 .287 .000 .688 .000 152 .000 
Ask Bid .165 .000 .727 .000 2279 .000 .170 .000 .825 .000 181 .000 
Amihud .262 .000 .525 .000 150 .000 .286 .000 .420 .000 390 .000 
LM12 .138 .000 .920 .000 462 .000 .139 .000 .892 .000 974 .000 
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Appendix B.2: 
The normality test  of the measures of liquidity for deletions and their control  
This Table reports the normality test for the main and the control sample of addition as well as the deletions by using Jarque-Bera, Kolmogorov-Smirnova and 
Shapiro-Wilk. These tests show that the measures of liquidity for both the main and control sample are not normally distributed. Trading volume (VO) is the 
turnover by volume. Number of trades (NT) is the number of daily transactions for a particular stock. Ask minus bid (Ask-bid) is the difference between ask and bid 
price. Amihud is the average ratio of the daily absolute return to the pound trading volume on that day. LM12 is the proportional number of days with zero daily 
return over 12 months. The control sample is constructed by matching each event stock with non-event stock with the closest pre-revision market capitalization. 
 
Tests of Normality Deletions Control 
  
Kolmogorov-
Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk 
Jarque-Bera 
Kolmogorov-
Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk Jarque-Bera 
  Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig. jb Chi(2) Statistic Sig. Statistic Sig. jb Chi(2) 
VO .244 .000 .666 .000 725 .000 .261 .000 .511 .000 142 .000 
NT .277 .000 .629 .000 534 .000 .294 .000 .573 .000 612 .000 
Ask Bid .188 .000 .638 .000 333 .000 .151 .000 .791 .000 499 .000 
Amihud .148 .000 .810 .000 670 .000 .442 .000 .104 .000 145 .000 
Zero .118 .000 .921 .000 738 .000 .108 .000 .900 .000 766 .000 
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Appendix B.3 :  
The construction of LIQ 
 
The construction of LIQ is similar to the construction of SMB and HML in Fama and French (1993) and 
Carhart (1997). At the beginning of each month from January and July 1985 to July 2010, we sort all FTSE 
ALL SHARES ordinary common stocks in ascending order based on their liquidity measures LM12 producing 
two independent portfolios, low-liquidity    and high-liquidity   . The    and HL portfolios contains the 
35% of the lowest-liquidity stocks and 35% highest-liquidity in the FTSE ALL SHARES index, respectively. 
These portfolios            are held for six months after portfolio formation period. According to Liu 
(2006), the 6-month holding period is chosen because it gives a moderate liquidity premium compared to 
the 1- and 12-month holding period, which seems plausible for estimating the liquidity factor. We then 
construct the mimicking liquidity factor LIQLM12 as the monthly profits from buying one dollar of equally 
weighted    and selling one dollar of equally weighted  . We repeat the previous procedures by using 
Amihud and the inverse of trading volume 1/VOL to produce LIQAmihud and LIQ1/VOL, respectively. 
Monthly LIQ1/VOL               LIQLM12 LIQAmihud Monthly LIQ1/VOL LIQLM12 LIQAmihud 
Jan-85 
 
-0.0249501 
 
May-88 0.005343 0.019979 0.004133 
Feb-85 
 
0.0216235 
 
Jun-88 -0.01557 -0.01966 0.01956 
Mar-85 
 
0.0109143 
 
Jul-88 2.12E-05 -0.01063 -0.00971 
Apr-85 
 
0.0073344 
 
Aug-88 0.014706 0.046819 -0.0014 
May-85 
 
-0.0048781 
 
Sep-88 -0.02177 -0.03343 0.028418 
Jun-85 
 
0.0301949 
 
Oct-88 0.021555 0.005605 -0.01572 
Jul-85 
 
-0.0292097 
 
Nov-88 0.005518 0.019731 -0.01707 
Aug-85 
 
-0.0257643 
 
Dec-88 -0.03055 -0.01965 0.000467 
Sep-85 
 
0.0283532 
 
Jan-89 -0.02795 -0.06464 -0.04007 
Oct-85 
 
-0.0341878 
 
Feb-89 0.01832 0.031237 -0.0078 
Nov-85 
 
-0.00634965 
 
Mar-89 -0.04266 0.006738 -0.03567 
Dec-85 
 
0.00499774 
 
Apr-89 -0.02761 -0.00191 -0.00396 
Jan-86 
 
-0.021157 
 
May-89 -0.00702 0.018325 -0.02301 
Feb-86 
 
-0.0161872 
 
Jun-89 -0.01683 0.00942 -0.00512 
Mar-86 
 
-0.034396 
 
Jul-89 -0.03301 -0.05571 -0.03198 
Apr-86 
 
0.0357669 
 
Aug-89 -0.02076 -0.02434 -0.02619 
May-86 
 
0.0372067 
 
Sep-89 0.012233 0.036316 0.000817 
Jun-86 
 
-0.00178015 
 
Oct-89 -0.00643 -0.03372 0.00015 
Jul-86 
 
0.027775 
 
Nov-89 -0.04587 -0.0323 -0.05344 
Aug-86 
 
-0.0159104 
 
Dec-89 0.017864 -0.01555 -0.03947 
Sep-86 
 
0.0431018 
 
Jan-90 -0.018 0.039316 -0.02412 
Oct-86 
 
-0.00890176 
 
Feb-90 -0.05234 0.015442 -0.04093 
Nov-86 
 
0.0227318 
 
Mar-90 0.015721 -0.02739 0.027265 
Dec-86 
 
0.000662637 
 
Apr-90 0.009279 0.000868 0.024038 
Jan-87 0.008389 -0.0478481 -0.02834 May-90 -0.01689 -0.07527 -0.0169 
Feb-87 -0.03069 -0.0135305 -0.00033 Jun-90 -0.00159 0.000136 0.007053 
Mar-87 0.007178 0.0485138 0.029139 Jul-90 -0.0156 0.018331 -0.05356 
Apr-87 0.016578 0.0212871 0.010206 Aug-90 -0.04074 0.024291 -0.05124 
May-87 0.001272 0.0377828 -0.02137 Sep-90 -0.02759 0.022373 -0.0427 
Jun-87 -0.00858 0.0444589 -0.01327 Oct-90 0.006226 -0.02433 -0.02106 
Jul-87 0.050279 0.0232983 -0.02753 Nov-90 0.00532 -0.05224 0.005611 
Aug-87 -0.00523 0.0533799 0.008904 Dec-90 0.025926 -0.00272 -0.00214 
Sep-87 -0.03887 -0.00664178 0.012064 Jan-91 -0.03055 -0.03431 -0.00615 
Oct-87 -0.0026 0.060142 -0.05274 Feb-91 -0.02347 -0.02438 0.019829 
Nov-87 -0.02029 -0.0191089 0.019882 Mar-91 -0.01654 0.085763 -0.01008 
Dec-87 0.0335 -0.0886191 0.030629 Apr-91 -0.00257 -0.00024 -0.01197 
Jan-88 0.004813 -0.0146576 -0.00665 May-91 -0.03505 -0.00989 -0.04429 
Feb-88 0.0091 0.0145594 0.015677 Jun-91 0.011226 0.009474 0.013786 
Mar-88 0.025163 0.0362686 0.01969 Jul-91 -0.0462 -0.07195 -0.03398 
Apr-88 0.03049 -0.0268432 0.041313 Aug-91 -0.01335 -0.01477 0.00119 
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Appendix B.3 (continued): 
 
The construction of LIQ 
  
Monthly LIQ1/VOL      LIQLM12 LIQAmihud Monthly LIQ1/VOL LIQLM12 LIQAmihud 
 Sep-91 0.066473 0.065459 0.070201 Nov-95 -0.00036 -0.01922 -0.00043 
Oct-91 -0.0132 0.016936 -0.00397 Dec-95 -0.0042 0.002071 0.003746 
Nov-91 0.038209 0.058317 0.023119 Jan-96 0.025017 -0.00314 0.000269 
Dec-91 -0.02666 -0.03478 -0.0385 Feb-96 0.011447 0.027684 0.017677 
Jan-92 -0.01553 -0.04635 0.004316 Mar-96 0.023462 0.022889 0.01874 
Feb-92 0.01196 -0.0059 0.026895 Apr-96 0.018982 0.019199 0.009785 
Mar-92 -0.0049 0.006419 0.000341 May-96 0.028026 0.044651 0.023631 
Apr-92 -0.0493 -0.07196 -0.01159 Jun-96 0.001732 0.018755 -0.00997 
May-92 0.017242 0.056868 -0.00833 Jul-96 -0.03358 -0.00028 -0.03242 
Jun-92 -0.00632 0.033094 -0.03098 Aug-96 -0.0116 -0.02591 -0.00831 
Jul-92 -0.04177 0.025379 -0.06609 Sep-96 0.015832 0.006677 0.013599 
Aug-92 -0.01359 -0.00348 -0.02881 Oct-96 0.01346 -0.00192 0.019806 
Sep-92 -0.00341 -0.05296 0.017847 Nov-96 -0.02489 0.000464 -0.0226 
Oct-92 -0.0513 -0.05526 -0.05355 Dec-96 -0.02759 0.012103 -0.01158 
Nov-92 -0.01646 -0.01515 -0.03964 Jan-97 0.018997 -0.01373 -0.0068 
Dec-92 0.023749 0.003151 0.035893 Feb-97 0.039666 0.014375 0.044268 
Jan-93 0.069526 0.037804 0.073322 Mar-97 -0.00846 -0.00595 -0.00833 
Feb-93 0.044228 0.053816 0.030305 Apr-97 -0.00589 0.008672 0.005306 
Mar-93 -0.00773 0.021524 -0.00505 May-97 -0.01282 -0.02404 -0.00941 
Apr-93 0.033837 0.040077 0.03003 Jun-97 -0.01019 0.002754 -0.01003 
May-93 0.011389 0.02787 -5.3E-05 Jul-97 -0.06243 -0.05727 -0.06124 
Jun-93 0.020212 0.035388 0.003819 Aug-97 0.027432 0.020137 0.040131 
Jul-93 -0.0092 -0.01423 0.006409 Sep-97 -0.02489 -0.03829 -0.02362 
Aug-93 0.027603 0.022013 0.030689 Oct-97 0.030541 0.048789 0.042069 
Sep-93 0.017809 0.045019 0.007534 Nov-97 -0.0167 -0.00384 -0.01314 
Oct-93 0.02607 0.008496 0.026309 Dec-97 -0.0195 -0.01776 -0.00643 
Nov-93 -0.00573 0.008571 -0.01799 Jan-98 -0.00746 -0.03593 0.005005 
Dec-93 0.011107 -0.01235 0.021495 Feb-98 -0.01881 -0.04362 -0.00909 
Jan-94 0.056358 0.02698 0.027814 Mar-98 0.003508 0.015928 0.002223 
Feb-94 0.033221 0.088756 0.029001 Apr-98 -0.00107 0.007789 0.012374 
Mar-94 -0.00227 0.013731 -0.0056 May-98 0.028247 0.034427 0.031893 
Apr-94 -0.00245 0.008131 -0.01577 Jun-98 -0.00547 0.020045 -0.02066 
May-94 0.020277 0.040743 0.014945 Jul-98 -0.03952 -0.03253 -0.07226 
Jun-94 -0.0193 -0.0111 -0.01026 Aug-98 0.000667 0.041677 -0.00201 
Jul-94 -0.03174 -0.06883 -0.00895 Sep-98 -0.01453 -0.01694 -0.03222 
Aug-94 -0.00934 0.000479 -0.00601 Oct-98 -0.05928 -0.08564 -0.02657 
Sep-94 0.029609 0.060524 0.011271 Nov-98 0.014576 0.003193 -0.00746 
Oct-94 -0.03317 -0.03018 -0.02539 Dec-98 0.002575 -0.00138 -0.01597 
Nov-94 0.009627 0.009146 0.007848 Jan-99 -0.02832 -0.0474 0.000619 
Dec-94 0.002197 -0.00439 0.005176 Feb-99 -0.00887 -0.01652 0.005082 
Jan-95 0.012257 0.023922 -0.02069 Mar-99 0.019669 0.004491 0.036005 
Feb-95 -0.01487 -0.01585 -0.01593 Apr-99 0.005524 -0.02219 -0.00555 
Mar-95 -0.02524 -0.04113 -0.02934 May-99 0.021623 0.059714 5.45E-05 
Apr-95 -0.00325 0.003573 0.010327 Jun-99 -0.01012 -0.01132 -0.01367 
May-95 0.014888 0.019061 0.028324 Jul-99 0.019513 -0.00024 0.016863 
Jun-95 -0.00477 0.00319 -0.00011 Aug-99 0.014638 0.008798 0.013286 
Jul-95 -0.0101 -0.04302 -0.01143 Sep-99 0.020947 0.024052 0.014648 
Aug-95 0.058742 0.043964 0.024871 Oct-99 0.001388 -0.01231 0.006976 
Sep-95 0.014556 0.014287 -0.00775 Nov-99 0.054192 -0.04116 0.038323 
Oct-95 0.007198 -0.00406 -0.00763 Dec-99 -0.00532 -0.0371 0.050582 
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Appendix B.3 (continued): 
 
The construction of LIQ 
         
Monthly LIQ1/VOL              LIQLM12 LIQAmihud Monthly LIQ1/VOL LIQLM12 LIQAmihud 
Jan-00 0.074751 0.046986 0.062882 Feb-04 -0.01027 -0.02453 -0.0149 
Feb-00 0.001822 -0.09054 0.01504 Mar-04 0.013722 0.01328 0.007429 
Mar-00 -0.0573 -0.00359 -0.0692 Apr-04 0.003946 0.005421 0.008742 
Apr-00 -0.04631 0.012836 -0.0532 May-04 -0.02243 0.007049 -0.02956 
May-00 -0.02021 0.007427 -0.04254 Jun-04 0.000321 -0.01661 0.007415 
Jun-00 0.021517 0.004199 0.030199 Jul-04 0.014251 0.031131 0.0126 
Jul-00 0.011963 -1.3E-05 0.005622 Aug-04 0.007996 -0.00315 0.002072 
Aug-00 -0.01626 -0.04515 0.033446 Sep-04 0.015973 -0.00854 0.007449 
Sep-00 0.024527 0.057918 0.015193 Oct-04 0.009092 0.002054 0.004417 
Oct-00 -0.04554 0.000699 -0.05987 Nov-04 -0.01079 -0.02296 -0.0051 
Nov-00 0.000509 0.055242 -0.04215 Dec-04 0.004594 -0.03399 0.013388 
Dec-00 -0.03661 -0.01248 -0.03431 Jan-05 0.008558 -0.01799 0.011832 
Jan-01 0.031173 -0.01668 0.03559 Feb-05 0.012044 0.009337 -0.00121 
Feb-01 -0.00123 0.041928 -0.03393 Mar-05 0.005409 0.014305 -0.00827 
Mar-01 -0.00037 0.055302 -0.02624 Apr-05 0.012251 0.03828 0.009117 
Apr-01 -0.01175 -0.05363 -0.00158 May-05 -0.02282 -0.05978 -0.01479 
May-01 0.019458 0.023247 0.002971 Jun-05 0.008491 -0.01043 0.012985 
Jun-01 -0.01761 0.046901 -0.04857 Jul-05 -0.00311 -0.02821 -0.00035 
Jul-01 -0.02413 0.02493 -0.03489 Aug-05 0.004092 0.002954 0.013921 
Aug-01 0.019258 0.027631 0.020195 Sep-05 0.013634 -0.0254 0.019731 
Sep-01 0.019668 0.086523 -0.024 Oct-05 -0.0121 0.015971 -0.01859 
Oct-01 -0.03075 -0.05663 0.017647 Nov-05 -0.01016 -0.06184 -0.00273 
Nov-01 -0.01588 -0.05456 0.020647 Dec-05 -0.01878 -0.0317 -0.00561 
Dec-01 -0.01718 -0.00604 -0.0074 Jan-06 0.01095 -0.03209 0.014315 
Jan-02 0.012638 0.016819 -0.00694 Feb-06 0.002776 -0.01363 -0.00528 
Feb-02 0.025482 0.015108 0.004787 Mar-06 -0.01883 -0.03341 -0.0235 
Mar-02 -0.01479 -0.03789 -0.01034 Apr-06 0.007948 0.007617 0.014471 
Apr-02 0.044721 0.030333 0.033443 May-06 -0.01889 0.029165 -0.01673 
May-02 0.016962 0.012999 0.02761 Jun-06 -0.00661 -0.01276 -0.01237 
Jun-02 0.012656 0.06747 -0.00571 Jul-06 0.012269 0.000411 0.006906 
Jul-02 0.013571 0.071557 0.004422 Aug-06 -0.01244 -0.01618 -0.005 
Aug-02 0.010001 -0.01124 -0.00956 Sep-06 0.005501 -0.01596 0.009792 
Sep-02 0.012384 0.082616 -0.02103 Oct-06 -0.00371 -0.01854 -0.00726 
Oct-02 -0.07402 -0.07326 -0.05776 Nov-06 -0.00851 -0.00595 -0.01173 
Nov-02 0.007241 -0.00767 0.036394 Dec-06 0.020791 -0.02555 0.022847 
Dec-02 0.035563 0.05737 -0.00334 Jan-07 0.018375 0.006228 0.009188 
Jan-03 0.030194 0.060539 0.020992 Feb-07 -0.00093 -0.00054 -0.00108 
Feb-03 -0.00041 -0.00761 -0.00115 Mar-07 -0.01674 -0.0308 -0.0108 
Mar-03 0.023617 0.014415 0.016382 Apr-07 0.001547 -0.0049 0.010763 
Apr-03 -0.03519 -0.06216 -0.00207 May-07 0.002539 -0.00044 0.002717 
May-03 0.012588 -0.02974 0.029937 Jun-07 0.008575 0.031588 0.005828 
Jun-03 0.046334 0.036494 0.055985 Jul-07 0.01249 0.01667 0.005431 
Jul-03 -0.02575 -0.05962 -0.00093 Aug-07 -0.01188 -0.00099 -0.00928 
Aug-03 0.030533 -0.00417 0.045483 Sep-07 0.013686 0.02266 -0.00364 
Sep-03 0.025748 0.034265 0.035188 Oct-07 -0.0268 -0.0315 -0.02455 
Oct-03 -0.04049 -0.04935 -0.03499 Nov-07 -0.0048 0.054895 -0.01861 
Nov-03 0.005259 0.004134 -0.00373 Dec-07 0.00994 0.015944 -0.00494 
Dec-03 -0.00193 -0.00256 0.002885 Jan-08 0.015555 0.054979 0.012246 
Jan-04 0.005498 -0.01992 0.017339 Feb-08 0.033435 -0.01716 0.057698 
252 
 
Appendix B.3 (continued): 
 
The construction of LIQ 
 Monthly LIQ1/VOL             LIQLM12 LIQAmihud 
Mar-08 -0.01044 0.006164 -0.03053 
Apr-08 0.004655 -0.00578 0.015365 
May-08 0.019805 0.005878 0.025416 
Jun-08 0.039359 0.078865 0.035701 
Jul-08 -0.01524 0.005216 -0.02293 
Aug-08 -0.05481 -0.0468 -0.02449 
Sep-08 0.03478 0.110122 0.00779 
Oct-08 0.013253 0.134169 -0.00702 
Nov-08 -0.02364 0.043713 -0.01932 
Dec-08 -0.00505 -0.0514 0.006663 
Jan-09 0.001209 0.036119 -0.00467 
Feb-09 -0.03085 0.030056 -0.02265 
Mar-09 -0.05819 -0.05864 -0.01317 
Apr-09 0.021664 -0.15948 0.032055 
May-09 0.007885 -0.0269 0.020627 
Jun-09 0.028218 0.034031 0.022703 
Jul-09 -0.05143 -0.07516 -0.04416 
Aug-09 0.001553 -0.05593 0.045105 
Sep-09 0.019194 -0.02834 0.014601 
Oct-09 0.007603 0.015932 0.005798 
Nov-09 -0.00683 -0.00642 -0.01324 
Dec-09 -0.01901 -0.03372 -0.02212 
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Appendix B.4: 
 
The construction of smb and hml 
 
In the time of writing chapter 4 the Xfi centre of University of Exeter didn’t publish 
the estimation of SMB, HML, and MOM. Thus, we follow the standard procedures 
of Fama and French (1993) on estimating the values of SMB and HML. In June of 
each year t from 1985 to 2010, all  FT AL SHARES constituent list from DataStream 
are ranked on size. The median of FT AL SHARES stocks is then used to split shares 
into two groups, small and big (S and B). We also break FT AL SHARES listed stocks 
into three book-to-market equity groups based on the break points for the bottom 
30% (L), middle (40%) (M), and top 30% (H).  
We construct six portfolios (S/L, S/M, SH, B/L, B/M, and B/H) from the 
intersection of the two market size and the three book-to-market portfolios. For 
example, the S/L portfolio contains the stocks in the small size group that are also in 
the low-book-to-market group, and the B/H portfolio contains the big size stocks that 
also have high book-to-market value. Monthly and daily value-weighted
74
 returns on 
the six portfolios are calculated from July of year t to June of t + 1, and the portfolios 
are reformed in June of t + 1. We calculate returns beginning in July of year t to be 
sure that book equity for year t - 1 is known. Thus, SMB is the monthly (daily) 
difference between the value-weighted average of the return on the three small-stock 
portfolios (S/L, S/M and SH) and the value-weighted average of the returns on the 
three big-stock portfolios (B/L, B/M, and B/H). HML is the monthly (daily) 
difference between the value-weighted average of the return on the two high-book-
to-market portfolios (S/H, and BH) and the value-weighted average of the returns on 
the two book-to-market portfolios (S/L and B/L)
75
. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
74
 We also estimated the SMB and HML by using equally weighted return 
75
 We estimate LCAPM and LAPT using our construction of Faman and French three factors and 
momentum. We show that the results are not changed from the construction of Xfi centre that 
reported in the thesis (the results upon request) 
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Appendix B.5: 
 
The explanatory variables for the multivariate regression 
 We construct smb and hml as explained by the procedures in Appendix B.4; the data of smbExeter , 
hmlExter  and mom are obtained from Xfi Centre for Finance and Investment website, University of 
Exeter; rm and MKT=rm-rf are obtained from the Dtatastream. 
 
 Monthly SMB HML SMBExte HMLExter MOM Rm MKT 
Jul-85 -0.04555 -0.05052 0.002099 0.003029 0.000401 0.022346 0.013625 
Aug-85 0.055564 -0.00705 -0.00314 -0.00036 0.005468 0.069616 0.060878 
Sep-85 0.061217 0.041894 0.011362 0.044047 0.037836 -0.02722 -0.03596 
Oct-85 0.07663 0.011172 0.003712 0.000673 0.041399 0.074763 0.065924 
Nov-85 -0.0102 -0.0665 -0.02146 -0.01745 -0.0007 0.042269 0.033523 
Dec-85 0.059372 -0.03562 -0.00406 0.020141 -0.03349 -0.01597 -0.02484 
Jan-86 0.032966 0.049244 0.023885 0.034717 -0.00855 0.023369 0.013807 
Feb-86 0.023359 -0.03588 -0.00646 -0.02318 0.018504 0.081772 0.072395 
Mar-86 0.007751 0.020168 -0.02186 -0.00208 0.054267 0.082854 0.074309 
Apr-86 0.104106 0.087578 0.060969 0.012438 0.017723 0.010454 0.002599 
May-86 -0.01154 0.054905 0.015158 0.033192 -0.00863 -0.03052 -0.03799 
Jun-86 -0.03737 0.04002 0.003956 0.023742 0.016883 0.037278 0.029834 
Jul-86 0.090093 -0.02562 0.023193 0.012909 -0.00468 -0.05058 -0.05819 
Aug-86 -0.10616 0.009208 -0.05039 -0.00296 -0.02875 0.062049 0.05458 
Sep-86 0.150394 -0.00344 0.017921 0.038309 0.012295 -0.05578 -0.06352 
Oct-86 -0.03918 0.070082 -0.00211 0.027222 -0.01574 0.053586 0.045185 
Nov-86 0.028622 0.049355 0.017879 0.028186 -0.00651 0.013389 0.004903 
Dec-86 0.043479 0.000159 0.003003 0.034716 -0.00068 0.02819 0.019721 
Jan-87 0.079499 -0.01776 0.011244 0.0108 0.020681 0.084479 0.076078 
Feb-87 -0.03373 -0.08062 -0.01252 -0.04673 -0.01092 0.091442 0.083318 
Mar-87 0.104325 0.062702 0.041604 0.047876 0.032154 0.020099 0.012647 
Apr-87 -0.092 0.072028 0.002159 0.020712 -0.01709 0.026341 0.018997 
May-87 -0.00901 -0.02183 0.002498 0.002537 0.016402 0.07487 0.068056 
Jun-87 0.058392 0.121718 0.067638 0.046687 0.03711 0.053586 0.046562 
Jul-87 0.166007 -0.02297 0.051921 0.013136 0.01206 0.045087 0.037928 
Aug-87 0.056158 0.037499 0.00046 -0.00098 -0.00648 -0.04372 -0.05159 
Sep-87 -0.06294 0.025686 0.000492 0.004227 0.004299 0.056858 0.049061 
Oct-87 -0.00262 0.039175 0.02861 0.067167 -0.05128 -0.26347 -0.27057 
Nov-87 -0.05783 0.045671 -0.05038 0.037239 -0.01173 -0.09905 -0.10585 
Dec-87 -0.06767 -0.08181 -0.00278 0.011263 -0.03225 0.096804 0.090207 
Jan-88 0.071899 0.036074 0.019846 -0.00738 -0.00934 0.056013 0.049416 
Feb-88 0.058326 0.052456 0.009219 0.009049 0.002968 -0.00499 -0.01205 
Mar-88 0.074872 0.02523 0.022811 0.021356 0.031741 -0.00886 -0.01536 
Apr-88 -0.03127 -0.01663 -0.00135 0.011066 0.006182 0.038627 0.032324 
May-88 0.045546 -0.02769 0.026674 0.001563 0.026513 -0.0015 -0.00727 
Jun-88 0.034927 -0.01791 -0.00564 -0.00503 -0.03005 0.046342 0.039107 
Jul-88 0.014217 -0.00806 0.019502 0.024809 0.015098 0.005817 -0.00236 
Aug-88 0.037766 0.017079 -0.00063 0.016351 0.012749 -0.05238 -0.06148 
Sep-88 -0.07668 0.043796 -0.02256 0.00942 0.014677 0.042373 0.033341 
Oct-88 0.029234 0.031839 0.017621 0.026406 -0.01222 0.024086 0.014969 
 
 
 
 
255 
 
Appendix B.5 (continued):  
 
The explanatory variables for the multivariate regression 
Monthly SMB HML SMBExte HMLExter MOM Rm MKT 
Nov-88 0.016855 0.061597 0.011235 0.037221 0.011218 -0.02955 -0.03948 
Dec-88 -0.08227 0.005 -0.04028 0.008654 -0.00742 -0.00349 -0.01337 
Jan-89 -0.10248 0.025909 -0.03585 0.005477 -0.03351 0.142479 0.132757 
Feb-89 0.193197 -0.04664 0.041548 -0.01353 0.031051 -0.00817 -0.01804 
Mar-89 0.014893 -0.0085 -0.0125 -0.00496 0.010877 0.035827 0.026046 
Apr-89 -0.03242 0.01706 -0.01933 -0.00659 0.009088 0.016434 0.006771 
May-89 0.003237 0.022397 -0.00781 -0.00797 0.033382 0.00451 -0.00593 
Jun-89 -0.02657 0.007185 -0.02134 0.009406 0.004588 0.013389 0.00269 
Jul-89 -0.10542 0.06549 -0.02846 0.014276 -0.00262 0.068547 0.058135 
Aug-89 -0.0667 -0.00447 -0.04463 -0.04344 0.004689 0.032518 0.022021 
Sep-89 0.074631 0.021716 0.015388 0.013931 -0.01544 -0.028 -0.03856 
Oct-89 -0.13758 -0.00757 -0.0347 -0.013 0.012161 -0.07235 -0.08291 
Nov-89 -0.12651 0.043125 -0.05326 -0.01309 0.033744 0.057386 0.046814 
Dec-89 -0.03822 0.041273 -0.03003 0.017904 -0.01473 0.06173 0.0504 
Jan-90 0.128445 -0.03419 0.033059 0.00779 -0.00217 -0.02761 -0.03893 
Feb-90 -0.0385 -0.0065 -0.00919 -0.01366 0.010048 -0.03468 -0.04591 
Mar-90 -0.0065 -0.06766 -0.0298 -0.01039 0.018191 -0.0025 -0.01391 
Apr-90 -0.0644 -0.02065 -0.0018 0.015171 -0.00791 -0.06031 -0.07175 
May-90 0.1065 -0.14084 -0.05521 0.012109 -0.00733 0.110822 0.0995 
Jun-90 0.0148 0.094484 0.005472 0.00473 0.007415 0.018774 0.007562 
Jul-90 -0.0207 0.061574 0.007959 0.009372 0.014851 -0.01676 -0.02798 
Aug-90 -0.0837 -0.09973 -0.03884 0.014872 0.023357 -0.07965 -0.09084 
Sep-90 -0.0846 -0.04318 -0.02578 -0.01131 0.030129 -0.08011 -0.09126 
Oct-90 0.0317 -0.01916 -0.02379 0.02889 0.006119 0.036552 0.026224 
Nov-90 0.0397 -0.14403 -0.04585 0.030442 0.02304 0.04446 0.034452 
Dec-90 0.0001 0.057196 -0.00395 -0.01212 -0.00195 0.004711 -0.00557 
Jan-91 0.0039 -0.14411 -0.05979 -0.01555 0.012904 0.008435 -0.00166 
Feb-91 0.1098 0.15509 0.062768 0.016061 -0.06207 0.114382 0.104845 
Mar-91 0.0377 0.218322 0.059521 -0.02163 -0.01671 0.041852 0.032694 
Apr-91 0.0079 0.043619 -0.00417 -0.01083 0.00393 0.01187 0.003006 
May-91 -0.0007 -0.06914 -0.02765 -0.02268 0.028168 0.003306 -0.00524 
Jun-91 -0.0338 0.033938 -0.01109 -0.02703 0.019138 -0.02975 -0.03824 
Jul-91 0.0643 -0.1475 -0.06472 0.005543 0.036023 0.068547 0.06023 
Aug-91 0.0265 0.047286 0.01484 -0.01089 -0.00571 0.030455 0.022431 
Sep-91 -0.0021 0.164609 0.054933 0.001368 0.018095 0.001802 -0.00594 
Oct-91 -0.0216 0.081747 0.006284 -0.04679 0.04007 -0.01764 -0.02561 
Nov-91 -0.0563 0.120097 0.02351 -0.04778 0.021905 -0.05228 -0.06032 
Dec-91 0.016 -0.1084 -0.06739 -0.04616 0.038104 0.020303 0.012187 
Jan-92 0.0338 0.017792 0.006359 -0.017 0.009288 0.038004 0.030124 
Feb-92 0.0016 0.018738 0.007991 -0.00958 0.028286 0.005616 -0.00216 
Mar-92 -0.0473 0.047243 -0.00783 -0.01878 0.013668 -0.04324 -0.05137 
Apr-92 0.0948 -0.03437 0.003271 0.064331 -0.04868 0.098999 0.091169 
May-92 0.0226 0.126724 0.028193 -0.00384 -0.00534 0.026546 0.01901 
Jun-92 -0.0725 0.041737 -0.00768 -0.01458 0.03982 -0.06882 -0.07638 
Jul-92 -0.0604 -0.08688 -0.06643 -0.05344 0.016703 -0.05635 -0.06403 
Aug-92 -0.0404 -0.04076 -0.03076 -0.00989 0.038995 -0.03613 -0.04387 
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Appendix B.5 (continued):  
 
The explanatory variables for the multivariate regression 
 
Monthly SMB HML SMBExte HMLExter MOM Rm MKT 
Sep-92 0.0995 -0.06135 -0.02625 -0.01221 -0.00664 0.103956 0.097343 
Oct-92 0.0419 -0.12722 -0.02274 0.022885 -0.03444 0.045923 0.040458 
Nov-92 0.0448 -0.03453 -0.00608 0.013073 0.000212 0.048751 0.043521 
Dec-92 0.0387 0.149243 0.056294 0.025417 -0.02398 0.042477 0.037348 
Feb-93 0.0236 0.051746 -0.00314 0.046097 0.006808 0.027162 0.022761 
Mar-93 0.0083 0.02329 0.014568 0.039728 0.021968 0.011769 0.007384 
Apr-93 -0.0136 0.095311 0.041008 0.028083 -0.02006 -0.01035 -0.01473 
May-93 0.0105 0.027516 0.013698 0.022414 0.009149 0.013794 0.009527 
Jun-93 0.0206 0.015794 0.002585 0.026208 0.025435 0.023881 0.019655 
Jul-93 0.0115 -0.03257 -0.00957 0.038244 0.0231 0.014707 0.010557 
Aug-93 0.0611 0.05018 0.004679 0.007442 -0.01708 0.064282 0.060131 
Sep-93 -0.0199 0.063835 0.008582 0.026514 0.028067 -0.01686 -0.02108 
Oct-93 0.039 -0.02299 -0.021 8.43E-05 0.017753 0.042165 0.038081 
Nov-93 -0.0057 -0.07077 -0.0276 -0.00364 0.007702 -0.0027 -0.00674 
Dec-93 0.0808 0.026508 -0.01566 0.014635 0.040654 0.083829 0.079838 
Jan-94 0.0379 0.178465 0.076442 0.036404 0.005679 0.040707 0.036749 
Feb-94 -0.0404 0.140914 0.042449 0.004989 -0.00981 -0.03806 -0.04191 
Mar-94 -0.0678 0.025823 -0.01134 -0.00209 -0.02512 -0.06209 -0.06611 
Apr-94 0.0118 0.053597 0.002604 -0.00714 -0.00022 0.015215 0.011265 
May-94 -0.0501 0.057272 0.01853 0.011392 -0.00152 -0.04829 -0.05221 
Jun-94 -0.0252 -0.09639 -0.03803 0.004644 -0.0073 -0.02078 -0.02479 
Jul-94 0.0563 -0.05382 -0.02553 0.015589 0.017623 0.060033 0.055481 
Aug-94 0.0523 -0.03198 -0.03398 -0.00361 -0.00074 0.055801 0.051442 
Sep-94 -0.0711 0.062197 0.020169 0.007645 0.015509 -0.06677 -0.07122 
Oct-94 0.0168 -0.07371 -0.02836 0.004339 0.004982 0.019284 0.014866 
Nov-94 -0.0053 0.007966 -0.00525 -0.01031 0.002094 -0.0028 -0.00744 
Dec-94 -0.0044 -0.01228 -0.01541 -0.00188 0.010746 -0.0004 -0.0052 
Jan-95 -0.0269 -0.00625 0.005173 -0.00107 0.011001 -0.02557 -0.03052 
Feb-95 0.0043 -0.00907 -0.01277 -0.00682 -0.01321 0.007327 0.002314 
Mar-95 0.0347 -0.04043 -0.01645 -0.00869 -0.01213 0.043207 0.038254 
Apr-95 0.026 0.016286 0.003531 0.002001 0.017063 0.029219 0.023863 
May-95 0.0341 0.055229 0.003003 0.001076 0.00187 0.038108 0.033179 
Jun-95 -0.0055 0.01363 -0.01543 -0.03101 0.039895 -0.0021 -0.00745 
Jul-95 0.049 -0.00024 -0.00126 0.007547 0.000101 0.051271 0.045932 
Aug-95 0.0096 0.111091 0.012004 -0.03386 0.022167 0.013997 0.008683 
Sep-95 0.0083 -0.00611 0.009386 -0.03137 0.039978 0.013389 0.0081 
Oct-95 0.0002 0.025907 -0.00391 -0.04659 0.048759 0.002603 -0.00269 
Nov-95 0.0314 -0.05602 -0.01834 0.000963 0.02384 0.034067 0.028904 
Dec-95 0.0081 -0.02537 -0.0094 0.012304 0.000368 0.012984 0.007946 
Jan-96 0.0216 0.064203 0.015076 -0.00054 0.00835 0.024495 0.019642 
Feb-96 -0.0006 0.081092 0.022722 -0.00699 -0.003 0.001701 -0.00311 
Mar-96 0.0015 0.06654 0.020981 0.000916 -0.00459 0.00894 0.004229 
Apr-96 0.0386 0.088173 0.034584 -0.00193 0.004321 0.043207 0.038505 
May-96 -0.0151 0.119156 0.021181 -0.02951 0.010208 -0.01213 -0.01686 
Jun-96 -0.0156 0.035974 -0.00566 0.003007 0.018725 -0.01203 -0.01655 
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Appendix B.5 (continued):  
 
The explanatory variables for the multivariate regression 
 
 
Monthly SMB HML SMBExte HMLExter MOM Rm MKT 
Jul-96 -0.0113 -0.12566 -0.03084 0.015299 -0.00744 -0.00747 -0.01196 
Aug-96 0.0439 -0.00034 -0.01284 -0.00867 0.030347 0.05001 0.045525 
Sep-96 0.0151 -0.00109 -0.01017 -0.00046 0.030279 0.018774 0.014264 
Oct-96 0.0061 0.04495 0.011818 -0.01206 0.017415 0.008032 0.003455 
Nov-96 0.0144 -0.03351 -0.02516 0.017194 -0.00513 0.016739 0.011768 
Dec-96 0.0144 -0.0173 -0.00805 0.021012 0.003126 0.017349 0.012353 
Jan-97 0.0367 0.092596 0.035171 0.00232 0.047961 0.037797 0.032985 
Feb-97 0.0097 0.054837 0.007329 -0.00105 -0.01611 0.011769 0.007016 
Mar-97 -0.0039 -0.03158 -0.02419 0.009281 -0.00991 0.002603 -0.00229 
Apr-97 0.017 -0.05013 -0.01546 0.007261 0.040095 0.021426 0.016456 
May-97 0.0307 -0.07452 -0.03679 0.023768 0.033824 0.033861 0.028823 
Jun-97 -0.0074 -0.05919 -0.02203 0.019582 0.012196 -0.00389 -0.00909 
Jul-97 0.0507 -0.18166 -0.05919 0.019274 0.034403 0.050536 0.045163 
Aug-97 -0.008 0.083071 0.036954 -0.00176 -0.02546 -0.00399 -0.00958 
Sep-97 0.0783 -0.06231 -0.01981 -0.02566 0.004029 0.081015 0.075441 
Oct-97 -0.0656 0.105484 0.03255 0.013399 0.015217 -0.06471 -0.07029 
Nov-97 -0.0023 -0.02261 -0.02523 -0.0059 -0.0075 -0.0009 -0.00666 
Dec-97 0.0535 -0.07841 -0.02005 -0.03286 0.053534 0.05559 0.049933 
Jan-98 0.0521 -0.067 -0.03893 -0.0206 0.113312 0.052744 0.047304 
Feb-98 0.0578 -0.07642 0.00188 -0.00536 -0.01262 0.059397 0.053815 
Mar-98 0.0366 0.046319 0.016355 0.030218 0.001861 0.042686 0.037095 
Apr-98 0.0026 0.038697 0.004037 0.005817 -0.01462 0.004711 -0.00095 
May-98 0.0047 0.114814 0.038967 0.008022 0.014775 0.00632 0.000646 
Jun-98 -0.021 -0.0542 -0.0546 -0.01154 0.051099 -0.01882 -0.02475 
Jul-98 -0.0032 -0.10648 -0.03943 -0.02689 0.063645 -0.0024 -0.00828 
Aug-98 -0.1075 -0.07167 -0.04845 -0.00702 0.004028 -0.10381 -0.10965 
Sep-98 -0.0393 -0.09932 -0.04191 0.036264 -0.04182 -0.037 -0.04246 
Oct-98 0.0682 -0.13868 -0.03372 0.020019 -0.04869 0.069723 0.064418 
Nov-98 0.0487 0.01238 -0.01661 -0.02854 0.038107 0.050536 0.045481 
Dec-98 0.0179 -0.00744 -0.00612 -0.07009 0.0548 0.019182 0.014638 
Jan-99 0.0082 0.049266 0.024809 -0.03152 0.043571 0.008637 0.004361 
Feb-99 0.048 0.072361 0.020272 0.02385 -0.07046 0.049695 0.045612 
Mar-99 0.0246 0.047937 0.03982 0.026497 -0.05343 0.030867 0.026876 
Apr-99 0.0462 0.016422 0.040225 0.104127 -0.09871 0.048437 0.044437 
May-99 -0.0458 0.079794 0.01373 0.008215 0.015602 -0.04438 -0.04841 
Jun-99 0.0196 0.032525 0.010926 0.00689 0.006017 0.021426 0.017586 
Jul-99 -0.0071 0.082659 0.04737 0.002034 0.016623 -0.00638 -0.01034 
Aug-99 0.0048 0.120686 0.027936 0.006177 -0.02381 0.008839 0.004889 
Sep-99 -0.0384 -0.09467 0.019351 -0.04625 0.004427 -0.03661 -0.04083 
Oct-99 0.0277 -0.03809 -0.00341 -0.09546 0.046802 0.028601 0.024342 
Nov-99 0.0628 0.213173 0.059582 -0.1683 0.1263 0.064282 0.059981 
Dec-99 0.0503 0.092713 0.004278 -0.03313 0.11443 0.051692 0.047131 
Jan-00 -0.0821 0.222916 0.082303 -0.08663 0.068549 -0.08158 -0.08623 
Feb-00 0.0046 0.11116 0.032383 -0.13998 0.112937 0.006924 0.002179 
Mar-00 0.0405 -0.22654 -0.06719 0.049642 -0.1912 0.044251 0.039507 
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Appendix B.5 (continued):  
 
The explanatory variables for the multivariate regression 
 
 
Monthly SMB HML SMBExte HMLExter MOM Rm MKT 
Apr-00 -0.0349 -0.07153 -0.05195 0.090256 -0.13722 -0.03285 -0.03769 
May-00 0.0051 -0.10795 -0.02201 0.067372 -0.12943 0.006823 0.00207 
Jun-00 0.0041 0.251537 0.037795 0.015411 0.044195 0.005314 0.00057 
Jul-00 0.0108 0.00674 0.01242 -0.04051 0.036465 0.01187 0.007125 
Aug-00 0.0475 0.016565 0.030328 -0.03168 0.03988 0.051797 0.04701 
Sep-00 -0.0557 0.060347 -0.00178 0.026964 -0.06176 -0.05427 -0.05898 
Oct-00 0.0161 -0.14706 -0.06491 0.117269 -0.08526 0.017145 0.012434 
Nov-00 -0.0433 0.042348 -0.01169 0.129399 -0.10658 -0.0419 -0.04649 
Dec-00 0.0132 -0.03495 0.026085 -0.00342 0.009058 0.01491 0.01035 
Jan-01 0.0155 0.140737 0.043623 0.017669 -0.06393 0.016129 0.01166 
Feb-01 -0.0535 0.073447 0.021799 0.043367 0.103277 -0.05077 -0.05515 
Mar-01 -0.0546 -0.05643 -0.04117 0.12498 0.087888 -0.05058 -0.05476 
Apr-01 0.0581 -0.01952 0.009848 -0.01273 -0.03051 0.060457 0.056273 
May-01 -0.0202 0.154756 0.0392 0.006257 0.070968 -0.01804 -0.02207 
Jun-01 -0.0296 0.005415 -0.00973 0.078334 0.089022 -0.02819 -0.03229 
Jul-01 -0.0235 -0.10853 -0.02409 0.067216 0.009654 -0.02274 -0.0268 
Aug-01 -0.0277 0.088858 0.067819 0.040431 0.082258 -0.02332 -0.02646 
Sep-01 -0.0964 -0.33481 -0.10707 0.132331 0.06063 -0.09426 -0.09775 
Oct-01 0.0312 0.113653 0.043678 0.010381 -0.06142 0.032414 0.02905 
Nov-01 0.0417 0.099348 0.043643 0.055192 -0.07338 0.043625 0.040537 
Dec-01 0.0039 -0.02118 0.017484 -0.0023 0.0309 0.00451 0.001372 
Jan-02 -0.011 0.051168 0.01891 -0.03972 0.099418 -0.01045 -0.0136 
Feb-02 -0.0116 0.021179 -0.00511 -0.03283 0.078385 -0.00807 -0.01128 
Mar-02 0.0367 0.075251 0.020431 0.025537 0.008276 0.041956 0.038684 
Apr-02 -0.0177 0.148865 0.058892 0.004017 0.059681 -0.01558 -0.01883 
May-02 -0.0145 0.088459 0.023852 0.029801 0.022048 -0.01222 -0.01564 
Jun-02 -0.0858 -0.0029 -0.00134 -0.00936 0.052777 -0.08424 -0.08746 
Jul-02 -0.0938 -0.12517 -0.03483 0.0752 0.018055 -0.09226 -0.09553 
Aug-02 -0.0022 -0.08026 -0.01756 0.058735 0.03187 0.003306 0.000176 
Sep-02 -0.1196 0.078052 -0.00454 -0.03596 0.088172 -0.11759 -0.12068 
Oct-02 0.0762 -0.28201 -0.07479 0.043994 -0.02143 0.077884 0.074788 
Nov-02 0.0331 0.063905 0.030876 0.050899 -0.09484 0.035413 0.032274 
Dec-02 -0.0545 0.071411 0.004639 -0.00961 0.073968 -0.05342 -0.05657 
Jan-03 -0.0905 0.086615 0.029276 0.049206 -0.01151 -0.08972 -0.0928 
Feb-03 0.0214 -0.09026 -0.02256 0.020248 0.035436 0.026238 0.023401 
Mar-03 -0.0133 -0.00971 -0.00881 -0.02085 0.015527 -0.00618 -0.00903 
Apr-03 0.0897 0.005136 0.007204 -0.00048 -0.11589 0.093737 0.090908 
May-03 0.0409 0.182112 0.076104 0.066215 -0.05043 0.043834 0.041038 
Jun-03 0.0012 0.181342 0.046797 -0.02329 -0.0197 0.003105 0.000259 
Jul-03 0.0378 0.162707 0.029812 0.025928 -0.03049 0.039459 0.036797 
Aug-03 0.0092 0.157659 0.035217 -0.00066 -0.01938 0.015621 0.01275 
Sep-03 -0.0179 0.002011 -0.0017 0.016868 0.01743 -0.01597 -0.01886 
Oct-03 0.0482 0.014915 -0.00767 -0.00085 0.016762 0.049486 0.046389 
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Appendix B.5 (continued):  
 
The explanatory variables for the multivariate regression 
 
 
Monthly SMB HML SMBExte HMLExter MOM Rm MKT 
Nov-03 0.01 -0.0717 -0.01854 0.035117 -0.01092 0.012882 0.009752 
Dec-03 0.0283 -0.03591 -0.0083 0.021251 -0.00016 0.029219 0.026055 
Jan-04 -0.0092 0.232176 0.069008 0.013948 0.055318 -0.00866 -0.0119 
Feb-04 0.0257 0.013636 0.001369 0.00851 0.023037 0.028601 0.025304 
Mar-04 -0.0207 0.037966 0.008672 0.001565 -0.01302 -0.01321 -0.01663 
Apr-04 0.0184 -0.08335 -0.02075 0.003642 -0.03514 0.02061 0.017154 
May-04 -0.0159 -0.05765 -0.02609 -0.00264 -0.01402 -0.01321 -0.01684 
Jun-04 0.0122 0.094455 0.030742 -0.01423 0.031035 0.014707 0.010933 
Jul-04 -0.0164 -0.04694 -0.01192 0.017007 -0.00156 -0.01538 -0.01923 
Aug-04 0.01 -0.04268 -0.02245 0.019372 -0.00302 0.016535 0.012678 
Sep-04 0.026 0.017344 0.012236 0.014859 0.027702 0.027779 0.023947 
Oct-04 0.0114 0.008121 0.000408 0.022181 -0.00226 0.012275 0.008459 
Nov-04 0.0207 0.022009 0.010525 0.024375 0.01591 0.023983 0.020193 
Dec-04 0.0279 0.017161 0.013789 0.00706 -0.0036 0.029116 0.025292 
Jan-05 0.0126 0.116669 0.032434 0.013783 -0.00018 0.013288 0.009489 
Feb-05 0.0222 0.052424 -0.00177 -0.00792 -0.00153 0.025931 0.022048 
Mar-05 -0.0151 -0.01204 -0.00159 0.016063 -0.01542 -0.00876 -0.01264 
Apr-05 -0.0247 -0.02057 -0.03381 -0.02325 -0.00881 -0.02254 -0.02637 
May-05 0.036 -0.04452 -0.01526 0.009366 0.006259 0.039043 0.035244 
Jun-05 0.0309 0.058697 0.018206 0.011291 0.018804 0.033964 0.03019 
Jul-05 0.033 -0.01084 -0.00398 0.004117 0.002456 0.033861 0.030237 
Aug-05 0.0055 0.024802 0.01278 -0.0005 0.022855 0.011668 0.008086 
Sep-05 0.0326 -0.00894 -0.01652 -0.02329 0.047545 0.034171 0.030573 
Oct-05 -0.0296 -0.05495 -0.01949 0.004583 -0.00605 -0.02887 -0.03249 
Nov-05 0.0288 0.159093 0.050924 -0.02898 0.024369 0.033034 0.029436 
Dec-05 0.0387 0.000143 -0.0059 -0.01355 0.016703 0.039355 0.03574 
Jan-06 0.0286 0.127468 0.035604 -0.01064 0.043062 0.029116 0.025518 
Feb-06 0.0094 0.055804 0.018914 -0.00102 -0.00819 0.012072 0.008491 
Mar-06 0.0311 -0.07094 -0.01929 0.016523 0.022927 0.037901 0.034294 
Apr-06 0.0086 -0.02322 -0.00966 -0.01407 0.032432 0.010656 0.007025 
May-06 -0.0512 -0.0182 -0.00317 -0.00225 -0.02073 -0.04782 -0.0515 
Jun-06 0.0174 -0.01923 -0.00921 -0.00213 -0.01117 0.020099 0.016393 
Jul-06 0.0124 -0.02448 -0.01897 0.018264 0.004935 0.013186 0.009371 
Aug-06 0.0011 0.065276 0.011927 -0.01171 -0.00268 0.007125 0.003234 
Sep-06 0.0143 0.032643 0.019593 0.030274 -0.00194 0.015722 0.011756 
Oct-06 0.0295 -0.02396 0.002725 0.033082 0.007458 0.030352 0.026293 
Nov-06 -0.0066 0.047021 0.022802 0.016352 0.025475 -0.0029 -0.00698 
Dec-06 0.0326 0.070021 0.036579 0.008468 0.037333 0.033344 0.029185 
Jan-07 -0.003 0.085063 0.00773 -0.00982 -0.01015 -0.0025 -0.00686 
Feb-07 -0.0042 0.032989 -0.00238 -0.02054 0.003111 -0.0017 -0.00602 
Mar-07 0.0266 -0.05244 0.001823 -0.00557 0.00895 0.033447 0.029071 
Apr-07 0.022 0.046697 -0.00552 0.000365 0.001988 0.024495 0.020044 
May-07 0.0248 0.006092 -0.01852 0.013676 0.006014 0.02819 0.023663 
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Appendix B.5 (continued):  
 
The explanatory variables for the multivariate regression 
 
Monthly SMB HML SMBExte HMLExter MOM Rm MKT 
Jun-07 -0.0101 -0.01697 -0.05012 0.005186 -0.03127 -0.00757 -0.01226 
Jul-07 -0.0338 0.074804 0.030219 -0.01509 0.005162 -0.03324 -0.0379 
Aug-07 -0.0087 -0.07693 -0.02361 -0.00797 -0.00784 -0.0027 -0.00738 
Sep-07 0.0173 -0.12603 -0.07514 -0.00825 0.070596 0.018876 0.014324 
Oct-07 0.0414 -0.02288 0.012665 0.005529 0.033509 0.043416 0.038889 
Nov-07 -0.0502 -0.14601 -0.08793 -0.04076 0.05391 -0.04744 -0.05186 
Dec-07 0.0018 -0.04036 -0.03743 -0.00339 0.037862 0.002603 -0.00166 
Jan-08 -0.0872 -0.01793 0.004453 0.004952 -0.01685 -0.08662 -0.09073 
Feb-08 0.0043 0.169838 0.050118 -0.00831 0.065192 0.00773 0.003672 
Mar-08 -0.0285 -0.04697 0.00181 -0.01085 -0.00551 -0.02059 -0.02448 
Apr-08 0.0591 -0.04527 -0.04479 0.012695 0.064736 0.06258 0.058589 
May-08 -0.0057 0.026887 -0.01984 -0.02255 0.071989 -0.002 -0.00611 
Jun-08 -0.0735 0.023193 -0.02095 -0.04728 0.112249 -0.07068 -0.07484 
Jul-08 -0.0373 -0.01215 0.002426 -0.04793 -0.06122 -0.03603 -0.04017 
Aug-08 0.0435 0.010794 0.00808 0.011396 -0.0818 0.049905 0.045881 
Sep-08 -0.1342 -0.00817 -0.00051 -0.04365 -0.01487 -0.13238 -0.13606 
Oct-08 -0.1208 -0.17364 -0.11439 -0.05545 0.137742 -0.119 -0.12191 
Nov-08 -0.0228 -0.14558 -0.05952 -0.00915 0.043807 -0.01666 -0.01805 
Dec-08 0.0353 0.006857 -0.03141 0.016002 0.022334 0.03676 0.035784 
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Appendix B.6: 
 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation matrix of explanatory variables 
 
LIQ1/VOL, LIQLM12, LIQAmihud are mimicking liquidity factors. The construction of mimicking liquidity factor is similar to the construction of SMB and HML in 
Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). At the beginning of each month from January and July 1985 to July 2010, we sort all FT ALL SHARES ordinary 
common stocks in ascending order based on their liquidity measures producing two independent portfolios, low-liquidity     and high-liquidity    as 
follows:    portfolio contains the 35% lowest-liquidity FT ALL SHARES stocks while    includes the 35% highest-liquidity FT ALL SHARES stocks. The two 
portfolios            are held for six months after portfolio formation. According to Liu (2006), the 6-month holding period is chosen because it gives a 
moderate liquidity premium compared with the 1- and 12-month holding which seems plausible for estimating the liquidity factor. We then construct 
the liquidity factor as the monthly profits from buying one dollar of equally weighted    and selling one dollar of equally weighted  .  We construct 
smb and hml as explained by the procedures in Appendix B.4; the data of smbExeter , hmlExter  and mom are obtained from Xfi Centre for Finance and 
Investment website, University of Exeter; rm and rm-rf are obtained from the Dtatastream. 
 
Panel A:  Descriptive statistics 
          MKT SMB HML SMBExter HMLExter MOM LIQ1/VOL LIQLM12 LIQAmihud 
Mean 0.0058 0.0106 0.0039 -0.0007 0.0048 0.0087 -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0011 
Median 0.0099 0.0130 0.0036 -0.0009 0.0045 0.0080 0.0000 0.0004 0.0000 
Minimum -0.2660 -0.3348 -0.1691 -0.1144 -0.1683 -0.1912 -0.0740 -0.1595 -0.0723 
Maximum 0.1386 0.2515 0.1487 0.0823 0.1323 0.1377 0.0748 0.1342 0.0733 
Panel A:  Correlation matrix          
  
       rm SMB HML SMBExter HMExter MOM LIQ1/VOL 
          
LIQLM12 LIQAmihud 
MKT 1.000 -.093 .114 -.018 .063 -.119 -.241 -.710 -.006 
SMB  1.000 -.279 .854 -.018 .040 .529 .261 .513 
HML - - 1.000 -.114 .525 -.049 -.135 -.118 -.106 
smbExter - - - 1.000 .090 -.047 .457 .183 .476 
hmlExter - - - - 1.000 -.320 -.014 .046 -.033 
MOM - - - - - 1.000 .140 .090 .012 
LIQ1/VOL - - - - - - 1.000 .475 .681 
LIQLM12 - - - - - - - 1.000 .122 
LIQAmihud - - - - - - - - 1.000 
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Appendix B.7: 
The estimation of LCAPM using Amihud 
This Table estimates the factors of LCAPM by using Firm-by-firm time series regression. We apply the 
monthly time-series regression of 24 months (260 days) around the index additions. The 24 months 
sample is run of each addition (deletion) for t from month -24 to month -1 prior to the addition 
(deletion) month and from month +1 to month +24 after the addition (deletion) month. To estimate 
the factors of Liu (2006) we follow the procedures explained by Lin et al. (2009) as in Eqs.(4.2) and 
(4.3).    and     are firms  ’s factor loadings for the FTSE ALL SHARES return and mimicking liquidity 
factors LIQ, respectively      and        are the loading factors of FTSE ALL SHARES return and 
liquidity in the pre-event, respectively         and       are the difference in the loading factors in the 
post- relative to pre-event of FTSE ALL SHARES return and liquidity, respectively. %Ch is the 
percentage of increase in the sample that experiences an increase        and          in the post-event 
period. The t-values with autoregressive error correction standard error, assuming that the errors of 
the coefficient estimates follow AR (1) process. The asterisks ***, ** and * indicate significance at a 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively 
 
               Monthly estimation of LCAPM  
Panel A: Additions 
 
                              
          
     Mean 0.998 -0.368 -0.142 -0.398 
Median 0.928 -0.182 -0.102 -0.151 
  
 
(10.15**) (-2.40**) (-0.025) (-2.15**) 
  %Ch  (56.3)  (53.5)   
               
Mean 0.236 -0.545 0.282 -0.585   
Median 0.066 -0.245 -0.02 -.179   
 (1.31) (-2.35-*) (1.43) (-2.11**)   
%Ch  (61)  (54.2)   
Panel B: Deletions 
                               
                 
Mean 0.912 -0.084 -0.364 -0.072   
Median 0.863 -0.050 -0.118 0.081   
t-value (6.94***) (-0.541) (-2.26**) (-0.353)   
%Ch  52.1  46.8   
               
Mean 0.226 -0.169 0.146 -0.179   
Median 0.001 -0.150 0.061 0.060   
t-value (1.18) (0.840) (0.560) (-0.690)   
%Ch  53.24  48.20   
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Appendix B.8: 
Check the robustness of LCAPM and LAPT 
Table5.9 compares the robustness of LCAPM and the Multivariate model. 
In this table, we compare between the LCAPM and the LAPT pricing models by using three criteria. 
First, we estmate the percentage of the stocks with non-significant intercepts. The higher the 
perecentage of stocks with non-significant intercepts, the more powerful the model. Second, we 
estimate the adjusted R-squared for each stock. Then, we avraged the adjusted R-squared over all 
the sample. The higher the  average adjusted R-squared, the more powerful the model. Third, we 
estimate the Akaike information criteria (AIC) for each stock. Then, we avraged AIC over all the 
sample. The model with lower AIC average is the best.  We estimate these criteria for the additions 
and deletions, seperately. 
  Additions   Deletions 
 
LCAPM LAPT 
 
LCAPM LAPT 
Adj. R2 0.29 0.33 
 
0.30 0.34 
AIC 3.37 3.45 
 
3.36 3.38 
%Non-sign α 75.8 76.4 
 
81.8 81.5 
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Appendix B.9: 
Changes in comovement with FTSE100 and N-FTSE100 index  
 
This Table estimate the unvariate and bivariate regression for each addition (deletion) separately for 
the pre- and post- additions (deletions) as in Eqs.(5.1) and (5.2), respectively. From the univariate 
regression we record the average changes in the post relative to the pre-event for the slope 
coefficient,    , and the change in R2, ΔR2. For the bivariate model, we repeat the same procedures 
in the univariate model and we examine the mean changes in the slopes,            
and            . The FTSE100 index is a value-weighted index comprising the 100 largest stocks in 
the LSE. The FTSE250 Index is also a value-weighted index consisting of the 101st to the 350th largest 
companies based on market capitalisation- on the London Stock Exchange. The regressions are 
estimated separately for the pre- and post-event periods using seemingly unrelated regression 
procedure (SUR) following Mase (2008) to account for any possible dependence across the sample as 
we have multiple additions and deletions at each quarterly review. The asterisks ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at a 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Table 4.1 shows that approximately half 
of the sample were added to (deleted from) the FTSE100 index before 1999. Hence, we construct the 
main sample into two equally sub-periods: the older sub-period. 
      Unvariate   Bivariate 
    N                                
Panel : Daily 
returns               
Additions  1986-2009 182 0.168*** 0.068*** 
 
0.355*** -0.260*** 
 
  
(5.638) (6.429) 
 
(9.608) (-4.347) 
 
1986-1999 98 0.116*** 0.038 
 
0.373*** -0.360*** 
   
(2.438) (1.277) 
 
-6.851 (-3.776) 
 
2000-2009 84 0.230*** 0.105*** 
 
0.336*** -0.155** 
   
(5.313) (7.33) 
 
(6.409) (-2.083) 
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Appendix B.10: 
Changes in residuals and fundamentals comovement  
 
This Table presents the cross-sectional descriptions across pre- and post-index revision periods, in 
the fundamental- and sentiment-based comovement of both additions and deletions by using 
Amihud and Mendelson (1987) with Kalman Filter as explained from Eq.(5.3) to Eq.(5.11).     is the 
average shifts of SLF return on the FTSE100 index in the post-event relative to the pre-event from 
the univariate regression.            (            ) is the average shifts SLF return on the FTSE100 
(non-FTSE100) index in the post-event relative to the pre-event from the bivariate regression.       
is the average shifts of the FLF return on the FTSE100 index in the post-event relative to the pre-
event from the univariate regression.                           is the average shifts of FLF return 
on the FTSE100 (non-FTSE100) index in the post-event relative to the pre-event from the bivariate 
regression. Table 4.1 shows that approximately half of the sample were added to (deleted from) the 
FTSE100 index before 1999. Hence, we construct the main sample into two equally sub-periods: the 
older sub-period. 
Panel A: Residuals   Unvariate   Bivariate 
    N                                       
       Additions  1986-2009 179 0.153*** 
 
0.141*** -0.135*** 
   
3.783 
 
3.742 -3.46 
 
1986-1999 91 0.134** 
 
0.106** -0.187*** 
   
2.085 
 
1.992 -3.203 
 
2000-2009 88 0.173*** 
 
0.176*** -0.081* 
   
3.420 
 
3.273 -1.618 
  
Panel B: Fundamental    Unvariate Bivariate 
    N                                 
       Additions  1986-2009 179 -0.336* 
 
-0.609** 0.819** 
   
-1.861 
 
-2.056 2.410 
 
1986-1999 91 -0.294 
 
-0.956*** 1.252*** 
   
-1.404 
 
-2.731 2.907 
 
2000-2009 88 -0.397 
 
-0.264 0.364 
   
-1.296 
 
-0.565 0.601 
              
 
 
 
